Rare Earth Minerals Don't Have to Feed the War Machine

On August 24, the Department of War announced a $750 million investment to secure rare-earth elements produced by Serra Verde at its Pela Ema project in Brazil. Combined with a $300 million purchase commitment from the Defense Logistics Agency and $500 million from a major bank, the arrangement represents a $1.55 billion investment structure aimed at reducing US dependence on Chinese-controlled supply chains.

There is a legitimate problem here.

There is also a troubling choice about how we intend to solve it.

Rare-earth elements such as neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium are essential components of modern life. They are used in permanent magnets found in electric vehicles, wind turbines, electronics, industrial equipment, and other technologies. They are also used in fighter jets, guided missiles, nuclear submarines, drones, and other weapons systems.

A mineral dug from the ground does not know whether it will eventually become part of an offshore wind turbine or the guidance system of a missile. That decision is political.

China currently dominates this supply chain. According to the International Energy Agency, China accounted for about 60% of global mining of magnet rare earths in 2024, 91% of their refining, and 94% of sintered permanent-magnet production. That level of concentration creates a genuine economic vulnerability, particularly after Chinese export restrictions demonstrated how quickly access to these materials can become a geopolitical bargaining chip.

Diversification makes sense.

But listen carefully to the language the US government is using to describe it.

Assistant Secretary of War for Industrial Base Policy Mike Cadenazzi called resilient supply chains a “fundamental warfighting requirement.” The department says the agreement will guarantee materials necessary to manufacture “next-generation weapons systems.” Its announcement specifically highlights nuclear submarines, fighter jets, guided missiles, combat vessels, and drones.

That framing deserves scrutiny.

The United States is not simply securing minerals. It is incorporating another piece of the global economy into an increasingly militarized conception of national security.

A Mineral Can Power a Wind Turbine or a Missile

There is nothing inherently military about neodymium.

A mineral dug from the ground does not know whether it will eventually become part of an offshore wind turbine or the guidance system of a missile.

That decision is political.

And that is precisely why this $1.55 billion initiative should provoke a broader conversation about the kind of economy the United States is building.

If Washington treats critical minerals primarily as inputs for weapons, we should not be surprised when the industries surrounding them increasingly organize themselves around weapons production.

Serra Verde is an important source of these materials. Its Pela Ema operation began commercial production in 2024 and is the first large-scale producer outside Asia of all four critical magnetic rare-earth elements: neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium. The company expects production to reach roughly 6,400 metric tons of rare-earth oxides annually by the end of 2027.

That makes Brazil potentially important to reducing the world's dangerous dependence on a single supplier.

But reducing dependence on China should not automatically mean subordinating a new international supply chain to the needs of the Pentagon.

Rare-earth resilience could instead be treated as civilian industrial policy: an effort to ensure reliable supplies for renewable energy, public transportation, resilient electrical grids, medical technologies, communications infrastructure, and other components of human security.

The difference is more than rhetorical.

Government priorities influence markets. Purchase guarantees influence production. Subsidies determine which industries expand. Billions of public dollars can create an ecosystem in which manufacturers orient themselves toward military customers because those customers offer enormous, guaranteed demand.

If Washington treats critical minerals primarily as inputs for weapons, we should not be surprised when the industries surrounding them increasingly organize themselves around weapons production.

Security Is Bigger Than Military Power

The Department of War's announcement actually exposes the contradiction.

The same release that celebrates rare earths as essential to fighter aircraft and nuclear submarines acknowledges that they are vital to “energy infrastructure, transportation, aerospace, and electronics.”

Exactly.

Those civilian applications should not be an afterthought.

The United States could reproduce the very system it says it wants to escape: concentrated supply chains organized around geopolitical blocs, each treating access to minerals as leverage against the other.

Climate change threatens lives. An unreliable electrical grid threatens lives. Fragile transportation and communications systems threaten economic stability. Supply-chain disruptions can close factories and eliminate jobs.

Those are security issues too.

Yet American policymakers repeatedly define security through the narrowest possible lens: military capability first, virtually everything else second.

A peace economy asks a different question.

Instead of asking only, "What materials do we need to maintain our technological advantage in warfare?" we should ask: "What materials do people need to live safely, sustainably and prosperously—and how can we obtain them without creating new forms of exploitation, environmental destruction, or international conflict?"

That would still require diversifying the rare-earth supply chain.

It would still require investment.

It would still require cooperation with countries such as Brazil.

But the purpose would be different.

Don't Replace One Dependency With Another

There is another danger in framing critical minerals as part of strategic competition with China.

The United States could reproduce the very system it says it wants to escape: concentrated supply chains organized around geopolitical blocs, each treating access to minerals as leverage against the other.

Minerals essential to decarbonization could become another source of great-power confrontation.

The result would not necessarily be resilience. It could be a global scramble for resources.

Countries possessing lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare-earth deposits would increasingly become arenas for competition among powerful states. Supply agreements would become security agreements. Economic relationships would become tests of allegiance.

Minerals essential to decarbonization could become another source of great-power confrontation.

That is not a theoretical concern when officials explicitly describe access to raw materials as a “warfighting requirement.”

The alternative is not continued dependence on China. Diversification is necessary. The IEA itself has repeatedly warned that extreme concentration in rare-earth refining and magnet production represents a significant economic risk.

But diversification should mean creating many reliable suppliers and processing centers—not dividing the mineral economy into rival military camps.

Build a Peace Supply Chain

A different critical-minerals strategy is possible.

The United States could invest aggressively in recycling and recovery of rare-earth materials. It could develop domestic processing capacity while applying strong labor and environmental standards. It could enter long-term partnerships with Brazil and other producing countries that emphasize shared economic development rather than simply extracting resources for American strategic advantage.

And the government could prioritize civilian demand—renewable power, electric transportation, grid modernization, and other public infrastructure—alongside legitimate defense requirements.

It could guarantee that communities near mines and processing facilities benefit economically and retain meaningful influence over development decisions.

And the government could prioritize civilian demand—renewable power, electric transportation, grid modernization, and other public infrastructure—alongside legitimate defense requirements rather than allowing military procurement to dictate the direction of an entire emerging industry.

Serra Verde itself demonstrates why the choice matters. The company's rare earths can supply permanent magnets for electric vehicles and wind turbines just as surely as they can supply defense and aerospace manufacturers.

The question is not whether America should secure access to critical minerals.

It should.

The question is what we intend to do with the security that access provides.

A nation can spend billions building supply chains designed to manufacture the next generation of weapons.

Or it can use the same industrial capacity to build the infrastructure required for the next generation of human life.

The minerals are the same.

The economy we build around them is a choice.