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Labor activist Raraa Rahmawati argues that the hazards in her country’s nickel industry are part of the broader problem of a global economy rigged to favor the wealthy
Electric vehicle sales are rising rapidly around the world. But few people who purchase these cars know anything about the workers who produce them.
Labor activist Raraa Rahmawati is trying to change that for one group of e-vehicle supply chain workers: the more than 230,000 Indonesians who toil in the nickel mining and processing industry. Recently, she reported on the reality of these workers’ lives at an international “People’s Summit” held parallel to the G20 leaders meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa.
Indonesia boasts the world’s largest reserves of nickel, a key component of the lithium batteries that power electric vehicles. To capture more of the value of this essential mineral, the national government banned raw nickel exports in 2020. This has triggered a boom in domestic nickel processing.
Who’s benefiting most from this boom? The Chinese firm Tsingshan ranks as the top investor in Indonesia’s nickel processing operations. The company has contracts to supply carmakers around the world, including a $5 billion deal with Tesla.
“People who buy electric cars think they’re contributing to a ‘just transition’ away from fossil fuels,” she told the international crowd in Johannesburg. “But they should know this is really just another form of extractivism."
Tsingshan’s founder and chairman, Xiang Guangda, has accumulated a fortune worth an estimated $3.7 billion. Known as the “Nickel King,” the Chinese tycoon closely guards his privacy. But Bloomberg last year spilled one revealing tidbit: that Xiang had purchased a $62 million mansion for his daughter in Singapore.
The contrast between the living and working conditions for Xiang’s family and his employees could not be more extreme. Rahmawati works with an organization, Sembada Bersama, that is documenting the severe workplace hazards in this industry.
In a new report, Sembada Bersama reveals disturbing information about the Indonesia Weda Bay Industrial Park, a massive nickel mining and smelting complex in a former rainforest in the northern part of the Maluku Islands. Tsingshan owns the largest share of the project.
The most disturbing finding: an apparent pattern of “sudden deaths” among the plant’s workers, who are mostly 25 to 35 years old. Nearly every worker Sembada Bersama interviewed was aware of these tragic incidents. Rahmawati said that while lack of transparency and oversight make it impossible to prove, these deaths are likely the result of cardiac arrests related to grueling working conditions.
Smelter operators typically work two 12-hour shifts over two days, often having to rotate between day and night shifts, with a third day off. To document additional hazards, Sembada Bersama collaborated with workers to take meter readings inside the smelters. The data they collected reveal workplace heat temperatures of as high as 108.5°F, excessive levels of inhalable dust particles that can cause respiratory disease and cancer, and noise levels high enough to cause permanent hearing loss.
These occupational health risks come on top of the Indonesian nickel industry’s devastating environmental costs and high accident rates. Two years ago, an explosion at a Tsingshan plant left 21 workers dead.
Tsingshan recently signed an agreement with the United Nations Industrial Development Organization to improve ecological practices and industrial skills training at its Indonesia operations. This suggests the firm is feeling some pressure. But with few alternative job opportunities, local communities and workers remain vulnerable to the enormous power of Tsingshan and other nickel corporations.
The Sembada Bersama report ends with detailed recommendations for the Indonesian government and corporations. Rahmawati also argues that the hazards in her country’s nickel industry are part of the broader problem of a global economy rigged to favor the wealthy. International solidarity and cooperation, she feels, will be key to unrigging the system.
“People who buy electric cars think they’re contributing to a ‘just transition’ away from fossil fuels,” she told the international crowd in Johannesburg. “But they should know this is really just another form of extractivism. We need a cross-border movement. It’s time for us to be united.”
Reincarnation on a future overheated Earth might be an appropriate "reward" for government and private leaders responsible for obstructing the progress of green energy.
As imagined by Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) in The Divine Comedy, Hell has nine levels, with the lowest reserved for the very worst souls. Although it is no longer fashionable to believe that Hell exists, we can't prove that it doesn't. And it is generally thought that among its tortures for condemned souls are extremely high temperatures.
If the climate continues heating up we may create hellish conditions right here on an overheated Earth. Would it be appropriate for those responsible for allowing this to happen to end in an actual Hell? As the Lord High Executioner sings in The Mikado, "My object all sublime... is to make the punishment fit the crime."
Or perhaps the guilty parties could be reincarnated on the unpleasant future Earth they are helping create. Like Hell, which no one can prove does not exist, no one has ever proved that reincarnation is impossible.
So in case there is no Hell, Earth itself might take care of inflicting cosmic justice.
I imagine that Hell, if it exists, or a future overheated Earth, will have ample room for guilty members of Congress and the Supreme Court; coal, gas, and oil company executives; and the like.
Of course as a mere mortal human being, I cannot claim to be a perfect judge of my fellow mortals. But it seems to me that many current American leaders will bear heavy responsibility if we do not curb global warming in time to avoid catastrophe. I say leaders in the plural here deliberately, since no one person—not even a president—could do the damage currently being done by American policy without the help of other leaders.
I imagine that Hell, if it exists, or a future overheated Earth, will have ample room for guilty members of Congress and the Supreme Court; coal, gas, and oil company executives; and the like.
President Donald Trump began his second administration by withdrawing the US again from the Paris Agreement to fight climate change. Although "only" a symbolic action, it telegraphed the new administration's intentions to sabotage green energy.
Non-symbolic actions quickly followed. It is bad enough that the government has been canceling subsidy programs designed to hasten the day when solar and wind energy replace coal, oil, and gas.
Far worse, the administration is trying to prevent completion of major wind farms that are already largely built and in which people have invested billions of dollars. This makes no sense economically and will increase the electricity shortages already causing big increases in consumer prices.
And the administration is canceling permissions for new green projects that government agencies had already granted.
Worse still is the administration's attempt to force other countries to halt their own policies aimed at replacing dirty electricity with green electricity, using tariff rates as bargaining chips. As long as only the US slows down needed reforms, the rest of the world could at least move forward.
From a geopolitical point of view, recent US policies are making China look better and better, as it appears destined to dominate production of green energy and electric vehicles. The US continues to dominate declining industries like coal, gas, and oil—the modern equivalents of buggy whips.
Perhaps most outrageous of all (so far!) is the administration's attempt to turn off functioning satellites already in orbit that can measure carbon dioxide and methane—the chief warming agents in the atmosphere—as an "economy" measure!
Economy measure?! As "Swami Beyondananda" recently put it, "If we lose the Earth, there goes the GDP."
In the same vein, the Trump Environmental Protection Agency now proposes to stop requiring corporations to measure and report the amount of greenhouse gases they are releasing into the atmosphere.
The administration is also trying to close down its Mauna Loa installation in Hawaii and three other places measuring greenhouse gas levels in the atmosphere.
Apparently the administration fears that all these measurements will undermine its already feeble arguments that it is safe to continue burning coal, oil, and gas to produce the power required by modern civilization.
As I noted earlier, reincarnation on a future overheated Earth might be an appropriate "reward" for government and private leaders responsible for obstructing the progress of green energy.
But from another point of view, an actual Hell might provide more justice for them.
Hell has no air conditioners.
Policies that promote alternatives to car use, reduce sprawl, encourage more compact batteries, and require recycling would all reduce the scale of mining needed for carbon-free transportation.
Upon my return from the Atacama, I began thinking about the definitions of some seemingly basic words: transportation, for one; need, for another. I wondered if the mining requirements might be lower, depending on the prevailing mode of transportation, or if there was a way to conceptualize social need as something distinct from the stream of inputs demanded by downstream industries. I pondered whether a reimagined transportation sector in which many more Americans rode buses or bikes would require the same massive volumes of minerals as one in which every household owned their own electric vehicle. I speculated about the per person material footprint under distinct mixes of electrified mobility.
Surely, I thought, some other researcher had already tested these hypotheses. I turned to databases of academic articles and browsed the reports of climate think tanks. To my surprise, no such studies existed. Instead, and without exception, all the extant models assumed that the only way to eliminate emissions from transportation is to replace individual gas-powered vehicles with individual electric vehicles. The best possible future, “net-zero emissions” (per the International Energy Agency), envisioned a world full of cars powered by batteries. Successful climate action meant a Tesla or a BYD in every garage.
Three years after I had first hypothesized that different transportation choices might require less mining, I stopped waiting for someone else to produce the data to put my hunch to the test. By that point, I had begun working with a climate think tank. I reached out to environmental engineers, transit wonks, and battery experts and asked if we could build a model from scratch. We were guided by an approach called “industrial ecology,” which studies industrial systems in terms of their material and energy flows. In this case, we were looking for the amount of lithium required to meet the needs of fully electric mobility. We pitted a scenario in which all traditional cars had been replaced with electric ones against a scenario in which more Americans rode to work, school, or shopping centers in clean energy buses or got around by bikes or by walking. In other words, and in sharp contrast to prevailing models, instead of comparing a zero-emissions world with one in which we continued to rely on fossil fuels, we compared multiple zero-emissions worlds with one another.
We didn’t stop there. Having set our imaginations free to roam, we tinkered with additional features of the worlds we were building. We imagined denser cities and suburbs, with less sprawl enabling less car use; cars with a range of battery sizes (American EV batteries are twice as large as the global median); high rates of mineral recycling and recovery. The futures we mapped out ultimately ranged from an electrified status quo to a fundamental shift in how Americans live and move. We did try to temper our dreaming with a healthy dose of realism. We only tested changes in the cities and suburbs, understanding the obstacles to rapidly building out mass transit in rural America. Even in our most transformative vision, the energy transition would still require tens of millions of EVs.
Achieving a globally just energy transition requires understanding supply chains in reverse, starting from what we produce and consume and working backward to their material inputs, and further still, to the relentless scramble for new extractive frontiers.
I expected these different green scenarios to entail distinct material footprints, measured in the total volume of lithium mining. But the results shocked me. The best-case scenario—smaller batteries, more recycling, denser cities and towns, and more mass transit use, walking, and cycling—requires 66 percent less lithium than the worst-case scenario (batteries get even bigger, suburbs stay sprawled, recycling is nonexistent).That percentage difference was based on a cumulative assessment across all the years we modeled (2023–2050). If instead we just look at 2050, the final year, the spread was more dramatic: the difference in lithium demand between the best- and worst-case scenarios was 92 percent. That’s in large part because recycling takes time to have an impact on reducing mining, with recycled feedstock increasing as the batteries from EVs purchased in the 2020s, ’30s, and ’40s reach the end of their life and become available for material recovery.
These findings put the supposedly zero-sum trade-off between climate action and protecting landscapes and communities from extraction in a new light. The futures we conjured showed that it is, in fact, possible to achieve climate targets without the alarming amount of mining predicted by all other forecasts. And there’s more: Increasing mass transit use and housing density will get us to zero emissions much faster than swapping every traditional car for an electric vehicle. To put it bluntly, a path to zero emissions that relies on electrifying individual cars is not only the most resource-intensive route to zero emissions, but also the slowest route to that urgent goal. We fully recognize that the political and even cultural obstacles to realizing our most ambitious scenario are formidable. But the prevailing approach not only requires much more extraction than socially necessary. It also runs afoul of climate science.
The implications of this modeling exercise completely changed the way I viewed mining. It suddenly dawned on me that extraction is not a problem that can be addressed solely at the sites of mining alone. It is absolutely vital to govern extractive frontiers better, improving environmental regulations and enforcing Indigenous rights. But some of our most potent tools to reduce the harms of mining reside elsewhere, all the way at the other end of far-flung supply chains. These tools take the form of the policy choices, investment decisions, and built environments that shape how we cut emissions from polluting sectors like transportation. The responsibility for protecting the Atacama’s watersheds does not rest only with Chilean bureaucrats, nor should Atacameño communities have to shoulder the burden of standing up to multinational mining firms on their own. We in the United States are also implicated in the supply chains that start in Chile’s northern reaches. Achieving a globally just energy transition requires understanding supply chains in reverse, starting from what we produce and consume and working backward to their material inputs, and further still, to the relentless scramble for new extractive frontiers.
The task of achieving a just energy transition is daunting. But this holistic view also opens up possibilities for action, revealing multiple and dispersed levers for reducing mining’s harms. Policies that promote alternatives to car use, reduce sprawl, encourage more compact batteries, and require recycling would all reduce the scale of mining needed for carbon-free transportation.
Confronting emissions as a holistic problem, rather than a purely technical question about the fastest way to electrify an ever-growing fleet of personal automobiles, entails a leap of political faith. New models and forecasts like the ones my colleagues and I built at our think tank, the Climate and Community Institute, can help us tell galvanizing stories about the future we want. If we can see and feel that alternate future, desire and describe it, then we can commit to creating the foundations for it in the here and now. Forecasts chart a path from our present to the world we want to build. But seeing something and building it aren’t the same. Better research or data can only carry us so far; concrete, bold, even risky actions are the stuff of real change. What practical steps can we take today to call forth a different tomorrow?
We can start by demanding supply chains organized around justice for everyone they touch, rather than profits for just a few. Just as any workplace is simultaneously a site of exploitation and locus of worker power, and any mine is at once a setting for extraction and a potential scene of community resistance, the supply chains of green technologies are both a means of domination—of people and of nature—and fertile ground for making the world anew.
Supply chains are currently organized for profit, but they can nonetheless become arenas for grassroots organizing and unexpected alliances. Lithium battery supply chains don’t just link mines to factories to consumers, or upstream to downstream corporations. They also connect Indigenous land defenders and urban transit users, workers manufacturing e-bikes and battery recycling advocates, bus drivers and avid cyclists, and climate activists and promoters of dense, walkable cities and towns. These communities, workers, and advocates are already bound together by the global operations of green capitalism—and in many cases, are already organizing locally. What would it take for them to join hands and fight for globally just supply chains, together?
Today, a coalition like this may feel impossible. Electrifying the status quo to stave off the scariest warming scenarios already seems hard enough. Electrifying while also changing engrained habits, like car dependency and suburban sprawl, seems far-fetched, if not utopian. But fear of radical change is misplaced: Radical, turbulent, accelerating, and yes, frightening, change is already baked into the carbon in the atmosphere and in the reign of sclerotic elites, predatory corporations, and moribund institutions.
There is no escaping the harsh reality of mounting instability—political, economic, ecological. This turmoil touches everything, including the material underbelly of the energy transition. This is the paradox of extraction: It is at once the most enduring feature of the world order and among the most prone to disruptive conflict, whether between Global North and South, between geopolitical rivals, or between local communities and huge corporations. Such contests are asymmetric, yet over the past century have provided openings to challenge the entrenched power relations of our global economy.
Extractive frontiers are so sedimented that they may feel like second nature, but it is precisely from these frontiers that we must begin again, from the underground on up.
Adapted from Extraction: The Frontiers of Green Capitalism by Thea Riofrancos. Copyright ©2025 by Thea Riofrancos. Used with permission of the publisher, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. All rights reserved.