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We Must Demand Coverage That Doesn't Fan the Flames of War With China
Western media is trying to make it sound like war was China’s idea, when it’s the US that has been actively preparing for it for the last decade.
May 31, 2026
This month, the world watched as US President Donald Trump wrangled up his bro-squad of capitalist billionaires and chartered them across the world to China. We watched in disbelief as the China-hating Trump administration paraded around Beijing gawking at beautiful ceilings and giant rose bushes. “China is beautiful,” Trump said.
All the while, the top US oligarchs met with Chinese officials, hoping to find openings they could us to slither into China’s large, booming markets and siphon off even more wealth that they most definitely don’t need. Fortunately, China just wasn’t that interested.
Even though nothing much came of the meetings, all the China hawks in Washington were on the edge of their seats, anxious that better relations with China would risk their favorite justification for raising the military budget to an unprecedented $1.5 trillion. But we need to prepare for war with China by 2025… no, 2027… wait, maybe 2030? Forever?
Mainstream media had a lot to say about the meeting. The Guardian was especially deceptive, with one article titled:
This is the kind of headline we’ve come to expect from outlets like the New York Post, whose credibility is on par with a spam email. In fact, they did have a similar article:
It’s not a huge surprise that Western media is trying to make it sound like war was China’s idea, when it’s the US that has been actively preparing for it for the last decade. It’s part of their strategy to use misleading headlines to stoke fear about China, so nobody pays attention to the war-antagonizing behavior of the United States.
When President Xi Jinping speaks about the “Thucydides Trap,” he is warning the US against treating war with China as inevitable and instead urging it to pursue diplomacy and cooperation. Many US policymakers, however, continue to frame China’s rise primarily as a military threat, expanding military posturing across the Asia-Pacific in an effort to preserve US dominance even at the risk of escalation.
It’s reported that Trump and Xi also talked at length about the US war on Iran. This conflict—as well as US military actions in Venezuela—is also tied to the broader US confrontation with China. Both countries possess major oil, gas, and critical mineral reserves and have become important economic partners to China. By targeting two of China’s key energy suppliers, the US is attempting to limit China’s access to the resources, while hoarding them for itself (and Israel).
The US war on Iran has been a disaster, which is one of the reasons Trump is in China, hoping for concessions. It’s not just energy dominance the US is worried about. While oil and gas prices are skyrocketing around the world, Iran has made an exception for Chinese oil tankers, which trade with Iran using the Chinese yuan. For decades, US global power has depended on the petrodollar system, which keeps global energy trade tied to the US dollar and gives the US enormous economic warfare abilities. But China’s continued purchase of Iranian oil using the yuan, along with growing efforts by countries across the Global South to trade outside the dollar system, threatens to weaken that dominance.
The global order is clearly shifting toward a more multipolar world. The question is whether the US will respond with diplomacy or attempt to preserve unipolar dominance through military confrontation with China. To prevent escalation, we must reject the idea that war between great powers is inevitable. And we must also demand media coverage that accurately and credibly covers the role the United States is playing in escalating tensions. That includes news outlets like The Guardian, which clearly prioritize painting China as the villain over credible and in-depth reporting.
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Amid Trump-Xi Meeting, US Coalition Urges Congress to ‘Prioritize Peace’ and End ‘Confrontational Posture’ With China
“Americans are increasingly supportive of US-China cooperation, while tensions with China do not serve American interests,” said dozens of anti-war groups as President Trump met with Chinese President Xi.
May 14, 2026
As US President Donald Trump meets with Chinese President Xi Jinping, a coalition of anti-war groups is calling on Congress to pressure the administration to "prioritize peace, cooperation, and stability" at a time when the US-China relationship is increasingly hostile.
“Americans are increasingly supportive of US-China cooperation, while tensions with China do not serve American interests,” argued the coalition, which includes Just Foreign Policy, Win Without War, the Friends Committee on National Legislation, Our Revolution, and dozens of other groups in a letter sent to members of Congress on Thursday.
They cited recent surveys showing that negative perceptions of China are consistently falling among Americans, including a Pew Research poll from January, which showed that just 28% of Americans viewed China as an "enemy" compared with 42% who saw it that way in 2024.
“At a time when so many domestic needs are going unmet, a confrontational posture toward China is costing untold billions of dollars in military build-up, trade and energy disruption, and securitization of technology—money that could and should be spent on the things Americans need at home," the coalition continued.
Trump's first visit to China in nearly a decade comes amid a global energy crisis caused by his war in Iran, a conflict where China has expressed a desire to act as a mediator.
While the coalition denounced Trump's war as "an unauthorized war of choice" that has led the world to a "deeply dangerous and uncertain place," it also said it presented an opportunity for the US and China to engage in diplomacy in hopes of putting the relationship "on a more stable footing."
Xi said that Taiwan remains the "most important issue in China-US relations” as the talks kicked off, warning that if mishandled, it could create a "very dangerous situation."
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said after a meeting on Thursday that the decadesold "One China Policy," which takes no explicit view on Taiwan's sovereignty, hasn't changed. Though he warned that it would be “a terrible mistake” for China to attempt to seize the island by force.
Friction between the US and China has only been heightened after Trump announced the sale of more than $11 billion worth of weapons to Taiwan in December, the largest ever arms sale to the island. At the time, China said the sale "gravely violates" the One China Policy.
The anti-war coalition warned that "current military and political trends in the United States, China, and Taiwan are moving us closer to a serious crisis or conflict over the island" and called on the US to "revitalize its One China Policy and press Beijing to reaffirm its focus on peaceful unification, with no timeline."
“Diplomacy with Beijing, rather than military posturing or arms racing across the Taiwan Strait,” they said, “is the only realistic path forward, especially since the American public has little interest in participating in a military conflict against China in defense of Taiwan.”
According to a survey by the Institute for Global Affairs in November, just 35% of Americans said they'd support the US sending troops to defend Taiwan if it were to be attacked by China. In a January poll commissioned by The New Republic, just 10% of Democratic voters said they wanted their party to support sending troops, and 30% wanted it to support sending weapons.
But Democratic leadership has pressured Trump to take the opposite approach and ramp up hostility toward Beijing in advance of this week's talks.
On Wednesday, Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY), the ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was joined by Reps. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.), Jim Himes (D-Ct.), and Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.) to send a letter urging Trump to approve a delayed $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan ahead of his visit.
The Democrats on the House Foreign Affairs Committee joined in support for the sale, saying that "Trump must reaffirm in his meeting with Xi that the US will continue to uphold our longstanding One-China policy while standing firmly with Taiwan’s democracy and security. And he must make that clear by notifying Congress of the $14 billion arms sales to Taiwan. Anything else would undermine American credibility."
Just Foreign Policy (JFP) countered that the request to send more weapons just before talks were set to begin was "deeply unserious" and an "absurdly ill-timed move that would sabotage diplomacy—or worse."
Jake Werner, the director of the East Asia program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft—another signatory to the anti-war letter—warned that while Democrats should confront Trump on the issue of China, they shouldn't goad him into an even more hawkish approach.
“If you want to attack Trump, that's great, but you should attack Trump on the basis of prudent, conflict-avoiding principles,” Werner said. “They should be criticizing him not for engaging in diplomacy, but for engaging in the wrong kind of diplomacy.”
In their letter to Congress, these and the other anti-war groups pushed for a similar diplomatic approach to other sources of tension with China, arguing that the US should take no position on the sovereignty of disputed territory in the South China Sea.
They also encouraged members of Congress to avoid creating "incentives" for other nations to adopt more confrontational stances toward China.
They singled out a first-ever test launch of an American Tomahawk missile in the Philippines last week, which had the capability to reach the Chinese mainland. Chinese military observers described it as the “worst provocation” in years by the US and suggested that Beijing should ramp up its air-defense and stealth-strike drone capabilities in response, according to the South China Morning Post.
The anti-war coalition said they "urge Congress to press the administration to avoid further escalatory signals and to instead pursue diplomacy to restore and expand non-proliferation agreements that can prevent a wasteful and dangerous arms race."
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How Will Trump Manage—or Mismanage—China?
In all aspects of the U.S.-China rivalry, Trump will be pulled toward both increased militancy and combativeness and a more pragmatic, transactional approach.
Dec 18, 2024
Gaza, Haiti, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Russia, Syria, Ukraine, and Venezuela: President-elect Donald Trump will face no shortage of foreign-policy challenges when he assumes office in January. None, however, comes close to China in scope, scale, or complexity. No other country has the capacity to resist his predictable antagonism with the same degree of strength and tenacity, and none arouses more hostility and outrage among MAGA Republicans.
In short, China is guaranteed to put President Trump in a difficult bind the second time around: He can either choose to cut deals with Beijing and risk being branded an appeaser by the China hawks in his party, or he can punish and further encircle Beijing, risking a potentially violent clash and possibly even nuclear escalation. How he chooses to resolve this quandary will surely prove the most important foreign test of his second term in office.
Make no mistake: China truly is considered The Big One by those in Trump’s entourage responsible for devising foreign policy. While they imagine many international challenges to their “America First” strategy, only China, they believe, poses a true threat to the continued global dominance of this country.
Trump will enter office in January with a toolkit of punitive measures for fighting China ready to roll along with strong support among his appointees for making them the law of the land.
“I feel strongly that the Chinese Communist Party has entered into a Cold War with the United States and is explicit in its aim to replace the liberal, Western-led world order that has been in place since World War II,” Rep. Michael Waltz (R-Fla.), Trump’s choice as national security adviser, declared at a 2023 event hosted by the Atlantic Council. “We’re in a global arms race with an adversary that, unlike any in American history, has the economic and the military capability to truly supplant and replace us.”
As Waltz and others around Trump see it, China poses a multi-dimensional threat to this country’s global supremacy. In the military domain, by building up its air force and navy, installing military bases on reclaimed islands in the South China Sea, and challenging Taiwan through increasingly aggressive air and naval maneuvers, it is challenging continued American dominance of the Western Pacific. Diplomatically, it’s now bolstering or repairing ties with key U.S. allies, including India, Indonesia, Japan, and the members of NATO. Meanwhile, it’s already close to replicating this country’s most advanced technologies, especially its ability to produce advanced microchips. And despite Washington’s efforts to diminish a U.S. reliance on vital Chinese goods, including critical minerals and pharmaceuticals, it remains a primary supplier of just such products to this country.
Fight or Strike Bargains?
For many in the Trumpian inner circle, the only correct, patriotic response to the China challenge is to fight back hard. Both Rep. Waltz, Trump’s pick as national security adviser, and Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), his choice as secretary of state, have sponsored or supported legislation to curb what they view as “malign” Chinese endeavors in the United States and abroad.
Waltz, for example, introduced the American Critical Mineral Exploration and Innovation Act of 2020, which was intended, as he explained, “to reduce America’s dependence on foreign sources of critical minerals and bring the U.S. supply chain from China back to America.” Sen. Rubio has been equally combative in the legislative arena. In 2021, he authored the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which banned goods produced in forced labor encampments in Xinjiang Province from entering the United States. He also sponsored several pieces of legislation aimed at curbing Chinese access to U.S. technology. Although these, as well as similar measures introduced by Waltz, haven’t always obtained the necessary congressional approval, they have sometimes been successfully bundled into other legislation.
In short, Trump will enter office in January with a toolkit of punitive measures for fighting China ready to roll along with strong support among his appointees for making them the law of the land. But of course, we’re talking about Donald Trump, so nothing is a given. Some analysts believe that his penchant for dealmaking and his professed admiration for Chinese strongman President Xi Jinping may lead him to pursue a far more transactional approach, increasing economic and military pressure on Beijing to produce concessions on, for example, curbing the export of fentanyl precursors to Mexico, but when he gets what he wants letting them lapse. Howard Lutnick, the billionaire investor from Cantor Fitzgerald whom he chose as Commerce secretary, claims that Trump actually “wants to make a deal with China,” and will use the imposition of tariffs selectively as a bargaining tool to do so.
What such a deal might look like is anyone’s guess, but it’s hard to see how Trump could win significant concessions from Beijing without abandoning some of the punitive measures advocated by the China hawks in his entourage. Count on one thing: This complicated and confusing dynamic will play out in each of the major problem areas in U.S.-China relations, forcing Trump to make critical choices between his transactional instincts and the harsh ideological bent of his advisers.
Trump, China, and Taiwan
Of all the China-related issues in his second term in office, none is likely to prove more challenging or consequential than the future status of the island of Taiwan. At issue are Taiwan’s gradual moves toward full independence and the risk that China will invade the island to prevent such an outcome, possibly triggering U.S. military intervention as well. Of all the potential crises facing Trump, this is the one that could most easily lead to a great-power conflict with nuclear undertones.
When Washington granted diplomatic recognition to China in 1979, it “acknowledged” that Taiwan and the mainland were both part of “one China” and that the two parts could eventually choose to reunite. The U.S. also agreed to cease diplomatic relations with Taiwan and terminate its military presence there. However, under the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Washington was also empowered to cooperate with a quasi-governmental Taiwanese diplomatic agency, the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States, and provide Taiwan with the weapons needed for its defense. Moreover, in what came to be known as “strategic ambiguity,” U.S. officials insisted that any effort by China to alter Taiwan’s status by force would constitute “a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area” and would be viewed as a matter “of grave concern to the United States,” although not necessarily one requiring a military response.
If, however, he chooses to act “crazy” by embracing “strategic clarity” and stepping up military pressure on China, he would likely receive accolades from many of his supporters, while provoking a (potentially nuclear) war with China.
For decades, one president after another reaffirmed the “one China” policy while also providing Taiwan with increasingly powerful weaponry. For their part, Chinese officials repeatedly declared that Taiwan was a renegade province that should be reunited with the mainland, preferably by peaceful means. The Taiwanese, however, have never expressed a desire for reunification and instead have moved steadily toward a declaration of independence, which Beijing has insisted would justify armed intervention.
As such threats became more frequent and menacing, leaders in Washington continued to debate the validity of “strategic ambiguity,” with some insisting it should be replaced by a policy of “strategic clarity” involving an ironclad commitment to assist Taiwan should it be invaded by China. President Joe Biden seemed to embrace this view, repeatedly affirming that the U.S. was obligated to defend Taiwan under such circumstances. However, each time he said so, his aides walked back his words, insisting the U.S. was under no legal obligation to do so.
The Biden administration also boosted its military support for the island while increasing American air and naval patrols in the area, which only heightened the possibility of a future U.S. intervention should China invade. Some of these moves, including expedited arms transfers to Taiwan, were adopted in response to prodding from China hawks in Congress. All, however, fit with an overarching administration strategy of encircling China with a constellation of American military installations and U.S.-armed allies and partners.
From Beijing’s perspective, then, Washington is already putting extreme military and geopolitical pressure on China. The question is: Will the Trump administration increase or decrease those pressures, especially when it comes to Taiwan?
That Trump will approve increased arms sales to and military cooperation with Taiwan essentially goes without saying (as much, at least, as anything involving him does). The Chinese have experienced upticks in U.S. aid to Taiwan before and can probably live through another round of the same. But that leaves far more volatile issues up for grabs: Will he embrace “strategic clarity,” guaranteeing Washington’s automatic intervention should China invade Taiwan, and will he approve a substantial expansion of the American military presence in the region? Both moves have been advocated by some of the China hawks in Trump’s entourage, and both are certain to provoke fierce, hard-to-predict responses from Beijing.
Many of Trump’s closest advisers have, in fact, insisted on “strategic clarity” and increased military cooperation with Taiwan. Michael Waltz, for example, has asserted that the U.S. must “be clear we’ll defend Taiwan as a deterrent measure.” He has also called for an increased military presence in the Western Pacific. Similarly, last June, Robert C. O’Brien, Trump’s national security adviser from 2019 to 2021, wrote that the U.S. “should make clear” its “commitment” to “help defend” Taiwan, while expanding military cooperation with the island.
Trump himself has made no such commitments, suggesting instead a more ambivalent stance. In his typical fashion, in fact, he’s called on Taiwan to spend more on its own defense and expressed anger at the concentration of advanced chip-making on the island, claiming that the Taiwanese “did take about 100% of our chip business.” But he’s also warned of harsh economic measures were China to impose a blockade of the island, telling the editorial board of The Wall Street Journal, “I would say [to President Xi]: if you go into Taiwan, I’m sorry to do this, I’m going to tax you at 150% to 200%.” He wouldn’t need to threaten the use of force to prevent a blockade, he added, because President Xi “respects me and he knows I’m [expletive] crazy.”
Such comments reveal the bind Trump will inevitably find himself in when it comes to Taiwan this time around. He could, of course, try to persuade Beijing to throttle back its military pressure on the island in return for a reduction in U.S. tariffs—a move that would reduce the risk of war in the Pacific but leave China in a stronger economic position and disappoint many of his top advisers. If, however, he chooses to act “crazy” by embracing “strategic clarity” and stepping up military pressure on China, he would likely receive accolades from many of his supporters, while provoking a (potentially nuclear) war with China.
Trade War or Economic Coexistence?
The question of tariffs represents another way in which Trump will face a crucial choice between punitive action and transactional options in his second term—or, to be more precise, in deciding how severe to make those tariffs and other economic hardships he will try to impose on China.
In January 2018, the first Trump administration imposed tariffs of 30% on imported solar panels and 20%-50% on imported washing machines, many sourced from China. Two months later, the administration added tariffs on imported steel (25%) and aluminum (10%), again aimed above all at China. And despite his many criticisms of Trump’s foreign and economic policies, President Biden chose to retain those tariffs, even adding new ones, notably on electric cars and other high-tech products. The Biden administration has also banned the export of advanced computer chips and chip-making technology to China in a bid to slow that country’s technological progress.
Accordingly, when Trump reassumes office on January 20, China will already be under stringent economic pressures from Washington. But he and his associates insist that those won’t be faintly enough to constrain China’s rise. The president-elect has said that, on day one of his new term, he will impose a 10% tariff on all Chinese imports and follow that with other harsh measures. Among such moves, the Trump team has announced plans to raise tariffs on Chinese imports to 60%, revoke China’s Permanent Normal Trade Relations (also known as “most favored nation”) status, and ban the transshipment of Chinese imports through third countries.
Most of Trump’s advisers have espoused such measures strongly. “Trump Is Right: We Should Raise Tariffs on China,” Marco Rubio wrote last May. “China’s anticompetitive tactics,” he argued, “give Chinese companies an unfair cost advantage over American companies… Tariffs that respond to these tactics prevent or reverse offshoring, preserving America’s economic might and promoting domestic investment.”
But Trump will also face possible pushback from other advisers who are warning of severe economic perturbations if such measures were to be enacted. China, they suggest, has tools of its own to use in any trade war with the U.S., including tariffs on American imports and restrictions on American firms doing business in China, including Elon Musk’s Tesla, which produces half of its cars there. For these and other reasons, the U.S.-China Business Council has warned that additional tariffs and other trade restrictions could prove disastrous, inviting “retaliatory measures from China, causing additional U.S. jobs and output losses.”
As in the case of Taiwan, Trump will face some genuinely daunting decisions when it comes to economic relations with China. If, in fact, he follows the advice of the ideologues in his circle and pursues a strategy of maximum pressure on Beijing, specifically designed to hobble China’s growth and curb its geopolitical ambitions, he could precipitate nothing short of a global economic meltdown that would negatively affect the lives of so many of his supporters, while significantly diminishing America’s own geopolitical clout. He might therefore follow the inclinations of certain of his key economic advisers like transition leader Howard Lutnick, who favor a more pragmatic, businesslike relationship with China. How Trump chooses to address this issue will likely determine whether the future involves increasing economic tumult and uncertainty or relative stability. And it’s always important to remember that a decision to play hardball with China on the economic front could also increase the risk of a military confrontation leading to full-scale war, even to World War III.
And while Taiwan and trade are undoubtedly the most obvious and challenging issues Trump will face in managing (mismanaging?) U.S.-China relations in the years ahead, they are by no means the only ones. He will also have to decide how to deal with increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea; continued Chinese economic and military-technological support for Russia in its war against Ukraine; and growing Chinese investments in Africa, Latin America, and elsewhere.
In these, and other aspects of the U.S.-China rivalry, Trump will be pulled toward both increased militancy and combativeness and a more pragmatic, transactional approach. During the campaign, he backed each approach, sometimes in the very same verbal outburst. Once in power, however, he will have to choose between them—and his decisions will have a profound impact on this country, China, and everyone living on this planet.
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