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One expert described the reported deal as "tantamount to the United States giving up on nonproliferation."
Nonproliferation experts are raising alarms after Reuters reported on Tuesday that President Donald Trump's administration plans to ask Congress to approve a deal that could allow Saudi Arabia to develop nuclear weapons.
According to Reuters, an agreement crafted by the Trump administration would allow the US to share nuclear power technology with the Saudis without proper safeguards that "would stop materials being used in nuclear weapons programs."
Specifically, Reuters' sources said the deal "does not include the 'Gold Standard' that would block the kingdom from enriching uranium and reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, both of which are potential pathways to nuclear weapons."
Kelsey Davenport, director for nonprolifertion policy at the Arms Control Association, warned in a Tuesday social media post that the reported agreement "sets a terrible precedent" because it "goes against long-standing bipartisan support for negotiating nuclear cooperation agreements that prohibit enrichment and reprocessing."
"If the deal is inadequate, which it seems to be," Davenport added, "Congress should vote to disapprove it."
Andrea Stricker, deputy director and research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Nonproliferation Program, said that "Congress should block" the deal, which she warned could lead other states in the region to seek their own nuclear weapons.
If Congress fails to block the deal, Stricker added, then "one hopes the policy will be reversed by a subsequent administration before too much damage is done in terms of watering down safeguards, setting negative precedents for other states, and failing to contain the spread of enrichment and reprocessing."
James Acton, co-director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Nuclear Policy Program, said the reported Saudi nuclear deal is "tantamount to the United States giving up on nonproliferation."
"Saudi officials are open about a potential interest in nuclear weapons," Acton said. "The United States should do nothing to facilitate enrichment or reprocessing in the Kingdom."
Emma Ashford, senior fellow at the Stimson Center, agreed that the reported agreement would mean the end of US attempts to curtail the spread of nuclear weapons, and noted the irony of the Trump administration "bombing Iran to prevent them ever having enrichment, while giving it to the Saudis."
Rosemary Kelanic, director of the Middle East Program at Defense Priorities, called the reported deal a "terrible idea" that "goes against decades of US policy to give enrichment technology to a country that doesn't already possess it."
Kelanic also warned that the agreement would empower the Saudi government in ways that could come back to bite the US.
"Aside from the proliferation risks, uranium enrichment would give Saudi Arabia a potent source of leverage to extract future concessions from Washington," Kelanic explained, "including new security guarantees, by threatening to weaponize its program unless the United States promises enhanced military protection. That has happened before, for instance in South Korea and West Germany, where the U.S. traded protection to persuade partners to abandon nuclear programs."
Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY), ranking member of the House Foreign Relations Committee, expressed "deep concerns" about the reported deal, which he said "would significantly erode existing nonproliferation standards."
"Any agreement must include appropriate limits on enrichment and reprocessing," Meeks emphasized, "as well as the [International Atomic Energy Agency's] Additional Protocol."
"Trump, Putin, and Xi can and must put the world on a safer path by taking commonsense actions to build down the nuclear danger," said one campaigner.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Wednesday implicitly confirmed that New START—a key arms control treaty between the United States and Russia—will expire Thursday, prompting renewed demands for what one group called "a more coherent approach from the Trump administration" toward nuclear nonproliferation.
Asked about the impending expiration of New START during a Wednesday press conference, Rubio said he didn't "have any announcement" on the matter, and that President Donald Trump "will opine on it later."
"Obviously, the president’s been clear in the past that in order to have true arms control in the 21st century, it’s impossible to do something that doesn’t include China because of their vast and rapidly growing stockpile," Rubio said.
🇺🇸🇷🇺🇨🇳 Secretary of State Marco Rubio:
I don't have any announcement on New START right now. I think the President will opine on it later.
The President has been clear in the past that in order to have true arms control in the 21st century, it's impossible to do something that… pic.twitter.com/8pxi3bfdsy
— Visioner (@visionergeo) February 4, 2026
New START, signed in 2010, committed the United States and Russia to halving the number of strategic nuclear missile launchers in their arsenals. While the treaty did not limit the size of the countries' actual nuclear arsenals, proponents pointed to its robust verification regime and other transparency features as mutually beneficial highlights of the agreement.
“We have known that New START would end for 15 years, but no one has shown the necessary leadership to be prepared for its expiration,” said John Erath, senior policy director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and former longtime State Department official.
“The treaty limited the number of nuclear weapons the United States and Russia could have, but perhaps more importantly, New START also provided each country with unprecedented insights into the other’s arsenal so that Washington and Moscow could make decisions based on real information rather than speculation," Erath added.
The last remaining major treaty limiting the world's two largest nuclear arsenals expires Feb. 5. Does this mean the end of nuclear arms control? Not necessarily. Read our statement.armscontrolcenter.org/statement-on...
[image or embed]
— Nukes of Hazard (@nukesofhazard.bsky.social) February 4, 2026 at 2:04 PM
Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, said Wednesday that "the end of New START requires a more coherent approach from the Trump administration."
"If President Trump and Secretary Rubio are serious, they should make a serious proposal for bilateral (not trilateral) talks with Beijing," he asserted. "Despite Trump’s talk about involving China in nuclear negotiations, there is no indication that Trump or his team have taken the time to propose risk reduction or arms control talks with China since returning to office in 2025."
Kimball continued:
Furthermore, there is no reason why the United States and Russia should not and cannot continue, as [Russian President Vladimir] Putin suggested on September 22, to respect the central limits of New START and begin the hard work of negotiating a new framework agreement involving verifiable limits on strategic, intermediate-range, and short-range nuclear weapons, as well as strategic missile defenses.
At the same time, if he is serious about involving China in “denuclearization” talks, he could and should invite [Chinese President Xi Jinping] when they meet later this year, to agree to regular bilateral talks on risk reduction and arms control involving senior Chinese and US officials.
"With the end of New START, Trump, Putin, and Xi can and must put the world on a safer path by taking commonsense actions to build down the nuclear danger," Kimball added.
Erath lamented that "with New START’s expiration, we have not only lost unprecedented verification measures that our military and decision-makers depended on, but we have ended more than five decades of painstaking diplomacy that successfully avoided nuclear catastrophe."
"Agreements preceding New START helped reduce the global nuclear arsenal by more than 80% since the height of the Cold War,"
he noted. "Now, both Russia and the United States have no legal obstacle to building their arsenals back up, and we could find ourselves reliving the Cold War."
Last week, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Science and Security Board advanced its symbolic Doomsday Clock to 85 seconds to midnight, the closest it has ever been to global thermonuclear annihilation, citing developments including failure to extend New START, China's growing arsenal, and Russian weapons tests—to which Trump has vowed to respond in kind.
"The good news is," said Erath, is that "the end of New START does not have to mean the end of nuclear arms control."
"While New START can’t be extended beyond today, Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin could decide to respect the numerical limits the treaty set on nuclear arsenals," he explained. "They could also resume the treaty’s data exchanges and on-site inspections, in addition to implementing verification measures from other previous arms control treaties."
"Further, they could instruct their administrations to begin immediate talks on a new treaty to cover existing and novel systems and potentially bring in other nuclear powers, like China," Erath continued. "Meanwhile, Congress could—and should—fund nonproliferation and global monitoring efforts while refusing to fund dangerous new nuclear weapons systems."
Last December, US Sens. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) and Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) and Reps. Don Beyer (D-Va.), John Garamendi (D-Calif.), and Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) reintroduced the bicameral Hastening Arms Limitation Talks (HALT) Act, "legislation outlining a vision for a 21st century freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons."
"The Doomsday Clock is at 85 seconds to midnight," Markey—who co-chairs the congressional Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Working Group—said Wednesday ahead of a press conference with HALT Act co-sponsors. "We need to replace New START now."
The policy shift—which began during the first Trump administration—came after lobbying from US drone makers and amid stiff competition from Chinese, Israeli, and Turkish manufacturers.
After years of lobbying from US weapons makers, President Donald Trump is reportedly set to implement his first-term reinterpretation of a Cold War-era arms control treaty in order to sell heavy attack drones to countries including Saudi Arabia, according to a report published Friday.
In July 2020, Trump announced that his administration would reclassify unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with flight speeds under 500 miles per hour—including General Atomics' MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper and Northrop Grumman's Global Hawk—as exempt from certain restrictions under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).
Signed by the United States in 1987 during the administration of President Ronald Reagan, the 35-nation MTCR "seeks to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by controlling exports of goods and technologies that could make a contribution to delivery systems" for such weapons, as the US State Department website explains.
The end of Trump's first term limited his first administration's implementation of the MTCR policy shift, which was not continued under former President Joe Biden, who adopted a somewhat stricter stance on arms exports to some gross human violators including Saudi Arabia, but not others—most notably Israel.
Now, a US official and four people familiar with the president's plan tell Reuters that Trump is preparing to complete the MTCR revision, a move that "would unlock the sale of more than 100 MQ-9 drones to Saudi Arabia, which the kingdom requested in the spring of this year and could be part of a $142 billion arms deal announced in May."
As Reuters reported:
Under the current interpretation of the MTCR, the sale of many military drones is subject to a "strong presumption of denial" unless a compelling security reason is given and the buyer agrees to use the weapons in strict accordance with international law.
The new policy will allow General Atomics, Kratos, and Anduril, which manufacture large drones, to have their products treated as "Foreign Military Sales" by the State Department, allowing them to be easily sold internationally, according to a US official speaking to Reuters on condition of anonymity.
This effort is the first part of a planned "major" review of the US Foreign Military Sales program, the official said.
The US State Department did not respond to Reuters' request for comment on the policy shift.
Trump's move comes as US arms makers face stiff competition from Chinese, Israeli, and Turkish drone manufacturers. Neither China nor Israel are signatory to the MTCR, and Turkey, which did sign the agreement, features lighter and shorter-range UAVs not subject to the same restrictions as the heavier Reaper.
The US official who spoke to Reuters said the new guidelines will allow the US "to become the premier drone provider instead of ceding that space to Turkey and China."
Daryl Kimball, director of the Arms Control Association—a longtime critic of MTCR revision—warned that Trump's planned reinterpretation "would be a mistake."
"It's such a terrible precedent that could drive states to determine that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty no longer benefits their security," one expert warned during a virtual event on the conflict.
Experts said Monday during a webinar on the escalating Mideast crisis that U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran's civilian nuclear facilities—which were ostensibly under International Atomic Energy Agency protection—further exposed the United States as untrustworthy and severely damaged efforts to stop the global proliferation of nuclear weapons.
ReThink Media hosted Monday's webinar, during which host Mac Hamilton discussed issues including Saturday's U.S. attack on Iran with panelists Sara Haghdoosti, the executive director of Win Without War; Yasmine Taeb, the legislative political director at MPower Change; Kelsey Davenport, Arms Control Association's director for nonproliferation policy; and Arti Walker-Peddakotla, chair of the board at About Face: Veterans Against the War.
"Military action is not an effective long-term strategy for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran."
President Donald Trump ordered the attacks on the Fordow Uranium Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center despite decades of U.S. intelligence community consensus—including his own administration's recent assessment—that Iran is not trying to develop nuclear weapons. Trump also disregarded international law, his own two-week ultimatum for Iran, and the fact that the three facilities were supposed to be safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
"From a nonproliferation perspective, Trump's decision to strike Iran was a reckless, irresponsible escalation that is likely to push Iran closer to nuclear weapons in the long term," Davenport said during Monday's webinar. "The strikes did damage key Iranian nuclear facilities, like the underground Fordow enrichment site. But Tehran had ample time prior to the strikes to remove its stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium to a covert location, and it's likely that they did so."
"This underscores that the strikes may have temporarily set back Iran's program, but military action is not an effective long-term strategy for preventing a nuclear-armed Iran," she continued. "Because technically, Iran has retained its nuclear weapons capability and critical aspects of the program."
"And politically, there's greater impetus now to weaponize," Davenport contended. "I mean, strikes are already strengthening factions in Iran calling for withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and strengthening arguments that nuclear weapons are necessary to deter further attacks."
Rejecting the president's claim to have "completely and totally obliterated" Iran's nuclear sites, Davenport said that "all Trump has destroyed is U.S. credibility, I think Iranians have less reason now to trust the United States to negotiate an agreement in good faith."
Davenport continued:
Iran has certainly learned the lessons of past history. I mean, [former Libyan Prime Minister] Moammar Gadhafigave up Libya's nuclear weapons program, and later was overthrown by Western-backed forces. Syria, its nuclear weapons program was bombed while it was still in its infancy. Decades later, [former Syrian President] Bashar al-Assad was overthrown.
The United States has demonstrated it is not interested in credible negotiations under the Trump administration, and that if a deal is struck there's no guarantee that the United States will abide by its commitments, even if Iran is abiding by its end of the bargain. That's what we saw in the [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] scenario. So it really raises questions about U.S. nonproliferation policy going forward, and the risk of erosion, you know, to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.
In 2018, Trump unilaterally withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, despite his own administration's assessment that Tehran was in full compliance with the agreement. Critics argued Trump's move was meant to satisfy Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who has boasted about being able to control U.S. policy and whose country has an undeclared nuclear arsenal and is not a party to the NPT.
Davenport highlighted the "uptick in conversation" in Tehran about quitting the NPT, given that "the treaty cannot preserve and protect civil nuclear activities."
"I think it is worth underscoring that the United States struck sites that were under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. These were not covert enrichment facilities," she stressed. "These were not sites where Iran was dashing to the bomb. You know, there's no evidence of that. These were safeguarded facilities that the IAEA regularly has access to."
"This is a devastating blow to the nonproliferation regime," Davenport said. "And I think over time, this is going to contribute to erosion of the treaty. It's such a terrible precedent that could drive states to determine that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty no longer benefits their security, that their civil programs can become targets without any evidence of weaponization, and drive further questioning of whether remaining in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is in their interest."
IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi—who last week said there was no proof Iran is trying to build a nuclear bomb—also warned during a Monday meeting of the body's board of governors in Vienna that "the weight of this conflict risks collapsing the global nuclear nonproliferation regime."
"But there is still a path for diplomacy," Grossi said. "We must take it, otherwise violence and destruction could reach unimaginable levels and the global nonproliferation regime that has underpinned international security for more than half a century could crumble and fall."
"Iran, Israel, and the Middle East need peace," he emphasized. "Armed attacks on nuclear facilities should never take place and could result in boradioactive releases with grave consequences within and beyond the boundaries of the state which has been attacked. I therefore again call on maximum restraint. Military escalation not only threatens lives, it also delays us from taking the diplomatic path."
"To achieve the long-term assurance that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon and for the continued effectiveness of the global nonproliferation regime, we must return to negotiations," Grossi added.
Iranian officials and other observers have accused Grossi and the IAEA of complicity in U.S. and Israeli attacks on Iran. Last week, Iran filed a complaint against the agency's chief for allegedly "undermining the agency's impartiality."
This, following last week's IAEA board of governors approval of a resolution stating that Iran is not complying with its obligations as a member of the body, a finding based largely on dubious intelligence that skeptics compared to the "weapons of mass destruction" lies in the lead-up to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq.
In an opinion piece published Monday by Common Dreams, Medea Benjamin and Nicolas J.S. Davies of the peace group CodePink wrote that the U.S. and Israel "used Grossi" to "hijack the IAEA and start a war on Iran."
"Rafael Grossi should resign as IAEA director before he further undermines nuclear nonproliferation and drags the world any closer to nuclear war," Benjamin and Davies added.
On Monday, the Majlis, Iran's Parliament, began weighing legislation to suspend cooperation with the IAEA.
"The world clearly saw that the IAEA has failed to uphold its commitments and has become a political instrument," Majlis Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf said on the chamber floor Monday.
Qalibaf added that Iran would "will definitely respond in a way that will make gambler Trump regret" attacking Iran.
Later Monday, Iran fired a salvo of missiles at a military base housing U.S. troops in Qatar and, reportedly, at an American facility in Iraq. There have been no reported casualties or strike damage.
This was followed by Trump's announcement on social media of a cease-fire agreement between Israel and Iran.
Rather than turning back from the brink of nuclear war, nuclear armed states are accelerating nuclear weapons spending. We must change course.
On April 8, 2010, the United States and Russia signed the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), a landmark achievement that capped and reduced deployed nuclear arsenals, symbolizing hope for a safer, more stable world. Now, 15 years later, as the expiration of New START approaches in February 2026, the risks of a renewed nuclear arms race loom large. Over the past four years, repeated Russian threats to use nuclear weapons in the war in Ukraine have dramatically weakened the “nuclear taboo.” The risk of a potentially civilization-ending nuclear war has risen to levels some experts say is at least has high as during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Rather than turning back from the brink of nuclear war, nuclear armed states are accelerating nuclear weapons spending. The U.S. alone is estimated to spend $756 billion on nuclear weapons in the next ten years.
Amid this urgent landscape, the just introduced McGovern-Tokuda resolution - H.Res.317 provides a transformative framework to confront these challenges, offering a comprehensive roadmap toward a world free of nuclear weapons as a national security imperative. Reps. McGovern and Tokuda understand that the story of nuclear weapons will have an ending. It will either be the end of nuclear weapons or the end of human civilization. We have been incredibly fortunate throughout the nuclear weapons era. As Robert McNamara famously declared after the Cuban Missile Crisis, “We lucked out. It was luck that prevented nuclear war.”
Hoping for good luck is not an acceptable security policy and, sooner or later, our luck will run out.
The policies of the nuclear weapons states are essentially a hope that this luck will continue. But hoping for good luck is not an acceptable security policy and, sooner or later, our luck will run out. As William Perry has warned: “nuclear weapons no longer provide for our security, they endanger it.”
House Resolution 317 is not merely a legislative initiative; it is a bold declaration of humanity's collective determination to eliminate nuclear weapons and secure a future without weapons that risk the end of human civilization. This resolution encapsulates the vision of Back from the Brink, a grassroots movement unwavering in its mission to abolish the global nuclear threat. Building upon its steadfast advocacy, the coalition sees this legislation as a step forward in the fight for global disarmament and an unequivocal commitment to a nuclear-free future. Back from the Brink has supported initiatives to reduce nuclear risks, including the prior version of this resolution during the 118th Congress. Now leading efforts to rally support for the new resolution, the coalition recognizes this legislation as a vital step toward global disarmament.
The resolution complements the Foster resolution, H.Res.100, by calling for arms control negotiations with Russia and China while maintaining a focus on broader disarmament efforts. It explicitly opposes nuclear testing, supports theRadiation Exposure Compensation Act (RECA), to address the legacy of harm caused by nuclear weapons, and prioritizes a just economic transition for the nuclear labor force. Denise Duffield of Back from the Brink encapsulates the resolution’s importance: “The McGovern-Tokuda resolution is more than a statement—it’s a detailed, actionable roadmap to nuclear disarmament. It provides a clear strategy for reducing nuclear risks, ending outdated policies, championing justice for impacted communities, and advancing a future free from the threat of nuclear war.”
The Arms Control Association and the Council for a Livable World are among the notable organizations supporting the McGovern-Tokuda resolution. Their endorsements underscore the resolution’s potential to restore U.S. leadership in reducing nuclear dangers. Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association, emphasizes, “This timely resolution outlines a practical plan for action to restore U.S. leadership to lead the world back from the nuclear brink and build a safer world for our children and generations to come.”
John Tierney, Executive Director of the Council for a Livable World, points out the pragmatic benefits of the resolution, stating, “We cannot risk letting nuclear threats increase. That is why Council for a Livable World supports Congressman McGovern’s H.Res.317 to lower nuclear risks and promote diplomacy to work toward a world free from nuclear threats.”
The resolution goes beyond arms control and disarmament negotiations—it addresses the devastating legacy of economic harm caused by nuclear weapons, both past and present. Today, the United States spends billions annually on nuclear weapons programs, diverting critical resources away from urgent human and community needs. According to this year'snuclear spending tax calculator, the U.S. allocated over $94 billion to nuclear weapons programs in FY 2024 alone. These funds could have been used to fund the Children’s Health Insurance Program for seven years or fund HUD’s mandatory affordable housing programs for nine years. Instead, this spending perpetuates environmental contamination, denies justice to impacted communities, and undermines investments in education, healthcare, and sustainable development. The McGovern-Tokuda resolution offers a path to redirect these resources toward building a safer, more equitable future.
The United States spends billions annually on nuclear weapons programs, diverting critical resources away from urgent human and community needs.
It also addresses the devastating legacy of radiological impacts. From environmental contamination to human exposure, the communities and workers affected by nuclear weapons production and testing deserve justice, healthcare, and full remediation. Martha Dina Argüello of Physicians for Social Responsibility-Los Angeles describes the resolution as “a truly comprehensive nuclear disarmament framework—one that addresses the past and current harm caused by nuclear weapons and the need to care for and provide a just economic transition for the people and communities whose livelihoods depend on nuclear weapons.”
The 15th anniversary of New START is a powerful reminder of what can be achieved through bold leadership and collective action. As the treaty’s expiration looms and the threat of nuclear catastrophe grows, the stakes could not be higher. The McGovern-Tokuda resolution provides a clear and actionable path to eliminate these risks, but success depends on all of us. Now is the time to take a stand. Join theBack from the Brink campaign to amplify this critical call for nuclear disarmament. Get involved, raise your voice, and rally your community to support this transformative resolution. Together, we can build a future free of nuclear weapons—one that saves the world and imbues our lives with profound hope and meaning. Take action today—the world is counting on you.
After nearly 80 years we face the very real danger that, for the first time since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear weapons will again be detonated on this planet.
The next president of the United States, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will face many contentious domestic issues that have long divided this country, including abortion rights, immigration, racial discord, and economic inequality. In the foreign policy realm, she or he will face vexing decisions over Ukraine, Israel/Gaza, and China/Taiwan. But one issue that few of us are even thinking about could pose a far greater quandary for the next president and even deeper peril for the rest of us: nuclear weapons policy.
Consider this: For the past three decades, we’ve been living through a period in which the risk of nuclear war has been far lower than at any time since the Nuclear Age began — so low, in fact, that the danger of such a holocaust has been largely invisible to most people. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the signing of agreements that substantially reduced the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles eliminated the most extreme risk of thermonuclear conflict, allowing us to push thoughts of nuclear Armageddon aside (and focus on other worries). But those quiescent days should now be considered over. Relations among the major powers have deteriorated in recent years and progress on disarmament has stalled. The United States and Russia are, in fact, upgrading their nuclear arsenals with new and more powerful weapons, while China — previously an outlier in the nuclear threat equation — has begun a major expansion of its own arsenal.
The altered nuclear equation is also evident in the renewed talk of possible nuclear weapons use by leaders of the major nuclear-armed powers. Such public discussion largely ceased after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, when it became evident that any thermonuclear exchange between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would result in their mutual annihilation. However, that fear has diminished in recent years and we’re again hearing talk of nuclear weapons use. Since ordering the invasion of Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly threatened to employ nuclear munitions in response to unspecified future actions of the U.S. and NATO in support of Ukrainian forces. Citing those very threats, along with China’s growing military might, Congress has authorized a program to develop more “lower-yield” nuclear munitions supposedly meant (however madly) to provide a president with further “options” in the event of a future regional conflict with Russia or China.
Thanks to those and related developments, the world is now closer to an actual nuclear conflagration than at any time since the end of the Cold War. And while popular anxiety about a nuclear exchange may have diminished, keep in mind that the explosive power of existing arsenals has not. Imagine this, for instance: even a “limited” nuclear war — involving the use of just a dozen or so of the hundreds of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) possessed by China, Russia, and the United States — would cause enough planetary destruction to ensure civilization’s collapse and the death of billions of people.
And consider all of that as just the backdrop against which the next president will undoubtedly face fateful decisions regarding the production and possible use of such weaponry, whether in the bilateral nuclear relationship between the U.S. and Russia or the trilateral one that incorporates China.
The U.S.-Russia Nuclear Equation
The first nuclear quandary facing the next president has an actual timeline. In approximately 500 days, on February 5, 2026, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the last remaining nuclear accord between the U.S. and Russia limiting the size of their arsenals, will expire. That treaty, signed in 2010, limits each side to a maximum of 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads along with 700 delivery systems, whether ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), or nuclear-capable heavy bombers. (That treaty only covers strategic warheads, or those intended for attacks on each other’s homeland; it does not include the potentially devastating stockpiles of “tactical” nuclear munitions possessed by the two countries that are intended for use in regional conflicts.)
At present, the treaty is on life support. On February 21, 2023, Vladimir Putin ominously announced that Russia had “suspended” its formal participation in New START, although claiming it would continue to abide by its warhead and delivery limits as long as the U.S. did so. The Biden administration then agreed that it, too, would continue to abide by the treaty limits. It has also signaled to Moscow that it’s willing to discuss the terms of a replacement treaty for New START when that agreement expires in 2026. The Russians have, however, declined to engage in such conversations as long as the U.S. continues its military support for Ukraine.
Accordingly, among the first major decisions the next president has to make in January 2025 will be what stance to take regarding the future status of New START (or its replacement). With the treaty’s extinction barely more than a year away, little time will remain for careful deliberation as a new administration chooses among several potentially fateful and contentious possibilities.
Its first option, of course, would be to preserve the status quo, agreeing that the U.S. will abide by that treaty’s numerical limits as long as Russia does, even in the absence of a treaty obliging it to do so. Count on one thing, though: such a decision would almost certainly be challenged and tested by nuclear hawks in both Washington and Moscow.
Of course, President Harris or Trump could decide to launch a diplomatic drive to persuade Moscow to agree to a new version of New START, a distinctly demanding undertaking, given the time remaining. Ideally, such an agreement would entail further reductions in the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals or at least include caps on the number of tactical weapons on each side. And remember, even if such an agreement were indeed to be reached, it would also require Senate approval and undoubtedly encounter fierce resistance from the hawkish members of that body. Despite such obstacles, this probably represents the best possible outcome imaginable.
The worst — and yet most likely — would be a decision to abandon the New START limits and begin adding yet more weapons to the American nuclear arsenal, reversing a bipartisan arms control policy that goes back to the administration of President Richard Nixon. Sadly, there are too many members of Congress who favor just such a shift and are already proposing measures to initiate it.
In June, for example, in its version of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2025, the Senate Armed Services Committee instructed the Department of Defense to begin devising plans for an increase in the number of deployed ICBMs from 400 of the existing Minuteman-IIIs to 450 of its replacement, the future Sentinel ICBM. The House Armed Services Committee version of that measure does not contain that provision but includes separate plans for ICBM force expansion. (The consolidated text of the bill has yet to be finalized.)
Should the U.S. and/or Russia abandon the New START limits and begin adding to its atomic arsenal after February 5, 2026, a new nuclear arms race would almost certainly be ignited, with no foreseeable limits. No matter which side announced such a move first, the other would undoubtedly feel compelled to follow suit and so, for the first time since the Nixon era, both nuclear powers would be expanding rather than reducing their deployed nuclear forces — only increasing, of course, the potential for mutual annihilation. And if Cold War history is any guide, such an arms-building contest would result in increased suspicion and hostility, adding a greater danger of nuclear escalation to any crisis that might arise between them.
The Three-Way Arms Race
Scary as that might prove, a two-way nuclear arms race isn’t the greatest peril we face. After all, should Moscow and Washington prove unable to agree on a successor to New START and begin expanding their arsenals, any trilateral nuclear agreement including China that might slow that country’s present nuclear buildup becomes essentially unimaginable.
Ever since it acquired nuclear weapons in 1964, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) pursued a minimalist stance when it came to deploying such weaponry, insisting that it would never initiate a nuclear conflict but would only use nuclear weapons in a second-strike retaliatory fashion following a nuclear attack on the PRC. In accordance with that policy, China long maintained a relatively small arsenal, only 200 or so nuclear warheads and a small fleet of ICBMs and SLBMs. In the past few years, however, China has launched a significant nuclear build-up, adding another 300 warheads and producing more missiles and missile-launching silos — all while insisting its no-first-use policy remains unchanged and that it is only maintaining a retaliatory force to deter potential aggression by other nuclear-armed states.
Some Western analysts believe that Xi Jinping, China’s nationalistic and authoritarian leader, considers a larger arsenal necessary to boost his country’s status in a highly competitive, multipolar world. Others argue that China fears improvements in U.S. defensive capabilities, especially the installation of anti-ballistic missile systems, that could endanger its relatively small retaliatory force and so rob it of a deterrent to any future American first strike.
Given the Chinese construction of several hundred new missile silos, Pentagon analysts contend that the country plans to deploy as many as 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035 — roughly equivalent to deployed Russian and American stockpiles under the New START guidelines. At present, there is no way to confirm such predictions, which are based on extrapolations from the recent growth of the Chinese arsenal from perhaps 200 to 500 warheads. Nonetheless, many Washington officials, especially in the Republican Party, have begun to argue that, given such a buildup, the New START limits must be abandoned in 2026 and yet more weapons added to the deployed U.S. nuclear stockpile to counter both Russia and China.
As Franklin Miller of the Washington-based Scowcroft Group and a former director of nuclear targeting in the office of the secretary of defense put it, “Deterring China and Russia simultaneously [requires] an increased level of U.S. strategic warheads.” Miller was one of 12 members of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, a bipartisan group convened in 2022 to reconsider America’s nuclear policies in light of China’s growing arsenal, Putin’s nuclear threats, and other developments. In its final October 2023 report, that commission recommended numerous alterations and additions to the American arsenal, including installing multiple warheads (instead of single ones) on the Sentinel missiles being built to replace the Minuteman ICBM and increasing the number of B-21 nuclear bombers and Columbia-class ballistic-missile submarines to be produced under the Pentagon’s $1.5 trillion nuclear “modernization” program.
The Biden administration has yet to endorse the recommendations in that report. It has, however, signaled that it’s considering the steps a future administration might take to address an expanded Chinese arsenal. In March, the White House approved a new version of a top-secret document, the Nuclear Employment Guidance, which for the first time reportedly focused as much on countering China as Russia. According to the few public comments made by administration officials about that document, it, too, sets out contingency plans for increasing the number of deployed strategic weapons in the years ahead if Russia breaks out of the current New START limits and no arms restraints have been negotiated with China.
“We have begun exploring options to increase future launcher capacity or additional deployed warheads on the land, sea, and air legs [of the nuclear delivery “triad” of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers] that could offer national leadership increased flexibility, if desired, and executed,” said acting Assistant Secretary of Defense Policy Vipin Narang on August 1st. While none of those options are likely to be implemented in President Biden’s remaining months, the next administration will be confronted with distinctly ominous decisions about the future composition of that already monstrous nuclear arsenal.
Whether it is kept as is or expanded, the one option you won’t hear much about in Washington is finding ways to reduce it. And count on one thing: even a decision simply to preserve the status quo in the context of today’s increasingly antagonistic international environment poses an increased risk of nuclear conflict. Any decision to expand it, along with comparable moves by Russia and China, will undoubtedly create an even greater risk of instability and potentially suicidal nuclear escalation.
The Need for Citizen Advocacy
For all too many of us, nuclear weapons policy seems like a difficult issue that should be left to the experts. This wasn’t always so. During the Cold War years, nuclear war seemed like an ever-present possibility and millions of Americans familiarized themselves with nuclear issues, participating in ban-the-bomb protests or the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign of the 1980s. But with the Cold War’s end and a diminished sense of nuclear doom, most of us turned to other issues and concerns. Yet the nuclear danger is growing rapidly and so decisions regarding the U.S. arsenal could have life-or-death repercussions on a global scale.
And one thing should be made clear: adding more weaponry to the U.S. arsenal will not make us one bit safer. Given the invulnerability of this country’s missile-bearing nuclear submarines and the multitude of other weapons in our nuclear arsenal, no foreign leader could conceivably mount a first strike on this country and not expect catastrophic retaliation, which in turn would devastate the planet. Acquiring more nuclear weapons would not alter any of this in the slightest. All it could possibly do is add to international tensions and increase the risk of global annihilation.
As Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, a nonpartisan research and advocacy outfit, put it recently: “Significant increases in the U.S. deployed nuclear arsenal would undermine mutual and global security by making the existing balance of nuclear terror more unpredictable and would set into motion a counterproductive, costly action-reaction cycle of nuclear competition.”
A decision to pursue such a reckless path could occur just months from now. In early 2025, the next president, whether Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, will be making critical decisions regarding the future of the New START Treaty and the composition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Given the vital stakes involved, such decisions should not be left to the president and a small coterie of her or his close advisers. Rather, it should be the concern of every citizen, ensuring vigorous debate on alternative options, including steps aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating the world’s nuclear arsenals. Without such public advocacy, we face the very real danger that, for the first time since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear weapons will again be detonated on this planet, with billions of us finding ourselves in almost unimaginable peril.
"It is not possible anymore to stop the Iranian nuclear program with conventional means," the hardline Knesset member and former Israeli defense minister said.
A longtime Israeli lawmaker and former defense minister took to the airwaves and social media on Wednesday to suggest his country should do whatever it takes to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
"It is not possible anymore to stop the Iranian nuclear program with conventional means," Avigdor Liberman of the right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu party said during a Channel 12 interview. "And we will have to use all the means that are available to us."
"We will have to stop with the deliberate policy of ambiguity, and it needs to be clear what is at stake here," Liberman continued, apparently referring to Israel's refusal to say whether it has nuclear weapons. "What is at stake here is the future of this nation, the future of the state of Israel, and we will not take any risks."
Member of Knesset and former Minister of Defense, Avigdor Liberman, live on Channel 12, openly calls to use nuclear weapon against Iran, in order to prevent it from reaching weaponization of its nuclear program. What a fuckin' psycho. pic.twitter.com/NYGfQ1zqVp
— B.M. (@ireallyhateyou) July 4, 2024
When pressed on what he meant by stopping Iran with non-conventional means, Liberman said, "I said it very clearly."
"Right now there is no time to stop the Iranian nuclear program, their weaponization, by using conventional means," he added.
Liberman made similar comments on social media, where his remarks sparked alarm and condemnation. The lawmaker's hardline call comes amid powder keg tensions between Tel Aviv and Tehran, which warned last week that any Israeli invasion of Lebanon—from which Iranian ally Hezbollah is resisting Israel's annihilation of Gaza—would trigger an "obliterating war."
According to the Arms Control Association (ACA), a U.S.-based advocacy group, Iran is a "threshold state," meaning "it has developed the necessary capacities to build nuclear weapons."
However, a February 2024 threat assessment report authored by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence stated that "Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities necessary to produce a testable nuclear device."
"Since 2020, however, Tehran has stated that it is no longer constrained by any JCPOA limits," the report says, a reference to so-called Iran Nuclear Deal from which the U.S. unilaterally withdrew in 2018 under former President Donald Trump. "Iran has greatly expanded its nuclear program, reduced [International Atomic Energy Agency] monitoring, and undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so."
Iran maintains its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, although Kamal Kharazi, a foreign policy advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei,
told the Financial Times earlier this week that his country would "have to change our doctrine" if faced with an existential threat.
The ACA and others estimate that Israel has around 90 nuclear warheads and fissile material for approximately 200 more.
Liberman isn't the first Israeli lawmaker to suggest nuclear war against Iran. Far-right Deputy Knesset Speaker Nissim Vaturi—who sparked outrage by saying Israeli forces are "too humane" in Gaza and should "burn" the Palestinian territory—said in April that "in the event of a conflict with Iran, if we do not receive American ammunition, we will have to use everything we have."
"Rather than take actions that might accelerate dangerous nuclear competition, the United States must exercise prudent nuclear restraint and energetically pursue effective arms control and disarmament diplomacy."
A U.S.-based arms control group on Thursday forcefully countered a new bipartisan congressional report that claims it is necessary "to rebuild the nuclear infrastructure and modernize the nuclear forces" in the United States due to "the militarily troubling and increasingly aggressive behaviors of Russia and China."
While nine nations have nukes, "the three states with the largest nuclear arsenals—Russia, the United States, and China—are on the precipice of a unconstrained era of dangerous nuclear competition," the Arms Control Association (ACA) declared in response to the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States report.
The commission's publication comes as the Chinese government is ramping up its nuclear arsenal, amid heightened fears of a potential U.S.-China military conflict over Taiwan, and 20 months into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which has elevated global concerns about Moscow's possible use of nuclear weapons.
"The experience of the Cold War teaches us that an unconstrained arms race has no winners, only losers."
Additionally, as the ACA noted, "with the impending expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in February 2026, and the disappearance of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, Russia is now considering 'de-ratifying' the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty."
Given those conditions, the commission contended that the existing U.S. nuclear modernization plan should be "fully and urgently" executed but also "supplemented to ensure U.S. nuclear strategy remains effective in a two-nuclear-peer environment." Its recommended modifications include addressing "the larger number of targets due to the growing Chinese nuclear threat" and accounting for "advances in Russian and Chinese integrated air and missile defenses."
The ACA, meanwhile, stressed that "the experience of the Cold War teaches us that an unconstrained arms race has no winners, only losers. Leaders in Moscow, Beijing, and Washington need to seize the opportunity to engage in nuclear risk reduction talks, negotiate sensible and verifiable reductions of their arsenals, and refrain from building new destabilizing types of weapons, rather than proceed down a 'lose-lose' path of nuclear competition."
The group argued that "despite reckless behavior on the part of Russia and China in pursuing a more diverse array of nuclear weapons, the scale and diversity of the current U.S. nuclear arsenal still exceeds what is necessary to hold a sufficient number of adversary targets at risk so as to deter enemy nuclear attack."
"In the current context, any decision to increase the number of deployed U.S. strategic nuclear weapons above New START levels could trigger a dangerous action-reaction cycle," warned the ACA. "It would not enhance deterrence in the face of China's growing nuclear capabilities or Russia's existing capabilities. It would more likely encourage China to deploy more nuclear weapons on an even wider array of delivery systems over the coming decade and prompt Russia to match any increases in the U.S. strategic force."
"Increasing the number of deployed U.S. strategic nuclear weapons or adding new types of nuclear war-fighting weapons to the the arsenal would not only be counterproductive, but prohibitively expensive," the ACA continued. The group also emphasized that "once nuclear weapons are used in a war between the United States and Russia or between the United States and China, there is no guarantee a nuclear war could be 'limited,'" citing estimates that a major exchange could kill and injure over 90 million people in the first few hours alone.
According to the ACA:
Rather than take actions that might accelerate dangerous nuclear competition, the United States must exercise prudent nuclear restraint and energetically pursue effective arms control and disarmament diplomacy with Russia, China, and other nuclear-armed states inside and outside of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Considering that new bilateral nuclear arms control limits with Russia may be difficult to achieve so long as Russia's war on Ukraine rages on, the United States could seek an executive agreement or simply a reciprocal unilateral arrangement verified with national technical means of intelligence that commits Russia and the United States to respect New START's central limits until a more permanent and comprehensive nuclear arms control arrangement is concluded.
At the same time, U.S. and other world leaders should urge China, France, and the United Kingdom to cap the size of their nuclear arsenals as long as Russia and the United States meet their fundamental Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligations, which involve participating in genuine negotiations to halt and reverse a potential nuclear arms race.
The group highlighted recent remarks from key members of U.S. President Joe Biden's administration to bolster its arguments for restraint and diplomacy. For example, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin said in December: "Nuclear deterrence isn't just a numbers game. In fact, that sort of thinking can spur a dangerous arms race."
Jake Sullivan, Biden's national security adviser, said in June speech for ACA's annual forum that "the United States is ready to engage Russia now to manage nuclear risks and develop a post-2026 arms control framework," and "we're also ready to engage China without preconditions—helping ensure that competition is managed, and that competition does not veer into conflict."
"I want to be clear here—the United States does not need to increase our nuclear forces to outnumber the combined total of our competitors in order to successfully deter them," Sullivan added in June, as a trio of experts noted last week in Foreign Affairs. One of them reshared the piece on social media Thursday in response to the congressional commission's report.
James M. Acton, co-director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Nuclear Policy Program, Steve Fetter, a University of Maryland professor and King's College London visiting professor, and Charles L.Glaser, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology senior fellow and George Washington University professor emeritus, wrote that "a world in which the United States faces two nuclear peers may bring new risks. The possibility of simultaneous crises with both Beijing and Moscow could create new opportunities for misunderstanding and undesired escalation."
"The important point is that the key approach for reducing these dangers will be diplomacy, including communication in times of both peace and crisis," they added. "Expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal would not ameliorate the nuclear threats posed by Russia and China—and might even exacerbate them."
While rising fears of such arms have fueled recent demands for every country on Earth to support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, so far none of the nine nations with nukes—including India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan—have joined the global pact.
"Rather than add to the chaos and side-step the rules of the global system," said one critic, Biden should clarify that "cluster munitions need not and should not be part of the conflict in Ukraine, or in any war."
An independent weapons watchdog on Thursday implored the Biden administration to abandon any plans it has to provide the Ukrainian government with cluster bombs.
While the White House has yet to finalize its decision, the State Department is expected to invoke a waiver under U.S. arms export laws that would allow stockpiled cluster munitions to be transferred to Ukraine, which is currently waging a counteroffensive against invading Russian forces.
In a statement, Arms Control Association executive director Daryl Kimball said that sending cluster bombs to Ukraine "would be escalatory, counterproductive, and only further increase the dangers to civilians caught in combat zones and those who will, someday, return to their cities, towns, and farms."
"Some U.S. officials claim that these weapons 'would be useful' against mass formations of troops and armor or broad targets, such as airfields, and that they would allow Ukraine to concentrate their use of unitary warheads against higher-value Russian targets," said Kimball.
"The reality is more complicated," he continued. "Cluster munitions will not differentiate a Ukrainian soldier from a Russian one. The effectiveness of cluster munitions is significantly oversold and the impact on noncombatants is widely acknowledged, but too often overlooked."
Kimball noted that "the limited military utility and the substantial humanitarian dangers of cluster munitions are among the key reasons why the Defense Department halted using them in Afghanistan in 2002 and Iraq in 2003, and has chosen to invest in alternative munitions."
"It is why, in 2008, former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates issued an order to phase out by 2018 cluster munitions with an unexploded ordnance rate of greater than 1%, and it is why, in 2011, the Obama administration affirmed this policy," said Kimball. "It is why Congress, in 2018, enacted a series of export restrictions on cluster munitions with a failure rate in excess of 1%."
"The Pentagon has, unfortunately, dragged its feet and in 2017 the Trump administration announced the 2018 deadline for phasing out non-compliant cluster munitions would not be met," he added. "No new deadline for meeting that goal was set by the Trump administration or the Biden administration."
On the one-year anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, President Joe Biden said, "The decisions we make over the next five years are going to determine and shape our lives for decades to come… a choice between chaos and stability."
Kimball on Thursday referenced that February statement and said, "Rather than add to the chaos and side-step the rules of the global system, President Biden should have made it clear that cluster munitions need not and should not be part of the conflict in Ukraine, or in any war."
As the Arms Control Association explains:
Cluster munitions are designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions, each of which weighs less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. The U.S. stockpile includes dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICMs), surface-to-surface warheads, and other types of older cluster munitions. Given that cluster munitions disperse hundreds or even thousands of tiny but deadly bomblets, their use produces significant quantities of unexploded submunitions that can maim, injure, or kill civilians and friendly forces during, and long after, a conflict.
The limited military value and the indiscriminate impacts of these weapons led the majority of the world's countries to negotiate the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. The treaty—which 123 nations have joined—prohibits State parties from developing, producing, acquiring, using, transferring, or stockpiling cluster munitions. While 23 NATO members are parties to the treaty, the United States, Ukraine, and Russia are not.
Human Rights Watch (HRW) has long documented the devastating consequences of U.S.-made cluster munitions in countries such as Serbia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen.
On Thursday, HRW released a new report detailing civilian harm and suffering caused by the use of cluster bombs throughout the war in Ukraine.
"Cluster munitions used by Russia and Ukraine are killing civilians now and will continue to do so for many years," said Mary Wareham, the organization's acting arms director. "Both sides should immediately stop using them and not try to get more of these indiscriminate weapons."
"As we live in an increasingly digital age, we need to ensure that humans hold the power alone to command, control, and launch nuclear weapons—not robots," said co-sponsor Sen. Ed Markey.
In the name of "protecting future generations from potentially devastating consequences," a bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers on Wednesday introduced legislation meant to prevent artificial intelligence from launching nuclear weapons without meaningful human control.
The Block Nuclear Launch by Autonomous Artificial Intelligence Act—introduced by Sen. Ed Markey (D-Mass.) and Reps. Ted Lieu (D-Calif.), Don Beyer (D-Va.), and Ken Buck (R-Colo.)—asserts that "any decision to launch a nuclear weapon should not be made" by AI.
The proposed legislation acknowledges that the Pentagon's 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states that current U.S. policy is to "maintain a human 'in the loop' for all actions critical to informing and executing decisions by the president to initiate and terminate nuclear weapon employment."
The bill would codify that policy so that no federal funds could be used "to launch a nuclear weapon [or] select or engage targets for the purposes of launching" nukes.
"As we live in an increasingly digital age, we need to ensure that humans hold the power alone to command, control, and launch nuclear weapons—not robots," Markey asserted in a statement. "We need to keep humans in the loop on making life-or-death decisions to use deadly force, especially for our most dangerous weapons."
Buck argued that "while U.S. military use of AI can be appropriate for enhancing national security purposes, use of AI for deploying nuclear weapons without a human chain of command and control is reckless, dangerous, and should be prohibited."
According to the 2023 AI Index Report—an annual assessment published earlier this month by the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence—36% of surveyed AI experts worry about the possibility that automated systems "could cause nuclear-level catastrophe."
"Use of AI for deploying nuclear weapons without a human chain of command and control is reckless, dangerous, and should be prohibited."
The report followed a February assessment by the Arms Control Association, an advocacy group, that AI and other emerging technologies including lethal autonomous weapons systems and hypersonic missiles pose a potentially existential threat that underscores the need for measures to slow the pace of weaponization.
"While we all try to grapple with the pace at which AI is accelerating, the future of AI and its role in society remains unclear," Lieu said in a statement introducing the new bill.
"It is our job as members of Congress to have responsible foresight when it comes to protecting future generations from potentially devastating consequences," he continued. "That's why I'm pleased to introduce the bipartisan, bicameral Block Nuclear Launch by Autonomous AI Act, which will ensure that no matter what happens in the future, a human being has control over the employment of a nuclear weapon—not a robot."
"AI can never be a substitute for human judgment when it comes to launching nuclear weapons," Lieu added.
While dozens of countries support the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, none of the world's nine nuclear powers, including the United States, have signed on, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine has reawakened fears of nuclear conflict that were largely dormant since the Cold War.