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The basic story here is that in order to give donors in the financial industry still more money, Trump is planning to privatize a perfectly well-functioning public system for securitizing mortgages.
In Washington no bad idea stays dead long. Therefore it should not be surprising that U.S. President Donald Trump is planning to move forward with plans to privatize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage giants that have been in government conservatorship for almost two decades.
As with many of the moves undertaken by Trump, it is not clear what problem this is meant to solve. For the period they have been in conservatorship, Fannie and Freddie have been securitizing mortgages at a low cost and have not faced any substantial management problems.
There is of course one problem that privatizing Fannie and Freddie would solve. This is yet one more way that the financial industry can run up some profits and high pay for top executives at the expense of the rest of us.
The Congressional Budget Office calculated that having private institutions, rather than Fannie and Freddie in their current form, would add roughly 20 basis points, 0.2% to the cost of securitizing mortgages. With around $1 trillion in mortgages being securitized each year, that comes to $2 billion annually. That is not huge in the context of the federal budget (0.03%), but it is four times the annual appropriation for the Corporation for Public Broadcasting that got Trump so upset.
Trump is giving a green light to his finance buddies to find every more creative ways to rip off businesses and ordinary people.
And in the case of privatizing Fannie and Freddie, we literally get nothing for it except a less efficient mechanism for securitizing mortgages. This is similar to the plans for privatizing Social Security. We have an extremely efficient public system, but many people in the Trump administration see the opportunity to make trillions of dollars in fees by turning it into a private system.
As with a privatized Social Security system, we would also be exposing ourselves to needless risk by privatizing Fannie and Freddie. The basic problem is that we would be allowing a private corporation to operate with a government guarantee against losses. This guarantee gives a private securitizer an enormous incentive to securitize bad mortgages in order to increase volume and make more profits. That was the story of the housing bubble and the subsequent collapse and financial crisis in 2008-09.
If a private securitizer is carefully regulated, it can limit the risk of reckless lending. But does anyone believe that the Trump administration is going to have careful regulation of the financial industry?
The basic story here is that in order to give donors in the financial industry still more money, Trump is planning to privatize a perfectly well-functioning public system for securitizing mortgages. This move will almost certainly increase the cost of mortgages for homebuyers, the only question is by how much. And it raises the risk for future financial crises and government bailouts.
Making the financial sector less efficient in order to hand money to contributors is very much front and center in the Trump administration. This is the same story with his decision to promote crypto currency, which is making Trump and his friends tens of billions of dollars; as opposed to letting the Federal Reserve Board issue a digital currency, which would save us tens of billions in bank and credit card fees.
The evisceration of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau follows the same pattern. Trump is giving a green light to his finance buddies to find every more creative ways to rip off businesses and ordinary people.
That’s how we should understand the drive to privatize Fannie and Freddie. How could anyone oppose it?
"For all the claims Trump and the GOP have made about being the voice of working-class voters, firing Chopra... only satisfies unscrupulous corporations and unelected billionaires like Elon Musk," one advocate said.
U.S. President Donald Trump moved Saturday morning to fire Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Director Rohit Chopra, who had earned the praise of consumer advocates and the ire of Wall Street for his efforts to return more than $6 billion to ordinary Americans.
Chopra announced his firing on social media, also sharing a letter to the president in which he touted the work of the CFPB and outlined possible priorities for his successor.
"Every day, Americans from across the country shared their ideas and experiences with us," Chopra wrote to his followers. "You helped us hold powerful companies and their executives accountable for breaking the law, and you made our work better. Thank you."
In his letter, Chopra mounted a full-throated defense of the CFPB, which has often been attacked by Republicans and pro-Trump figures, including billionaire Elon Musk. He wrote that the 2008 financial crisis "made Americans question whether regulators and law enforcement would hold companies and their executives accountable for their mismanagement or wrongdoing," especially since many of the companies responsible for the crash only got larger and more powerful following a taxpayer-funded bailout.
"That's what agencies like CFPB work to fix: to make sure that the laws of our land aren't just words on a page," he wrote, adding that "with so much power concentrated in the hands of a few, agencies like the CFPB have never been more critical."
Chopra, who was appointed by former President Joe Biden to head the CFPB in 2021, said that he was "proud the CFPB had done so much to restore the rule of law" during his tenure.
"Since 2021, we have returned billions of dollars from repeat offenders and other bad actors, implemented dormant legal authorities and long-overdue rules required by law, and given more freedom and bargaining leverage to families navigating a complex and confusing financial system," he wrote.
"If civil society does its job, every person unnecessarily taken advantage of by a financial institution will attribute the blame to the right person—Donald Trump."
Chopra also touted the CFPB's regulation of junk fees, inaccurate medical bills, and digital surveillance by Big Tech. Under Chopra, the CFPB sued major financial institutions such as Bank of America and JP Morgan Chase and finalized a rule to strike around $49 billion worth of medical debt from credit reports, according to CNN.
With Chopra in charge, the bureau "has fought against junk fees, repeat offenders, big tech evasions, and corporate deception. It has championed competition, transparency, accountability, and consumer financial health," Adam Rust, director of financial services for the Consumer Federation of America, said in a statement reported by NPR.
Despite the fact that Chopra was originally appointed by Trump in 2018 to serve on the Federal Trade Commission, Chopra's firing was expected as soon as Trump took office, with both major banks and tech companies urging the new president to oust him.
While anticipated, the move was criticized by progressive advocates and lawmakers.
"For all the claims Trump and the GOP have made about being the voice of working-class voters, firing Chopra and attacking the CFPB only satisfies unscrupulous corporations and unelected billionaires like Elon Musk," Revolving Door Project founder and executive director Jeff Hauser said in a statement. "If civil society does its job, every person unnecessarily taken advantage of by a financial institution will attribute the blame to the right person—Donald Trump."
Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-Wash.) called his firing "an enormous loss for the American people."
"My friend Rohit Chopra has done an incredible job leading the CFPB—standing up to big corporations, protecting consumer data, and saving money for poor and working families," Jayapal said on social media.
Former Labor Secretary Robert Reich wrote on social media: "Under Rohit Chopra's tenure, the CFPB continued to serve as a shining example of government working on behalf of the people. Chopra took on corporate greed, unnecessary junk fees, predatory lending, and other financial shenanigans. It's telling that Trump just fired him."
According to The New York Times, the CFPB under Trump is expected by financial industry officials to roll back some of Chopra's regulations and to issue fewer new rules and weaken enforcement.
However, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) pointed out that this would run counter to Trump's own campaign rhetoric.
"President Trump campaigned on capping credit card interest rates at 10% and lowering costs for Americans. He needs a strong CFPB and a strong CFPB director to do that," she said in a statement. "But if President Trump and Republicans decide to cower to Wall Street billionaires and destroy the agency, they will have a fight on their hands."
Chopra himself, in his farewell letter to Trump, suggested steps the CFPB could take under new leadership. These included:
"We have also analyzed your promising proposal on capping credit card interest rates, and we see a path for enacting meaningful reform," he wrote to Trump. "I hope that the CFPB will continue to be a pillar of restoring and advancing economic liberty in America."
The great 401(k) experiment of do-it-yourself retirement plans was always a better deal for the financial services industry that profited handsomely from managing them than for employers and workers.
Pension plans never really went away—despite beliefs to the contrary that they are fatally flawed, with 401(k)s being the only sustainable retirement plans. The reality is that there are still 50,000 financially healthy pension plans in the United States. Most public sector workers, for sure a minority of all workers, still have pension plans. The other reality, though, is that progressively fewer workers since the early 1980s have had access to traditional pensions plans.
The general experience in American workplaces has been that once gone, pension plans do not come back. Here and there the trend has been bucked with pension plans returning to replace 401(k)s. In 2008, West Virgina public teachers voted to return their pension plan that had been taken away by the state legislature in 1991. The 401(k)-like plan that replaced it had produced such poor returns that participants were facing poverty in retirement. In 2012, after a long campaign, Connecticut state employees were allowed on a voluntary basis to switch out of a 401(k)-like plan into the state’s traditional pension plan.
More recently, there have been developments of potential large-scale replacements of 401(k)s with pension plans that may portend the beginnings of a significant pension comeback.
There is plenty of evidence that a dollar invested in a traditional pension plan delivers far more retirement income than one invested in a 401(k).
In 2006 the Alaska state legislature took away the pension plan for schoolteachers and replaced it with a 401(k). School teachers and their union never accepted the change and continually fought to reverse it. This year they may succeed. The Alaska Senate has voted to reinstate the pension plan. If the House of Representatives, where the fight will be tougher, follows suit, the plan will be reinstated.
Proponents of the reinstatement argued that Alaska was having a hard time keeping teachers who were quitting and leaving for teaching positions in states that had pension plans, which most do. Opponents of the change have argued, as they usually do, that it would be too expensive. But there is plenty of evidence that a dollar invested in a traditional pension plan delivers far more retirement income than one invested in a 401(k). Further, consulting New School economist Teresa Ghilarducci showed that Alaska would actually save $76 million annually by making the change.
If that can occur in Republican-dominated Alaska, union-strong Michigan, where state employees lost their pension plan in 1997, would seem to be a candidate for a similar development.
Meanwhile, in corporate America where pension plans have dwindled to near extinction, IBM has announced that it may develop a cash balance plan, a kind of quasi-pension plan, to replace its 401(k). Cash balance plans do not deliver as much retirement income as traditional defined-benefit pension plans, but they do have three advantages for workers over 401(k)s. Collective plan contributions are professionally invested, producing higher returns than the often-amateur investments of 401(k) participants. Once credited to participant accounts, contributions remain regardless of future market activity unlike with 401(k)s. And, by law, cash balance plans are required to offer life pensions from their funds that deliver significantly more retirement income than life annuities that life insurance companies sell to 401(k) participants.
IBM’s accountants are exploring the cash balance model mainly because it offers tax advantages over 401(k)s. At the same time investment risks, as with 401(k)s, are shouldered by participants, unlike with traditional pension plans.
The great 401(k) experiment of do-it-yourself retirement plans was always a better deal for the financial services industry that profited handsomely from managing them. For employers it was less of a good deal. Some are now beginning to do until recently the unthinkable and explore readopting the P word.
Current laws allow the big international banks to run the largest derivatives casino that the world has ever seen.
This is a sequel to a Jan. 15 article titled “Casino Capitalism and the Derivatives Market: Time for Another ‘Lehman Moment’?”, discussing the threat of a 2024 “black swan” event that could pop the derivatives bubble. That bubble is now over 10 times the gross domestic product of the world and is so interconnected and fragile that an unanticipated crisis could trigger the collapse not just of the bubble but of the economy. To avoid that result, in the event of the bankruptcy of a major financial institution, derivative claimants are put first in line to grab the assets—not just the deposits of customers but their stocks and bonds. This is made possible by the Uniform Commercial Code, under which all assets held by brokers, banks, and “central clearing parties” have been “dematerialized” into fungible pools and are held in “street name.”
This article will consider several proposed alternatives for diffusing what Warren Buffett called a time bomb waiting to go off. That sort of bomb just detonated in the Chinese stock market, contributing to its fall; and the result could be much worse in the U.S., where the stock market plays a much larger role in the economy.
A January 30 article on Bloomberg News notes that “Chinese stocks’ brutal start to the year is being at least partly blamed on the impact of a relatively new financial derivative known as a snowball. The products are tied to indexes, and a key feature is that when the gauges fall below built-in levels, brokerages will sell their related futures positions.”
Further details are in a January 23 article titled “‘Snowball’ Derivatives Feed China’s Stock Market Avalanche.” It states, “China’s plunging stock market is leading to losses on billions of dollars worth of derivatives linked to the country’s equity indexes, fueling further selling as retail investors offload their positions… Snowball products are similar to the index-linked products sold in the 2008 financial crisis, with investors betting that U.S. equities would not fall more than 25% or 30%,” which they did.
Chinese shares rose on February 6, as officials took measures to prop up the ailing market, including imposing new “zero tolerance” curbs for malicious short selling.
The Chinese stock market is much younger and smaller than that in the U.S., with a much smaller role in the economy. Thus China’s economy remains relatively protected from disruptive ups and downs in the stock market. Not so in the U.S., where speculating in the derivatives casino brought down international insurer AIG and investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008, triggering the global financial crisis of 2008-09. AIG had to be bailed out by the taxpayers to prevent collapse of the too-big-to-fail derivative banks, and Lehman Brothers went through a messy bankruptcy that took years to resolve.
In a December 2010 article on Seeking Alpha titled “Derivatives: The Big Banks’ Quadrillion-Dollar Financial Casino,” attorney Michael Snyder wrote, “Derivatives were at the heart of the financial crisis of 2007 and 2008, and whenever the next financial crisis happens, derivatives will undoubtedly play a huge role once again… Today, the world financial system has been turned into a giant casino where bets are made on just about anything you can possibly imagine, and the major Wall Street banks make a ton of money from it. The system… is totally dominated by the big international banks.”
In a 2009 Cornell Law Faculty publication titled “How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why Re-Regulating Them Can Prevent Another,” Prof. Lynn Stout proposed stabilizing the market by returning to 20th-century derivative rules. She noted that derivatives are basically wagers or bets, and that before 2000, the U.S. and U.K. regulated derivatives primarily by a common‐law rule known as the “rule against difference contracts.” She explained:
The rule against difference contracts did not stop you from wagering on anything you liked: sporting contests, wheat prices, interest rates. But if you wanted to go to a court to have your wager enforced, you had to demonstrate to a judge’s satisfaction that at least one of the parties to the wager had a real economic interest in the underlying and was using the derivative contract to hedge against a risk to that interest… Using derivatives this way is truly hedging, and it serves a useful social purpose by reducing risk.
…Under the rule against difference contracts and its sister doctrine in insurance law (the requirement of “insurable interest”), derivative contracts that couldn’t be proved to hedge an economic interest in the underlying were deemed nothing more than legally unenforceable wagers.
…Hedge funds, for example, should really call themselves “speculation funds,” as it is quite clear they are using derivatives to try to reap profits at the other traders’ expense.
The rule against difference contracts died in 2000, when the U.S. embraced wholesale deregulation with the passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA):
The CFMA not only declared financial derivatives exempt from CFTC or SEC oversight, it also declared all financial derivatives legally enforceable. The CFMA thus eliminated, in one fell swoop, a legal constraint on derivatives speculation that dated back not just decades, but centuries. It was this change in the law—not some flash of genius on Wall Street—that created today’s $600 trillion financial derivatives market.
Not only are speculative derivatives now legally enforceable, but under the Bankruptcy Act of 2005, derivative securities enjoy special protections. Most creditors are “stayed” from enforcing their rights while a firm is in bankruptcy, but many derivative contracts are exempt from these stays. Similarly, under the Dodd Frank Act of 2010, derivative claimants have “superpriority” in the bankruptcy of a financial institution. They are privileged to claim collateral immediately without judicial review, before bankruptcy proceedings even begin. Depositors become “unsecured creditors” who can recover their funds only after derivative, repo, and other secured claims, assuming there is anything left to recover, which in the event of a major derivative crisis would be unlikely.
That’s true not only of the deposits in a bankrupt bank but of stocks, bonds, and money market funds held by a broke or dealer that goes bankrupt. Under the Bankruptcy Act of 2005 and Sections 8 and 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), “safe harbor” is provided to entities described in court documents as “the protected class.” The customers who purchased the assets have only a “security entitlement,” a weak contractual claim to a pro rata share of a residual pool of fungible assets all held in the name of Cede & Co., the proxy of the Depository Trust and Clearing Corp. (DTCC). As Wall Street financial analyst John Rubino put it in a January 27 podcast:
What we used to think of as a bank bail-in where they take your deposit in order to support a failing bank, that is now spread across the entire financial economy where whatever you have in an account anywhere can just disappear, because they’re going to transfer ownership of it to these big dominant entities out there in the financial system that need those assets in order to keep from blowing up.
Derivative speculators are considered “secured” because they post a portion of what they could wind up owing as “margin,” but why that partial security is superior to the 100% security posted by the depositor or purchaser is not explained. The “protected class” is granted “safe harbor” only because their bets are so risky that to let them fail could crash the economy. But why let them bet at all?
The fix of the G20 leaders following the global financial crisis, however, was to force banks to clear over-the-counter derivatives through central counterparties (CCPs), which stand between buyer and seller and protect either party if the other blows up. By March 2020, 60% of credit default swaps and 80% of interest rate swaps were centrally cleared. The problem, as noted in a December 2023 publication by the Bank for International Settlements, is that these measures taken to protect the system can actually amplify risk.
CCPs tend to ask for more collateral than banks did in the pre-crisis world; and when a CCP hikes its initial margin requirement to cover the risk of default, this applies to everyone in the market, meaning cash calls are synchronized. As explained in a May 2022 Reuters article:
It’s logical that CCPs ask for more collateral during a panic: That’s when defaults are most likely. The problem is that margin calls seem to have made things worse. In March 2020, for example, a so-called “dash for cash” saw investors liquidate even prime money-market funds and U.S. Treasury securities.
… [R]ampant margin calls have intensified a financial panic twice in as many years, with central banks effectively bailing out markets in 2020. That’s better than in 2008, when taxpayers had to step in. But the problem of margin calls remains unsolved.
… Central counterparty (CCP) clearing houses should consider asking clients for more collateral during good times to reduce the risk of destabilizing margin calls during a financial panic, a Bank of England official said on May 19.
Yet all this, as Michael Snyder observes, is to allow the big international banks to run the largest derivatives casino that the world has ever seen. Why not just shut down the casino? Prof. Stout’s suggested solution is for Congress to return to the pre-2000 rule under which speculative derivative bets were not enforceable in court. That would include reversing the “superpriority” privileges in the Bankruptcy Act of 2005 and the Dodd-Frank Act. But it won’t be a quick fix, as Wall Street and our divided Congress can be expected to put up a protracted fight.
In a 2015 law review article titled “Failure of the Clearinghouse: Dodd-Frank’s Fatal Flaw?,” Prof. Stephen Lubben points to a more ominous risk from pushing all derivatives onto exchanges; and that concern is shared by former hedge fund manager David Rogers Webb in his 2024 book The Great Taking. The exchanges are supposed to be safer than private over-the-counter trades because the exchange steps in as market maker, accepting the risk for both sides of the trade. But in a general economic depression, the exchanges themselves could go bankrupt. No provision for that is made in the Dodd-Frank Act, which purports to decree “no more bailouts.” Still, reasons Prof. Lubben, the government would undoubtedly step in to save the market from collapse.
His proposed solution is for Congress to make legislative provision for nationalizing any bankrupt exchange, brokerage, or Central Clearing Counterparty before it fails. This is something to which our gridlocked Congress might agree, since under current circumstances it would not involve any major changes, wealth confiscation, or new tax burdens; and it could protect their own fortunes from confiscation if the DTCC were to go bankrupt.
Another alternative that not only could work but could fix Congress’s budget problems at the same time is to impose a 0.1% tax on all financial transactions. See Scott Smith, A Tale of Two Economies: A New Financial Operating System, showing that U.S. financial transactions (the financialized economy) are over $7.6 quadrillion, more than 350 times the U.S. national income (the productive economy). See my earlier article summarizing all that here. On a financial transaction tax curbing speculation in derivatives, see also here, here, and here.
There are other possible solutions to customer title concerns. There is no longer a need for the archaic practice of holding all securitized assets in the street name of Cede & Co. The digitization of stocks and bonds was a reasonable and efficient step in the 1970s, but today digital cryptography has gotten so sophisticated that “smart contracts” can be attached by blockchain-like distributed ledger technology (DLT) to digital assets, tracking participants, dates, terms, and other contractual details. The states of Delaware and Wyoming have explored maintaining corporate lists of stockholders on a state-run blockchain; but predictably, the measures were opposed. The practice of holding assets in street name has proven very lucrative for the DTCC’s member brokers and banks, as it facilitates short selling and the “rehypothecation” of collateral.
In October 2023, the DTCC reported that it has been exploring adopting DLT; but the goal seems only to be speedier and safer trades. No mention was made of returning registered title to the purchasers of the traded assets, which could be done with distributed ledger technology.
The most readily achievable solution is probably that in a South Dakota bill filed on January 29. The bill is detailed in a February 2 article titled “You Could Lose Your Retirement Savings in the Next Financial Crash Unless Others Follow This State’s Lead,” which observes:
…[I]f your broker… were to go bankrupt, the broker’s secured creditors (the people to whom the broker owes money) would be empowered to take the investments that you paid for in order to settle outstanding debts….
To avoid a catastrophe in the future, a nationwide movement is desperately needed to alter the existing Uniform Commercial Code. Of course, that won’t be easy to accomplish, especially because bank lobbyists and other powerful financial interests will almost certainly fight kicking and screaming to stop policymakers from taking away their advantage over consumers.
The good news is, this “great taking” can be stopped at the state level. Americans don’t need to count on a divided Congress to get the job done. Because the UCC is state law, state lawmakers can take concrete steps to restore the property rights of their constituents and protect them in the event of a financial crisis.
On Monday, South Dakota legislators introduced a bill that would do just that. The legislation would ensure that individual investors have priority over securities held by brokerage firms and other intermediaries.
It would also alter jurisdictional provisions so that cases are determined in the state of the individual investor, rather than the state of the broker, custodian, or clearing corporation. This would ensure that individual investors are able to rely on the laws of their local state.
Hopefully, other states will follow South Dakota’s lead. Tennessee, for one, is reported to have such a bill in the works.
Risk was at the center of every financial upheaval since the 1980s. What can be done to keep history from repeating itself and threatening the banking system, economy, and jobs of everyday people?
First Republic Bank became the second-biggest bank failure in U.S. history after the lender was seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and sold to JPMorgan Chase on May 1, 2023. First Republic is the latest victim of the panic that has roiled small and midsize banks since the failure of Silicon Valley Bank in March 2023.
The collapse of SVB and now First Republic underscores how the impact of risky decisions at one bank can quickly spread into the broader financial system. It should also provide the impetus for policymakers and regulators to address a systemic problem that has plagued the banking industry from the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s to the financial crisis of 2008 to the recent turmoil following SVB’s demise: incentive structures that encourage excessive risk-taking.
The Federal Reserve’s top regulator seems to agree. On April 28, the central bank’s vice chair for supervision delivered a stinging report on the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, blaming its failures on its weak risk management, as well as supervisory missteps.
In each of the financial upheavals since the 1980s, the common denominator was risk.
We are professors of economics who study and teach the history of financial crises. In each of the financial upheavals since the 1980s, the common denominator was risk. Banks provided incentives that encouraged executives to take big risks to boost profits, with few consequences if their bets turned bad. In other words, all carrot and no stick.
One question we are grappling with now is what can be done to keep history from repeating itself and threatening the banking system, economy, and jobs of everyday people.
The precursor to the banking crises of the 21st century was the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.
The so-called S&L crisis, like the collapse of SVB, began in a rapidly changing interest rate environment. Savings and loan banks, also known as thrifts, provided home loans at attractive interest rates. When the Federal Reserve under Chairman Paul Volcker aggressively raised rates in the late 1970s to fight raging inflation, S&Ls were suddenly earning less on fixed-rate mortgages while having to pay higher interest to attract depositors. At one point, their losses topped US$100 billion.
S&L executives were often paid based on the size of their institutions’ assets, and they aggressively lent to commercial real estate projects, taking on riskier loans to grow their loan portfolios quickly.
To help the teetering banks, the federal government deregulated the thrift industry, allowing S&Ls to expand beyond home loans to commercial real estate. S&L executives were often paid based on the size of their institutions’ assets, and they aggressively lent to commercial real estate projects, taking on riskier loans to grow their loan portfolios quickly.
In the late 1980s, the commercial real estate boom turned bust. S&Ls, burdened by bad loans, failed in droves, requiring the federal government take over banks and delinquent commercial properties and sell the assets to recover money paid to insured depositors. Ultimately, the bailout cost taxpayers more than $100 billion.
The 2008 crisis is another obvious example of incentive structures that encourage risky strategies.
At all levels of mortgage financing–from Main Street lenders to Wall Street investment firms–executives prospered by taking excessive risks and passing them to someone else. Lenders passed mortgages made to people who could not afford them onto Wall Street firms, which in turn bundled those into securities to sell to investors. It all came crashing down when the housing bubble burst, followed by a wave of foreclosures.
Incentives rewarded short-term performance, and executives responded by taking bigger risks for immediate gains. At the Wall Street investment banks Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, profits grew as the firms bundled increasingly risky loans into mortgage-backed securities to sell, buy, and hold.
Incentives rewarded short-term performance, and executives responded by taking bigger risks for immediate gains.
As foreclosures spread, the value of these securities plummeted, and Bear Stearns collapsed in early 2008, providing the spark of the financial crisis. Lehman failed in September of that year, paralyzing the global financial system and plunging the U.S. economy into the worst recession since the Great Depression.
Executives at the banks, however, had already cashed in, and none were held accountable. Researchers at Harvard University estimated that top executive teams at Bear Stearns and Lehman pocketed a combined $2.4 billion in cash bonuses and stock sales from 2000 to 2008.
That brings us back to Silicon Valley Bank.
Executives tied up the bank’s assets in long-term Treasury and mortgage-backed securities, failing to protect against rising interest rates that would undermine the value of these assets. The interest rate risk was particularly acute for SVB, since a large share of depositors were startups, whose finances depend on investors’ access to cheap money.
When the Fed began raising interest rates last year, SVB was doubly exposed. As startups’ fundraising slowed, they withdrew money, which required SVB to sell long-term holdings at a loss to cover the withdrawals. When the extent of SVB’s losses became known, depositors lost trust, spurring a run that ended with SVB’s collapse.
For executives, however, there was little downside in discounting or even ignoring the risk of rising rates.
For executives, however, there was little downside in discounting or even ignoring the risk of rising rates. The cash bonus of SVB CEO Greg Becker more than doubled to $3 million in 2021 from $1.4 million in 2017, lifting his total earnings to $10 million, up 60% from four years earlier. Becker also sold nearly $30 million in stock over the past two years, including some $3.6 million in the days leading up to his bank’s failure.
The impact of the failure was not contained to SVB. Share prices of many midsize banks tumbled. Another American bank, Signature, collapsed days after SVB did.
First Republic survived the initial panic in March after it was rescued by a consortium of major banks led by JPMorgan Chase, but the damage was already done. First Republic recently reported that depositors withdrew more than $100 billion in the six weeks following SVB’s collapse, and on May 1, the FDIC seized control of the bank and engineered a sale to JPMorgan Chase.
The crisis isn’t over yet. Banks had over $620 billion in unrealized losses at the end of 2022, largely due to rapidly rising interest rates.
So, what’s to be done?
We believe the bipartisan bill recently filed in Congress, the Failed Bank Executives Clawback, would be a good start. In the event of a bank failure, the legislation would empower regulators to claw back compensation received by bank executives in the five-year period preceding the failure.
Clawbacks, however, kick in only after the fact. To prevent risky behavior, regulators could require executive compensation to prioritize long-term performance over short-term gains. And new rules could restrict the ability of bank executives to take the money and run, including requiring executives to hold substantial portions of their stock and options until they retire.
To prevent risky behavior, regulators could require executive compensation to prioritize long-term performance over short-term gains.
The Fed’s new report on what led to SVB’s failure points in this direction. The 102-page report recommends new limits on executive compensation, saying leaders “were not compensated to manage the bank’s risk,” as well as stronger stress-testing and higher liquidity requirements.
We believe these are also good steps, but probably not enough.
It comes down to this: Financial crises are less likely to happen if banks and bank executives consider the interest of the entire banking system, not just themselves, their institutions, and shareholders.
"Is this the next financial crisis unfolding? It feels like it may be—and all because of reckless increases in interest rates by central banks," argued one political economist.
A vanishingly short period of relief in U.S. and global markets was shattered Wednesday after the scandal-plagued Swiss banking giant Credit Suisse announced that its auditor identified "material weakness" in its financial reporting and the firm's largest investor—the Saudi National Bank—said it wouldn't inject more cash to bolster the company.
As its share price plunged, Credit Suisse intensified concerns about its financial health—and broader alarm about the stability of global markets—by pleading with the Swiss National Bank and the regulator Finma to issue public statements of support for the lender, which controlled roughly $580 billion in assets at the end of last year.
"The bank said it is working to address the problems [with its financial reporting], which 'could require us to expend significant resources,'" The Washington Post reported Wednesday. "It cautioned that the troubles could ultimately impact the bank's access to capital markets and subject it to 'potential regulatory investigations and sanctions.'"
The fresh crisis at Credit Suisse, which comes just days after two U.S. banks collapsed, compounded fears that seemingly isolated problems at individual financial institutions could signal a deeper systemic threat with far-reaching implications for the interconnected global economy.
"This is scary—financial markets are now betting on Credit Suisse failing—and no one can pretend there will not be a fallout from that," Richard Murphy, a professor of accounting practice at Sheffield University Management School in the U.K., wrote Wednesday, pointing to the soaring price of the bank's five-year credit default swaps, which prompted flashbacks to the 2008 global financial crisis.
"Is this the next financial crisis unfolding? It feels like it may be—and all because of reckless increases in interest rates by central banks," Murphy added.
Experts and analysts have argued that—along with years of deregulation—the U.S. Federal Reserve's rapid interest rate hikes contributed to the fall of California-based Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), which sold its bond portfolio at a major loss last week after it declined in value due to the Fed's actions.
While U.S. lawmakers have lambasted SVB for poor risk management, the firm was hardly alone in taking on large bond holdings when interest rates were low only to watch them lose value precipitously as central banks jacked up rates to combat high inflation.
"Investors said Credit Suisse's problems were a reminder that Europe's banks also had large holdings of bonds that had been hammered by rising interest rates," the Financial Times reported.
As The American Prospect's David Dayen put it Wednesday, "As long as interest rates keep rising, more banks will be exposed."
"Credit Suisse is in principle a much bigger concern for the global economy than the regional U.S. banks which were in the firing line last week."
Just a week ago, it appeared that Fed Chair Jerome Powell was bent on continuing to raise interest rates even amid mounting warnings about the potentially devastating impacts on millions of workers whose wages and jobs are on the line.
But faced with growing panic in the financial sector, Powell is now widely expected to step on the brakes—at least temporarily—at the Fed's policy meeting next week. Powell is himself a former investment banker, and Wall Street lobbies the Fed on a range of issues.
Reuters reported Wednesday that "expectations for the U.S. central bank's next move have swung wildly in recent days, after the sudden failure of two regional banks late last week triggered alarm about the health of the banking system and raised doubts about how much further the Fed may take what has been an aggressive fight against stubbornly high inflation."
Turmoil at Credit Suisse, which insists its balance sheet is "strong," will likely cement the case against further Fed rate hikes in the near future, analysts suggested.
The Treasury Department is reportedly monitoring news at Credit Suisse, whose U.S. arm is overseen by the Fed.
"Credit Suisse is in principle a much bigger concern for the global economy than the regional U.S. banks which were in the firing line last week," Andrew Kenningham, chief Europe economist with Capital Economics, wrote in a research note on Wednesday. "Credit Suisse is not just a Swiss problem but a global one."
Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) joined Hillary Clinton for their first joint campaign appearance on Monday to introduce an economic plan that the presumptive Democratic nominee hopes will rally the populist spirit stirred by rival Bernie Sanders.
Despite Clinton's well-known ties to the financial industry, she capitalized on anti-Wall Street fever Monday by telling rally-goers in Ohio, "I got into this race because I wanted to even the odds for people who have the odds stacked against them. To build an economy that works for everyone, not just those at the top, we have got to go big, and we have got to go bold."
The event marked the first time Clinton and Warren have campaigned together, and speculation is building that Clinton is vetting the Massachusetts senator for vice president. Like Sanders, Warren has built much of her career as a champion against income inequality and "too big to fail" banks.
Political commentator and former secretary of labor Robert Reich tweeted on Monday, "This morning in Ohio, Hillary sounded more like Bernie than she's ever sounded."
But Clinton is not the only one seeking to exploit that progressive energy—Republicans are, too. According to a GOP strategy memo (pdf) obtained by the Huffington Post on Sunday, the Republican National Committee (RNC) is planning on wooing Sanders supporters to its platform through various means, including targeting Clinton's running mate.
The goals of the strategy, titled Project Pander, are to "drive wedges between these top contenders and either Clinton and/or traditional Democrat constituencies, such as labor, environmentalists, and gun control advocates, and other traditional left-wing constituencies;" and "[w]here applicable, frame the [vice presidential] choice as an insult to the large, deep base of Bernie Sanders supporters who are struggling with the notion of supporting Hillary Clinton as the presumptive Democrat nominee," the HuffPost reported.
The strategists recognized that Warren would be a welcome pick for Sanders supporters. They said the RNC could respond by "highlighting the policy differences between the two, particularly Clinton's ties to the financial industry and on Syria... to sow unease from the left if Warren mollifies some of her views."
Top Democratic donors in the financial industry are threatening revolt after news broke that top Wall Street critic and progressive darling Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) is one of the leading candidates for vice president under Hillary Clinton.
An in-depth report published by Politico on Monday cites a dozen interviews with Clinton's Wall Street backers--of which there are many--warning that the coffers will dry up if Warren is chosen.
"If Clinton picked Warren, her whole base on Wall Street would leave her," one top Democratic donor told Politico reporter Ben White.
"They would literally just say, 'We have no qualms with you moving left; we understand all the things you've had to do because of Bernie Sanders, but if you are going there with Warren, we just can't trust you, you've killed it,'" added the anonymous bundler, who has reportedly helped raise millions for Clinton.
Warren's dedicated pursuit of banking reform makes her an alluring VP pick for a campaign that hopes to woo millions of Bernie Sanders supporters. As White notes, "No American politician in recent history has done more to harness the powerful anti-Wall Street sentiment that continues to rage in the country since the financial crisis of 2008."
At the same time, however, Warren on the ticket would likely alienate some of the campaign's biggest financial industry donors, who hope a Clinton presidency would be more friendly toward their business interests.
Politico reports:
These people say there is an opportunity for much better relations between business and the White House than during President Barack Obama's tenure, as well as more effective deal making with Congress to avoid the kind of fiscal crises that damaged the economy the past six years. In addition to cutting deals on taxes and infrastructure, Wall Street worries about the return of the debt ceiling as a potentially big issue in 2016, as well as the return of sequester spending cuts.
"There is going to be a lot to deal with in the first 100 days, and I'm not sure going left and picking Warren would be particularly helpful," said a top financial services lobbyist in Washington.
The former secretary of state had seen a surge of financial sector donations, as Common Dreams previously reportedly, particularly since Donald Trump became the presumptive GOP nominee.
According to the nonpartisan crowdfunding tracker Crowdpac, Clinton has raised $32 million from the finance and insurance sectors. At the same time, the Center for Responsive Politics found that, with an estimated $28 million, the Securities & Investment industry has donated more than any other to her campaign.
Last week, the Wall Street Journal revealed that Warren was among the top candidates for the spot, along with "Labor Secretary Tom Perez; Housing and Urban Development Secretary Julian Castro; Sens. Tim Kaine of Virginia, Sherrod Brown of Ohio and Cory Booker of New Jersey; Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti, and Reps. Xavier Becerra of California and Tim Ryan of Ohio," according to several Democrats.
Notably, Democratic rival Bernie Sanders was not among those listed.
Another senior Wall Street executive brushed aside the argument that Clinton needed Warren on the ticket, stating: "There will be plenty of time to galvanize the left and get them to come out. And Warren would be a nightmare to try and manage."
In a letter described by news outlets as "scathing" and "unusually blunt," Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) on Tuesday slammed the country's top Wall Street regulator for broken promises and lax regulation of the financial industry.
In a 13-page letter, Warren described the two-year tenure of Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) chairwoman Mary Jo White as "extremely disappointing."
From failing to require companies to admit wrongdoing when the agency finds they violate the law to failing to implement Dodd-Frank rules on CEO pay disclosure, White has not been the "tough watchdog" the SEC needs, Warren said.
Warren also criticized the ongoing use of "waivers," which allow such companies to skirt SEC review, among financial firms that break the law, as well as White's failure to address undisclosed campaign contributions. And the letter raises the question of whether White's "regular recusals" for conflicts of interest have delayed enforcement activity.
On these and other matters mentioned in the letter, Warren says White made reassuring promises to lawmakers during her 2013 confirmation hearing. However, Warren states, "you appear to have broken those promises."
"The public relies on the SEC to act as the cop on the beat for an honest marketplace--issuing rules that ensure that investors can make informed decisions and holding rule breakers accountable for their actions," Warren wrote. "When the SEC falls down on the job, the impact is felt throughout the economy and it touches every American family."
She continued: "I am disappointed you have not been the strong leader that many hoped for--and that you promised to be. I hope that you will step up to the job for which you have been confirmed."
Warren, who serves on the Senate Banking Committee, voted for White during the confirmation process in 2013 despite some concerns about her banking industry ties. However, the Boston Globe reports that "[r]elations between Warren and White have been steadily deteriorating -- with a boiling point reached last month when Warren and White met to discuss a long-delayed rule on chief executive pay."
That rule, cited in Warren's letter, would require public companies to disclose compensation for CEOs, the median pay for their workers, and the ratio between the two. It was supposed to be completed 21 months ago but has been postponed several times, Warren said.
"I cannot understand how and why this rule has been delayed for so long," Warren wrote, "and I am perplexed as to why you told me personally that the rule would be completed by the fall of 2015 when it appears that you were or should have been aware of additional delays."
White, for her part, issued a statement that read in part: "Senator Warren's mischaracterization of my statements and the agency's accomplishments is unfortunate, but it will not detract from the work we have done and will continue to do, on behalf of investors."