

SUBSCRIBE TO OUR FREE NEWSLETTER
Daily news & progressive opinion—funded by the people, not the corporations—delivered straight to your inbox.
5
#000000
#FFFFFF
To donate by check, phone, or other method, see our More Ways to Give page.


Daily news & progressive opinion—funded by the people, not the corporations—delivered straight to your inbox.
"These corporations and their partners continue to sell the public a comforting lie to hide the hard truth: that we simply have to stop producing so much plastic," said one campaigner.
A report published Wednesday by Greenpeace exposes the plastics industry as "merchants of myth" still peddling the false promise of recycling as a solution to the global pollution crisis, even as the vast bulk of commonly produced plastics remain unrecyclable.
"After decades of meager investments accompanied by misleading claims and a very well-funded industry public relations campaign aimed at persuading people that recycling can make plastic use sustainable, plastic recycling remains a failed enterprise that is economically and technically unviable and environmentally unjustifiable," the report begins.
"The latest US government data indicates that just 5% of US plastic waste is recycled annually, down from a high of 9.5% in 2014," the publication continues. "Meanwhile, the amount of single-use plastics produced every year continues to grow, driving the generation of ever greater amounts of plastic waste and pollution."
Among the report's findings:
"Recycling is a toxic lie pushed by the plastics industry that is now being propped up by a pro-plastic narrative emanating from the White House," Greenpeace USA oceans campaign director John Hocevar said in a statement. "These corporations and their partners continue to sell the public a comforting lie to hide the hard truth: that we simply have to stop producing so much plastic."
"Instead of investing in real solutions, they’ve poured billions into public relations campaigns that keep us hooked on single-use plastic while our communities, oceans, and bodies pay the price," he added.
Greenpeace is among the many climate and environmental groups supporting a global plastics treaty, an accord that remains elusive after six rounds of talks due to opposition from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other nations that produce the petroleum products from which almost all plastics are made.
Honed from decades of funding and promoting dubious research aimed at casting doubts about the climate crisis caused by its products, the petrochemical industry has sent a small army of lobbyists to influence global treaty negotiations.
In addition to environmental and climate harms, plastics—whose chemicals often leach into the food and water people eat and drink—are linked to a wide range of health risks, including infertility, developmental issues, metabolic disorders, and certain cancers.
Plastics also break down into tiny particles found almost everywhere on Earth—including in human bodies—called microplastics, which cause ailments such as inflammation, immune dysfunction, and possibly cardiovascular disease and gut biome imbalance.
A study published earlier this year in the British medical journal The Lancet estimated that plastics are responsible for more than $1.5 trillion in health-related economic losses worldwide annually—impacts that disproportionately affect low-income and at-risk populations.
As Jo Banner, executive director of the Descendants Project—a Louisiana advocacy group dedicated to fighting environmental racism in frontline communities—said in response to the new Greenpeace report, "It’s the same story everywhere: poor, Black, Brown, and Indigenous communities turned into sacrifice zones so oil companies and big brands can keep making money."
"They call it development—but it’s exploitation, plain and simple," Banner added. "There’s nothing acceptable about poisoning our air, water, and food to sell more throwaway plastic. Our communities are not sacrifice zones, and we are not disposable people.”
Writing for Time this week, Judith Enck, a former regional administrator at the US Environmental Protection Agency and current president of the environmental justice group Beyond Plastics, said that "throwing your plastic bottles in the recycling bin may make you feel good about yourself, or ease your guilt about your climate impact. But recycling plastic will not address the plastic pollution crisis—and it is time we stop pretending as such."
"So what can we do?" Enck continued. "First, companies need to stop producing so much plastic and shift to reusable and refillable systems. If reducing packaging or using reusable packaging is not possible, companies should at least shift to paper, cardboard, glass, or metal."
"Companies are not going to do this on their own, which is why policymakers—the officials we elected to protect us—need to require them to do so," she added.
Although lawmakers in the 119th US Congress have introduced a handful of bills aimed at tackling plastic pollution, such proposals are all but sure to fail given Republican control of both the House of Representatives and Senate and the Trump administration's pro-petroleum policies.
Policies that promote alternatives to car use, reduce sprawl, encourage more compact batteries, and require recycling would all reduce the scale of mining needed for carbon-free transportation.
Upon my return from the Atacama, I began thinking about the definitions of some seemingly basic words: transportation, for one; need, for another. I wondered if the mining requirements might be lower, depending on the prevailing mode of transportation, or if there was a way to conceptualize social need as something distinct from the stream of inputs demanded by downstream industries. I pondered whether a reimagined transportation sector in which many more Americans rode buses or bikes would require the same massive volumes of minerals as one in which every household owned their own electric vehicle. I speculated about the per person material footprint under distinct mixes of electrified mobility.
Surely, I thought, some other researcher had already tested these hypotheses. I turned to databases of academic articles and browsed the reports of climate think tanks. To my surprise, no such studies existed. Instead, and without exception, all the extant models assumed that the only way to eliminate emissions from transportation is to replace individual gas-powered vehicles with individual electric vehicles. The best possible future, “net-zero emissions” (per the International Energy Agency), envisioned a world full of cars powered by batteries. Successful climate action meant a Tesla or a BYD in every garage.
Three years after I had first hypothesized that different transportation choices might require less mining, I stopped waiting for someone else to produce the data to put my hunch to the test. By that point, I had begun working with a climate think tank. I reached out to environmental engineers, transit wonks, and battery experts and asked if we could build a model from scratch. We were guided by an approach called “industrial ecology,” which studies industrial systems in terms of their material and energy flows. In this case, we were looking for the amount of lithium required to meet the needs of fully electric mobility. We pitted a scenario in which all traditional cars had been replaced with electric ones against a scenario in which more Americans rode to work, school, or shopping centers in clean energy buses or got around by bikes or by walking. In other words, and in sharp contrast to prevailing models, instead of comparing a zero-emissions world with one in which we continued to rely on fossil fuels, we compared multiple zero-emissions worlds with one another.
We didn’t stop there. Having set our imaginations free to roam, we tinkered with additional features of the worlds we were building. We imagined denser cities and suburbs, with less sprawl enabling less car use; cars with a range of battery sizes (American EV batteries are twice as large as the global median); high rates of mineral recycling and recovery. The futures we mapped out ultimately ranged from an electrified status quo to a fundamental shift in how Americans live and move. We did try to temper our dreaming with a healthy dose of realism. We only tested changes in the cities and suburbs, understanding the obstacles to rapidly building out mass transit in rural America. Even in our most transformative vision, the energy transition would still require tens of millions of EVs.
Achieving a globally just energy transition requires understanding supply chains in reverse, starting from what we produce and consume and working backward to their material inputs, and further still, to the relentless scramble for new extractive frontiers.
I expected these different green scenarios to entail distinct material footprints, measured in the total volume of lithium mining. But the results shocked me. The best-case scenario—smaller batteries, more recycling, denser cities and towns, and more mass transit use, walking, and cycling—requires 66 percent less lithium than the worst-case scenario (batteries get even bigger, suburbs stay sprawled, recycling is nonexistent).That percentage difference was based on a cumulative assessment across all the years we modeled (2023–2050). If instead we just look at 2050, the final year, the spread was more dramatic: the difference in lithium demand between the best- and worst-case scenarios was 92 percent. That’s in large part because recycling takes time to have an impact on reducing mining, with recycled feedstock increasing as the batteries from EVs purchased in the 2020s, ’30s, and ’40s reach the end of their life and become available for material recovery.
These findings put the supposedly zero-sum trade-off between climate action and protecting landscapes and communities from extraction in a new light. The futures we conjured showed that it is, in fact, possible to achieve climate targets without the alarming amount of mining predicted by all other forecasts. And there’s more: Increasing mass transit use and housing density will get us to zero emissions much faster than swapping every traditional car for an electric vehicle. To put it bluntly, a path to zero emissions that relies on electrifying individual cars is not only the most resource-intensive route to zero emissions, but also the slowest route to that urgent goal. We fully recognize that the political and even cultural obstacles to realizing our most ambitious scenario are formidable. But the prevailing approach not only requires much more extraction than socially necessary. It also runs afoul of climate science.
The implications of this modeling exercise completely changed the way I viewed mining. It suddenly dawned on me that extraction is not a problem that can be addressed solely at the sites of mining alone. It is absolutely vital to govern extractive frontiers better, improving environmental regulations and enforcing Indigenous rights. But some of our most potent tools to reduce the harms of mining reside elsewhere, all the way at the other end of far-flung supply chains. These tools take the form of the policy choices, investment decisions, and built environments that shape how we cut emissions from polluting sectors like transportation. The responsibility for protecting the Atacama’s watersheds does not rest only with Chilean bureaucrats, nor should Atacameño communities have to shoulder the burden of standing up to multinational mining firms on their own. We in the United States are also implicated in the supply chains that start in Chile’s northern reaches. Achieving a globally just energy transition requires understanding supply chains in reverse, starting from what we produce and consume and working backward to their material inputs, and further still, to the relentless scramble for new extractive frontiers.
The task of achieving a just energy transition is daunting. But this holistic view also opens up possibilities for action, revealing multiple and dispersed levers for reducing mining’s harms. Policies that promote alternatives to car use, reduce sprawl, encourage more compact batteries, and require recycling would all reduce the scale of mining needed for carbon-free transportation.
Confronting emissions as a holistic problem, rather than a purely technical question about the fastest way to electrify an ever-growing fleet of personal automobiles, entails a leap of political faith. New models and forecasts like the ones my colleagues and I built at our think tank, the Climate and Community Institute, can help us tell galvanizing stories about the future we want. If we can see and feel that alternate future, desire and describe it, then we can commit to creating the foundations for it in the here and now. Forecasts chart a path from our present to the world we want to build. But seeing something and building it aren’t the same. Better research or data can only carry us so far; concrete, bold, even risky actions are the stuff of real change. What practical steps can we take today to call forth a different tomorrow?
We can start by demanding supply chains organized around justice for everyone they touch, rather than profits for just a few. Just as any workplace is simultaneously a site of exploitation and locus of worker power, and any mine is at once a setting for extraction and a potential scene of community resistance, the supply chains of green technologies are both a means of domination—of people and of nature—and fertile ground for making the world anew.
Supply chains are currently organized for profit, but they can nonetheless become arenas for grassroots organizing and unexpected alliances. Lithium battery supply chains don’t just link mines to factories to consumers, or upstream to downstream corporations. They also connect Indigenous land defenders and urban transit users, workers manufacturing e-bikes and battery recycling advocates, bus drivers and avid cyclists, and climate activists and promoters of dense, walkable cities and towns. These communities, workers, and advocates are already bound together by the global operations of green capitalism—and in many cases, are already organizing locally. What would it take for them to join hands and fight for globally just supply chains, together?
Today, a coalition like this may feel impossible. Electrifying the status quo to stave off the scariest warming scenarios already seems hard enough. Electrifying while also changing engrained habits, like car dependency and suburban sprawl, seems far-fetched, if not utopian. But fear of radical change is misplaced: Radical, turbulent, accelerating, and yes, frightening, change is already baked into the carbon in the atmosphere and in the reign of sclerotic elites, predatory corporations, and moribund institutions.
There is no escaping the harsh reality of mounting instability—political, economic, ecological. This turmoil touches everything, including the material underbelly of the energy transition. This is the paradox of extraction: It is at once the most enduring feature of the world order and among the most prone to disruptive conflict, whether between Global North and South, between geopolitical rivals, or between local communities and huge corporations. Such contests are asymmetric, yet over the past century have provided openings to challenge the entrenched power relations of our global economy.
Extractive frontiers are so sedimented that they may feel like second nature, but it is precisely from these frontiers that we must begin again, from the underground on up.
Adapted from Extraction: The Frontiers of Green Capitalism by Thea Riofrancos. Copyright ©2025 by Thea Riofrancos. Used with permission of the publisher, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc. All rights reserved.
Government delegates negotiating a plastics treaty should resist the urge to incorporate quick fixes like plastic credits in the text, and instead should set ambitious, non-negotiable targets for plastic reduction and reuse.
The escalating global plastic pollution crisis demands urgent, decisive action, with plastic threatening ecosystems and human health.
Governments are convening at the second part of the fifth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC 5.2) in Geneva, tasked with forging a historic, legally binding instrument to tackle plastic pollution across its entire life cycle—a mandate enshrined in the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) Resolution 5/14 three years ago.
Plastic credit schemes are increasingly discussed on the sidelines of the ongoing treaty negotiations—often presented under the umbrella of blended and innovative financing. Proponents argue that these schemes can potentially close the gap in countries with inadequate waste management infrastructure. Plastic credits have not explicitly made it in the most recent Chair’s Text at the ongoing INC 5.2 meeting, but they were mentioned in one of the expert group meetings in August 2024, as an innovative financing approach, with the potential to “incentivize companies to shift towards sustainable practices.”
Scientists have estimated that it would cost $18.3-158.4 trillion to support global actions toward zero waste pollution by 2040. According to the World Bank, income generated from plastic credits can potentially help close the funding gap for plastic waste management by 2040, amounting to about $240 billion annually. These benefits may sound enticing particularly with the urgency of securing funding to address plastic pollution, but in fact represent a dangerous distraction, risking greenwashing and diverting critical finance and political action.
The future of our planet depends on preventing plastic pollution at its source, not pursuing plastic credits to offset harm after it is done.
Plastic credits appear to be a win-win solution on paper—companies provide funding for waste collection initiatives to “offset” their plastic footprint. However, this approach mirrors the shortcomings of carbon offsetting, which has faced numerous problems, including “phantom credits,” lack of new emission reductions, and double counting. While a universal definition for plastic credits is still under development, organizations like PCX Solutions, Verra, BVRio, and the World Bank generally agree on this scheme as a results-based financing mechanism, which funds projects designed to tackle plastic pollution, primarily through collection and recycling efforts. Plastic credits have initially been introduced as voluntary schemes, in which businesses may purchase credits to “offset” their plastic footprint, or the amount of plastic they have produced, often done to enhance brand image, meet sustainability commitments, and fulfill corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives.
There are several countries that have incorporated plastic credits into their extended producer responsibility (EPR) policies, as a way for companies to achieve regulatory compliance. The Philippines, for example, mandates large corporations to gradually offset their plastic footprint, aiming for an 80% collection or recovery by 2028. This system permits plastic offsetting as an alternative to EPR fees, which are conceptually intended to fully cover plastic waste management costs—a burden often borne by municipalities. However, it remains uncertain whether existing EPR policies with plastic offsets fully cover the cost of managing plastic waste.
Experts have argued that plastic credit mechanisms lack a standardized accounting system, making it challenging to effectively measure credits from plastic offsetting projects and plastic footprints. They also found that plastic credits face difficulties in meeting critical offset criteria such as additionality, permanence, and the “no-harm” principle. It is difficult to prove that the plastic collected or recycled through a credit scheme would not have been managed anyway. A 2023 investigation into Verra’s databases, for instance, found that more than 80% of listed projects have been operational for more than a year before being listed on the registry platform, contradicting claims that these activities are unviable without funding from plastic credits.
There are also concerns about permanence, largely due to the challenges of achieving genuinely closed-loop recycling for plastic waste. The meager 9% global recycling rate for plastic highlights the challenges posed by its complex compositions and chemical additives, as well as the economic impracticality of such interventions. It is not surprising that many of these plastic credit projects involve burning collected plastic waste in cement kilns.
Experts have warned that current credit prices are too volatile to provide sustainable funding for waste management. SourceMaterial uncovered a significant price disparity within a registry platform: Plastic credits linked to co-processing treatment in cement kilns are available for as little as $115 per credit, whereas credits from community-based collection projects can cost up to $630. Using the Philippines EPR case, the price disparity suggests that companies may opt for the cheapest credits derived from burning for regulatory compliance, rather than pursuing plastic reduction measures.
Plastic credits are fundamentally flawed and risk becoming a costly diversion from meaningful action. Government delegates attending the INC 5.2 meeting should resist the urge to incorporate quick fixes like plastic credits in the treaty text, and instead should set ambitious, non-negotiable targets for plastic reduction and reuse, ensuring accountability across the entire plastic life cycle, as mandated under UNEA Resolution 5/14.
A strong, dedicated financial mechanism is essential for the treaty. Developed member states should fund a substantial portion of the contributions, in line with the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and polluter pays. This will ensure that the health and environmental costs are internalized, and funds are available for remediation to protect human health, biodiversity, and the environment. Likewise, the financial mechanism should also direct investments toward initiatives focusing on plastic production caps and waste prevention, as well as the development and scale-up of safe, non-toxic, and accessible reuse and refill systems, rather than limiting to downstream interventions like recycling and waste management. Furthermore, it should support and facilitate a just transition for workers along the plastics life cycle, including waste pickers and other informal workers and workers in cooperative settings, Indigenous Peoples, and frontline or directly affected communities.
The future of our planet depends on preventing plastic pollution at its source, not pursuing plastic credits to offset harm after it is done. Real solutions begin with reduction, not compensation.