Trump Is Primed to Lead the American Counter-Revolution
The MAGA/NatCon crowd on the verge of taking over government have made speech after speech outlining their ideas to wield radical violence on behalf of objectives as wide-ranging as eliminating the FBI to invading “sanctuary cities.”
The revolution may not be televised, but the counter-revolution sure will be.
In this new political era, the dominant military power in the capitalist world-system is ruled by a Venn Diagram of baddies—ethnonationalists, oligarchs, tech bros, and national security hawks. These elites take their opportunity to direct state power from the legitimacy afforded a single man. One of the only common elements about the diverse (but majority white and male) votes cast for Donald Trump is that they all saw Washington liberal elites as the enemy.
To put it differently, Trump voters were against one set of ruling-class elites and so cast their vote for a man who has surrounded himself with a different cadre of ruling-class elites, all of whom seem to fashion themselves as enemies of the previous dominant set. MAGA politics marks the emergence of political counter-elites with nothing short of revolutionary ambitions.
But what does that mean? Why is nobody talking about what is obviously emerging—counter-elites who are literally talking about revolution?
Defining Terms
In parsing the distinctions and overlaps among conservatives, reactionaries, and the forgotten category of counter-revolutionaries, everything is at stake.
Everybody’s go-to text today for these terms and concepts—terms that typologize the political right—seems to be Corey Robin’s The Reactionary Mind. A fine book, but a product of its moment (2011) and definitely a distinct take rather than a consensus view about the right. Joe Mackay has also done some work parsing conservative and reactionary in particular.
George Lawson, meanwhile, has made a convincing case that in the context of the age of empires, “counter-revolution” was about countering the revolutionary projects that emerged after the French Revolution. This gave counter-revolution back then a Burkean quality, which is to say conservative in the literal sense—preserving the old order, tradition, and distributions of power. This is the conventional way of understanding counter-revolution.
But in the West right now, and specifically in America, there is no left-revolutionary situation to counter. This is why the dust-binned work of Arno Mayer might be the ideal way to make sense of where this current configuration of right-wing political power is taking America.
Seen through a Mayer-ian lens, Project 2025 is not “weird”—it’s a field manual for counter-revolution on the institutional and policy terrain.
Mayer wrote many classics, but the one that really speaks to our moment is Dynamics of Counter-Revolution. In that book, he offers three types of right-wing “forces of order” with different agendas. Two are straightforward but deserve explaining, while the third is both more controversial and more important to grasp right now.
He defined conservative thought as “designed to give coherence to the defense of traditional social, economic, and political institutions and of traditional aesthetics, morals, and manners.” Reactionaries, meanwhile, “advocate a return to a mythical and romanticized past. In this past they seek the recovery and restoration of institutions…which sustained a hierarchical order of privileges and prerogatives.”
Mayer’s counter-revolution is particularly relevant to the current moment. He defined this concept as the forces of “order, hierarchy, authority, discipline, obedience, tradition, loyalty, courage, sacrifice, and nationalism [that wield revolutionary methods,] mobilizing and regimenting superannuated, unhinged, and inert individuals and groups… that enables them to become a new but claimant political counterelite.”
Unpacking counter-revolutionaries even further, Mayer goes on to say that they combine “the glorification of traditional attitudes and behavior patterns with the charge that these are being corrupted, subverted, and defiled by conspiratorial agents and influences… its constructive purposes remain deliberately inchoate and equivocal.”
It is common to use reactionary or far-right to describe MAGA and NatCon politics. These guys are no Edmund Burkes, after all. Neither of these terms is wrong, but they say nothing about counter-revolution, which is something they actively talk about. To wit:
You Say You Want A Revolution, Well, You Know
It’s not just that they invoke revolution in their rhetoric. Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-Vt.) talked about revolution rhetorically while running for president, but proposed a pretty gradualist reform agenda… and a non-violent one at that.
The MAGA/NatCon crowd on the verge of taking over government, by contrast, have made speech after speech outlining their ideas to wield radical violence on behalf of objectives as wide-ranging as eliminating the FBI to invading “sanctuary cities” to bombing Mexico and initiating mass deportations of immigrants from everywhere. Seen through a Mayer-ian lens, Project 2025 is not “weird”—it’s a field manual for counter-revolution on the institutional and policy terrain.
The “fascist debate” about MAGA has been frustrating and unhelpful. Mayer’s category of counter-revolutionary, though, captures important features, only some of which are present in the “fascist” discourse:
- Nationalist
- Glorification of tradition
- Authority
- Hierarchy
- Counter-elite elite
- A need to purge “agents” who have corrupted the nation
- Mobilizing “unhinged and inert” groups of people
That checks out!
According to Theda Skocpol in States and Social Revolutions, revolution consists of “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state and class structures… accompanied by and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below.” Counter-revolution, then, is a similarly rapid and radical transformation of the world but with two distinctions. One is that it comes from the top (by elites) even more than from below. The other is that the content of the revolution, following Mayer, is reactionary.
And now that MAGA has more institutional power to transform America than any group in the past 100 years, the future will look less like Nazi Germany 2.0 than a project of counter-revolution to transform the social order and existing distributions of power in society. American government will be ethnonationalist. It will be patriarchal. It will be violent. It will redound to the benefit of oligarchs. And it will threaten to destabilize the world.
Disturbingly, the architecture for this counter-revolutionary project has much source material to draw on in the form of existing U.S. foreign policy and the existing balance of forces between capital and labor. Even the counter-revolutionary’s impetus to dehumanize its enemies has gotten a substantial boost from the dehumanization that permeates U.S. policy, from the Mexico border to Palestine.
That “normal” U.S. politics has gifted the counter-revolution so much of what it needs to wreak havoc on the world should prompt a re-examination of what is normal.
Is “Counter-Revolution” Right?
Mayer’s various arguments are not beyond critique. His analysis of counter-revolution ties closely to the making of World War I, which he saw as an external solution to domestic political conflict between left and right. But all the belligerents in World War I were not polarized in the same ways when it came to left-right conflict. And although there is evidence that the world war had domestic political motivations, there’s not enough evidence to suggest it was more important than alternative motivations (inter-imperial competition, the boomerang effect of colonialism, the balance of power’s inevitable system failure, the “cult of the offensive,” national status pathologies, etc).
A slightly amended argument would carry more weight: World War I tilted Western politics in favor of counter-revolutionaries and reactionaries, even if that was not its primary purpose. It’s hard to argue with that.
Nevertheless, what makes Mayer notable is the very shape of these important arguments. He’s bringing together an analysis of geopolitics with left-right politics. His formulations are compatible with neoclassical realism in international relations but have much more meaning and content than that theoretical tradition.
And in the final analysis, if Mayer’s counter-revolutionary diagnosis applies to the current admixture of ethnonationalists, oligarchs, tech bros, and national security bros, then the political horizons of the progressive left are going to have to transcend donating money to the Democratic Party.
