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Washington’s present predicament cannot be explained solely through depleted arsenals, poor military planning, Trump’s impulsiveness, or Netanyahu’s manipulation. Nor can it be understood simply as the result of underestimating Iran.
The US government continues to double down, even as its stubbornness costs it dearly—not only in material terms, but also in geopolitical influence. Washington is rapidly losing power and status in the Middle East, a decline that could produce a wider domino effect, reverberating around the world.
The latest expression of this hubris came from US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. Speaking at a G20 gathering of finance ministers in Asheville, North Carolina on September 1, Bessent declared that within two years, the Strait of Hormuz would become “a worthless piece of water,” as oil would instead be transported through overland pipelines.
Bessent is now promoting a new narrative that shifts the emphasis from the military war to an economic one. In an August 23 article for the Financial Times, he announced that “an economic D-Day is coming for Iran,” threatening countries that continue to trade with Tehran with severe economic consequences.
This sounds less like a serious foreign-policy strategy than an admission of Washington’s inability to alter the course of the ongoing war.
The deeper failure lies in Washington’s attempt to impose an outdated model of regional domination on a Middle East—and a world—that has fundamentally changed.
Two dominant schools of thought have emerged to explain how Washington found itself in this position.
The first, promoted largely by sections of the US media, former officials, and retired military commanders, argues that the war on Iran was a mistake from the outset and that Washington lacked the military and logistical preparedness necessary to wage it.
The second explanation places Iran at the center. It argues that Washington fundamentally underestimated Iran’s military capabilities, political resilience, and regional reach, treating the country as though it were another Venezuela that could be subdued through sanctions, threats, and limited military pressure.
Both explanations contain elements of truth. Neither, however, provides the deeper, less defensive, and more historically grounded understanding required to explain the scale of the present American failure.
John J. Mearsheimer, the prominent American political scientist and international relations scholar, has been among the boldest critics of the US war.
“Trump is trapped and has no way out,” Mearsheimer said on July 15, reiterating an argument he had advanced repeatedly since the beginning of the war. “All of this is to say that the decision to attack Iran on 28 February 2026 is one of the greatest blunders in the history of US foreign policy,” he added.
Mearsheimer, like Jeffrey Sachs, Scott Ritter, and other critical American voices, often—and understandably—analyzes these “great blunders” from a US-centered perspective. For millions of people in the Middle East, however, this collective analysis is not an intellectual or strategic exercise. It describes their everyday reality. They have lived through these catastrophic miscalculations and paid the human cost of US intransigence, militarism, and political failure.
The history of US foreign policy in the Middle East offers countless examples of this destructive pattern. Washington’s support for Israel—the region’s greatest destabilizing force—remains the most enduring example.
Palestinians, Lebanese, Syrians, and other peoples of the region require no new strategic framework to reach a conclusion similar to Mearsheimer’s. They have experienced the consequences of US power directly: wars, invasions, occupations, sanctions, political interference, and unconditional support for Israel.
The United States also established a disastrous record through its invasion and occupation of Iraq. It succeeded in overthrowing Saddam Hussein’s government in 2003, but failed catastrophically to govern the country, stabilize it, or restructure the Middle East according to the "vision" it had proclaimed.
The outcome was not a new American order, but the devastation of Iraq, prolonged instability, and the rise of political forces Washington had neither anticipated nor controlled.
Washington’s Western allies were also drawn into what became known as the Iraq quagmire, paying considerable political, military and financial costs for a war whose premises proved false and whose consequences remain unresolved.
Naturally, those former partners have little appetite for participating in a much larger and potentially more destructive war against Iran for an indefinite period—particularly when the crisis is being managed by Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, two deeply unpopular, impulsive, and widely distrusted leaders.
But the Middle East has changed. Regional states now possess greater political agency, more diversified alliances, and far more at stake than they did in 2003. They are no longer operating within a regional order in which Washington represents the only meaningful center of global power.
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent visit to Egypt provides one of numerous examples. “We must uphold the principle that the people of the Middle East are the masters of their own affairs,” Xi said during his September 2 meeting with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. He also urged countries to oppose “external interference” and strengthen regional dialogue on peace and security.
Like Egypt, other regional powers are similarly diversifying their partnerships rather than relying exclusively on Washington.
Key Middle Eastern leaders understand that a prolonged war against Iran would not remain confined to Iran. It could destabilize the entire region, devastate economies and infrastructure, threaten vital energy routes and generate interconnected wars whose consequences could endure for decades.
This brings us to Israel. Historically the cornerstone of US strategy in the region, Israel is itself considerably weaker. It is militarily overstretched, politically fragmented, socially divided, and unable to decisively conclude any of the wars it has opened, despite Netanyahu’s repeated declarations of victory.
Washington’s present predicament, therefore, cannot be explained solely through depleted arsenals, poor military planning, Trump’s impulsiveness, or Netanyahu’s manipulation. Nor can it be understood simply as the result of underestimating Iran.
The deeper failure lies in Washington’s attempt to impose an outdated model of regional domination on a Middle East—and a world—that has fundamentally changed.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's "apologists have to explain why killing kids happens so regularly and effortlessly," said one congressman who noted growing support for blocking US weapons to Israel.
A series of Israeli strikes across southern Lebanon since Friday night have killed and wounded dozens of people, including women, children, and paramedics, despite a US-brokered ceasefire.
On Monday, Israeli strikes in Kfar Rumman killed 12 people: a paramedic and 11 people in a targeted residential building, including at least four women and two children, according to Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health.
Al Jazeera reported that the attack on the targeted home killed three generations of one family, including a 2-month-old baby.
Another 11 people were killed in Lebanon on Sunday, and four others before that, bringing the death toll to 27, with at least 69 civilians wounded, according to the ministry. Women, children, medics, and journalists were among those harmed.
Those casualties followed Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz claiming Friday that the IDF had taken control of Lebanon's Ali al-Taher ridge, about six miles from the border, and vowing that his country's military "will not withdraw from the security zone in Lebanon until Hezbollah is disarmed."
Since Hamas led the October 7, 2023 attack on Israel, resulting in the Israel Defense Forces' genocidal war on the Gaza Strip, the Lebanese political and militant group Hezbollah has sided with Palestinians in the besieged exclave, and the IDF has been attacking southern Lebanon.
Hezbollah has also backed Iran since the US and Israel began bombing the country in February, leading to renewed Israeli violence in Lebanon. In addition to slaughtering at least 73,658 Palestinians in Gaza since October 2023, the IDF has killed more than 8,900 Lebanese and injured over 30,6000, according to the ministry.
That bloodshed over the past few years has fueled calls for cutting off the billions of dollars in military aid that the United States gives Israel annually. US Congressman Mark Pocan (D-Wis.) issued one such call after the attacks on Monday, stressing on social media that "Israel strikes Lebanon and kills kids. They continue to strike Gaza and kill kids."
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's "apologists have to explain why killing kids happens so regularly and effortlessly," Pocan continued. "More and more members of Congress are saying it's time to #BlocktheBombs."
Although a June ceasefire brought some relief to the people of Lebanon, hundreds of thousands remain displaced by Israeli occupation and attacks. Agence France-Presse reported Monday that after the June ceasefire deal was reached, villagers returned home to Kfar Rumman.
Following the attack after midnight Monday, "an AFP photographer saw the building that was hit in Kfar Rumman had been destroyed, with school books and remnants of furniture strewn across the rubble," the agency detailed. It continued:
"Since we returned here, we've lived in fear," Fouad Chakaron told AFP.
He insisted the targeted building was inhabited by "peaceful people with no connection to anyone."
Neighbors fled after the strike, which also damaged nearby buildings, AFP's photographer said.
Multiple outlets noted that the IDF didn't issue an evacuation warning before the strikes on Kfar Rumman. Reuters pointed out that the IDF claimed steps had been taken to mitigate harm "to uninvolved individuals, including the use of precise munitions and aerial surveillance," and it is now reviewing the reported casualties.
The IDF said on social media Monday that it hit "several Hezbollah terrorist infrastructure sites across southern Lebanon, including a weapons storage facility. Additionally, the IDF struck terrorists who were identified transferring weapons in the area of Kfar Rumman, in order to remove the threat they posed. The strikes were in response to Hezbollah’s launch of two explosive drones toward IDF troops in the security zone."
The deadly strikes on Monday came after Lebanon's Ministry of Public Health announced Sunday that "the Israeli raids launched by the occupation forces this morning led to the complete destruction of the Ghandour Hospital in Nabatieh, which constitutes an additional serious violation of international humanitarian law that provides for the protection of health facilities."
Lebanese President Joseph Aoun condemned the destruction of the hospital, which was reportedly emptied of patients and staff, and highlighted that attacks in the area also "resulted in the fall of innocent victims and caused severe damage to the building of the Ministry of Finance there."
Israel's assault on the Nabatieh region is "a dangerous escalation," the president said, and "reveals a persistent pattern of attacks that goes beyond the alleged military targets to purely civilian administrations and health centers, reflecting a clear intent to strike the continuity of Lebanese institutions' operations and disrupt people's daily interests."
While Aoun said he holds "the Israeli side fully responsible for this ongoing escalation," he is also "calling on the United States of America and the international community to take urgent action to stop these violations and hold their perpetrators accountable, affirming that Lebanon, despite all these attacks, is committed to upholding its sovereignty, the stability of its south, and the safety of its citizens."
Acknowledging the problems is only the first step. A demonstrated and sustained commitment to implement a changed approach to the multiple crises we have helped to create or exacerbate across the Middle East—and the globe—must follow.
While the US has a long history of signing treaties, making commitments, and then walking away from them (ask Native American tribes about this), this century’s record of American policy in the Middle East is something quite extraordinary. Dramatic policy shifts, broken treaties, promises made and forgotten, foolish wars fought without attention paid to the mess left for others, and the shattering of international law and conventions—all of these have done substantial damage to the region and to the trust that others have in the US.
It’s convenient for Republicans and Democrats to point the finger at the “other side” for America’s loss of standing and support in the world. In reality, there’s plenty of blame to be shared by all of this century’s administrations. President George W. Bush started the disastrous wars and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, but Presidents Barack Obama and Joseph Biden ended both badly, compounding the damage that had been done. And while Bush may have flaunted international law and conventions with the use of torture, rendition, and extrajudicial targeted killings, Obama further undermined the US’s commitment to the rule of law by refusing to call for accountability for these crimes.
Biden waxed eloquent in his defense of what he called the “international rules-based order.” But he undercut himself when it became clear that his commitment was selective since it only applied to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and not to Israel’s genocidal policies in Palestine.
And speaking of Palestine, during the first quarter of this century, no administration has taken the firm measures needed to curb Israeli behaviors in the occupied Palestinian territories or in Lebanon and now Syria. The impact has been clear: Israel acts with impunity, Palestinians have lost hope, and the people of the region have lost even a shred of belief that the US can play a constructive role in peacemaking.
Upon this dismal record of this century’s first four administrations, President Donald Trump, since reentering the White House in 2025, has pounded the final nail in the coffin of trust for American leadership in the Middle East.
While on one occasion Biden went to UN Security Council and secured passage of a ceasefire for Gaza—telling the council that Israel approved it, knowing full well that Israel had not agreed to its terms—Trump has taken this practice of dissembling even further. With great fanfare he assembled leaders to an event celebrating his 20-point peace plan to end the Gaza conflict. The problem, of course, was that none of the combatant parties—neither Hamas nor especially Israel—had agreed to its terms. And Trump’s boastful handling of his war with Iran has reached new levels of absurdity. On at least 42 occasions he has announced that the war was over, he had won, or that Iran was begging to negotiate on his terms, only to pivot a day or two later threatening, in violent or vulgar language, to obliterate Iran if they didn’t, as he put it, “wave the white flag” of surrender.
Added to this mess are the thousands of Lebanese who’ve been killed and the scores of villages laid waste by Israel since the Trump-backed ceasefire, the displacement and frightening violence that Israeli settlers and soldiers are wreaking in the West Bank, the continuing genocide unfolding in Gaza, and the insecurity in the Arab Gulf States housing US bases which are being recklessly attacked by Iranian missiles and drones. It is no wonder that Arabs have lost faith not only in the US’s commitment to regional peace and security, but also to the trustworthiness of the US as an ally.
A problem so big can’t be fixed by one US election. After decades of a dizzying roller coaster ride of wars based on lies, violations of international laws and conventions, promises made and then broken, and now an administration that acts impulsively and makes contradictory pronouncements as if words have no meaning—trust has been lost.
After the disasters resulting from the Bush administration’s Iraq war, its anti-Arab, anti-Muslim domestic policies, and its ill-conceived “democracy agenda,” President Obama traveled to Cairo to deliver a speech designed to open a new chapter in US relations with the region. After seven years without decisive follow-through on the promises he’d made in his Cairo address, Obama gave a long interview to The Atlantic Magazine in which he blamed the Arabs for not doing enough. When I spoke with him about the speech and that interview, he told me that the expectations of the Arabs had been too high. I responded that he was the one who set the high expectations and made the promises that he would “change Washington, change America, and change the world.” “Don’t blame them,” I said, “for believing you.”
What’s evident now is that the Arab world isn’t believing US promises or even our words. They are beginning to find their way in a post-US world order by creating new alliances, finding new partners, and putting their own interests first. If the US is to even have a place in this new order, we will need more than a just a new president with promises of change. What will be required is a thoughtful examination of our decades of shortcomings and betrayals leading to new policies toward justice for Palestinians and regional partnerships and security. But acknowledging the problems is only the first step. A demonstrated and sustained commitment to implement a changed approach to the multiple crises we have helped to create or exacerbate across the region must follow. Since it took us a generation to dig deep holes for ourselves in the Arab World, getting out won’t be quick or easy. Restoring trust will take time and hard work.
Trump wants to play down the connection between rising inflation and gas prices, on the one hand, and his foolish war of choice on the other. But will US voters or the Iranians let him?
Despite the excitement around Donald Trump’s new sanctions and even the US strikes against the Iranian island of Larak just hours ago, much suggests that Trump is not seeking a dramatic ratcheting up of pressure on Iran.
According to reports Sunday, the U.S. military hit Iranian launchers on the island to prevent Tehran from planting new mines in the Strait of Hormuz. This is the first known U.S. strike against the country since Trump announced a ceasefire in July. Details are forthcoming.
Meanwhile, the much-touted “major financial institution” that Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent promised to sanction for dealings with Iran turned out to be nothing more than Egypt’s second-largest bank. Though Banque Misr ranks among the region’s major banks, it is a dwarf beside the multi-trillion-dollar giants of global finance.
It should come as no surprise that there is more bark than bite in Trump’s latest sanctions moves. That is not to say Bessent’s economic warfare won’t hurt ordinary Iranians or squeeze the Iranian economy. It will. But there is little to suggest that the pain will compel Tehran to submit to Trump — or that the sanctions are even designed to inflict significant harm, despite his rhetoric.
Rather, Trump appears to be pursuing a very different gamble: maintaining a low-level conflict until the midterms—neither securing a diplomatic deal nor allowing the situation to deteriorate into full-scale war. A period of relative tranquility that pushes Iran out of the headlines and, in the run-up to the elections, weakens the connection between rising inflation and gas prices, on the one hand, and Trump’s foolish war of choice, on the other.
The D-Day sanctions help create the perception that the U.S. has the upper hand while increasing pressure on Iran. Together with increased traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, they make the status quo more costly for Tehran than for Washington — but not so costly that Iran is incentivized to counter-escalate in the short term.
Rather, it is a slow strangulation designed to ensure that, for the next two months, there is neither headline-grabbing diplomacy nor military escalation.
This gives Tehran little cause for immediate panic. Its response will largely depend on what Washington does next. I see three possible scenarios.
Trump may overshoot, pushing Iran beyond what Tehran deems manageable in the short term. For instance, the strikes against Iranian positions on Larak island will very likely generate an Iranian response. Moreover, if Trump confiscates Iranian oil tankers bound for China, Tehran will almost certainly respond by intensifying attacks on ships using the southern corridor of the Strait, while potentially also targeting energy infrastructure in the GCC. China, too, would likely respond forcefully to such a move. The result would be precisely the kind of escalation Trump wants to avoid over the next two months.
In the second scenario, the D-Day sanctions neither incentivize Iran to counter-escalate in the short term nor alter its medium-term calculations. Tehran reckons that, despite the hype, its closure of the Strait remains sufficient and that the mounting economic pressure on Trump will eventually compel him to return to the table with a more pragmatic posture.
Though this is not the most likely outcome, it helps explain why Iran is investing heavily in regional diplomacy even as all signs point to Trump not wanting a deal at this juncture.
Omani, Pakistani, and Qatari diplomats are engaged in intense diplomacy with Tehran over the Strait. According to my sources, Trump has signaled directly to Iran that he will not lift the blockade even if Tehran reopens the Strait, nor does he favor returning to the earlier Memorandum of Understanding. Again, keeping Iran out of the headlines in the run-up to the elections requires avoiding developments of either kind—military or diplomatic.
By engaging with regional mediators, Tehran achieves three objectives. First, it demonstrates to its domestic public that the war’s prolongation is due to American intransigence, not Iranian inflexibility. As the war drags on and Iranian civilians grow weary, controlling the blame narrative becomes increasingly important to Tehran. Fortunately for Tehran, Trump’s categorical public rejection of diplomacy plays directly into Iran’s hands.
Second, this diplomatic engagement is also crucial for the regional blame game. If the war resumes, who regional states blame matters considerably, particularly because the war will inflict a heavy price on them. Tehran needs to demonstrate to regional governments that Iran is willing to compromise while Trump refuses even to negotiate.
Finally, the current diplomacy builds regional consensus around specific solutions and principles. If Trump returns to the table, an infrastructure of semi-completed agreements with regional buy-in will already be in place — built while Trump voluntarily absented himself. Trump will pay a price if he seeks to unravel the progress the region made while he sulked in the White House.
But the most likely scenario is neither immediate escalation nor a post-midterm return to talks. Rather, in this scenario the Trump administration’s newfound confidence proves warranted: the combination of new sanctions and growing traffic through the southern corridor of the Strait has created a new reality in which Iran is hurting more than the U.S., and its trajectory is becoming increasingly — but not dramatically — negative. Iran will therefore be weaker in a few months, and in a less favorable diplomatic and military position.
While this will incentivize Iran to counter-escalate, Tehran may choose to delay its response and wait for a more opportune moment. If Washington wants to keep things quiet until the midterms, Tehran may conclude that the optimal moment to strike back is two or three weeks before the Congressional elections, maximizing the political damage to Trump.
But Iran may not limit its response to tankers in the Strait. Iranian officials say, both publicly and privately, that they expect the U.S. and Israel to resume the war after the midterms regardless of the impact of the D-Day sanctions. Regional diplomats have largely reached the same conclusion. If sanctions weaken Iran over time while the global economy recovers and adjusts to the new reality in the Strait, a prolonged pause will work against Tehran. Iran may therefore decide to escalate dramatically, taking full advantage of Trump’s perceived vulnerability in the run-up to the elections.
Iran appears encouraged by its performance in the second round of the war and by how quickly Trump halted his attacks. The first round lasted 38 days; the second just 13. Yet more than half of the American casualties were inflicted during the second round, despite it lasting only a third as long.
While only one out of a plethora of variables in this war, the impacts of the second round suggest that American force protection had weakened, interceptor shortages had become more acute, and Iran had learned more from the first round of fighting in February than America did. Tehran appears to have improved both the sophistication of its attacks and the intelligence behind them. Iran had spent decades studying how America fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, for the first time, it had direct experience fighting the United States — and Tehran has learned faster than Washington had anticipated.
Still, while Iran’s calculation about Trump’s electoral vulnerability may prove correct, its apparent belief that an election loss will restrain Trump in 2027 may be misplaced. A Trump humiliated at the polls and potentially facing a third impeachment attempt may be forced to play defense at home, but precisely because of his domestic troubles, he may also be incentivized to lash out abroad. Freed from electoral constraints, Trump may be willing to take risks he previously eschewed, including deploying ground troops.
After all, it was in the period following his November 2020 defeat that Trump displayed an unprecedented appetite for risk. Then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley feared Trump might either provoke a war with Iran after losing the election or manufacture a domestic crisis to justify using the military and potentially remain in power.
Trump reportedly floated proposals for an attack on Iran, which Milley vehemently opposed. “You're gonna have a fucking war,” he prophetically told Trump. Will there be a General Milley in Trump’s inner circle after the midterms?
Upon the dismal record of the 21st century’s first four administrations, President Donald Trump, since reentering the White House in 2025, has pounded the final nail in the coffin of trust for American leadership.
While the US has a long history of signing treaties, making commitments, and then walking away from them (ask Native American tribes about this), this century’s record of American policy in the Middle East is something quite extraordinary. Dramatic policy shifts, broken treaties, promises made and forgotten, foolish wars fought without attention paid to the mess left for others, and the shattering of international law and conventions—all of these have done substantial damage to the region and to the trust that others have in the US.
It’s convenient for Republicans and Democrats to point the finger at the “other side” for America’s loss of standing and support in the world. In reality, there’s plenty of blame to be shared by all of this century’s administrations. President George W. Bush started the disastrous wars and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, but Presidents Barack Obama and Joseph Biden ended both badly, compounding the damage that had been done. And while Bush may have flaunted international law and conventions with the use of torture, rendition, and extrajudicial targeted killings, Obama further undermined the US’ commitment to the rule of law by refusing to call for accountability for these crimes.
Biden waxed eloquent in his defense of what he called the “international rules-based order.” But he undercut himself when it became clear that his commitment was selective since it only applied to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and not to Israel’s genocidal policies in Palestine.
And speaking of Palestine, during the first quarter of this century, no administration has taken the firm measures needed to curb Israeli behaviors in the occupied Palestinian territories or in Lebanon and now Syria. The impact has been clear: Israel acts with impunity, Palestinians have lost hope, and the people of the region have lost even a shred of belief that the US can play a constructive role in peacemaking.
If the US is to even have a place in this new order, we will need more than a just a new president with promises of change.
Upon this dismal record of this century’s first four administrations, President Donald Trump, since reentering the White House in 2025, has pounded the final nail in the coffin of trust for American leadership in the Middle East.
While on one occasion Biden went to the United Nations Security Council and secured passage of a ceasefire for Gaza—telling the council that Israel approved it, knowing full well that Israel had not agreed to its terms—Trump has taken this practice of dissembling even further. With great fanfare he assembled leaders to an event celebrating his 20-point peace plan to end the Gaza conflict. The problem, of course, was that none of the combatant parties—neither Hamas nor especially Israel—had agreed to its terms. And Trump’s boastful handling of his war with Iran has reached new levels of absurdity. On at least 42 occasions he has announced that the war was over, he had won, or that Iran was begging to negotiate on his terms, only to pivot a day or two later threatening, in violent or vulgar language, to obliterate Iran if they didn’t, as he put it, “wave the white flag” of surrender.
Added to this mess are the thousands of Lebanese who’ve been killed and the scores of villages laid waste by Israel since the Trump-backed ceasefire, the displacement and frightening violence that Israeli settlers and soldiers are wreaking in the West Bank, the continuing genocide unfolding in Gaza, and the insecurity in the Arab Gulf States housing US bases which are being recklessly attacked by Iranian missiles and drones. It is no wonder that Arabs have lost faith not only in the US’ commitment to regional peace and security, but also to the trustworthiness of the US as an ally.
A problem so big can’t be fixed by one US election. After decades of a dizzying roller coaster ride of wars based on lies, violations of international laws and conventions, promises made and then broken, and now an administration that acts impulsively and makes contradictory pronouncements as if words have no meaning—trust has been lost.
After the disasters resulting from the Bush administration’s Iraq war; its anti-Arab, anti-Muslim domestic policies; and its ill-conceived “democracy agenda,” President Obama traveled to Cairo to deliver a speech designed to open a new chapter in US relations with the region. After seven years without decisive follow-through on the promises he’d made in his Cairo address, Obama gave a long interview to The Atlantic magazine in which he blamed the Arabs for not doing enough. When I spoke with him about the speech and that interview, he told me that the expectations of the Arabs had been too high. I responded that he was the one who set the high expectations and made the promises that he would “change Washington, change America, and change the world.” “Don’t blame them,” I said, “for believing you.”
What’s evident now is that the Arab world isn’t believing US promises or even our words. They are beginning to find their way in a post-US world order by creating new alliances, finding new partners, and putting their own interests first. If the US is to even have a place in this new order, we will need more than a just a new president with promises of change. What will be required is a thoughtful examination of our decades of shortcomings and betrayals leading to new policies toward justice for Palestinians and regional partnerships and security. But acknowledging the problems is only the first step. A demonstrated and sustained commitment to implement a changed approach to the multiple crises we have helped to create or exacerbate across the region must follow. Since it took us a generation to dig deep holes for ourselves in the Arab World, getting out won’t be quick or easy. Restoring trust will take time and hard work.
Most people do not know that the term “checkmate” in chess is a loan from Persian. “Shah-mat” means the king is confused and helpless. Trump may learn this hard way—but not without bringing much pain and suffering on people at home and worldwide.
US President Donald Trump, born with a golden spoon in his mouth, has been used throughout his life to buying his way out of any jams into which he got himself. He gave money to women (and probably girls) he assaulted in return for non-disclosure agreements. If he went bankrupt, he could find investors to float his next purchase, even if they were disreputable, or he could find a way to raise cash through money laundering. In rashly launching an illegal and aggressive war on Iran on February 28, however, he may have painted himself into a corner from which there is no escape.
In fact, this may be the end of Donald Trump. Not because Iran can directly harm him. But because it can keep gasoline prices and inflation high through the November 3 midterms. If there is a Democratic “blue wave,” Trump and his corrupt cabinet will face endless hearings on the Hill and he’d likely be impeached again. Moreover, it isn’t clear that, as an unpopular lame duck, he could keep Republicans in line.
Recent opinion polls find Trump is enormously unpopular, with approval ratings plummeting among independents, and that he is even being deserted by some of his base. Rural Americans with limited incomes who drive gas-guzzling trucks were blindsided when Trump raised the price of gasoline from $2.70 a gallon to over $4 a gallon nationally this spring and summer. For many of them, that is a reduction in their standard of living. Rural people spend 9% of their income on gasoline because they have longer commutes and they need trucks for hauling, whereas for urban people it is closer to 5%. By picking a fight with Iran in the cockpit of the world’s energy production, the Gulf, Trump took food out of the mouths of people in Appalachia and Kansas. And it isn’t just gasoline. Fertilizer shortages because of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz affect the price of food, which is going to go up over the next year. A shortage of sulfur hurts mining and mineral processing and makes many goods more expensive. A shortage of helium puts up the cost of anything with computer chips in them.
In short, this generation of Iranian revolutionaries may be planning to do to Trump what an earlier clique in Tehran did to Jimmy Carter. It is widely thought that Khomeini and radicals around him refused to release US embassy hostages, taken in autumn 1979, until Ronald Reagan was inaugurated. The revolutionaries had a grudge with Carter because they saw him as having supported Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whom they overthrew. They thus played a role in making Carter look weak in the lead-up to the November 1980 election, helping install Reagan. It was all about political revenge then, as it is now.
Last week, Iran’s clerical Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, shook up the security apparatus with a raft of new appointments. He brought to the forefront veterans of the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-1988, who had suffered through WW I-style trench warfare and Iraqi use of mustard and sarin gas. That generation of leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) fought on for 6 years after Iraq offered an armistice. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had launched a war of aggression on Iran in 1980, aiming to grab the oil-rich Khuzistan province for himself, but quickly was drawn into a quagmire that some wags called a “sitzkrieg.” One reason Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and those loyalists who followed “the Line of the Imam” refused the offer of an end to hostilities is that they wanted revenge. They did not want to let Saddam walk away unscathed. They may even have hoped to take important Iraqi cities such as the southern port of Basra or the shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf, where Shia holy figures are buried.
One of these maximalists is Mohsen Rezai, a former commander of the IRGC, who was named secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) and liaison for Khamenei with that body.
It may not be very useful to talk about a big division between moderates and hard liners in Iran right now on the issue of relations with the US. All the major political figures are furious with Trump for attacking them. The divide is between those who think it is better to squeeze Trump in the short term (as with the now-lapsed Memorandum of Understanding) to achieve a good result for Tehran, and those who are determined to go for a bigger win, of destroying Trump politically and then extracting maximum concessions from Washington.
As soon as he came to head the Supreme National Security Council, Rezai signaled that the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed until the US accepted his maximalist demands. He wants the billions of dollars in Iranian funds sequestered by the US to be released immediately. He wants the US military to withdraw from the Gulf region. He wants Washington to strong-arm the Israelis into ceasing their occupations of and attacks on Lebanon, the West Bank and Gaza. He wants a US recognition of Iranian control of the Strait.
He isn’t a fool. He knows that the US won’t acquiesce in these demands in the short term.
But what if US and European oil reserves start getting so low that it is unwise to release further petroleum? What if China, which nearly halved its petroleum imports since March, comes back into the market and starts importing 11.5 million barrels a day, the way it did last year? In short, what if all the cushions run out that have kept a dire energy crisis from breaking out even though over a billion barrels of oil have been taken off the market?
In August, 2008, the world economy looked pretty good. By September 15 of that year the credit markets had locked up and there was no way for firms to do the day to day borrowing of money on which commerce depends. Too many bad loans had been repackaged as derivatives and there was a mortgage crisis.
Rezai thinks that we’re in a building crisis similar to that of 2008, and that by keeping Hormuz closed, Iran can pull the trigger on the US economy. He is betting that, although Iran is hurting, it can take the pain in a way that the US won’t be able to if the full energy crisis hits home.
And if that happens, he is betting, Trump will be like a burglar trapped in a back yard by the owners’ pit bulls (resurgent Democrats), and will be too harried or bloody to even think about striking Iran again. And while Washington turns inward to a piranha-like frenzy of political infighting, Iran will nail down permanently its control of Hormuz, ensuring that the Israelis and Americans will never again risk a global energy crisis by attacking Iran.
And then Trump and his entire legacy would enter a seven-spiral crash. Most people do not know that the term “checkmate” in chess is a loan from Persian. “Shah-mat” means the king is confused and helpless. Tehran is going for a checkmate.
The Iranian Parliament speaker said the strait will stay closed until the US blockade and oil embargo are lifted, and any party continuing its "aggression or threats" would face a "more severe defeat."
Just days after threatening to declare the Strait of Hormuz a US territory, President Donald Trump on Tuesday posted a map on his Truth Social platform with that label over the crucial waterway—and was swiftly called out by a top Iranian diplomat.
"Just as Trump correctly wrote the name of the Persian Gulf, his illusion about the Strait of Hormuz will soon be corrected—or we will correct the delusions of this delusional individual," Iran's deputy foreign minister, Kazem Gharibabadi, responded in Arabic on X.
Gharibabadi included a screengrab of Trump's post featuring a map that shows the strait, which is south of Iran and runs between the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman.
Since Trump and Israel began illegally bombing Iran on February 28, the Middle East country has restricted traffic through the strait, a key shipping route, particularly for fossil fuels. That has driven up fuel prices worldwide, including in the United States, where the cost for a gallon of gasoline just hit a record high for mid-August.
Despite the economic toll at home, the range of impacts across the Middle East—where nearly six months of war have killed thousands of people—and a plummeting approval rating, Trump said last week that "I'll never apologize, I did the right thing."
That declaration and Trump's threat over the strait came in a Friday speech on Long Island, after which critics across the United States and beyond condemned the president as a "completely unhinged lunatic" and "sadistic violent menace to the world" who ought to be impeached again.
By Monday, a 60-day ceasefire deal expired, and neither side has signaled any progress on talks to end the war—which Trump claims is aimed at stopping Iran from building nuclear weapons, even though his own intelligence agencies have said it wasn't trying to do so. Trump notably ditched the Obama administration's Iran nuclear deal during his first term.
According to Palestine Chronicle, Iranian Maj. Gen. Mostafa Izadi, deputy commander-in-chief of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, said Tuesday that "the enemy failed to destroy Iran's defensive capabilities and nuclear industries."
As for the strait, Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf said that it will stay closed until the US blockade and oil embargo are lifted, and warned that any party continuing its "aggression or threats" would face a "more severe defeat."
Two recent podcasts demonstrated what happens when establishment politicians, whose prepared talking points never stray from what serves as the conventional wisdom about Israel-Palestine, run up against interviewers unwilling to give them a pass.
Two July podcasts hosted by progressive media stars and featuring leading Democratic lawmakers brought home the deep disconnect that exists between the way establishment politicians and media operate and the way both come to speak about the Middle East and the realities that exist in that region.
Late last month, Mehdi Hasan hosted Sen. Mark Warner (D-Va.) on his podcast “Mehdi Unfiltered,“ while Congressman Adam Smith (D-Wash.) joined Krystal Ball on her program “Breaking Points.” Because Warner is the ranking Democratic member on the Senate Intelligence Committee and Smith is the top Democrat on the House Armed Services Committee, one might have expected more from them. The conversations were respectful, but neither of the lawmakers was prepared for the grilling they received from their respective hosts.
Both programs demonstrated what happens when establishment politicians, whose prepared talking points never stray from what serves as the conventional wisdom about Israel-Palestine, run up against interviewers unwilling to give them a pass. Two observations must be made: one is about the relationship that has come to exist between establishment politics and mainstream media; the other is how Israel-Palestine is playing out in the US.
One can see the incestuous relationship between political and media elites in full bloom at the annual White House correspondents’ dinner. President Donald Trump has painted the media as “the enemy” and purveyors of “fake news,” establishing an adversarial relationship with the mainstream media. He can afford to do so because for the last 30 years far-right Republicans have set up their own multi-platform alternative media. They have their own TV networks, newspapers, social media sites (including Trump’s own “Truth Social”).
The lesson that comes through so clearly in both interviews is the important role being played by new independent progressive media.
In Washington, most politicians (liberal Democrats and centrist Republicans alike) and the mainstream media figures who report on them work and live in close proximity to one another. Their homes are in the same neighborhoods; they send their children to the same schools, attend the same houses of worship, and socialize together. There’s also a “revolving door” factor, as some former government officials leave their posts to become highly paid TV hosts or commentators, and some journalists leave their positions to accept government appointments.
At the White House correspondents’ dinner, “celebrities” from both of these worlds mingle. They throw polite jabs at one another, but their respective jobs require them to use the occasion to be seen and make contacts. This fraternization causes some in the media to temper their coverage—especially as, in the competitive world of today’s media, if a journalist aggressively crosses the wrong officials or breaks from conventional wisdom on a controversial issue of some importance, they may end up losing access to the officials they cover or even losing their positions.
This problem is most pronounced when it comes to media coverage of the Middle East. There’s no doubt that public opinion regarding Israel-Palestine has changed, but this isn’t the case when it comes to the media and political elites. For evidence one can point to polling data, votes in Congress, the number of elections in which critics of Israel have won, and the hundreds of millions of dollars that pro-Israel groups have poured into both defeating what they call “anti-Israel radicals” and attempting to influence the public discourse. But these two shows revealed the impact of the changes in other ways.
For example, when senior political figures from either party appear on major network TV shows to discuss the Middle East, the conversations are usually constrained by the uninformed conventional wisdom shared by both politicians and their interviewers. This is the case for two reasons. First, almost no major network media figures know the history, culture, or politics of the Middle East. For most reporters, that region’s history began the day they got the assignment. Even those who have spent years reporting on the Middle East tend to view it through the conflicts they’ve been assigned to cover or briefings they’ve received from policymakers, who in turn generally have no direct knowledge of the people impacted by their policies. And the stable of experts the networks regularly invite as commentators are largely former government officials who have failed in the past, learned no lessons from their mistakes, and therefore continue to propagate the same views that have defined their sad careers.
It’s much the same when we look at the way lawmakers approach the Middle East. Most are either ignorant about the region or its history or have “willed ignorance”—not wanting to know because the cliches of the conventional wisdom have served them well. Why make things complicated? “Israel is the only democracy in the Middle East,” “Israel is an ally that protects US interests,” or a variation on “Israel wants peace, but the Arabs only want to destroy Israel.”
Regardless of what other Middle East-related issues elected officials are discussing, cliches like these form the backdrop to their thinking. Accepted wisdom shared by politicians and media alike. So when Rep. Smith and Sen. Warner sat down with interviews with Ball and Hasan, they were clearly unprepared to be grilled on: how the US can continue to provide advanced military support to Israel when it uses this aid in violation of international law; whether millions of dollars from pro-Israel super-PACs are negatively impacting our elections; or whether Palestinians should be guaranteed equal rights in Israel-Palestine.
For example, when Krystal Ball pressed Rep. Smith on why he would support a provision that would provide for Israel to co-produce weapons with the US military, he immediately fell back on the very tired cliche that since 1948 Arabs have been trying to destroy Israel. She reminded him of the expulsion of Palestinians and asked if he believed in equal rights and whether that applied to Palestinians’ right to return, he felt compelled to answer in the negative. He did so arguing that if Palestinians had equal rights, then Arabs might become the majority, and Israel would no longer be an ethno-national state.
Smith might have gotten away with these answers on a major network news program, but Krystal Ball was unwilling to accept the false historical narrative that has become the conventional wisdom. As she challenged him, it became clear that Smith was uneasy. He was no longer given a pass allowing him to remain in his comfort zone.
Much the same occurred between Mehdi Hasan and Sen. Warner. When Hasan asked Warner whether he would agree that Israel had committed genocide in Gaza, he awkwardly sidestepped the question with a non sequitur saying that he wouldn’t use that term because he was concerned that it only served to fuel those who want to eliminate Israel by chanting “from the river to the sea!” Mehdi would have none of this nonsense and continued pressing the senator. Equally confounding were the senator’s convoluted evasions when he was asked whether he felt that campaign contributions from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee played a negative role in US politics.
Some evidence of the changing public mood on Israel did come through in both interviews since both lawmakers indicated that they were feeling enough public pressure forcing them to oppose some of the proposed Israeli military aid packages included in the new budget, but then displayed their lack of understanding by falling back on the “new conventional wisdom” of saying that they were doing so only because Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was the problem and they didn’t want to reward him.
The lesson that comes through so clearly in both interviews is the important role being played by new independent progressive media. They know the issues they cover, their questions aren’t scripted, and they are not afraid to challenge elites.
"In a country that has experienced profound loss and suffering, this decision represents a powerful commitment to the right to life," said the UN's human rights chief.
In a move cheered by human rights defenders around the world, Lebanon's Parliament on Tuesday abolished the death penalty for all crimes, making the country the first in the Arab world to do so and standing in stark contrast to neighboring and nearby nations.
Lebanon's abolition—announced on June 30 at the 9th World Congress Against the Death Penalty in Paris—was approved by parliamentary lawmakers and, once signed by President Joseph Aoun as expected, will make the country the 129th worldwide to abolish capital punishment.
Under amendments introduced by Independent MP Abdul Rahman Bizri, execution—formerly carried out by hanging or firing squad—will be replaced as the ultimate punishment by life imprisonment under hard labor for crimes committed after abolition. Those currently condemned to death will have their sentences commuted to hard labor for life.
“Lebanon is regaining its pioneering role in the region as a defender of human rights,” Lebanese Justice Minister Adel Nassar said, adding that his country “has chosen to combat murder rather than resort to capital punishment."
MP Georges Okais of the Christian, right-wing Lebanese Forces party, said that “Abolishing the death penalty is a historic achievement, and we have adopted international standards regarding human rights.”
Hezbollah's parliamentary bloc walked out in protest of abolition, which is also opposed by other lawmakers including Independent MP Jihad al-Samad, who called the move "contrary to Islamic law."
Opponents of abolition argue that it, plus a general amnesty draft law introduced in April, could result in leniency for perpetrators of bombings and other serious crimes.
However, Nassar insisted that abolition “does not mean leniency toward criminals.”
Lebanese law had designated execution as punishment for a wide range of crimes including—but not limited to—murder, aggravated rape, terrorism, treason, spying, military desertion, aggravated theft, and arson. While 84 people were sentenced to death, Lebanon has not executed anyone in 22 years.
“We can see the uncertainty that those who are condemned to death are living under," one psychologist working in Lebanese prisons told the French advocacy group Together Against the Death Penalty in a 2021 study. "We don’t apply the death penalty, but we don’t cancel it either."
"Are we going to wake them up one day and tell them that they will be executed?" the psychologist added, describing the process in Japan and Europe's last executioner, Belarus, without mentioning the countries. "It is the most horrible thing to live through. It leads to anxiety, depression, and stress that is sometimes uncontrollable. They are alive, but without living.”
Lebanon's imminent abolition stands in stark contrast with neighboring and regional countries. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen rank among the world's most prolific executioners, while Syria's recent history is marred by thousands of extrajudicial executions during the administration of President Ahmed al-Sharaa, and Israel recently legalized the hanging of "terrorists"—a law critics claim will only be applied to Palestinians.
Daniel Cullen, project manager at Oxford University's Death Penalty Research Unit, lauded Lebanon's achievement, which came at "a time of myriad domestic challenges."
"Since October 2023, Israeli forces have conducted intense bombardments in their campaign against the Hezbollah militant group, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths, including during periods of nominal ceasefire," Cullen wrote. "Together with the Israeli military occupation of large areas of the south of the country and issuing of evacuation orders, this has resulted in the displacement of around one million people."
"Even prior to this, the country had already experienced a stark economic collapse since 2019, with a near 40% reduction in GDP, in addition to recovering from the effects of the explosion at Beirut port in August 2020," he continued. "Against this background, Minister of Justice Adel Nassar specifically highlighted the importance of the abolition legislation as a demonstration of Lebanon’s ability to commit to international human rights standards."
"Lebanon’s commitment to achieving abolition during a time of national crisis demonstrates that this is entirely possible," Cullen added.
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said on social media: "I welcome the Lebanese Parliament's decision formally to abolish the death penalty, and call on others to follow its lead. In a country that has experienced profound loss and suffering, this decision represents a powerful commitment to the right to life."
European Union High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas called Lebanon's abolition "a significant step forward for human rights in the country."
"As the first country in the region to abolish the death penalty, Lebanon is setting a powerful example for other countries in the Middle East and beyond, reinforcing the strong global trend towards abolition and the growing international support for ending the death penalty worldwide," she continued.
"The European Union calls on all countries that still apply the death penalty to abolish it and, pending abolition, to maintain or introduce a moratorium on executions as a first step," Kallas added, urging "those considering its reintroduction to refrain from such a regressive step."
The West African nation of Burkina Faso adopted a draft penal code last December that would restore the death penalty for crimes including treason, terrorism, and espionage. An effort to revive capital punishment in the Central Asian country of Kyrgyzstan was blocked by its Constitutional Court. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has repeatedly said he is ready to reintroduce the death penalty during his 23 years in power, while populist Filipino Sen. Ronald dela Rosa—a former police chief closely associated with former President Rodrigo Duterte's mass-murderous drug crackdown—reintroduced death penalty legislation after his reelection last year.
Human Rights Watch Lebanon researcher Ramzi Kaiss hailed Lebanon's "final break from a cruel sentence that should never be imposed.”
“Capital punishment is unique in its cruelty and finality and is plagued with arbitrariness, prejudice, and error,” Kaiss asserted.
Amnesty International called the move "a landmark victory."
“Lebanon’s decision to abolish the death penalty marks a major milestone and a victory for human rights in the country," said Heba Morayef, Amnesty's Middle East and North Africa director.
Morayef continued:
Justice must be rooted in human rights, not in an irreversible and cruel punishment. After more than two decades without executions, today’s step transforms a precarious hiatus in executions into lasting legal protection upholding the right to life and bringing Lebanon in line with the global trend towards abolition.
The passing of this law is testament to the decades of tireless advocacy by Lebanese human rights defenders and organizations, as well as the leadership of key officials who recognized the death penalty as a cruel and inhuman punishment, often imposed after unfair proceedings and the burden of which frequently falls on those at most disadvantage.
“To turn this law from paper to practice, Lebanese authorities must now ensure that all death sentences are commuted and ratify the key international treaty on abolition, while advancing broader reforms to strengthen a justice system based on dignity, fairness, and respect for human rights," Morayef added. "Authorities must accompany this law with broader legislative reform, including to ensure that any criminal justice punishments are consistent with human rights principles.”
The Trump administration may not like paying for the privilege of using the strait, but its decision to go to war in the first place created the situation the United States is now in. Bad policies have unintended consequences.
In the weeks since the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding collapsed, Washington and Tehran have used the time to strengthen their respective positions in the event negotiations resume.
For the United States, this has largely taken the form of overt threats by President Donald Trump himself and hints that an even more comprehensive US bombing campaign against Iranian strategic targets is on the table. For Iran, the strategy is familiar: ensure maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is kept to an absolute minimum.
US and Iranian officials continue to give conflicting accounts of where negotiations stand. Despite Trump’s repeated declarations that Tehran is begging for a deal, the Iranians stress no talks are occurring with the United States. Still, both sides seem to agree that any pending agreement will center on the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic waterway that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has proved capable of shutting down at will.
Various schemes have been proposed between Iran and Oman, the two countries on either end of the strait. While a deal is not finalized, Iran will most certainly retain more power over the strait’s traffic than it did before the war began in February.
The question now is whether tolls or fees will accompany any arrangement worked out between Tehran and Muscat. The Trump administration is dead set against acceding to any fee structure because it would provide the Iranian government with additional revenue and represent visible proof that Trump’s preventive war was a strategic mistake. Referring to the Strait of Hormuz, Secretary of State Marco Rubio reiterated the US position in July: "If we create a precedent in the Middle East where a nation-state can decide that they are going to control an international waterway, charge a toll…we have created a very dangerous precedent which will repeat itself in other parts of the world.”
Of course, permitting an Iranian toll or fee structure isn’t ideal. Before the war, such a hypothetical would have been difficult to imagine. The strait at that time was free and open, and roughly 120 to 150 ships relied on the route each day to get their products to customers worldwide.
The United States wants Iran to return to this status quo. Yet Iran has no intention of doing so — and to expect otherwise is to be completely ignorant of how events have played out since.
Trump’s war handed Iran the perfect excuse to leverage its geography, and the Iranians didn’t hesitate to do so. Originally, Tehran’s shuttering of the strait aimed to increase the cost on Washington and eventually convince US partners in the region to pressure Trump into ending the war. But over time, the Strait of Hormuz, in addition to Iran’s more aggressive posture toward its neighbors writ-large, has become something far more valuable: a strategic card Iran can play whenever Trump threatens to accelerate military operations.
Re-opening the strait is now as important to the United States as containing Iran’s nuclear program, if not more so. The question is how to do it.
Trump originally tried to pursue this objective through military force, hoping US strikes could degrade Iran’s military capacity to such an extent that the IRGC would have to stop shooting at ships. The strategy overestimated the US military’s power to force a change in Tehran’s strategic calculus and underestimated Iran’s ability to manufacture and launch cheap drones and missiles at scale. Every US strike merely reaffirmed the Iranian government’s belief that the war was existential for them. Instead of capitulating, Iran fought back, targeting vessels that used the southerly route near Oman’s coast and making it clear that heavier US bombing would compel more Iranian attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure.
US military attempts to bring the strait back to its pre-February state have failed and will likely continue to fail. If the Trump administration seeks to extricate itself from a war without end, its best option is to accept a toll or fee structure in the regional chokepoint. Hawks on Capitol Hill would no doubt scream bloody murder, and some of Trump’s own political allies will have a difficult time explaining how such a scheme is appealing. But if the choice is between swallowing fees or endless conflict, then the former is the better option. The Trump administration may not like paying for the privilege of using the strait, but its decision to go to war in the first place created the situation the United States is now in. Bad policies have unintended consequences.
Fortunately, fees in the strait would not be the end of the world.
This wouldn’t be the first time a country located next to a critical trade chokepoint received some form of compensation. The most obvious case is the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia, where shipowners contribute to a voluntary fund, administered by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, for navigational assistance, maritime safety, environmental protection and search and rescue. A similar arrangement in the Strait of Hormuz would thus not set a precedent. In fact, shipping companies and the insurance carriers that underwrite them might even view these voluntary payments as in their own interest if it helps prevent even costlier disasters or accidents.
There’s no use brushing the obvious under the rug: US acceptance of Iranian tolls or fees would be an embarrassing acknowledgment that Iran is now a principal arbiter of the strait. Moreover, depending on how high the fees are — Tehran is reportedly demanding 7% of the value of a ship’s cargo — the Iranians would be collecting revenue they wouldn’t have had prior to the war.
But even this scenario is not as dire as many assume. In practice, Iran’s leverage dissipates with every month that passes by. The Gulf Arab states are not sitting still and watching the new status quo helplessly. Rather, Tehran’s neighbors are increasingly adapting to Iran’s machinations by tapping into pipelines that bypass the strait altogether and exploring future projects that make their energy infrastructure more durable and less vulnerable to a single chokepoint.
Saudi Arabia is using its cross-country east-west pipeline to export more crude oil through the Red Sea. While this alternative route remains vulnerable to strikes by the Iran-aligned Houthis and doesn’t fully compensate for the loss of normal traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, it has still allowed the kingdom to avoid shutting down production entirely. Ditto the United Arab Emirates, which is sending more crude through its Fujairah export terminal, located outside the strait. Fujairah’s share of UAE exports increased to 66% in July from 51% a month earlier. Iran’s actions during the war will only reinforce Persian Gulf oil producers’ desire to diversify their routes, reducing Tehran’s ability to obstruct energy flows in the future.
Negotiations on reopening the Strait of Hormuz continue. If there comes a point where fees for passage are unavoidable, then US policymakers should keep a cool head. Ceding the point would be the most efficient way for the United States to remove itself from a foolish conflict at minimal cost.