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Does Johnson speak for his fellow Republicans? If he doesn’t, they need to make that clear—and not just by saying they don’t want to shut down Social Security.
Republicans tend to be quiet about their plans for Social Security’s future. But Senator Ron Johnson (R-Wis.) just said the quiet part out loud. In a FOX Business interview this week, Johnson called Social Security “grotesque” and a “Ponzi scheme.” He claimed “you can't fix it, you just shut it down and hope that you can recover some of your money."
Johnson isn’t just any Republican Senator. He is the chair of the Senate Budget Committee, a member of the Senate Committee on Finance, which has jurisdiction over Social Security, and a member of the Senate Select Committee on Aging.
Just hours after the FOX interview, Johnson chaired a hearing on Social Security’s future—where he doubled down on slandering the nation’s most popular and effective program as a “Ponzi scheme.”
Ron Johnson has very little company: Only two percent of Americans support any benefit cuts, let alone shutting down Social Security.
Republican President Dwight Eisenhower would not recognize his party. A true supporter of Social Security, he would have been horrified at Johnson’s rhetoric. Indeed, in 1954, Eisenhower wrote to his brother:
“There is a tiny splinter group… that believes you can [abolish Social Security]. Among them are H. L. Hunt (you possibly know his background), a few other Texas oil millionaires, and an occasional politician or business man from other areas. Their number is negligible and they are stupid.”
Unfortunately, that “tiny splinter group” whose “number is negligible” and who are “stupid” now control the Republican Party. They generally are too smart to show their disdain for a program that is so essential to the economic security of their constituents. But Johnson can’t keep his hostility from showing.
Does Johnson speak for his fellow Republicans? If he doesn’t, they need to make that clear—and not just by saying they don’t want to shut down Social Security. Republicans need to explain what their plan is to prevent an automatic cut of over 20 percent when Social Security faces a shortfall around 2032.
Democrats have a solution, which is overwhelmingly supported by voters of all political views and all demographics: Make the wealthiest Americans, who currently stop paying into Social Security after their first $184,500 in income, pay in on all their income—including unearned investment income.
This would allow us to not just avert Social Security cuts, but expand its modest benefits for everyone. The Social Security Expansion Act, sponsored by Senators Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) and Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), would increase benefits across the board by $200 a month, with additional targeted increases for vulnerable groups. So far, it does not have a single Republican co-sponsor.
In recent months, a few Republicans like Senator Bernie Moreno (R-Ohio) have started expressing openness to modifying the cap on contributions. That is a first step. But to truly show they are on the side of the American people, and not Eisenhower’s “tiny splinter group,” they need to go further and make a promise: Not one penny of cuts for current or future Social Security beneficiaries.
That is the will of the American people. Regardless of age, race, political affiliation, gender, or education level, Americans want to expand benefits—not cut them. Ron Johnson has very little company: Only two percent of Americans support any benefit cuts, let alone shutting down Social Security.
It is no surprise that Johnson faced a day of massive backlash, both online and from Democrats at the Budget Committee hearing. My colleague at Social Security Works, Alex Lawson, confronted Johnson outside the hearing. Johnson doubled down, again calling Social Security’s earned benefits a "Ponzi scheme.”
By the end of the day, Johnson changed tactics. He told Americans not to believe their lying ears, insisting he had never said he wanted to shut down Social Security. And he introduced the so-called “Stop Scaring Seniors Act,” which would authorize the government to use general government revenue to fund Social Security.
Johnson is the one scaring seniors. His bill is a gimmick designed to distract from what Johnson told us all he really believes: That Social Security shouldn't exist.
One of Social Security's greatest political protections is that it doesn't add even a penny to the deficit. Johnson's bill would undercut that protection and make Social Security easier to cut in the future. Given Johnson's longstanding hostility to Social Security, it is likely that paving the ground for future cuts is half the point.
Now that Democrats are in control, they should bring the Social Security Expansion Act to a vote next year.
Tellingly, back in 2022, Johnson proclaimed that Social Security spending should be moved to the discretionary budget—meaning it would be subjected to annual government funding fights. This bill serves the same purpose.
The other half of the story is that Johnson, who is worth a reported $40 million, is desperate for a solution that protects himself and his ultra-wealthy friends from paying their fair share.
Here’s the bottom line: In no more than six years, Congress must bring more money into Social Security, in order to avoid benefit cuts. The Democrats have proposed that the wealthiest should contribute their fair share into Social Security.
Now that Democrats are in control, they should bring the Social Security Expansion Act to a vote next year. Republicans can vote for it or offer an alternative.
If they instead kill it with the filibuster, that will make Social Security a front-and-center issue for the 2028 election. Because even MAGA Republicans oppose cutting Social Security, the election will likely be another Blue Tsunami. It will show that Eisenhower was right: those who hate Social Security are stupid and their number is indeed negligible.
This November, voters delivered an electoral earthquake.
A Blue Tsunami of Democratic victories in states the party scarcely dreamed of taking—from Kansas and Alaska to Texas and Mississippi.
But the more seismic political earthquake was not the size of the Democratic wave, but the new breed of Democrats riding it.
Across battleground districts and deep-red states alike, a defiant new mode of Democratic populism performed shockingly well—one with the potential to shatter old factional divisions and forge a new organizing principle for the center of the party.
To understand just how dramatically the center has shifted, look to how Democrats won Texas.
Self-declared populist Gina Hinojosa named economic power as the defining struggle of our era. James Talarico railed against billionaires buying elections, lobbyists rigging the rules, and Big Tech destroying American society. And rancher Clayton Tucker attacked agricultural consolidation and sold “Bust Monopolies” stickers.
Nationwide, the party’s election machinery trained its fire not only on Republicans, but on Big Tech data centers, price gouging monopolies, Wall Street home takeovers, AI surveillance pricing, and corporate consolidation in medicine, agriculture, groceries and beyond.
The victors—hardly all disciples of the progressive left—were united by a willingness to wage class war against concentrated economic power, echoing Texas progressive populist Jim Hightower: “Politics isn’t about left versus right, it’s about top versus bottom.”
Seemingly overnight, this has become the party’s new center of gravity.
That’s welcome news for the party’s left flank: For a generation of progressives for whom ‘Centrist Democrat’ and ‘Moderate Democrat’ have been shorthand for ‘Corporate Democrat,’ suddenly the midpoint of the party is looking very different.
But for the leaders of the party’s corporate-funded think tanks and diminishing neoliberal wing, this has presented an altogether more awkward problem: How to grapple with a party unifying against the very corporate interests they’ve spent years urging Democrats to accommodate?
Their answer has been simple enough: Declare the winners to be moderates, claim the victory as their own, and post, post, post their way through it.
Since the election, Matt Yglesias, Jonathan Chait and Third Way’s Jonathan Cowan have been trying to squeeze the populist surge into their well-worn “moderates win” narrative—claiming victory and vindication via a brand of politics that bears little resemblance to their own.
Jonathan Cowan, founder of the corporate-funded group Third Way, took a victory lap in The Wall Street Journal. It was inarguable, he said, that “moderates made both the Senate and House majority.” In The Atlantic, Chait recast the sweeping populist victory as a crushing defeat for the progressive left, framing their exuberance at the results as “election denial.” And through it all, Matt Yglesias has been relentlessly arguing that progressives Abdul El-Sayed and Troy Jackson statistically underperformed in victory.
The gall is considerable. Not just because this trio spent the whole cycle warning that economic populism was a road to ruin, but because this new crop of populists is clearly a world away from Third Way stalwarts like Joe Manchin, Kyrsten Sinema, Josh Gottheimer and Jared Moskowitz.
If it were merely a fight over folks taking a victory lap, it would be graceful to stay out of it. But the stakes run a little higher.
The fight to define the Democratic victory is ultimately a fight over what to do with it. To shape the party’s legislative, investigative, and political agenda in the years ahead—and how the media and punditocracy should cover it.
It also risks pulling both progressives and moderates back into old factional trenches just as this thumping victory opens the door to something far bigger: a more electable and durable governing coalition, a mandate for sweeping changes that both wings have long yearned for, and a unifying vision for a party that has been ideologically splintered and adrift for far too long.
As we watch this battle unfold, there are four points worth keeping in mind.
1) These Midterms Were Unifying, Actually
For veterans of factional battles past, now might seem like a good time to pause and welcome the arrival of a mode of politics that’s proven capable of unifying the progressive left and red-state Dems.
A number of centrist and progressive commentators have done just that—as have an even greater number of elected officials.
Senator Elizabeth Warren jumped in early to define the midterm results, writing in Time that the debate over whether moderates or progressives won is “the wrong question” entirely.
“Democrats won by recognizing Americans’ economic pain, denouncing Washington corruption that has made a rigged economy worse by favoring giant corporations over working people, and by pledging to upend this system,” Warren wrote.
In Denver last weekend, at a gathering hosted by the centrist Majority Democrats group, ‘moderate’ elected officials were falling over themselves to declare the party rifts over. “If you have elected officials who are spending all their time fighting progressive versus moderate, then they have missed the plot of the election,” Senator Elissa Slotkin told the crowd.
And similarly—while a battle rages between Chuck Schumer and Chris Van Hollen for Senate Majority Leader—Van Hollen has been keen to downplay the factional element.
It’s not about “progressives or moderates,” he told Fox News Sunday: “Those are old Washington labels. It’s much more about taking on a rigged economy, rigged in favor of the very wealthy and fueled by political corruption.”
Almost everyone in the party now has a reason to embrace this new mode of politics.
For progressives, it offers an alternate axis of regional, cultural and issue moderation that is less likely to gut ambitious economic legislation, frustrate major progressive reforms, or kill measures like the public option (cf. Lieberman, Manchin, and Sinema).
For moderates, it offers an election-winning bridge across the party—a way around culture-war minefields, unpopular slogans, and DSA skirmishes. And the rise of the “populist moderate” may finally allow centrists to distinguish “moderation” from deference to the wealthy and powerful.
Populism offers both wings an opening to unite around something more consequential than merely opposing a lame-duck Trump: Challenging the corporate interests and lobbyists that have spent years narrowing the limits of Democratic (and ‘democratic’) ambition.
And as we enter a post-Trump political era, it offers a clear path to redefine a Democratic Party that too many voters have come to see as elitist, out of touch, unable to deliver change, and just as beholden to wealthy donors and corporate interests as their Republican opponents.
2) These Are Not Your Grandmother’s Moderates
Branding populist midterm winners “moderates” obscures more than it illuminates.
These are candidates who railed against billionaire influence and Wall Street lobbyists, proudly refused corporate PAC money, championed ambitious new spending programs, pledged to get Big Money out of politics, publicly criticized AIPAC, savaged Big Tech oligarchs, ran against data centers, and strongly opposed US engagement in Middle East wars.
As many progressives responded: If anti-billionaire, anti-war, anti-AIPAC, big-spending Democrats are the new “moderates,” then defeat smells suspiciously like victory.
The far more accurate term would seem to be “populist”—a term which Texas governor-elect Gina Hinojosa told the New York Times “meets the moment” of our era: “The one fight in this country is about economic power, and populism is about economic power.”
New York Times opinion contributor Rotimi Adeoye described this form of populism as “a new liberal fusionism.” Candidates bundling leftist economic populism with centrist electoral pragmatism.
I might take that further: While President Barack Obama fused calls for post-partisan unity with progressive ambitions—hope and change—these new populists are fusing pragmatic coalition-building with explicit class confrontation—stop punching left and right, punch up.
It’s a distinction that runs beyond policy preferences and to a different mode of politics altogether.
Traditional moderates might promise competent management, incremental reform and political compromise. Populists are campaigning on the premise that the entire economic and political system is rigged and are demanding fundamental change.
They took public anger and channeled it toward billionaires, powerful corporations and the politicians who protect them, rather than simply railing against DC gridlock and government dysfunction.
And rather than seeking legitimacy through elite approval, reverence for institutions or bipartisan conventional wisdom, they’re earning credibility by breaking norms, confronting powerful interests and pledging to deliver results by any means necessary.
That doesn’t mean rejecting compromise or bipartisanship, it means treating them as a means to an end, not virtues in themselves.
What won this year was a mode of politics drawn from Warren’s critique of corporate power, Obama’s post-partisan optimism, Mamdani’s politics of joyful defiance and delivery, and Bernie’s anti-billionaire fury. In some cases it’s tempered by cultural moderation and left/party distancing, but it’s united, above all, by the class politics of populism: The battle isn’t left versus right, but the top versus the rest of us.
To give moderates their flowers, there is a version of moderation that may have won out earlier this month.
As Ezra Klein argued this cycle, Democrats need space to ‘moderate’ on cultural and regional issues—from religion to choice to immigration to guns—especially when running in red districts. Sure enough, we saw the election of ostensibly pro-life or pro-Second Amendment or culturally conservative Democrats in states like Mississippi, Iowa and Alaska.
The degree to which that moderation mattered is still hotly debated.
Others used different means to differentiate themselves from a Democratic brand tarred variously as elitist, culture-war obsessed, or too meek to take up big fights.
Jamie Ager embraced the brand “Mountain Democrat.” Paige Cognetti ran as a “democrat with a backbone” “like they used to make ‘em.” Marie Gluesenkamp Perez picked fights with the party repeatedly. Many worked hard to develop independent campaign branding.
Will the party’s sweep of populists come to occupy the “moderate” or “centrist” lanes? Probably. Neither label is going anywhere soon. But both terms imply midpoint posturing, whereas these candidates are trying to redraw the battle lines entirely.
This new “political center” is not seeking to carve a middle ground between the demands of the left and the concessions corporate interests are willing to tolerate. Whatever you choose to call them, these are not your grandmother’s moderates.
3) The Absolute Chutzpah
Perhaps another reason why the debate online has been particularly fiery is that folks like Cowan, Yglesias, and Chait really have no business taking a victory lap right now. They spent much of this cycle arguing explicitly against the politics of economic populism.
If anyone outside the campaigns themselves deserves a day in the sun, it’s the people who actually built the winning playbook.
More ‘progressive’ groups like Groundwork Collaborative, More Perfect Union, Data for Progress, Working Class Narrative, Working Families Party (and my own Open Markets Institute) did the hard work of figuring out how Democrats could reclaim the economy as a winning issue.
“Our democracy cannot survive an economy of powerlessness,” Senator Chris Murphy told an Open Markets conference in DC this June.
These groups were speaking with swing voters, investigating corporate corruption, identifying sleeper issues like data centers, lifting up corporate exploitation and rigorously testing economic messages and lines of attack with battleground voters.
They refined tweaks to Sanders-style populism to work better for independent-coded candidates in red states and battleground districts and supplied reams of data, polling, and message testing to campaigns. Even the DCCC and House Majority PAC ended the cycle by embracing their populist attacks in the toughest races.
What were the others busy doing?
Cowan kicked off the cycle with a Bulwark piece titled Democrats, Don’t Fall for the Allure of Left-Wing Populism, warning against precisely the kind of class-centered politics that won out.
“As a political matter, you have to squint pretty hard to see 2024 as a mandate to bring low the titans of industry,” he wrote, before reiterating Senator John Fetterman’s comparison of Elon Musk to Tony Stark. Third Way has been urging the party to focus on an “opportunity economy” of “growth and prosperity” rather than a confrontation with corporate power.
“The theory that populist economic policies can win back the working class for Democrats has been tried, and it has failed,” wrote Jonathan Chait last year, part of a series of articles urging a return to neoliberalism, championing ‘Abundance’ and warning against economic populism.
For his part, Matt Yglesias was writing pieces titled Let’s all practice billionaire positivity, describing economic populism as a “fad,” while also pressing for a deregulatory abundance agenda to dethrone it.
But on election night, victorious Democrats were bashing billionaires and corporate influence at a rate that would make Elizabeth Warren’s comms team blush.
Now, having lost the debate over how Democrats should campaign, these folks are trying to claim the mantle for how Democrats should govern—and taking their advice would be a dangerous mistake…
4) The Democratic Agenda Matters
This isn’t just an online debate, it’s one with real-world consequences.
Advocacy from corporate-funded centrist groups aims to shape party incentives, inform media coverage and, ultimately, blunt the shift toward populism.
Chamber of Progress—a self-described tech industry coalition—is already urging the party to lay off Big Tech: “Let’s not confuse an anti-Trump wave with an anti-tech mandate,” said CEO Adam Kovacevich.
It’s a bold claim after dozens of candidates explicitly campaigned on regulating AI, restricting data centers, banning surveillance pricing, and getting tech billionaires and corporate lobbyists out of politics. Axios reported that ballot measures to restrict data centers won 43–1 across 10 states, with an average margin of 75%.
“Data centers became—naturally and by design—a proxy for concerns about affordability, corporate power, and communities losing control to special interests,” admitted none other than OpenAI’s Chief Global Affairs Officer Chris Lehane in his post-election analysis.
It’s no surprise that advocacy groups and lobbyists are going in to bat for their stakeholders—just as it’s no surprise that industry groups are rebranding deregulatory agendas as affordability agendas. That’s politics.
It’s also no surprise that Third Way and the misleadingly named Progressive Policy Institute—a group whose funders have included Big Pharma and Big Tech—have both urged Democrats to train investigations on Trump rather than going hard on corporate power (this is the same PPI that advised Dems to retire “rigged system populism” mind you).
Unsurprisingly, their advice cuts against what voters have been telling pollsters.
“Perhaps the most important oversight to be done is to go after companies that are engaging in corrupt practices or practices that are unfairly raising people’s prices,” Melissa Toufanian, Managing Director at Navigator Research, told me just before the election.
In a memo shared on Capitol Hill by Groundwork Action—a top proponent of economic populism—the group shares polling which “indicates that an oversight agenda should prioritize investigating examples of corporate abuse and corruption that directly raise costs on Americans as opposed to other scandals or rule-of-law violations involving the Trump administration.”
In other words: Put corporate abuses and pay-for-play scandals under the spotlight, rather than programming a partisan defenestration for audiences on MS NOW.
“Two in three voters (66%) think that investigations of corporate greed should be a high priority for Congress—more than any other area of potential oversight we tested,” the memo says.
Extending investigations into corporate greed would show swing voters that Democratic investigations are responsive to voter concerns, serious about confronting corporate power, not consumed by partisan retribution, and capable of delivering real outcomes: Like criminal referrals and new legislation.
That broader focus should be carried through in legislation too.
“The problem is not just high prices but also the structure of the economy,” former Biden Antitrust official Tim Wu wrote recently in the New York Times. “Credibility has to come from a platform of policies that shift economic power away from the big guys in ways that voters can readily understand.”
That might be bills that raise the minimum wage or ban price gouging, congressional stock trading, Wall Street home ownership, and AI surveillance. Wedge the Republican Party with big, simple, populist economic policies. Dare Trump to use his veto pen and raise its salience.
If this new crop of populists follows the ‘Mamdani Model’ of governing pragmatism, they’ll borrow ideas from business, progressives, Republicans and centrists alike—whatever helps deliver their agenda—without pandering to those interests or pursuing deregulation for its own sake.
The danger: If Democrats let lobbyists, elites or ideological purists dilute the focus on economic populism—or swing back to milquetoast moderation—they will turn a sweeping mandate into another reason for disillusioned voters not to trust them.
Closing Thoughts
As the noise of this brawl shows, there is real anxiety on the left as well as the center.
Semafor’s Dave Weigel summed it up well: “The left’s take here is that the winning messages came from them. Economic populism with no hemming and hawing a-la 2024. Its worry is that Schumer/Jeffries could run things like Keir Starmer, taking the mandate and futzing around, giving the populist right another opening.”
Having lived through those years in Britain, I suspect the Democrats are less likely to repeat Labour’s mistakes.
For one thing, there’s no American Prime Minister with the power to impose a retreat from above—and the Democrats did not gut their own economic agenda prior to the election. Winning candidates know what they ran on. Most of those jockeying for attention in the presidential primaries will not do so by running to the right.
For another thing, key committee assignments are likely to be held by some of the party’s best anti-corruption attack dogs—from Sen. Elizabeth Warren to Reps. Jamie Raskin to Ro Khanna.
None of this guarantees that Democrats will govern as boldly as they campaigned. Their roaring return to Congress has been accompanied by a boom for Democratic lobbyists on K Street, Politico reports. But it has also prompted a flurry of legal notes to corporations, urging them to brace for a wave of Democratic subpoenas.
Ultimately, the fight raging online risks crowding out a happier story: This populist shift might do more to unite the party’s ideological factions than divide them.
(To pause for a victory lap of my own, this is something I foreshadowed last year, with victories from Mikie Sherrill and Zohran Mamdani, united by fierce anti-monopoly platforms).
The intra-party fight is not specifically what Senator-elect James Talarico was referring to in his victory speech, but his words seem apt for it: “They want us focused on how we’re different instead of on how we’re the same [...] They want us looking left and right at each other instead of looking up at them.”
The old left-versus-center argument will likely rage on for another two years. Pundits will continue tallying wins-above-replacement as though that’s the most important metric.
The more consequential question is whether Democrats can turn this populist breakthrough into the generational and geographic realignment that these midterms have put within reach—or squander the opportunity by falling back along traditional factional lines.
“That old politics is dying and a new politics is being born,” Talarico said in his victory speech. “Now, the real work begins.”
This essay was first published in Liberty & Power on Substack and appears at Common Dreams with permission.
The midterms showed voters want concentrated wealth and power challenged; a durable progressive realignment will require changing who gets recruited, financed, and treated as politically viable—not just changing the message.
Democrats’ sweeping midterm victory has rightly been described as an economic-populist wave. Across the country, candidates won by challenging billionaire influence, rising costs, corporate power, and an economy that too often leaves working people behind.
But there is another question progressives should ask now: If working-class power is the answer, who actually gets the chance to exercise political power?
I spent nearly two decades working behind the scenes on labor, consumer protection, technology, and artificial intelligence policy before entering electoral politics for the first time this year. I ran for Congress as an independent in New York’s 12th District. Together with another fellow independent, Karen Ortiz, we went through this experience from having to get on the ballot by collecting over 3,500 signatures to the general election.
People do not need someone else to become their voice. They need institutions that give them the tools, relationships, resources, and room to exercise their own power.
In the end, I came out of that campaign with more respect for voters and less confidence in the structures we use to understand and represent them.
Running outside the party machinery gave me an unusually direct look at what happens before voters ever cast a ballot.
Political institutions help determine who is encouraged to run, who knows donors, who can afford to stop working, who receives institutional support, who gets invited into important rooms, and who gets treated as a viable candidate.
By the time we tell voters that democracy has given them a choice, institutions have often made hundreds of choices about who will reach them.
New research from political scientists Nicholas Carnes and Noam Lupu makes the consequences stark. Working-class jobs make up roughly 70% of occupations in the average democracy they studied, yet only about 2% of national legislators previously held working-class jobs. Their research also finds that the disparity is not explained by workers being less interested in running, less qualified, or less attractive to voters.
Much of the filtering happens earlier.
Running for office requires time, income, professional flexibility, privacy, and a willingness to assume enormous personal risk. Those burdens are much easier to absorb if you have wealth, flexible employment, or professional networks.
Party gatekeepers, meanwhile, operate under intense pressure to win. They understandably gravitate toward people they know and candidates who already appear financially and professionally equipped to survive a campaign.
The result can become a self-reinforcing political class.
My campaign gave me a smaller window into the same machinery.
We ran independently and rejected corporate PAC, super PAC, and dark-money support. We spent enormous amounts of time talking with Democrats, Republicans, independents, and unaffiliated voters rather than concentrating only on people a political model told us we could win.
That is inefficient by the standards of modern campaigning.
Modern campaigns are built to sort base voter, swing voter, donor, low-propensity voter, progressive, moderate, independent.
Those categories have practical uses. But people routinely violated them.
A worker could want stronger labor protections and still distrust the government. A small-business owner could want tougher corporate regulation. A Republican could worry about workplace surveillance and artificial intelligence. A Democrat could be furious about billionaire influence in their own party.
The political categories were often cleaner than the people.
The electorate itself is also becoming less attached to those categories. Gallup found that a record 45% of American adults identified as independents in 2025, compared with 27% each identifying as Democrats and Republicans. In New York City, unaffiliated voters now make up more than one-fifth of registered voters, and nearly half are under 40.
That does not mean these voters are centrists. It certainly does not mean they are automatically progressive.
It suggests something more fundamental: Millions of Americans do not see the existing parties as complete expressions of who they are politically.
Progressives should see both an opportunity and a warning.
If the lesson of 2026 becomes simply that Democrats need better working-class messaging, we will have missed the deeper challenge.
Professional politicians becoming better at talking about working-class life is not the same as working people possessing political power themselves.
History shows that representation changes when institutions change.
When unions possessed greater political strength in countries like Britain and Germany, they did more than endorse politicians. They recruited workers, financed candidates, supplied organizers, and created pathways into government for people who otherwise faced enormous obstacles to running.
There are examples here at home.
I saw the same principle from another direction during my years at Coworker.org. Coworker was built on a simple idea: Workers who may not have a union or traditional organizing infrastructure still need ways to build power themselves. Over its first decade, more than 500,000 workers connected, organized, and advocated through the network, generating more than 3 million actions and 2 million petition signatures. Some campaigns began with a single worker asking for a workplace change and grew into durable networks, including early Starbucks worker organizing that helped lay groundwork for a much larger movement.
What I learned there was that people do not need someone else to become their voice. They need institutions that give them the tools, relationships, resources, and room to exercise their own power.
Imagine taking that idea seriously at scale.
Public financing could reduce candidates’ dependence on wealthy networks. Income replacement or political scholarships could allow workers to run without risking financial ruin. Right-to-return protections could make candidacy less dangerous for people who cannot simply leave their careers. Unions and community organizations could create candidate pipelines rooted in workplaces and neighborhoods rather than professional political circles.
And none of this substitutes for building power outside government.
Workers will have more influence inside legislatures when they have more leverage in workplaces, unions, neighborhoods, and durable civic organizations. Elections cannot be the only moment when ordinary people exercise power.
Democrats won an extraordinary election.
But victory creates its own blind spot.
The party that loses must ask what went wrong. The party that wins can convince itself that nothing is wrong.
Economic populism helped produce this moment. The next step cannot simply be adopting its language.
If progressives believe politics should serve working people, then working people need a much greater role in making politics.
The challenge after 2026 is not only to win more working-class votes.
It is to change who gets to lead.
Members of Congress can create change by following a simple template provided by the People-First Foreign Policy Pledge: End the Iran War and all endless wars, cut the Pentagon budget and abolish ICE, and end support for governments like Israel's that violate humans rights.
“The idea that US voters don’t care about foreign policy is over.” This is what we wrote in Common Dreams in early October, almost a month before the midterms buried the notion that voters don’t care about foreign policy.
Now, the new Democratic majority has the public mandate and the tools to begin acting on voters’ demands by ending the Iran War, shrinking the Pentagon budget, and stopping the arming of governments abusing human rights.
Democrats flipped over 40 House seats and nine in the Senate, providing sizable majorities in both chambers. Analysts across the political spectrum widely agree on what drove the wave: President Donald Trump’s unauthorized war on Iran and its role in pushing up the price of gas, groceries, and other basics.
Even Vice President JD Vance conceded the point. “The real reason we lost is obvious to almost everyone,” Vance wrote in a November 4 social media post that made headlines worldwide. “The reason we lost is the war.”
Other aspects of foreign policy also mattered: Voters backed candidates who opposed US support for Israel, Trump’s tariffs, and Trump’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) violent mass deportation campaign.
The new Democratic majorities, which include 109 incoming lawmakers—the largest class of newcomers since 1933—must seize this moment. With help from Republicans who have read the results, they should use Congress’ power to deliver the change voters want in how the country engages with the world.
Members of Congress can create this change by following a simple template provided by the People-First Foreign Policy Pledge, a tool we helped launch before the election with the endorsement of dozens of foreign policy experts and national organizations.
The Pledge urges support for three commonsense foreign policy positions that the elections showed are broadly popular across the country and across significant parts of the political spectrum. The three positions are
To deliver the change that voters are demanding and we desperately need, Congress should follow the Pledge to embrace a foreign policy that prioritizes the safety, security, and well-being of the people of our country and the world over those profiting off war.
Conventional wisdom once said that voters don’t care about foreign policy because it’s too far removed from their lives. This was likely never true, and it certainly isn’t now.
NBC News exit polls show that 74% of voters surveyed said the Iran War was a “crucial” or “major” factor in their vote. Anti-war messages were central to winning Senate campaigns in swing states as diverse as Texas, Georgia, and Ohio, as well as in dozens of house races. This is unsurprising for a war that quickly has become the most unpopular in US history, according to Stephen Semler of the Center for International Policy.
The public clearly understands how waging an illegal, offensive war of choice has made their lives less affordable by driving up gas, grocery, and other prices. They likewise know the war is wasting tens of billions of taxpayer dollars that could meet people’s urgent needs at home, while killing and injuring tens of thousands, starting on its first day, when a strike on a school in Minab, Iran killed 168 children and other civilians.
The revolt against the president and the party came in part because Trump reneged on his 2024 election campaign promises to “stop wars” and “not… start wars.”
Delivering a people-first foreign policy begins with ending the Iran War, which has harmed so many while benefiting only weapons makers such as Lockheed Martin, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders, and Washington, DC foreign policy elites who long pushed for the war.
Since the election, Democrats appear encouragingly united in prioritizing an end to the war by immediately cutting off its funding and reasserting Congress’ war powers. The Congressional Progressive Caucus, expected to grow to about 126 members, will be positioned to lead that push. Republicans who, like the vice president, understand the harm the conflict has caused their party would be smart to join Democrats in pressuring Trump to end the war.
The revolt against the president and the party came in part because Trump reneged on his 2024 election campaign promises to “stop wars” and “not… start wars.”
Beyond Iran, Democrats should follow the People-First Foreign Policy Pledge’s first commitment to end all endless wars, including those in Yemen and Somalia, as well as the extrajudicial assassinations of alleged drug traffickers off the coasts of South America.
The key to ending endless US wars—and preventing any future ones—lies in the Pledge’s second commitment. Just as defunding the Iran War is the best way to end it, cutting the budget for what Trump calls the Department of War is the best way to make this war the last one the country wages.
Earlier this year, Trump requested the largest military budget in US and world history for the 2027 fiscal year: $1.57 trillion, counting money to continue his war in Iran, which would be around a 50% increase over this year’s already out-of-control war budget.
Democrats must listen to the overwhelming opposition to Trump’s request: 65% of the country—and 87% of Democrats—are opposed, according to a Washington Post-ABC-Ipsos poll.
Giving Trump even a fraction of his proposed increase (even with prohibitions on using the money to fight Iran) would reward his attacks on Iran, Venezuela, and military threats against 10 other countries. Unless Democrats want to enable a new war with Cuba, for example, they should cut the current Pentagon budget to $750 billion, which would still exceed the combined military spending of China, Russia, and North Korea, while ensuring the cuts don’t harm military personnel or their families.
The cuts should come instead from the many boondoggle weapons programs, such as the “Trump-class” battleship, that go to the main beneficiaries of the bloated Pentagon budget: weapons makers, AI and other tech companies, and other military contractors, which already receive around 54% of annual military spending.
As many voters intrinsically understand, cutting the Pentagon budget will be key to advancing the domestic affordability agenda that so many have demanded and that also proved decisive in Democrats’ midterm victories. Funding Medicare for All, affordable housing, childcare, and other popular priorities will require clawing back money from the War Department that has come to devour more than half of annual discretionary spending controlled by Congress.
This would clearly be a popular move: A new Economist/YouGov poll shows, for example, that 70% of voters support increasing government spending on healthcare compared with only 36% who support increasing military spending.
A $750 billion budget would also be an important way to take on corruption in Washington, DC, another of voters’ top concerns. Military spending has long been an overlooked fountain of corruption and waste beginning with the campaign donations that contractors dole out to congressmembers to secure new contracts. Trump’s Pentagon appears to have been particularly successful in directing billions in contracts to cronies such as Elon Musk’s SpaceX and contractors backed by Trump family investments.
ICE may look like a domestic agency, but Trump’s deportation campaign has become a defining feature of US relations with its neighbors, and it has generated widespread outrage at home. In January, during an ICE raid in Minneapolis, federal agents shot and killed two US citizens, Renee Good, a 37-year-old mother of three, and Alex Pretti, a 37-year-old ICU nurse. ICE has locked up, brutalized, and deported tens of thousands of people whose only offense was a civil immigration violation.
Trump has acknowledged that his immigration policies were likely “too tough” and played a role in Democrats’ victories. Around 60% of voters surveyed in exit polls disapproved of how ICE “is handling its job” and felt that the Trump administration’s immigration enforcement actions have “gone too far.”
While “abolition” may sound too radical to some, nearly three-quarters of Democrats, almost half of independents, and even one-quarter of Republicans support abolishing ICE, according to a July Economist/YouGov poll. The Democratic National Committee passed a resolution in August calling for the agency’s abolition, and Democrats should follow through on this promise to voters.
Congress must also embrace the People-First Foreign Policy Pledge’s third commitment to cut off US support for Israel and other human rights violators.
More than half of voters in exit polls said they think US support for Israel is “too strong,” with only 12% saying it’s “not strong enough,” amid a dramatic decline in support for Israel among Democrats and others across the political spectrum.
It’s no wonder that candidates such as Michigan Senator-elect Abdul El-Sayed, who overcame $42 million in pro-Israel AIPAC spending against him, and House members-elect Adam Hamawy (NJ) and Darializa Avila Chevalier (NY) won after making calls to end support for Israel a key message in their campaigns.
Ending endless US wars, cutting the Pentagon budget, abolishing ICE, and stopping US support for Israel and other human rights violators are just the beginning of the transformation in US foreign policy we need.
This has become such a mainstream position that President Trump announced on election day that the US government would stop sending $3.8 billion in annual support to Israel to buy US and other weapons. In his November 4 social media post, Vice President Vance likewise identified changing the US relationship to Israel as one of four priorities for Republicans seeking to win back voters.
Fulfilling the People-First Foreign Policy Pledge’s third commitment begins with Congress simply enforcing the existing Leahy Laws, which bar US assistance to foreign military forces committing human rights violations, a standard that should apply to countries such as the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.
In Israel’s case, Congress must ensure Trump follows through on his promise to end $3.8 billion in annual funding and prevent the annual National Defense Authorization Act from including a dangerous provision to deepen military collaboration with and backdoor funding for the country.
We call on people regardless of political affiliation to join us in using the People-First Foreign Policy Pledge as a tool to demand Congress listen to voters and fulfill the Pledge’s three commitments. Each will improve the safety and security of our country and the world by building a foreign policy that puts people first rather than those who profit from war.
Ending endless US wars, cutting the Pentagon budget, abolishing ICE, and stopping US support for Israel and other human rights violators are just the beginning of the transformation in US foreign policy we need. And with 12 state legislative chambers and five governorships flipping to Democrats, including six new Democratic trifectas in Arizona, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Wisconsin, states can push, too, from divesting from weapons makers and countries violating human rights to resisting ICE cooperation.
We are excited to work with others to create a newly democratized foreign policy based on rejecting war and instead embracing diplomacy and the international cooperation we need to overcome the urgent challenges of affordability and inequality, data centers and AI, nuclear weapons, and catastrophic climate change.
Together, we can implement policies—domestic and foreign—that put people first just as tens of millions demanded on election day.