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Democracy's Gold Standard
Hand-Marked, Hand-Counted Paper Ballots, Publicly Tabulated at Every Polling Place in America
Last March, the country's highest court found secret, computerized vote counting unconstitutional. The country was Germany. The Constitution that computerized counting violated was the one the U.S. wrote and insisted Germans ratify under the terms of surrender following WWII.
Paul Lehto, a U.S. election attorney and constitutionalist, summarized the German court's landmark finding:
• The Constitution requires a "publicly observed count."
• No "specialized technical knowledge" can be required of observers.
Computerized voting-counting meets neither of these requirements, so machines will not be used in the 2009 elections.
Lehto wondered why observable democracy is an inviolable right for "conquered Nazis Germans", but not, apparently, for United States citizens.
Since the 2000 Florida debacle, the notion of publicly overseen paper ballot tabulation has been widely and unfairly discredited. Critics argue paper ballots are easily manipulated; voters are sloppy, so "voter intent" may not be clear; and human counters aren't as reliable as computers, which surely provide the best way to accurately count votes. Technology, after all, is progress – so the argument goes.
But technology does not always offer the most progressive solution to a problem, certainly not when citizen oversight and, thus, the constitutional right of self-governance, is scrapped in the bargain.
While hand-counting is routinely discredited, notice the odd paradox that, in the closest elections, a public hand-count of paper ballots (where they exist) is used to determine who actually won.
According to this oxymoronic logic, hand-counting is no good unless you really want to know the winner.
Publicly hand-counting ballots determined the winner of Minnesota's recent U.S. Senate race. A hand-count settled Washington State's 2004 Gubernatorial contest. And in the 2006 Republican Primary in Pottawatomie County, Iowa, a hand-count found that optical scanners had tallied seven races incorrectly. Unfortunately, publicly observable counting is the exception rather than the rule in this country, and is generally used only in the closest elections or when results are so obviously twisted officials are left with no other choice.
"Hand-counting paper ballots is recognized as the gold standard in states across the country," Ellen Theisen of election watchdog VotersUnite.org told me. "Why settle for less?"
Like me, Theisen, has spent years observing, reporting, and documenting election failure after failure as democracy's corners were cut with proprietary, secret vote-counting computers. She once thought, as I did, that optical-scanners with post-election "spot-checks" would be reliable.
Iran, however, was the last straw. The disastrous results highlighted, again, the most essential element for democracy: public observation. The country's contested Presidential election used hand-marked paper ballots, but they were never counted publicly. So the guessing games began, using as "evidence" pre-election polls, historical voting patterns, and the disbelief of passionate partisans.
Sound familiar? Post-election second-guessing has become more and more prevalent with each passing U.S election -- from Florida to Ohio to virtually every state in the country -- and for good reason. The counting isn’t publicly observed.
Enough.
"Hand counted paper ballots are the best available technology for conducting accurate, observable elections," says John Washburn, a Wisconsin computer expert. No "luddite", Washburn has testified before the U.S. Election Assistance Commission on e-voting.
"I love technology," he admits, and "I fear many of us technophiles are so blinded by the possible that we overlook the actual."Fully observable, precinct-based, Election Night hand-counting is a point of civic pride and community participation in 40% of New Hampshire's precincts. This is no behind-closed-doors, party-boss-counting of Boss Daley or Landslide Lyndon's day.
After polls close, fresh, bi-partisan counting crews relieve tired poll workers at each precinct. The crews count in groups of four – two calling out every vote, two marking each one down – as the citizenry watches, video-tapes, and assures the process is on the up and up. Ballots are never out of public oversight until counting is complete, usually before midnight; and results are publicly posted immediately. It's a very difficult system to game.
I'm open to other, equally observable tabulation methods. But after over five years of research and reporting, I've yet to find one. To paraphrase Churchill, public hand-tallies are the worst method for counting votes, except for all the others.
If hand-marked, hand-counted paper ballots are good enough for elections when you absolutely, positively have to know the correct result, aren’t they good enough for every election, every time?
Let’s begin with pilot projects -- not of higher-tech vote-counting computers -- but of publicly-observed, hand-counted paper ballots, with the ultimate goal of extending that Gold Standard to all of the U.S..
Now that would be progress.
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25 Comments so far
Show AllBrilliant article. People who believe that computerised electronic voting is some magical solution need to read this article. Especially this part:
"• The Constitution requires a "publicly observed count."
• No "specialized technical knowledge" can be required of observers."
The article perfectly describes the problem and the appropriate remedy. But, as with most such treatises, it ends just when we need one or two more paragraphs to explain how we're going to achieve such a pro-democracy change through our anti-democracy executive, legislature, court and (the 4th branch) media.
The constitutions compelled upon the former Axis powers after the end of WWII were in large part the works of military staff in a very liberal era with all the perceived bugs of our own Constitution (for instance) worked out. It is high time that we placed such a "gold standard" requirement into our own Constitution by amendment. I believe it is a proposal that both rank-and-file conservatives and liberals can wholeheartedly agree upon.
People have been stealing elections forever, and the ballot medium is immaterial. Chicago was notorious for paper-ballot "stuffing", "graveyard voting" and other election-theft methodologies ---but they were by no means alone!
Paper ballots have the same problem non-physical ballots do: either they're anonymous, and can be stolen, or they are identified with the voter, and have no secrecy. That the current designed-for-theft computer ballots are even *worse* should not be treated as an endorsement of paper!
There are ways to get around the problem of having both anonymity and accountability, but those ways work just as well for virtual ballots as for paper ...and fewer trees need be killed to provide safe virtual ballots than safe paper ones.
Please let's not throw the baby out with the bathwater.
The ballot medium is immaterial ... only when the ballot medium is immaterial.
Paper ballots don't have the same problems. The big difference is technology. Everyone and anyone can understand the technology of paper ballots. The process can be made transparent pretty easily if one wants to do so.
With electronic ballots, it isn't easy, I would argue it is not possible to make the process transparent, even if one wants to do so. Even if the source code for the software used to deal with the electronic ballots is publicly released, there are a couple problems:
One would need to be a programmer, or at least be able to read code, to understand what is being done. Given the size and complexity of modern day computer programs, it is very likely that one would need to be a programmer, or have a background in computer science, etc to be able to understand what an electronic ballot program is doing. And the time, patience, and inclination to wade through the source code.
Most people lack the training / background to be able to read through that source code.
Two, even if one can read the code of the software, how does one determine that the source code that is publicly released is the version that is actually being used?
And this is assuming that the source code will be publicly released. Are you willing to make that assumption?
In this case complex technology is NOT a good thing.
Please let's not drown the baby in our attempt to save some bathwater. Paper can be recycled.
Perhaps you could research the issues more completely? Let me just ask one question to prime the pump: if you can verify that your ballot was recorded the way you cast it, what difference does it make whether you can read the source code? Why would it matter what the technology is at all?
When you drop your paper ballot into the box, you've completely lost control over it. You have no idea whether the vote that is eventually counted as yours was the vote that you cast.
The core problems are independent of any particular balloting technology: 1) ensuring that everyone has equal opportunity to understand the issues; 2) ensuring that everyone has equal opportunity to determine what issues will be put to the vote; 3) ensuring that everyone has equal opportunity to cast their ballot; ensuring that everyone's ballot is counted accurately; and ensuring that everyone has equal opportunity to be confident of the overall result.
Did you read the article Mairead?
The emphasis was not on the ballot material but on the ability of the community to be involved in esuring the accuracy of the ballot counting.
How do you propose to allow community involvement in electronic ballot counting?
Also there is the issue of privatized vote counting. All electronic voting technologies in use in the US are considered trade secrets and are inaccessible to the public. How do you propose to deal with that.
Reagarding your wasted trees argument against paper, why not just mandate that the ballotrs are printed on recycled paper?
Yes, I did read the article. And I wrote my response because imo he's making unsupportable assumptions about the superiority of paper ballots.
The community can EASILY be involved in elections regardless of ballot media. Right now, in most places, the people who tick off your name and address in the voter rolls are community members. Rock-solid computer-based elections would have, for example, those people verifying that you are a legitimate voter, then someone at the next station who proctors the release of an anonymous ballot key, which can be exchanged at the third station for an anonymous ballot (which might just be bits) and a tear-off receipt. You fill it up, verify that it is as you wish, certify that to another proctor who signs it, and you (perhaps metaphorically) drop it in the box. Meanwhile, kids are changing red pins for green ones on a map of the precinct, to show turnout.
Once the polls have closed, everyone goes online and verifies, using their receipt, that their ballot was recorded properly. If they impeach it during the challenge period, they get to change it (so there's no percentage in trying to undermine the system by falsely claiming that their vote was stolen - the voting software simply cancels the vote attached to their receipt, and they get to vote again)
By disconnecting several steps, anonymity is maintained insofar as that's ever possible, and by letting everyone verify their own ballot and see the percentage of verifications, everyone can be confident of the result.
If people can verify their vote online, that means there has to be record of whom they voted for. Why should people trust that those records are not going to be stored in some database permanently?
Anonymity is maintained insofar as possible, under an electronic balloting system.
If I get a random ballot (I'm the only one who knows which one I got) and it has a unique, cryptographically-random number on it and on the attached receipt, that cryptographically-random number in effect becomes my "name" - an alias for me that I alone know.
So I can vote and then use the receipt to check how my vote was recorded. The act of voting does indeed create a record of how I voted, yes --but the alias shields my real-world identity and only I have the documentation (the receipt) to prove that I am the one behind the alias.
Mairead -- Are you sure not one of those steps could be compromised? I'm not. The step of "everyone going online" is not possible. Many people can't go online because they don't have computers, or should they make a trip down to the library or internet cafe? In a way, this seems like another brushing aside of poor people (not to mention Luddites!)
I agree with Brad. Paper ballots are the best way to go. There are all kind of protections that can be administered in disposition and counting every step of the way. The fact that there has been election fraud in the past is not an absolute argument against them.
(Many years ago, I worked for an elections office. The county election officer was a terrible tyrant about proper counting and observing procedures. He must have smoked a thousand cigarettes during election day and everybody hated him that day, but he was an absolute professional and we all knew it, and I'm sure our counts were accurate. Standards have to be high. Let's give some responsibility to humans. Keep taking it away and it will wither away, and that's exactly what is happening.)
Keep corporations out of elections.
Of course one of the steps could be compromised. Any human system can be compromised, if the people running it are corrupt.
You're simply taking it on faith with your "all kinds of protections...every step of the way" that your preferred system somehow WON'T be compromised. How realistic is that?
The question is: how easy would it be to *undetectably* compromise the system. The more anonymous the ballots are, and the more human hands they pass through, the more vulnerable they are to undetectable corruption. In contrast, the more completely individual ballots can be recognised as valid or invalid, the less corruptable the system is. A system that automatically detects the disappearance of valid ballots and the insertion of phony ones, and that shields the identity of the voter from everyone else while allowing voters to prove, if necessary, which ballot is theirs - that's a very secure system!
Well, I won't argue the point with you further, but the whole point of "protections every step of the way" is *not* to take it on faith, so I don't quite understand your second paragraph. We can make those protections as rigorous and multiple-checked as we think necessary.
But if you can devise that system that does exactly what you say, there is still the problem of two-tiers of voters, those who can check the results and those who can't.
My other point is closely related and I can't really argue it without going far beyond the subject of this thread. I think we have to nourish and grow public responsibility (including that of public officials) and we have to do it every chance we get because it is the enemy of corporate fascism. The practical reason is to sustain the vision of a republic which is deeper than technical fixes. Deep republic, deep democracy.
Always enjoy your posts.
I appreciate that you don't want to keep batting this back and forth, so let me in closing just compulsively tie up the two loose ends you pointed out:
My point about the protections is that it cuts both ways: an arbitrarily complete set of protections can be applied to computer-based ballots too. So although your point about being able to safeguard paper ballots to whatever degree is required is true and well-taken, that doesn't give paper any advantage.
As to the "digital divide", I regard it as axiomatic that a USA enlightened enough to prevent elections being stolen is more than enlightened enough to see that every citizen has all the necessities for a dignified life -including a computer with net access. Indeed, it's to prevent us from having such lives that elections are stolen...often long before they're even held.
We are, of course, in 100%, 4D agreement on the need for a politically aware and involved citizenry.
Why does the technology matter?
BECAUSE the technology determines how easy it is for a non specialist to determine that the ballot was recorded the way it was cast. BECAUSE the technology determines how easy it is for a non specialist to determine that the ballot was counted the way it was cast. BECAUSE the technology determines how easy it is for non specialists to trust the system.
"When you drop your paper ballot into the box, you've completely lost control over it. You have no idea whether the vote that is eventually counted as yours was the vote that you cast."
Yes. And it can be made so that the box is watched. The ballot counting watched. One does not need any special skills to watch ballot boxes, and to watch ballots being counted.
You say that a electronic balloting should not be judged on the current deliberately flawed system. I say that paper balloting should not be judged on models that are deliberately flawed to enable cheating.
"3) ensuring that everyone has equal opportunity to cast their ballot;"
Another flaw with electronic balloting, if by electronic balloting you require people to have online access to participate in voting. Poor people will be at a significant disadvantage. Electronic balloting becomes effectively a poll tax.
And, no the core problems are not independent of technology. The technology determines the problem. Different technologies have different problems.
eBallots can be stolen more secretly and with far fewer man-hours.
That far reduces the # of people needed to pull off a soft coup.
That makes them far more likely.
We have enough trouble with the commodification of campaigns and their purchase by a few centralized concerns.
The baby in the bathwater is a croc - a baby, perhaps, but these grow fast.
Please understand that I'm not suggesting that we keep the current system - it's nothing short of dreadful. It might as well have been advertised as being made for the convenience of thieves, because it was poorly designed, poorly developed, and obsolete before the first unit went out the door to the first victims.
"Lehto wondered why observable democracy is an inviolable right for "conquered Nazis Germans", but not, apparently, for United States citizens."
Because, having had the Nazis, they care about democracy?
http://www.users.bigpond.com/pmurray
http://www.paulmurray.id.au/ageofworms
Having said that, technology *can* be added on to the system - cryptographic signatures to eliminate fake ballot papers, a unique barcode on every printed paper, countersigned by the official that checks a voter's id.
It is a complex job to provide both anonymity and traceability - but it can be done. A voter can have their ballot stored electonically, and a code physically printed on it that shows how their vote was counted. They can go to a website (after embargo) and see for themselves that the ballot paper that they have with them was recorded properly.
A human element is required - a human electoral official to ask "is what you see on the screen the same as the vote you made?", who electonically signs the vote and is responsible should voters come back claiming that their vote was recorded wrongly. And, of course, the system must handle people attempting to cast doubt on the results by falsifyinbg their ballot after the fact.
But it can be done.
http://www.users.bigpond.com/pmurray
http://www.paulmurray.id.au/ageofworms
Isn't it funny that we were outraged by the 2000 and 2004 elections. But since Obama won in 2008, everything's fine, and will be in the future.
I totally agree that paper ballots are the only way to go. NOW, is there anyone on this thread who believes we will ever have paper ballots?? I did not think so. Case closed!
What we have here is the commodification and monetization of Democracy.
The mere idea that private corps could make a profit from writing ballot computer code not available to the public because it is "proprietary" ought to be absolute anathema, while in the U.S. it has thrown two of the past three Presidential elections (Obama won by too big a margin to be challenged on this score, which is why this is not an issue on the Rabid Right).
-30-
If by "absolute anathema" you mean that the officeholders who bought into it should lose their jobs, pensions, and the right to hold public office in future - I agree!
But I don't think I'm as sanguine as you about the meaning of Obama's election.
Alinsky noted that we constantly have to invent new tactics as the old ones are countered. He gave as an example the sit-in tactics that had worked very well in the '60s but no longer worked in the '70s because officialdom by then realised how to counter them.
I suspect what we're seeing in presidential elections is the same dynamic at work, only with the roles switched: they try something, and it throws us into disarray. But then we get angry about it after awhile, and they have to find something new to try. Selling us Obama seems to be the latest ploy.
Instead of stealing the election, they did another Clinton, taking a nobody who was willing to sell out and gradually "forcing" him on us just like a card-sharping magician gets someone to take a particular card for a mindreading stunt. The naïve victim takes the card without realising that it was a setup, and is amazed that the magician knows what it is. In our case the smooth-talking betrayer gets rich by selling us down the river while we, bewildered, mill around in a mix of bitterness, confusion, and "hope".
Paper ballots are the ONLY kind of voting process that makes ANY sense WHATSOEVER if you are genuinely interested in getting a true and verifiable ballot!!!!!