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A US-backed reactionary wave of the 1960s-1980s brought the rule of the generals. The current one might be called the reign of the clowns.
A reactionary wave is sweeping Latin America. Since the elections of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro in July 2024 and Uruguay’s Yamandú Orsi in November 2024, all seven of the subsequent direct presidential contests have gone to the right.
The Maduro election is widely assumed by the US-aligned corporate press to have been stolen, although a recently declassified CIA report found no election manipulation. More relevant has been Washington’s role in tipping elections to the right in Colombia, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Costa Rica. Most blatant was the Honduran contest in which President Donald Trump pardoned convicted narco-trafficker and former president Juan Orlando Hernández immediately before the election and threatened to cut aid if his candidate lost.
“The Latin American electoral left has reached its limits,” the Peoples Dispatch concludes. If Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva loses the presidential runoff, an orange wave will have inundated the Pink Tide for some time to come.
A US-backed reactionary wave of the 1960s-1980s brought the rule of the generals. The current one might be called the reign of the clowns: Colombia’s Abelardo de la Espriella joked about burning cats, Argentina’s Javier Milei communicated with his deceased dog, and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele proclaimed himself the “world’s coolest dictator.”
While the reactionaries of the past posed as nationalists, today’s neo-fascists flaunt their subservience to the White House in what Foreign Policy calls “caudillo courtship.” “Patriotism,” according to Vijay Prashad, “is cast aside for absolute loyalty to Washington and its corporations.”
The US military buildup in the Caribbean surrounding Venezuela has been accompanied by an aggressive penetration into the entire region.
Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez helped initiate regional alliances for Latin American integration and autonomy that deliberately excluded the US and Canada. ALBA and CELAC have survived, though much reduced; UNASUR and Petrocaribe have largely withered. Capitalizing on their decline, Washington has constructed the Shield of the Americas, a hemispheric bloc designed to reintegrate the region into a US-centered political and security architecture.
The US military buildup in the Caribbean surrounding Venezuela has been accompanied by an aggressive penetration into the entire region. The Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere is integrating military capabilities of 17 partner nations with those of the US in the Americas Counter Cartel Coalition.
For a quarter century, the US tried to overthrow the Bolivarian Revolution. The campaign further escalated with the imposition of an oil blockade last December. And still the Venezuelans resisted. Then on January 3, Washington kidnapped Venezuela’s President Maduro and his wife, National Assembly delegate Cilia Flores, leaving over 100 dead. The attack demonstrated, especially to Venezuelans, that Washington could act with impunity.
With a war on Iran looming, the US needed to reassure international oil markets to keep prices down at the gas pump. Maduro had repeatedly offered to negotiate with Washington and even update the hydrocarbon law. The US had demonized Maduro as a narco-terrorist, providing a pretext for abducting the lawful president while leaving intact much of the Chavista system that emerged from the Bolivarian Revolution led by Hugo Chávez.
Washington possibly reasoned that removing Maduro while compelling the existing state to accommodate intervention was more workable than destroying Chavismo and attempting regime change from scratch.
Vice President Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in as acting president. The Chavista party, legislature, judiciary, military, and grassroots organizations united behind her and continue to do so. Venezuela’s access to oil markets and thus its hope for economic recovery and national development was restored, but at a terrific price.
In the face of overwhelming force, Venezuela has been forced into an unprecedented negotiated sovereignty. Washington determines the boundaries within which Venezuela can bargain, although Caracas retains some agency within those boundaries.
Venezuelans feel alone, a sentiment communicated to me in a February visit and subsequent correspondence. Even some critical voices recognize “the continuing capacity of US imperialism to impose its will when no countervailing power exists, and without new political breakthroughs internationally to come to Venezuela’s aid.”
Venezuelans, regardless of political affiliation in a highly polarized country, feel under attack. They believe, with good reason, that the US could come back at any time with ever more devastating force. The metaphor of a “gun to the head” is a lived reality. Every week or so, a small boat is capriciously incinerated in the eastern Pacific or the Caribbean.
Some online leftists living in the imperial core call Rodríguez “cowardly”—substituting moralism for political analysis. But the “gun” was pointed not just at the leadership but at the whole country: the threat of an asphyxiating blockade, a large-scale invasion, a far-right government, and a bloodbath for Chavistas.
The key is understanding the problem as regional and the solution as uniting against the same enemy. The common denominator is the enormous leverage exercised by US imperial power.
Venezuelans also want peace. While militant currents exist, particularly in some of the more successful communes, there is no appetite for confrontation with the hegemon. The consensus after 26 years of US siege and 11 years of suffocating sanctions is a desire for reconciliation and economic recovery.
The Caracas Chronicles describes the current fatigue in Venezuela: “The timeline for economic relief is slipping away, while the timeline for public demand is accelerating,” resulting in “an exhausted society that has watched both the revolutionary narrative and promises of a swift transition collapse.”
The so-called oil deal became a lightning rod for mounting discontent, all the more so because neither Venezuela nor the US released the details; anyone could read anything into it. The long-hostile international corporate press took false umbrage that the Chavistas weren’t Chavista enough.
Everyone found fault, but practically no one discussed what Venezuela’s development path should be. It is easier to criticize the Chavista leadership than to consider a possible economic solution. Nor were comparisons made to other regional oil development agreements.
Venezuela does not have the capacity or investment to undertake major oil projects by itself.
Closer investigation would have shown that the Rodríguez government required negotiations, resisted company demands, and imposed fiscal and operational conditions. In fact, US oil companies complained that the conditions they were getting in Venezuela were too onerous.
But Venezuela did not negotiate from anything approaching equality with a hegemon that controlled sanctions licenses and much of the oil-sales revenue flow. Yet asymmetric bargaining is still bargaining. To think otherwise is to deny agency to the Venezuelans.
Most left-leaning folks see through American Exceptionalism. Yet a reverse corollary has lately been circulating: that among Latin American states there is something singularly wrong in Venezuela. The danger of “Venezuelan Exceptionalism” is that it downplays a united struggle against US imperialism and undermines building a common defense.
Some online leftists counterpose Cuba’s heroic resistance to Venezuela’s supposedly shameful capitulation. Whatever truth there may be in such a characterization, it obscures important realities. Washington never offered socialist Cuba—whose former ruling and propertied classes had largely left—the option of a negotiated soft landing. Further, holding Cuba’s resistance up against Venezuela is just half of the equation. The other half is the dire condition of the Cuban people under US blockade. Who wishes that on Venezuela?
The situation in Venezuela highlights what the Venezuelans have been telling us in the imperial core: Their predicament is a result of our failure to curb our own imperialists. The periphery will not free the core.
Cuba and Venezuela are particularly intense expressions of a regional struggle for sovereignty in a hemisphere where the US remains the predominant power. The central regional divide is not between governments that make compromises and those that do not. Virtually every Latin American government makes accommodations to international capital.
The key is understanding the problem as regional and the solution as uniting against the same enemy. The common denominator is the enormous leverage exercised by US imperial power.
The Party for Socialism and Liberation (PSL), among others, concludes that the Chavista leadership has gone from tactical retreat to strategic realignment. PSL points to troubling developments such as the deportation of Alex Saab and the opening of consular relations with Israel.
Whether the retreat over the last 10 months has gone so far that it no longer allows for a reversal remains unresolved. Given incomplete knowledge, however, the greater danger is reaching a premature conclusion rather than erring on the side of Rodríguez’s counsel for “prudence and strategic patience.”
We should not compare the Venezuelan present to a socialist ideal, but to the alternatives actually available under the present balance of forces—including the possibility of a fascist future.
Whether the current forced retreat ultimately proves tactical or strategic remains an important question for Venezuelans and their revolution. But for internationalists, that uncertainty does not change the immediate tasks.
Agreement on the character of the Rodríguez government is not a prerequisite for common action against US imperialism. Debate entails disagreements, sometimes sharp ones. But declaring others outside the movement because they differ over how to assess developments in Venezuela weakens the shared counter-hegemonic struggle.
For internationalists, the focus, as always, is on our own imperialists. Concretely, that means freeing Maduro and Flores, ending sanctions and the military threat, and returning stolen assets. In addition, whatever the future course of the Chavista government, solidarity with the communes and other social advances of the Bolivarian Revolution is still essential.
The situation in Venezuela highlights what the Venezuelans have been telling us in the imperial core: Their predicament is a result of our failure to curb our own imperialists. The periphery will not free the core.
Whatever concessions have been forced upon Venezuela, so long as Venezuelans continue to resist, their struggle calls for international solidarity.
"Often at the request of the Bolsonaro family, the US has engaged in a pressure campaign to weaken the Lula government," explained one analyst.
Just two days before Brazil's closely watched presidential election, the campaign of its left-wing president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, has asked the nation's top election court to examine the sudden shutdown of US consular services as part of a broader investigation into alleged election "interference" by the Trump administration.
The US suspended in-person consular services at its embassy and consulates across Brazil on Friday and advised Americans to avoid US diplomatic facilities, citing unspecified "security concerns."
In a petition filed to Brazil's Superior Electoral Court, Lula's campaign said taking such an action just days before Brazilians vote "projects instability over the electoral environment," something it said was part of a larger "infrastructure of external intervention in the Brazilian electoral process.”
In recent days, Brazil's intelligence agency said it confirmed the existence of interference by the US in Brazil's election to support Sen. Flavio Bolsonaro, the son of former far-right President Jair Bolsonaro—who is currently serving a 27-year prison sentence under house arrest for orchestrating a coup attempt in 2022.
"Although Trump has not formally endorsed him, Bolsonaro is undoubtedly Washington’s preferred candidate," explained Nick Cleveland-Stout, a research associate at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, on Friday. "Often at the request of the Bolsonaro family, the US has engaged in a pressure campaign to weaken the Lula government, sparking fears of further interference."
Trump responded with hostility to the prosecution of the disgraced ex-president—imposing tariffs of up to 50% on Brazilian imports in retaliation, sanctioning the Supreme Court justice overseeing the case, and threatening to use American "military might" against Brazil.
He's also designated two Brazilian crime groups as "narcoterrorist" organizations, invoking a similar pretext Trump used to justify his invasion of Venezuela to kidnap its leader Nicolás Maduro in January.
As the election has approached, Trump has appeared to put his thumb on the scale in an effort to stop Lula from achieving what would be an unprecedented fourth term.
In July, the US consulate in São Paulo invited right-wing pro-Bolsonaro social media influencers to a closed-door roundtable meeting to discuss “freedom of expression and the digital environment.”
The Guardian reported on Thursday that the State Department was also diverting $1 million from its human rights fund to oppose "judicial overreach and censorship" by Brazil’s Supreme Court, an apparent reference to the court's actions against Bolsonaro and his allies.
The Brazilian government has denied visas to two State Department officials whom it said were seeking to discuss "election integrity," which it perceived as an effort to “undermine the electoral system.”
Trump and his allies have previously spread baseless conspiracy theories to cast doubt upon Lula's victory in 2022, which helped to fuel the failed coup. They've done the same with the victories of other left-wing candidates in Latin American elections—including Bolivia's Evo Morales in 2019 and Guatemala's Bernardo Arévalo in 2023.
Lula's campaign said the sudden US suspension of consular services was "yet another extremely serious development in the interference in Brazilian elections by the US government," alleging that it was "coordinated, by all indications, directly by the brothers Flávio and Eduardo Bolsonaro.”
The filing noted that even “the legislative branch of the foreign state itself… recognizes the pattern of external pressure." It pointed to a letter sent earlier this week by Democratic US Sens. Jeanne Shaheen (NH), Peter Welch (Vt.), and Tim Kaine (Va.) to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, which said that "the administration’s most recent actions point toward an effort to interfere with, and potentially undermine, Brazil’s general election in October."

The first round of Brazil's election will begin on Sunday. Should neither candidate receive 50% of the vote, a runoff between the top two candidates will be held on October 25. Several major polls show Lula with a narrow first-round lead entering Sunday, although others have the race effectively tied or Bolsonaro slightly ahead.
But Lula has also seized upon Trump's meddling to portray Bolsonaro as a tool of foreign powers, drawing on a history of US-backed coups and election interference that have undermined Brazilian democracy.
“Flávio Bolsonaro is Trump’s candidate and what Trump wants is to colonize Brazil, take our riches, steal our future and leave us in the dust," said a campaign ad that began airing last week.
The Trump administration, for its part, has continued to double down on public overtures toward imperialist ambition. On Thursday, an official US State Department social media account reposted a video created in August glorifying the 19th-century Monroe Doctrine and declaring that "American dominance in the Western Hemisphere will never be questioned again."
Dov H. Levin, a political scientist at the University of Hong Kong who recently published research on the effects of foreign election interference, told the Brazilian newspaper Folha de S. Paulo that, if too overt, Trump's intervention could backfire.
"There are cases of failure," he said, "and cases where the reaction provoked by the intervention harms precisely the side it intended to help."
"We denounce before the entire Bolivian population this intervention that is being carried out illegally," said an official from Attorney General Roger Mariaca's office.
The Bolivia Public Prosecutor's Office on Thursday denounced “the kidnapping of our attorney general” after the country's top law enforcement official, Roger Mariaca, was intercepted and detained at Viru Viru International Airport in Santa Cruz, along with a prosecutor from the city.
Observers were quick to note that the arrests took place weeks after Mariaca's office arrested Fernando Cerimedo, a political operative with ties to right-wing campaigns across Latin America.
Cerimedo also has a business partnership with President Donald Trump's former campaign manager, Brad Parscale—a connection that helped earn Cerimedo the nickname "MAGA's Man in LatAm."
Marco Antonio Oviedo, Bolivia's interior minister, said the two officials were arrested on suspicion of criminal organization, money laundering, and drug trafficking.
The arrests were carried out with the "cooperation of the US government" as part of the "fight against terrorism," said Oviedo.
They were detained days after the Trump administration revoked their visas and those of more than a dozen other people from Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador.
The US State Department had accused them of corruption and having ties to drug trafficking, similar to allegations against Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro, who was abducted by US military forces in January.
Trump, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and other officials have taken numerous actions that they say are aimed at combating drug trafficking in Latin America, including bombing dozens of alleged drug boats, partnering with countries across the region on military operations, and creating the Shield of the Americas, an alliance with right-wing governments including that of Bolivian President Rodrigo Paz that is ostensibly aimed at defeating drug cartels and organized crime.
The Trump administration claimed Mariaca had taken "bribes to facilitate drug trafficking and help violent criminals evade justice." Mariaca denied the accusations on Monday and said his visa had been revoked as part of an effort at "interference" and "political pressure" due to his investigation into Cerimedo.
Cerimedo's arrest in August was in connection with the attempted murder of a lawyer and activist with whom he reportedly had a relationship.
"He's also being investigated for collusion in drug trafficking and other activities during his time as a presidential adviser to Rodrigo Paz," reported journalist Ollie Vargas.
On social media, Ryan Grim of Drop Site News called the detention of Mariaca "fallout from the arrest of Cerimedo," while another observer replied, "That's your Marco Rubio pulling the strings."
After the arrests, a special police unit reportedly searched the Santa Cruz Departmental Prosecutor’s Office, Mariaca's office, and the attorney general's home.
"We denounce before the entire Bolivian population this intervention that is being carried out illegally," Claudia Pardo, the head of communications at the Public Prosecutor's Office, told the press.
Journalist Joseph Bouchard noted that while claiming to fight drug trafficking in Latin America, the Trump administration is "actively protecting allied drug traffickers and criminals," such as former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernández, who was convicted in 2024 of helping the Sinaloa Cartel import hundreds of tons of drugs into the US. Trump pardoned Hernández last November, weeks before his administration invaded Venezuela and abducted Maduro.
The administration "bankrolled Fernando Cerimedo, who is now jailed in Bolivia for ties to drug trafficking," said Bouchard, "and the US forced Bolivia to jail his prosecutor."
Trump’s intervention in Brazilian elections undermines a basic and generally cherished right to self-determination, as well as the right to democracy itself. It is even clearly illegal under the Charter of the Organization of American States, to which the US is a signatory.
One of the most important elections in recent Latin American history will take place Sunday in Brazil. Incumbent president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has recently been emphasizing the issue of national sovereignty. One reason: The challenger, Flávio Bolsonaro, has the strong backing of the Trump administration—and the US has been intervening heavily on his behalf.
In the last few months of Brazil’s election campaign, Trump has met with Bolsonaro at the White House, imposed new tariffs on Brazilian goods and tried to send State Department officials to Brazil. (Both Brazilian and American officials said the presence of Trump administration operatives would cast doubt on the integrity of the voting there.)
A letter last week to Secretary of State Marco Rubio from 31 members of Congress documented additional hostile actions and concluded that “the United States is acting as an agent of interference and destabilization.”
The election is forecast to be very close, and the sovereignty issue could be persuasive for swing voters.
Trump’s intervention undermines a basic and generally cherished right to self-determination, as well as the right to democracy itself. It is even clearly illegal under the Charter of the Organization of American States, to which the United States is a signatory.
But Brazilians currently have reasons to attach even more urgency to preserving their sovereignty and independence. This can be seen in the recent history of Brazil and Latin America and in the economic impact of political independence on living standards.
Starting with Brazil: Lula was a metalworker and union leader who helped found, and then lead, the Workers Party. He served two consecutive terms as president of Brazil from 2003 to 2010 and left office with one of the highest approval ratings in the world—83%.
There were compelling reasons for that, which stemmed from the government’s changes in economic and social policy. These changed the lives of tens of millions of people in Brazil. GDP per person, the most basic measure of living standards, grew about four times as fast as it did in the eight years prior to Lula’s presidency. Poverty was reduced by 61% and extreme poverty by 64%. There was also a 57% increase in the real (inflation-adjusted) minimum wage. University enrollment almost doubled.
Lula was able to implement these and other life-changing reforms because he broke with the “Washington consensus” policies that had governed economic decision-making in the region as perhaps never before, from 1980 to 2000. This included economic policies that were often decided at the International Monetary Fund or sometimes other Washington-controlled institutions. The result was a disaster: Those two decades saw the worst long-term economic growth failure in Latin America for more than 100 years.
This historic economic growth collapse helped bring about the election of left-of-center governments in the majority of the region for the first time. As in Brazil, these governments were more independent than the prior regional norm and therefore pursued more progressive and effective economic policies. The turnaround was historic: From 2002 to 2013, the percentage of the population of Latin America living in poverty fell to 28.4 from 45.6 after increasing over the prior two decades.
The independence that these governments were able to establish is what Rubio and Trump appear to most want to abolish. Hence their current efforts at regime change in Brazil. This is the big prize for Rubio. It’s the largest country in Latin America, and a Lula government won’t support the Trump administration in its illegal efforts to control the region. But Lula’s opponent would almost certainly be a solid Trump ally.
That is Flávio Bolsonaro, a senator handpicked by his father Jair Bolsonaro, who was president from 2019 to 2023; he has branded himself “Bolsonaro 2.0.”
Flávio and his team are trying to link Lula to the biggest bank fraud in Brazilian history, which forced a deposit insurance payout of almost $8 billion for about 800,000 victims. But the dirt is actually on Flávio and his allies. He is up to his neck in this scandal. Nothing on Lula.
Bolsonaro 1.0 took a page from the Trump election-denial playbook when he lost the election of 2022 to Lula. He was unable to get enough military commanders to support a decree to prevent Lula from taking office. The nation’s Supreme Court subsequently convicted Bolsonaro of leading an attempted coup. The Brazilian “January 6” was on Jan. 8, 2023, when supporters of the defeated president vandalized Congress, the presidential palace and the Supreme Court and demanded that the military intervene to overturn the election result.
Last year Trump tried to stop the trial of Bolsonaro by slapping Brazil with an additional 40% tariff. Most Brazilians rejected the economic collective punishment as an assault on their national sovereignty, electoral democracy and justice system—which it clearly was. Bolsonaro was convicted and sentenced to prison.
Almost every one of the democratically elected, social democratic governments that came to power in the 21st century faced efforts from Washington to weaken, destabilize or remove it. This reached the level of US-backed coups d’état in Bolivia, Honduras and Haiti. The U.S was also involved in a 2002 coup in Venezuela that was quickly reversed, followed by years of US efforts at regime change there—and later the economic sanctions that killed more than a hundred thousand people, destroying most of the Venezuelan economy in the process. Argentina has also suffered from repeated US interventions that have caused and worsened economic downturns and crises, with serious costs.
Most recently, Trump has increased the economic violence against Cuba, which is Rubio’s foremost target. Cuba’s infant mortality rate has increased 148% since the US began tightening its sanctions, which currently include a devastating cutoff of fossil fuel and electricity.
In the most recent national elections in Colombia (June 21) and Honduras (last Nov. 30), Trump was seen as threatening economic harm (implicitly in Colombia and more explicitly in Honduras), if these citizens did not vote for his chosen candidate.
This is the recent and regional context of the fight for Brazil’s future. The Trump-Rubio interventions, with the collaboration of the Bolsonaro clan, have made the Flávio campaign into another US regime change operation. This should be defeated, for the sake of Brazil and the whole hemisphere.
Critics have described Trump's boat strikes as extrajudicial killings that violate due process. At a meeting during this week's gathering of the UN General Assembly, he seemed to agree.
Critics have often described President Donald Trump's campaign of boat strikes in the Caribbean and Pacific—which have taken the lives of at least 234 mostly unknown people—as extrajudicial killings that flout the very basics of due process.
On Tuesday, Trump essentially described them that way too, seeming to suggest that killing people outside the law is the whole point.
"For years, administrations just played games, and they'd bring them to a court in Miami or something, and the judge would release them immediately, and they'd go back to selling drugs," Trump said. "But now, we don't waste our time doing it."
He was speaking at a meeting of the Washington-led "Shield of the Americas" coalition, an alliance of leaders and foreign ministers ostensibly dedicated to stamping out drug cartels and other criminal organizations across the Americas.
The boat strike campaign—known first by the Defense Department as “Operation Southern Spear” before it was rebranded last month as Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere—is part of this effort. The administration says the more than 70 vessels it has targeted with lethal strikes since last September were engaged in “narco-trafficking,” and that killing their operators is a justifiable form of self-defense.
The principal illicit cargo on the maritime routes targeted by Southern Spear is cocaine. But the White House rarely provides any evidence publicly to substantiate that the boats it targets are involved with drug trafficking, and members of Congress have complained that even classified briefings lacked hard evidence. Some of those killed in the strikes have later been identified as ordinary fishermen and other civilians with no known ties to the drug trade.
An investigation from the Washington Office on Latin America found in July that the military has relied on extraordinarily broad criteria to launch the strikes against anyone deemed to be "affiliated" with a secret list of designated terrorist groups. They do not require the commanders launching them to know the identities of those aboard a vessel or have any evidence that it is carrying drugs at all.
Even if the boats were engaged in drug trafficking as the administration claims, wrote Ben Saul, the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism, in a report released earlier this week, there are no “international legal rights to unilaterally use military force” to counter drug cartels or other organized crime groups that have not mounted any “armed attack” against the US.
The strikes, Saul added, were not a “last resort” or “necessary or proportionate” since the US had not tried to use non-lethal means like intercepting or boarding them before resorting to bombings.
Concurring with several other UN experts, he said that the strikes were "contrary to international law, violate the human right to life, and plausibly constitute crimes against humanity," including "murder."
Trump's comments on Tuesday seemed to underscore what Saul and others critical of the boat bombings have emphasized: that rather than using lethal force as a last resort to repel an immediate threat, his administration was simply killing suspects as an alternative to avoid a cumbersome legal process.
Norman Ornstein, a political scientist and scholar at the conservative American Enterprise Institute, said in a post on social media that Trump's comments were "worthy of the International Criminal Court."
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has suggested the administration’s calls to “dismantle” the ICC are in part out of concern that the court, which prosecutes war crimes and other international criminality, could be used to prosecute members of the Trump administration over the boat strikes.
Trump described the ICC as “anti-American” and “evil" during a speech at the UN General Assembly earlier on Tuesday, in which he also threatened to "annihilate" Iran and celebrated that he was claiming the "spoils" of war from Venezuela.
During that same speech, he also boasted that his administration “has carried out dozens of strikes on cartel drug boats, destroying 97% of the drugs coming into the ocean and sea," a claim that his administration has not provided evidence to substantiate.
An internal analysis by the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), reported on in July by the Washington Post, found the opposite, in fact, stating that the strikes “failed to affect the supply or price of cocaine in the United States.”
As Trump heralded the boat strike campaign before the eyes of the world on Tuesday, a coalition of more than 70 lawmakers across the Americas called for the US to end what it said were "hundreds of extrajudicial killings of civilians."
The statement was signed by 15 Democratic members of the US Congress, including Reps. Jesús “Chuy” García (D-Ill.), Greg Casar (D-Texas), Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY), Ilhan Omar (D-Minn.), Rashida Tlaib (D-Mich.) and Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.). It was also signed by lawmakers from Puerto Rico as well as 12 other countries across the Americas—Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.
"The identities of nearly all the victims remain publicly unknown, and many families lack effective or safe avenues to obtain information or redress. Coastal and fishing communities face fear and uncertainty as these attacks put lives and livelihoods at risk," the lawmakers wrote.
"The rights to life, due process, and protections against the arbitrary use of force are core principles of democratic rule of law that our countries have committed to uphold," they added. "Allegations of drug trafficking, however serious, do not circumvent or override these protections, nor do they justify lethal force against people who pose no imminent threat."
Selective concern for "democracy" suggest that the real target is not simply its political system but the survival of a socialist government that continues to defy US regional dominance.
After Venezuela and Cuba, will the Trump administration turn its spotlight onto Nicaragua? Secretary of State Rubio has just finished a tour of three Latin American countries now allied with Trump—Colombia, Ecuador and Peru—and was asked about US policy towards Cuba and Nicaragua, and what he would do “to finally bring those dictatorships to an end.” Accusing left-wing governments of “destroying” their countries and bringing “misery” to their citizens, and in some cases of posing a security threat to the United States, Rubio said that the problem can now be addressed “in partnership with other presidents and other leaders in this region that feel the same way.”
Back in July, after media claims that Nicaragua’s Sandinista government plans to abolish elections completely, Rubio said that Nicaragua was “thwarting the basic tenets of our democratic hemisphere.” In September he added that its government had “indefinitely deprive[d] Nicaraguans of free and fair elections.” Yet Rubio, of course, said nothing in Ecuador about its president Noboa imposing a complete ban on the main, leftist opposition party, which ran him close in last year’s elections.
Washington’s selective concern for “democracy,” together with the measures now being considered against Nicaragua, suggest that the real target is not simply its political system but the survival of a socialist government that continues to defy US regional dominance.
Rubio has been pushing members of the Organization of American States to take action and stop “business as usual” with Nicaragua’s government. A meeting of OAS foreign ministers to discuss new sanctions was planned for September 15. It has been postponed, but of all OAS members, only Mexico and Brazil failed to support it.
The new OAS secretary, Albert Ramdin, enthusiastically urges its members to back US threats. Asked whether the OAS will break the rules in its own charter of “non-intervention” in the domestic affairs of countries, he was forced to equivocate. He claimed (as the OAS has on many previous occasions) that its plans aren’t interventionist, saying nevertheless that it must “actively respond” to what he calls “a political disaster.”
In a Washington meeting organized by the Nicaraguan government’s opponents, Ramdin called for a “critical mass” of countries to exert pressure because Nicaragua’s actions, he claims, have “repercussions that extend beyond the country's borders.” He openly admits to “speaking with opposition leaders who are living in Washington DC” as if that were normal behavior for a supposedly independent diplomat.
Naturally, these moves have excited the various Nicaraguan opposition groups, based in the US and Costa Rica. The little-known, Miami-based “Nicaraguan Exiles Unit” demanded US military intervention. The most violent opposition group, the Costa Rica-based Campesino Movement, which in 2018 launched fatal attacks on several Nicaraguan police stations, joined the call for armed intervention. This prompted a formal protest from Nicaragua to the Costa Rican government for permitting groups to act in this way, even using children in a video to incite such violence.
The feasibility of successful military action was examined this month by academic experts writing in War on the Rocks. They conclude that the conditions that allowed the kidnapping of Venezuela’s president do not exist in Nicaragua and it is far from clear that military force would leave the country with a viable administration in place.
By the time he reached Colombia, a note of realism had crept into Rubio’s comments. Asked again what he would do to “end authoritarian governments,” he replied that the "first responsibility to change a system belongs to the people of those countries.” Similarly, OAS Secretary Ramdin, in an interview full of contradictions, also balks at intervening in Nicaragua’s “domestic affairs.”
If both Rubio and Ramdin reject military intervention, what might be on the agenda either in the State Department or when regional foreign ministers eventually convene? Inevitably, there will be lengthy condemnations of Nicaragua linked to calls for “free, credible and accessible elections.” By implication, these would only be “free” if the opposition parties funded by Washington, which (with US assistance) carried out the coup attempt in 2018 in which over 200 Nicaraguans died, were able to stand.
Based on Washington's previous interventions in Nicaraguan elections, it would release a fresh wave of financial support, media manipulation, social media domination and bribes and threats from Trump, aimed at getting Nicaraguans to vote for Washington’s favored candidate, just as occurred in Honduras in its recent election. It is precisely to avoid this interference that Nicaragua is changing its electoral rules to exclude candidates who receive US money or who directed the 2018 insurrection.
Opposition journalist Wilfredo Miranda believes that countries are divided in their response and that “concrete” steps will emerge from the proposed meeting of foreign ministers only if Rubio himself attends. Even so, the range of measures under discussion look like more of the same, given that Nicaragua is already subject to sanctions on more than 60 individual ministers and other functionaries and two dozen state institutions and businesses, while more than 2,000 individuals are denied US visas. Nicaragua has also been deprived of funding by multilateral bodies such as the IMF and World Bank and is subject to higher tariffs on its exports than apply to its neighbors.
Ramdin is proposing coordinated action by all OAS member countries, not just the US, to “punish” Nicaragua. This might involve diplomatic isolation, targeted sanctions, new visa restrictions, limits on international flights and possibly broader trade restrictions of uncertain severity.
However, reaching consensus on tougher measures will be problematic. Nicaragua’s immediate neighbors—El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica—have close economic ties with it. They depend heavily on transport routes and the inter-regional electricity grid through the country. They were all damaged economically by the 2018 coup attempt, when its protagonists blocked the Panamerican highway and held over 400 international truckers hostage.
Nicaragua’s neighbors must be aware that Rubio’s rhetoric about its citizens living in “misery” has no basis in reality. The country has had the region’s fastest growth in GDP over the past decade, has the largest hospital network and the best roads. Indeed, a prosperous Nicaragua is key to regional stability: it receives 28% of its imports from Central America and contributes 16% of its exports. Nicaragua’s economy “weathers multiple shocks” according to the IMF, including US attacks.
Nicaragua is also a recognized “containment wall” against regional organized crime and drug trafficking. The country is far safer than neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica, which have both seen explosions in violent crime.
Ramdin drew attention to the potential regional impact of a major disaster or deteriorating economic conditions in Nicaragua, but its neighbors know that the Sandinista government has invested heavily in disaster prevention and its economy is buoyant.
While Ramdin focuses on “restoring democracy,” Rubio focuses more on Nicaragua’s socialist government which, in reality, has raised its people from “misery” and successfully challenged the imperialist model. His problem is that while Nicaragua’s opposition leaders are committed to the return of neoliberalism, which Nicaraguans experienced and rejected two decades ago, they only offer vague plans for political transition. In reality, they admit that they are “not yet unified or [have] built the institutional base needed to present a credible alternative.”
The groups also have little currency among Trump’s Florida base, fixated on regime change in Venezuela and Cuba. As Juan Gonzalez, a former Latin America aide to President Biden, told Politico: “The lesson from Nicaragua is: Don’t matter too much, don’t embarrass Washington and don’t become a domestic political issue.”
So the likelihood, if indeed Latin American foreign ministers can agree on anything, and if Rubio fits their meeting into his schedule, is more rhetoric about “democracy” along with additional sanctions. They’ll be deciding whether they should threaten Nicaraguans with the “misery” that Rubio claims they are already suffering.
"This is neither 'peace' nor 'strength,'" said one policy expert. "It's gruesome."
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio spoke publicly for the first time Wednesday about a shift in the Pentagon's boat bombing operations, in which the US in recent days has begun interdicting suspected refueling vessels for drug boats in Ecuador's territorial waters—but he made clear that the military is also still killing people aboard boats, as it did Wednesday in the latest bombing in the Caribbean.
US Southern Command announced that Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere—the recently rebranded name of the Trump administration's expanding military operation that it says is aimed at stopping drug trafficking—had executed its latest "lethal kinetic strike" on a boat operating along known "narco-trafficking routes in the Caribbean," killing three people that the US claimed were "narco-terrorists."
"Confirmed intelligence revealed the vessel's active involvement in narco-trafficking," said US Southern Command, releasing no evidence of the boat's illegal activities.
International legal experts have emphasized that the US is not in an authorized military conflict with drug cartels and that drug trafficking under international law is treated as a crime by law enforcement agencies—not as an act of force that the US can legally respond to with military action.
Officials and military service members involved in the strikes may be liable for war crimes or murder, experts have warned. Some of the at least 230 victims of the boat bombings since last September have been identified, with family members saying they were not even involved in drug trafficking.
Historian Alexander Aviña used the term "serial killer empire" to describe the Trump administration after the latest bombing.
Adam Isacson of the Washington Office on Latin America noted that the announcement by US Southern Command Wednesday night was the first in more than a year of attacks in which the strike order was "not attributed to a person."
Isacson also pointed out that according to Customs and Border Patrol data, there is little, if any, evidence that bombing boats and killing crew members and passengers in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific Ocean has done anything to stop the flow of drugs into the US.
Outside the US Embassy in Quito, Ecuador, Rubio told reporters Wednesday that as the US also begins conducting joint operations with Ecuador to interdict suspected refueling vessels in the country's territorial waters, "we have to operate according to their laws."
In those operations, people aboard the boats have been removed and handed over to Ecuadorian authorities before the US has conducted strikes.
Rubio at one point referred to the lethal boat bombings as operations that took place "earlier, last year," but also emphasized, "We still blow up ships if need be."
Brian Finucane of the International Crisis Group said the administration is continuing its campaign of "illegal killing in a make-believe war."
The latest boat bombing also came as Rubio announced that the US was designating Los Tiguerones, an Ecuadorian gang, as a foreign terrorist organization, empowering the administration to freeze the group's assets in US financial institutions.
The designation does not give the US the legal authority to carry out military strikes against Los Tiguerones or other gangs the administration has designated as terrorist groups—but a key element of Joint Task Force Western Hemisphere's expansion in Latin America has been joint military operations, including a US-Ecuadorian joint attack on a dairy farm where officials had claimed drug traffickers were operating.
The new designation "is part of [the administration's] narrative about a new 'War on Terror' against the narcos," said Finucane.
Glaeldys González Calanche, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, told The New York Times that Los Tiguerones has had diminishing power and influence in Ecuador in recent years and expressed surprise at the designation.
Ecuadorian gangs "operate at the lowest links of the chain" of drug trafficking operations in Latin America, González told the Times. “They provide services, like moving cargo from point A to point B. Ecuadorian groups are not decisive, they aren’t major players.”
Our first responsibility is not to prescribe Venezuela's political course, but to challenge the coercive power our own government exercises over it.
Ever since Hugo Chávez became Venezuela’s president in 1999 and initiated the Bolivarian Revolution, the country has been under siege by the US. The aggression escalated with the kidnapping of its lawful president, part of a larger and accelerating assertion of US imperial power worldwide. The Bolivarian Revolution survived but is in a forced tactical retreat.
For progressives outside Venezuela, this presents a difficult question. How should we respond when a government resisting US domination makes compromises that we may oppose, but does so under conditions largely imposed by Washington?
This article argues that criticism has its place. But it also needs to be contextualized in the larger struggle over Venezuela’s sovereignty and the consequences of weakening a government confronting overwhelming US power.
Tension between solidarity with an actually existing revolutionary process and criticism of its compromises has recurred throughout the Bolivarian Revolution. Among the first on the left to part company with the Chavista government were anarchists, who proclaimed that they were second to none in supporting revolutions against imperialism—until those projects succeeded in achieving state power.
We can all agree that the Rodríguez government faces demands backed by overwhelming US power and unite to oppose the continuing imperialist siege. Those of us living in the imperial core must aim the main blow at the conditions that have necessitated such retreats.
This tendency still affirmed their abstract solidarity with “the people” but not with their chosen representatives. They felt betrayed because the Bolivarian leadership failed to fulfill their expectations to build a workers’ state on a suitably expeditious timetable.
Riding a global commodities boom, the Bolivarian Revolution funded major social welfare programs, prioritizing poor and working people. To finance these measures, over half of Venezuela’s oil exports and 60% of its overall exports were sold to the US. Dependency on oil sales deepened, with oil accounting for over 95% of the country's foreign earnings.
Chávez proclaimed the goal of a socialist future, although he pardoned the unsuccessful 2002 coup plotters in an effort—perhaps mistaken—to encourage a cooperative domestic business class. He pragmatically sought opportunities to negotiate with them.
When Chávez died in March 2013, his chosen successor Nicolás Maduro won the snap presidential election. Maduro carried the Bolivarian project forward but under geopolitical conditions markedly different from his predecessor. Venezuela scholar Steve Ellner argues that there were no substantive political differences between the two leaders.
During Chávez’s illness, economic problems had accumulated (e.g., a dysfunctional currency exchange system). Maduro was under intense pressure from the moment he entered office.
Immediately, the US-backed and funded opposition started the guarimbas, demonstrations intended to accomplish by violence what they had failed to achieve at the ballot box. Washington, meanwhile, stepped up its hybrid war. Soon oil prices crashed and the US, under President Barack Obama, initiated ever more punishing sanctions in 2015.
Under these coercive measures, the Venezuelan economy by 2019 was in free fall with inflation over 100,000%. Never had an economy contracted so much in modern peacetime.
At this time of maximum weakness, a faction of the Venezuelan Communist Party developed a strategic disagreement with the governing coalition. It argued that the revolution should confront its class enemies more aggressively and expropriate major corporations, rather than seek a temporary rapprochement.
The nearly overwhelming task of righting the economy was ultimately achieved under Maduro's leadership. After precipitous economic contraction, Venezuela has experienced positive economic growth since 2021. Never had a petro-economy achieved such a turnaround, which included near food sovereignty. To do so, the government relied foremost on the strong Chavista base. It also had to appeal to nationalistic elements among the bourgeoisie and offer them economic incentives to secure their cooperation.
Venezuela was not unique in making such accommodations. During this period, Cuba and Nicaragua—the two other Latin American countries striving for socialism—also introduced market-oriented reforms. With all three countries, the measures were pragmatic adjustments to a world economy dominated by the US and hostile to socialism.
The events leading up to Maduro’s abduction on January 3 involved an ever-intensifying regime-change campaign by the US in concert with its allies: asphyxiating sanctions, stolen assets, diplomatic isolation, cyberattacks, assassination attempts, mercenary invasions, among other measures. The last two months saw a total naval blockade on Venezuelan oil shipments, cutting the country’s economic lifeline.
Regardless, Maduro repeatedly maintained his longstanding willingness to negotiate with Washington. Just two days before his abduction, Maduro outlined a program of accommodation in his annual New Year’s interview with Ignacio Ramonet. This is the program that his successor Delcy Rodríguez has followed, including the amnesty and hydrocarbons laws.
The Bolivarian Revolution persevered. Its accommodations may be understood as tactical responses to unfavorable conditions rather than as a full abandonment of the project.
The fact that Maduro did not waver and the Bolivarian Revolution did not break presented a dilemma for Washington. The US—especially as its aggression against oil-rich Iran was heating up—needed access to Venezuelan oil. Neither country benefited by keeping the oil in the ground.
Yet the US had painted itself into a corner. The Trump administration had demonized Maduro as a narco-trafficker. Even though Maduro was more than willing to negotiate, the US had precluded that option. The kidnapping followed.
The US invasion of Venezuela on January 3 demonstrated to both the leadership and the Venezuelan grassroots that they were alone—no country came to their defense. Whatever guardrails had existed before on the hegemon were down.
Yet the Bolivarian Revolution did not collapse. The highly polarized nation did not fall into civil unrest between Chavistas and opposition—if anything, it unified. The far-right María Corina Machado did not make her triumphal return to Caracas. Instead, that part of the opposition found itself discredited and in disarray.
In a seamless constitutional transition, Maduro’s vice president was sworn in as president. The Chavista movement united behind Acting President Delcy Rodríguez. Venezuela’s national recovery continues under a negotiated sovereignty where the US now bargains—with the ever-present threat of an even more lethal military action—over matters that should be the sole purview of Venezuelans.
The Bolivarian Revolution persevered. Its accommodations may be understood as tactical responses to unfavorable conditions rather than as a full abandonment of the project.
For international solidarity activists, the central question is how to forge a stance that advances the anti-imperialist struggle under these conditions. Those of us who support national sovereignty and self-determination should understand that what Venezuela is suffering relates to our failure to constrain our own imperialists.
Aiming the punch at the target. We can all agree that the Rodríguez government faces demands backed by overwhelming US power and unite to oppose the continuing imperialist siege. Those of us living in the imperial core must aim the main blow at the conditions that have necessitated such retreats.
We can all unite on actions to demand freeing President Maduro and “First Combatant” Cilia Flores from jail in New York City, ending sanctions, and returning stolen assets.
Differences among progressives. A useful distinction can be made between disagreements within the “left camp” and the fundamental conflict with imperialism. This does not mean suppressing differences or assuming that they are unimportant. Rather, it suggests approaching tensions among forces resisting imperialism in ways that seek common ground and avoid turning secondary differences into antagonistic ones.
Contextualizing criticism. Under pressure from Washington, the Rodríguez government deported former Venezuelan diplomat and minister Alex Saab and has established consular relations with Israel. These are among the bitter pills to swallow. Criticism of such actions may be entirely warranted, but should be assessed in light of the extraordinary constraints under which the Rodríguez government is operating.
A related example is Cuba, which is forced to tolerate a US military base and torture center in Guantánamo, has had the indignity of having the US secretary of war and the commander of the US Southern Command visit, and has introduced pro-capitalist economic reforms. Those reforms should be understood as “strategic adaptation” according to an article in Black Agenda Report. While not welcoming these accommodations to the US siege, international solidarity activists still unite with and defend Cuba.
Considering the alternatives. For example, the US and its allies waged wars of aggression and deposed Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in 2003, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, and Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in 2024. There were left critiques of these leaders but, in all instances, there were no viable left alternatives to them; nor were conditions for their people improved by their removal. There is no “third way” in a war.
This suggests that the relevant question is not whether a preferable government can be imagined, but what forces actually stand to replace the existing government. For Venezuela, if not the Rodríguez government, what is the actual alternative?
After 26 years of siege and domestic polarization, the Venezuelan people yearn for peace, reconciliation, and reconstruction—more so than ever after the devastating twin earthquakes on June 24. For those of us abroad, we can only imagine the difficulties of life under sanctions from the US and its allies.
Regional trends. Developments in Venezuela reflect a broader shift in Latin America under the “Donroe Doctrine,” where Trump’s reactionary wave has flooded the former Pink Tide. Venezuela should therefore be understood in the context of this region-wide sea change.
Not since Maduro’s election in 2024 has a leftist won in the region. We have witnessed a succession of far-rightists replace center-left presidents in Latin America. Last year, Nasry Asfura replaced Xiomara Castro in Honduras, José Antonio Kast replaced Gabriel Boric in Chile, and Rodrigo Paz replaced Luis Arce in Bolivia. This year, Abelardo de la Espriella replaced Gustavo Petro in Colombia. Coming up in October is the Brazilian presidential election pitting Flávio Bolsonaro against incumbent Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, with Trump actively interfering as he did in the other contests.
In all cases, the incumbents faced considerable criticism from the left. Yet whatever their shortcomings, the alternatives have been, or would be, less desirable.
Venezuela is not an isolated case. How progressives weigh criticism against solidarity, assess governments operating under US pressure, and consider the actual alternatives is increasingly relevant throughout the region.
Remarkably, given the intense pressure from the imperialists, the core Chavista leadership, the Socialist Party (PSUV), the civil-military union, the high courts and legislature, and the communes and grassroots organizations have all remained unified. Preserving that unity is particularly important; Bolivia’s experience of left fragmentation offers a cautionary example.
Our tasks are to educate the broader public about what is happening in Venezuela under extreme duress and to take collective action against the imperialist siege.
Between the Rubio State Department and corporate media, on one hand, and rejection of the Rodríguez government by some on the left, on the other, there is a vast intermediate terrain that needs to have a voice.
Whatever disagreements progressives may have with decisions made in Caracas, those decisions belong ultimately to Venezuelans. Our first responsibility is not to prescribe Venezuela's political course, but to challenge the coercive power our own government exercises over it. The Venezuelans have not told us how to make our revolution; we should do the same for them.
Our tasks are to educate the broader public about what is happening in Venezuela under extreme duress and to take collective action against the imperialist siege. The Bolivarian Revolution has not failed. But the project urgently requires relief.
File Trump’s Venezuelan oil deal and ridiculous claims about what it represents with all the other false things he says about the economy.
Donald Trump is not very good at running the economy, but he does have a great imagination about how he runs the economy. Trump continually boasts about the incredible amount of foreign investment coming into the country. It was $20 trillion last I heard, but it might be up to $30 or $40 trillion the next time Trump decides to boast about it.
This boast has absolutely nothing to do with reality. Contrary to what Trump says, there is no boom in auto factories or any other factories coming into the United States. Factory construction has actually plummeted since Trump came into the White House, after booming under Biden.
The looniness about the investment boom should be kept in mind when considering Trump’s deal to take control of 65 billion barrels of Venezuela’s oil. Trump is promising that this deal will both lower gas prices and be used to refill the Strategic Petroleum Reserves that he has largely drained as a result of his war on Iran.
If Venezuela doesn’t honor this deal, what will a future administration do, take them to court? Or will they send US soldiers to die for Venezuela’s oil?
While people are naturally offended by the blatant imperialism in this deal, that is precisely the reason why there is not much cause to be concerned. The basic story is, because the deal is so transparently an effort by the United States to steal oil from a country that it controls militarily, it is virtually guaranteed that as soon as the country is not run by a U.S.-installed dictator, Trump’s deal will be dumped in the trash.
This point was well-made by Venezuelan economist and opposition leader Ricardo Haussman (also cited in a piece by Michael Tomasky in The New Republic). The deal is seen as a joke by pretty much everyone in Venezuela.
If Venezuela doesn’t honor this deal, what will a future administration do, take them to court? Or will they send US soldiers to die for Venezuela’s oil?
In terms of its immediate impact, there is not some spigot that can be turned on that will get massive amounts of Venezuela’s oil flowing. It’s currently producing around 1.25 million barrels a day. While it has massive reserves, its production facilities deteriorated badly as a result of U.S. sanctions. The country was largely unable to get needed parts, and it lacked funding because it was prevented from selling its oil to much of the world.
Oil production can only get back to its 3 million barrel a day turn-of-the-century pace with billions of dollars of foreign investment. It is unlikely that this deal will make companies happier about putting large sums at risk. Any investment will only pay off over many years, long after Trump will be out of office.
It also is not plausible to use Venezuela’s oil to refill the Strategic Reserves. Venezuela’s oil is very heavy and highly acidic. The Strategic Reserve is designed for light, alkaline oil. It could not easily store Venezuela’s oil.
In short, file Trump’s Venezuelan oil deal with the $60 trillion in foreign investment pouring into the country. It exists only in his head.
While Simon Bolivar has been right for 200 years, the US is not doomed to act this way forever.
Simon Bolivar, the great liberator of South America, famously observed, “The United States appear(s) to be destined by Providence to plague America with misery in the name of liberty.” For 200 years, US leaders have never proved him wrong.
In the early 1800s, Bolivar led what is now Venezuela and five other countries to independence from the Spanish Empire. But the United States still refuses to recognize the independence of other countries in the region. Wannabe emperor Donald Trump even refers to Canadian prime minister Mark Carney as a “governor,” as if Canada was merely another US state.
The US-backed despots replacing popular democratic and socialist governments across Latin America today are indeed doing so in the name of liberty, as Bolivar warned. But in practice this means only the liberty of traditional ruling classes to exploit, impoverish and kill their less privileged neighbors, formerly as conquistadors and compradors for the Spanish Empire and now as agents of the US government and transnational corporations.
Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) vowed to “restore American preeminence in the Western hemisphere.” It reiterated the 19th century Monroe Doctrine, demanded “sole source contracts to our companies,” and promised to “push out foreign countries that build infrastructure in the region.”
Then came the most blatant demonstration of what Trump’s new Monroe Doctrine means in practice: the US invasion of Venezuela. On January 3, 2026, US forces bombed targets in Venezuela, stormed Caracas and kidnapped President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. Trump has openly declared that the United States would “run” Venezuela and recently claimed that the U.S. had secured the biggest oil deal in world history.
And Venezuela is not the only place where the US is using military force. The “war on drugs” has become a pretext for expanding US military power throughout the region. Since September 2025, the US military has incinerated small boats in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, killing at least 227 people without providing proof that they committed any crime. US forces are now participating in counternarcotics operations inside Ecuador, while the Trump administration is seeking similar joint military operations in Colombia, Honduras and other countries.
But military force is only one weapon in Washington’s arsenal. Trump has also cajoled, threatened and encouraged people throughout Latin America to elect extreme right-wing authoritarian presidents in his own image. Before Argentina’s 2025 midterm elections, Trump offered Javier Milei’s far-right government a $20 billion currency lifeline and backed another $20 billion in financing, while warning that US generosity depended on Milei’s political success. After Milei’s party won, Trump boasted, “He had a lot of help from us.”
Across the continent—from Colombia and Peru to Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras, Bolivia and Panama—there has been a stark reversal of the region's progressive pink tide that brought hope for a more independent and socially just Latin America. The only two major powers in Latin America still governed by the left are Mexico and Brazil—and Brazil faces a fiercely contested presidential election in October.
The progressive coalitions that came to power in Latin America had forged impressive grassroots ties between indigenous and rural communities in heavily exploited areas and urban working classes, linking struggles over identity, land and sovereignty with struggles over class and economic justice. But these broad coalitions were fragile, while the economic and institutional power of entrenched oligarchies remained largely intact. Those elites were never going to surrender their wealth and power without a fight.
And that fight is hardly unique to Latin America. In the United States, oligarchs are reacting furiously to the election victories of democratic socialists, who propose real-world solutions to America’s problems that would improve ordinary people’s lives instead of making the rich even richer, as our current system of neoliberal capitalism demands. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the same battle is playing out on a larger and often more brutal scale.
The right has capitalized on genuine voter concerns about crime, drug trafficking, economic hardship and, in some cases, immigration. Promises to eradicate violent crime through harsh crackdowns modeled on El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele resonate with many voters.
Just as Americans who are disillusioned by economic insecurity and the broken promises of the Democrats have turned to Donald Trump and the Republicans as the only alternative on offer within this undemocratic two-party system, elections in Latin America present voters with similarly narrow and deliberately confusing choices that can lead to the election of Trump-allied right-wing governments.
This pattern is also reflected in the news media that frame these choices for voters. Since the 1980s, Latin American broadcast media have become increasingly dominated by a small number of large commercial conglomerates, mostly tied to wealthy, powerful families. Latin America lacks the public broadcasting and community media that balance the dominance of commercial media in other parts of the world, although, as in the United States, there is a small but growing alternative media movement, with outlets like TeleSur, Brasil do Fato, La Jornada and Kawsachun News.
The United States also has a narrow range of dominant corporate media, but Latin America’s media are even more concentrated and responsive to oligarchic interests. The market concentration of Latin American media conglomerates is among the highest in the world, with four transnational companies controlling 89% of the broadcast media across six major countries, while Mexican billionaire Carlos Slim has the largest media holdings anywhere. The market power of these huge media conglomerates is a real obstacle to any movement for democracy or socialism.
Another major factor working against progressive forces is direct intervention from the United States. As working people come together to organize coalitions for structural change in Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States pours money into right-wing political movements to counter them.
The US-funded National Endowment for Democracy (NED), has spent billions of dollars to interfere in the political systems of countries around the world, especially to organize opposition to governments that won’t take orders from Washington. Allan Weinstein, who helped to create the NED, told the Washington Post in 1991, “A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA.”
The NED’s annual budget for Latin America and the Caribbean in 2025 was $36.7 million. But the NED spends most of its money in the countries where the US has the least influence, so it spent the largest amounts in Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua, and the most globally in China and Russia.
In countries where the US already has more influence through existing ruling classes and captive corporate media, it protects and promotes its interests through ideologically-crafted NGOs. Some receive direct US funding, while others are funded by corporate sponsors and foundations.
An organization that plays an outsized role in Latin America is the Atlas Network, a sprawling international network that brings together corporate interests, conservative donors and extreme right-wing groups to coordinate their activities. The Atlas Network receives no direct US government funding, but the US does fund many of the NGOs and foundations that Atlas works with to build right-wing coalitions and parties.
Atlas Network was founded in San Francisco in 1981 by Sir Antony Fisher, a British businessman and a colleague of Margaret Thatcher, Milton Friedman and F.A. Hayek, who all reportedly approved of his Atlas Network project. Atlas works in the shadows as “a think tank that creates think tanks,” and trains its partners on “how to win the battle for hearts and minds.” It has annual revenue of $28 million and works with more than 500 partner organizations in nearly 100 countries.
Atlas has a long history of connections to powerful corporate interests. In the 1990s it was strongly linked with the tobacco industry, and the UK’s Tobacco Control Research Group reported that Atlas “appears to have played a particular role in helping the tobacco industry oppose tobacco control measures in Latin America.” Atlas also has long-standing links with ExxonMobil and the Charles Koch Foundation.
More recently, the Atlas Network has been linked to Donald Trump, the Brexit campaign in the UK, and to protest movements against left-wing governments in Latin America.
Atlas and its partners set up fake online accounts to boost the #SOSCuba campaign on Twitter during protests in Cuba in 2021, and also ran trolling campaigns during the 2019 coup in Bolivia and elections in Ecuador and Peru. Atlas also worked with the now jailed Argentine right-wing fixer Fernando Cemedo to orchestrate “Gen Z” protests against the Scheinbaum government in Mexico in November 2025.
In Brazil, where agribusiness is gradually destroying the Amazon rainforest, climate science denial is a central part of Atlas’s work. Atlas Network sponsors the annual Liberty Forum, which brings right-wing groups together with the agribusiness industry to plan their strategy and messaging in Brazil. Atlas’s main partner organizing the Liberty Forums is the libertarian Institute for Business Studies, which has close links to the jailed former president Jair Bolsonaro. His son, Flavio, is challenging President Lula in October’s presidential election.
Another influential US ideological export to Latin America is evangelical protestant Christianity, which has grown from 4% of the population 50 years ago to 20-25% today. As in the United States, evangelical Christianity is a political force as much as a religion, leading movements against abortion, homosexuality and liberal, scientific education, and often supporting brutal state violence in the name of law and order.
The spread of evangelical christianity in Latin America was a deliberate Cold War policy launched by the US Information Agency in 1954 as a weapon against communism and later used to counter the growing influence of liberation theology among Catholics.
By the 1980s, Guatemala had its first evangelical president, Efrain Rios Montt, who seized power in a 1982 coup and conducted a US-backed genocide against the Mayan indigenous people, particularly the Ixil. Ríos Montt’s evangelical faith helped him cultivate powerful allies among US evangelicals, who raised money for his regime and lobbied Congress to restore US military aid even as evidence of massacres mounted.
Incredibly, evangelical Christianity has kept spreading in Guatemala since the end of the civil war in the 1990s, even among the Ixil themselves. The evangelical religion has become deeply rooted in the Ixil region even as survivors have struggled with the legacy of a genocide carried out under an evangelical dictator.
On a trip to Guatemala, Nicolas met a family in Ixil whose father was beheaded by an army death squad, after being accused of giving food to the Guerrilla Army of the Poor. His widow joined a weaving collective of genocide survivors, working long hours on a back-strap loom to weave the beautiful, intricate geometric designs that Ixil women are famous for. And yet, like many Ixil families in the decades since the genocide, the family had also joined an evangelical church.
It is tragic to see the recent resurgence of right-wing parties and politicians in Latin America and the Caribbean, but indigenous and working people are resisting, and they deserve our solidarity.
The mostly indigenous people of Bolivia have endured two right-wing coups in less than 10 years, but they have learned that when they say “No,” they have the power to down tools, withdraw their labor, block the roads and shut down the system that provides profits to the ruling class. They deserve our support.
The people of Cuba are enduring their worst test since the revolution, as the United States tightens its already deadly blockade, denying them fuel, electricity, medicine and even food. Many are dying of preventable causes at the hands of Trump and the US government. For 68 years, American politicians of both parties have tried and failed to snuff out this dangerous example of a poor country that, until this latest brutal escalation of the blockade, provided better healthcare to its people than the United States does. They too deserve our support.
The people of Brazil are going to the polls, and millions are standing up to Trump’s threats, manipulation by the Atlas Network, hypocritical sermons in evangelical churches, and the sneering arrogance and greed of Bolsonaro and his cronies. They too deserve our support.
In Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Honduras, brave people are already resisting the austerity and abuses of new right-wing rulers, as they have all done many times before. They all deserve our support.
In much of Latin America, the right’s grip on power is tenuous. The recent presidential elections in Colombia and Peru were extraordinarily close and many new right-wing governments face deeply divided parliaments and powerful opposition movements. We might well see a new wave of progressive politicians taking power across the region in less than four years.
For those of us in the United States, our job is to stop our government from interfering. While Simon Bolivar has been right for 200 years, the US is not doomed to act this way forever. It can and must stop exploiting, impoverishing and killing its neighbors.