Entrapment and Self-Perpetuating Conflict Escalation in the Iran War

One of the main findings of those who study conflict resolution is that it is easier to climb up the conflict escalation ladder than to climb back down. Also, the deeply-entrenched enemy images on both sides, with Iran’s belief that the US is “the Great Satan,” and US references to Iran belonging to the “Axis of Evil,” confirm that a long history of conflict and grievances make the conflict harder to resolve.

The most significant concern in recent years has been Iran’s uranium enrichment and fear that it could be used to make nuclear bombs, a major source of angst for both the US and Israel—as presumably are Israel’s 90 or so undeclared nuclear weapons for Iran. Since the need for security and safety is one of the most fundamental issues at the heart of many conflicts, this is a classic case of the “security dilemma,” where a state’s actions to increase its security cause reactions from other parties that lead to a decrease in its security. Indeed, Iran’s nuclear enrichment led to the first iteration of this armed conflict, where in response, on June 22, the US and Israel launched a surprise airstrike on three Iranian nuclear facilities.

Of course, US President Donald Trump’s annulment (reportedly encouraged by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu) of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (painstakingly negotiated over a 20-month period with the P5+1 and European Union)—even though Iran was abiding by the agreement (as certified by the International Atomic Energy Agency)—surely undermines Iran’s trust in any agreement that it may now reach with the US.

The apparent trigger for the current hostilities was a visit by Netanyahu to Washington on February 11, where Trump and his inner circle met with Netanyahu, the director of Mossad, and Israeli military staff, in a highly unusual classified meeting in the Situation Room, in which Netanyahu made an hours-long, hard-sell pitch “suggesting that Iran was ripe for regime change and expressing the belief that a joint US-Israeli mission could finally bring an end to the Islamic Republic.” He apparently argued that this could be accomplished in three to four days. Trump (who according to an article in The Atlantic has actually supported a hard-line approach against Iran since 1980) ended the meeting by saying, “It sounds good to me.”

Although various pundits, as well as the parties themselves, are arguing that one side or the other is “winning,” in fact, both are losing—and stand to lose even more (as does the rest of the world) if they cannot find an off-ramp.

In subsequent discussions about whether to go to war, Trump’s inner circle engaged in “groupthink” by not expressing their concerns openly and mainly acquiescing to Trump’s judgment. Groupthink occurs where there is pressure to reach a consensus without critical evaluation, resulting in irrational or dysfunctional decision-making. In decisions about whether to initiate war, it typically “includes an illusion of invulnerability; an unquestioned belief in the group’s inherent morality; collective efforts to discount warnings; stereotyped views of the enemy as evil; self-censorship of deviations from the group beliefs; a shared illusion of unanimity; suppression of dissent; and the emergence of self-appointed mind guards who screen the group from dissent.”

Just over two weeks later, in Operation Epic Fury, Israeli military strikes, informed by US intelligence, assassinated a number of senior Iranian officials, including the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei—in a major breach of the international norm against the assassination of leaders. Moreover, the attacks were launched unexpectedly in the midst of an ongoing negotiation process between the US and Iran on its nuclear program, again undermining Iran’s trust in negotiations with the US. The US and Israel also targeted other military and government sites, with Iran, in turn, responding with missile and drone strikes on Israel, US bases, and US-allied Arab countries and closure of the Strait of Hormuz, disrupting global trade.

Once the threshold to armed conflict has been crossed, parties typically become caught in a rapidly-spiraling vortex of aggressive interactions, which ensure that the conflict becomes worse and worse. As each inflicts increasing damage on the other, anger and a desire for revenge grow exponentially and each sees the other’s actions as provocation that must be responded to, typically with greater intensity than the action it follows, causing the conflict to grow in size and importance.

As each experiences losses or injury at the hands of the other, the desire to punish the other and to right the wrong that has been done increases. Conflicts then begin to operate in a “retaliatory spiral,” as both now have truly hostile intentions toward one another, further poisoning the relationship, and making a peace process ever more difficult. Reduced communication also makes reality testing more dubious and allows distorted images of the other side to grow.

Threats and ultimatums grow increasingly more alarming as both attempt to use “leverage” to influence the other. Trump, for example, threatened that Iran would be “blown off the face of the Earth,” “blasted into oblivion,” and “bombed back to the Stone Ages!!!” In early March, Ali Larijani, the head of the Iranian National Security Council, posted on X: “Be careful not to get eliminated yourself.” The next day, he, too, was assassinated.

What those making such threats fail to appreciate is that parties do not always respond to leverage as hoped. The use of heavy-handed leverage, especially threats and punitive measures, frequently backfires. All too often, parties react against these attempts to influence their behavior and refuse to comply—sometimes even at great cost to themselves. “Reactance” is a well-studied phenomenon that typically occurs when the party trying to achieve influence does not fully take into account all of the factors that affect the motivation of those they are trying to influence. In such cases, the blunt use of leverage is seen by the party for what it is—an attempt to “manipulate” it to act in a certain manner against its will or interests. In some cases, preserving one’s freedom of choice and control over a situation and not being seen by one’s constituents to cave to external pressure may be more important than avoiding punitive sanctions—even when they are severe. In such situations, leverage not only fails to bring about the desired result, but may even cause the party to become more entrenched in its resistance.

Reactance tends to be strongest in relation to punitive measures (“sticks”) but can also occur in relation to positive incentives (“carrots”), especially when they are perceived to be “bribes,” which erode an actor’s freedom of choice. Indeed, the creative use of incentives that are tailored to the parties’ interests will be much more likely to influence the other party than the blunt or simplistic use of leverage which may stir up resistance.

When previously defined limits to a conflict, termed “saliences,” are crossed, it tends to redefine the rules of the conflict. The US and Israeli action in breaking the taboo of assassinating leaders, and Iran’s decision to block the Strait of Hormuz—for the first time ever—represent two such saliences which caused an increased sense of outrage and injustice and more extreme retaliatory behavior in response. In frustration at the blockage in the Strait of Hormuz, Trump wrote on his social media account on Easter morning: “Open the F***in’ Strait, you crazy bastards, or you’ll be living in Hell—JUST WATCH! Praise be to Allah.” A couple of days later, he warned: “A whole civilization will die tonight, never to be brought back again.”

At this point, the international community became concerned about what further saliences Trump might cross (e.g., committing war crimes or using a nuclear weapon) and insisted on the parties agreeing to a two-week ceasefire, which had been proposed by Pakistan. Signed on April 8, the ceasefire did calm the situation significantly, as they often do (if not egregiously violated).

Soon after, when face-to-face marathon talks were held in Pakistan (which I’ve written about elsewhere), but no agreement was reached, Trump imposed his own blockade against Iranian ports—another first. Since then, although there have been no further face-to-face negotiations, the Pakistani mediators have passed papers back and forth between the parties, outlining their latest positions. One major factor that has slowed the process is the pairing of offers with threats, since the reactance it has engendered inclines the parties to reject the other’s offers.

Although various pundits, as well as the parties themselves, are arguing that one side or the other is “winning,” in fact, both are losing—and stand to lose even more (as does the rest of the world) if they cannot find an off-ramp.

Iran’s blockage of commercial ships carrying oil, gas, and fertilizer has been very costly for the US domestically, not only at the gas pump, but in terms of an economic downturn, inflation, and projections that the war will ultimately cost $1 trillion. Iran has also caused significant damage to US military bases in the Middle East (only recently reported) and a serious depletion of US military stockpiles. Moreover, US standing in the world has suffered considerably. Finally, for Trump, his ratings have fallen and there is concern that his party could lose in the midterms.

Iran has suffered not only the obliteration of its senior leadership, but also severe damage to its infrastructure; considerable civilian and military mortality; and loss of significant military assets, such as its navy, missiles, military bases, etc. The International Monetary Fund has projected Iran's economy will shrink by over 6% n 2026, with inflation running at almost 70%. It will take years for Iran’s reconstruction.

The rest of the world has and will also suffer greatly. For example, The World Food Programme has predicted that roughly 45 million more people could be pushed into acute hunger this year, and the World Central Kitchen has warned that fertilizer shortages could lead to a multiyear famine.

To work toward a peace agreement, both the US and Iran will need to recommit to and extend their ceasefire to give themselves sufficient time to engage in a well-planned third-party mediation process. Such a process would include adequate time to create an agenda of issues acceptable to both; exploration of the interests of each party in relation to each agenda item; discussion of creative problem-solving options that might meet their respective interests; and an innovative integration of proposed options into a more comprehensive agreement, acceptable to both.

Although it’s advisable for the Pakistani mediators, who have been committed and involved throughout, to continue in this role, it might be best to choose a venue such as Geneva rather than Islamabad that would allow both delegations to feel safe and have sufficient time for the process to unfold. Finally, technical experts, such as senior staff from the International Atomic Energy Agency, should be included to ensure understanding of the technical issues with regard to uranium enrichment and to propose new ideas.

To arrive at such an agreement, the parties will also need to reduce the number of tit-for-tat attacks on one another; lower their threats and hostile rhetoric; and do their homework to consider what inducements they could offer to one another.

Of course, another danger that will need to be anticipated is the possibility that either Netanyahu, who has recently said that “it’s not over”—or hardline factions in the US or in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps—could act as “spoilers.”

Obviously, the fundamental issue is the need for a better understanding and institutionalization of the knowledge and practice of conflict prevention and resolution, so that such incredibly destructive and senseless wars can be prevented and disputes of the future more sensibly settled by constructive rather than destructive means.