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The US has carried out nearly 100 strikes in Somalia this year alone, with scant coverage by the corporate media.
At least a dozen civilians—eight children, three women, and an elderly man—were killed in weekend bombings that local sources claimed were the latest of nearly 100 US airstrikes in the Horn of Africa nation this year alone.
The Somali Guardian reported that the strikes occurred near the southern Somali town of Jamame in the Lower Juba region. In addition to the 12 civilians killed, nine others were reportedly wounded in the attack.
While no one has claimed responsibility for the bombing, US Africa Command (AFRICOM) acknowledged carrying out weekend "airstrikes targeting al-Shabaab," an al-Qaeda-affiliated militant group, near Jamame.
“Specific details about units and assets will not be released to ensure continued operations security,” added AFRICOM—which earlier this year stopped sharing information about civilian harm caused by US attacks.
Somali Guardian reported that Danab, a US-trained Somali special forces unit, was also conducting operations in villages around Jamame. Danab often receives US air support while carrying out such missions.
The weekend strikes follow a Danab raid in Balcad district last week in which children were reportedly killed.
"Three were murdered including 2- and 3-year-olds," Somali activist Adan Abdulle said on Sunday. "This is not the first time that US or US-trained forces have murdered innocent civilians in cold blood. What makes these murders stand out is the callousness with which pressure was exerted on grieving families to keep quiet."
The latest strikes came amid a surge in US bombings targeting Somalia-based militants during US President Donald Trump's second term. Antiwar.com's Dave DeCamp has counted 96 US airstrikes on Somalia this year alone, based on AFRICOM data.
"President Trump has shattered the annual record for US airstrikes in Somalia, which he previously set at 63 during his first term in 2019," DeCamp noted Sunday. "For context, President [Joe] Biden launched a total of 51 airstrikes in Somalia throughout his four years in office, and President [Barack] Obama launched 48 over eight years."
Trump's record bombardment of Somalia has received almost no coverage in the US corporate media.
According to the UK-based watchdog Airwars, US forces have killed at least 92 and as many as 167 civilians in Somalia since 2007, when then-President George W. Bush ordered strikes on the country as part of the War on Terror.
The Costs of War Project at Brown University's Watson School for International and Public Affairs says that the open-ended US-led war has left more than 940,000 people dead, upward of 432,000 of them civilians, in at least seven countries, since shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.
Cuban and American officials are investigating the unverified claim that the doctors, who were kidnapped by al-Shabaab militants in 2019, died during a recent U.S. drone strike.
The United States military said Tuesday that it is investigating whether a drone strike on Somalia targeting al-Shabaab fighters killed two Cuban doctors being held hostage by the militant group.
According to al-Shabaab, surgeon Landy Rodríguez Hernández and general medicine specialist Assel Herrera Correa were killed in a U.S. airstrike in Somalia's southern state of Jubaland last Thursday—although there has been no confirmation of the deaths.
"The aerial bombardment, which began at around 12:10 am, targeted a house in Jilib, instantly killing Assel Herrera and Landy Rodríguez," the al-Qaeda-affiliated group said on social media.
The Cuban Foreign Ministry said Tuesday that National Assembly President Esteban Lazo Hernández traveled to Kenya "to make urgent efforts with the highest authorities of that country in the search for cooperation and clarification, in the light of the recent published news on the possible unconfirmed death" of the two doctors.
U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) acknowledged carrying out the February 15 bombing but said that "we do not have further information at this time about these reports, but we do take all claims of civilian casualties seriously. The command will continue to assess the results of this operation and will provide additional information as available."
According to Airwars, a U.K.-based monitoring group, hundreds of Somalis—including some civilians—were killed by U.S. airstrikes last year alone as the Biden administration quietly continues the so-called War on Terror launched in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States. The U.S. has been conducting airstrikes and ground raids in Somalia since the George W. Bush administration.
Al-Shabaab kidnapped the Cuban doctors in Mandera County, Kenya in April 2019. The doctors were working there under an agreement between the Kenyan and Cuban governments for the provision of medical professionals for services including the implemention of universal healthcare.
Cuba's socialist government provides universal healthcare to the Caribbean country's citizens and also deploys doctors to dozens of nations on humanitarian missions. While Cuban doctors are hailed around the world for their lifesaving service, they also allegedly face serious restrictions on their freedoms while working abroad.
Responding to news of the doctors' possible deaths, Cuban President Miguel Mario Díaz-Canel y Bermúdez said: "I express all my solidarity and affection to the families of our doctors Assel and Landy, in these moments of uncertainty and increased pain, and in the face of the tragic news not yet confirmed, in whose clarification we are working hard with international authorities."
"I admire the strength of both families and I remember with great affection our previous meetings," he continued. "Assel and Landy represent the noble and generous spirit of a people who share even what they do not have, with the humble of the Earth."
"Cuba does not lose hope of finding them alive," Díaz Canel added. "We will do so as long as there is no official confirmation that they have died."
Most Americans, including members of Congress, are unaware of the extent of War on Terror operations on the continent—or how little they have done to protect African lives.
Deaths from terrorism in Africa have skyrocketed more than 100,000% during the U.S. war on terror according to a new study by Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a Pentagon research institution. These findings contradict claims by U.S. Africa Command, or AFRICOM, that it is thwarting terrorist threats on the continent and promoting security and stability.
Throughout all of Africa, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in 2002 and 2003, resulting in a combined 23 casualties. At that time, the U.S. was just beginning a decades-long effort to provide billions of dollars in security assistance, train many thousands of African military personnel, set up dozens of outposts, dispatch its own commandos on a wide range of missions, create proxy forces, launch drone strikes, and even engage in ground combat with militants in Africa.
Most Americans, including members of Congress, are unaware of the extent of these operations—or how little they have done to protect African lives.
At least 15 officers who benefited from U.S. security assistance have been involved in 12 coups in West Africa and the greater Sahel during the war on terror.
Last year, fatalities from militant Islamist violence in Africa rose by 20%—from 19,412 in 2022 to 23,322—reaching “a record level of lethal violence,” according to the Africa Center. This represents almost a doubling in deaths since 2021 and a 101,300% jump since 2002-2003.
For decades, U.S. counter-terrorism efforts in Africa have been centered on two main fronts: Somalia and the West African Sahel. Each saw significant spikes in terrorism last year.
U.S. Special Operations forces were first dispatched to Somalia in 2002, followed by military aid, advisers, and private contractors. More than 20 years later, U.S. troops are still conducting counterterrorism operations there, primarily against the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab. To this end, Washington has provided billions of dollars in counterterrorism assistance, according to a 2023 report by the Costs of War Project at Brown University. Americans have also conducted more than 280 air strikes and commando raids there and created numerous proxy forces to conduct low-profile military operations.
Somalia saw, according to the Africa Center, “a 22% increase in fatalities in 2023—reaching a record high of 7,643 deaths.” This represents a tripling of fatalities since 2020.
The findings are even more damning for the Sahel. In 2002 and 2003, the State Department counted a total of just nine terrorist attacks in Africa. Today, the nations of the West African Sahel are plagued by terrorist groups that have grown, evolved, splintered, and reconstituted themselves. Under the black banners of jihadist militancy, men on motorcycles—wearing sunglasses and turbans and armed with AK-47s—rumble into villages to impose their harsh brand of Sharia law and terrorize, assault, and kill civilians. Relentless attacks by these jihadis have destabilized Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
“Fatalities in the Sahel represent a near threefold increase from the levels seen in 2020,” according to the Africa Center report. “Fatalities in the Sahel amounted to 50% of all militant Islamist-linked fatalities reported on the continent in 2023.”
At least 15 officers who benefited from U.S. security assistance have been involved in 12 coups in West Africa and the greater Sahel during the war on terror. The list includes officers from Burkina Faso (2014, 2015, and twice in 2022); Chad (2021); Gambia (2014); Guinea (2021); Mali (2012, 2020, and 2021); Mauritania (2008); and Niger (2023). At least five leaders of the Nigerien junta, for example, received American assistance, according to a U.S. official. They, in turn, appointed five U.S.-trained members of the Nigerien security forces to serve as that country’s governors.
Such military coups have undermined American aims of providing stability and security to Africans, yet the United States has been hesitant to cut ties with these rogue regimes. Despite the Nigerien coup, for example, the United States continues to garrison troops at, and conduct missions from, its large drone base there.
Juntas have also amped up atrocities. Take Colonel Assimi Goïta, who worked with U.S. Special Operations forces, participated in U.S. training exercises, and attended the Joint Special Operations University in Florida before overthrowing Mali’s government in 2020. Goïta then took the job of vice president in a transitional government officially charged with returning the country to civilian rule, only to seize power again in 2021.
That same year, Goita’s junta reportedly authorized the deployment of Russia-linked Wagner mercenary forces to fight Islamist militants after close to two decades of failed Western-backed counterterrorism efforts. Wagner—a paramilitary group founded by the late Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former hot-dog vendor turned warlord—went on to be implicated in hundreds of human rights abuses alongside the longtime U.S.-backed Malian military, including a 2022 massacre that killed 500 civilians.
U.S. law generally restricts countries from receiving military aid following military coups, but the U.S. has continued to provide assistance to Sahelian juntas. While Goïta’s 2020 and 2021 coups triggered prohibitions on some forms of U.S. security assistance, American tax dollars have continued to fund his forces. According to the State Department, the U.S. provided more than $16 million in security aid to Mali in 2020 and almost $5 million in 2021. As of July 2023, the department’s Bureau of Counterterrorism was waiting on congressional approval to transfer an additional $2 million to Mali. (The State Department did not reply to Responsible Statecraft’s request for an update on the status of that funding.)
Similarly, Burkina Faso’s military killed scores of civilians in drone strikes last year, according to a recent report released by Human Rights Watch. The attacks, targeting Islamist militants in crowded marketplaces and at a funeral, left at least 60 civilians dead and dozens more injured.
For more than a decade, the U.S. poured tens of millions of dollars into security aid to Burkina Faso. U.S. Africa Command or AFRICOM is, according to spokesperson Kelly Cahalan, “not currently providing assistance to Burkina Faso.” But she did not respond to questions clarifying what, exactly, that means.
Last year, in fact, AFRICOM commander Gen. Michael Langley admitted that the U.S. has continued to provide military training to Burkinabè forces. Those troops, for example, took part in Flintlock 2023, an annual training exercise sponsored by U.S. Special Operations Command Africa. Still, Burkina Faso suffered 67% of the militant Islamist-related fatalities in the Sahel (7,762) in 2023, according to the Africa Center.
U.S. Africa Command touts that it “counters transnational threats and malign actors” and promotes “regional security, stability, and prosperity” helping its African partners to ensure the “security and safety” of their people. The fact that civilian deaths from militant Islamist violence have reached record levels, according to the Africa Center, and spiked 101,300% during the war on terror demonstrates the opposite.
AFRICOM directed queries on the findings of the Africa Center’s new report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Pentagon did not respond to the questions prior to publication.
"The U.S. is failing to fulfill its commitments in responding appropriately to civilian harm," said one advocate.
Two dozen Somali and international human rights groups on Monday asked the Pentagon to "take immediate steps to address the requests of families whose loved ones were killed or injured by U.S. airstrikes in Somalia"—people who often say they're being ignored by American officials.
In a letter to U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, the groups cite recent Intercept reporting that "illustrates how in multiple cases of civilian harm in Somalia confirmed by the U.S. government, civilian victims, survivors, and their families have yet to receive answers, acknowledgment, and amends despite their sustained efforts to reach authorities over several years."
The letter highlights victims including Luul Dahir Mohamed, a 22-year-old Somali woman who was killed along with her 4-year-old daughter Mariam Shilow Muse in an April 2018 U.S. drone strike in El Buur. Luul's brother Abubakar Dahir Mohamed said that despite confirming their deaths and admitting they were civilians, the U.S. military has yet to provide the family with a "substantive reply."
"Since the strike, our family has been broken apart. It has been more than five years since it happened, but we have not been able to move on," Abubakar Dahir Mohamed wrote in an opinion piece published last week by The Continent. "Even as we have contacted [the U.S. government] in every way we know how, we have never been able to even start a process of getting justice. The U.S. has never even acknowledged our existence."
The groups' letter asserts that "the U.S. response thus far stands in stark contrast to this administration's stated priorities of mitigating, responding to, and learning from civilian harm."
Declaring that "the protection of civilians is a strategic priority as well as a moral imperative," the Pentagon last year
published its Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP), which includes stated commitments to improving commanders' understanding of civilian environments, developing standardized incident reporting and data management processes, and enhancing the military's ability to assess and respond when noncombatants are harmed by U.S. attacks.
"In light of these commitments, it is unfathomable that Abubakar and his family have for so long struggled to receive acknowledgment or amends from the United States," the new letter contends. "We urge the Department of Defense to urgently make long-overdue amends in consultation with Abubakar's family and their representatives, including condolence payments and an explanation for why their demands appear to have been ignored until now."
The letter notes that "the Department of Defense has at its disposal $3 million of annual funding provided by the U.S. Congress to make ex gratia payments to civilian victims and survivors of U.S. operations."
However, the signers "know of no cases in which those funds have been used in Somalia, despite the fact that in numerous cases confirmed by the United States, the identities of civilian victims and survivors are known and their contact information has been made available through their own reporting or through civil society representatives."
Living up to the Pentagon's commitment "requires responding to the inquiries of civilians seeking answers and making amends for the life-altering harm they and their families have experienced," the letter asserts. "We urge [U.S. Africa Command] and the Department of Defense to do so immediately."
International groups joining Somali signatories to the letter include Airwars, Amnesty International USA, Center for Civilians in Conflict, the Columbia Law School Human Rights Institute, and Human Rights Watch.
According to Airwars, a U.K.-based monitoring group, hundreds of Somalis—including some civilians—have been killed by U.S. airstrikes this year alone as the Biden administration quietly continues the so-called War on Terror launched in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States.
Airwars said in 2021 that as many as 48,000 civilians in over half a dozen countries have been killed by U.S. airstrikes since 9/11, while the Costs of War Project at Brown University's Watson Institute for International & Public Affairs estimates that more than 430,000 noncombatants have been killed by all sides during the war.
"Here we have the AFRICOM/Wagner overlap," said journalist Nick Turse, referring to U.S. troops and Russian hired guns in the African nation.
Mali's U.S.-backed army and foreign fighters apparently from the Russian mercenary firm Wagner Group have forcibly disappeared and murdered dozens of civilians in the African nation's central region since last December, Human Rights Watch said Monday.
HRW interviewed 40 people including 20 eyewitnesses to atrocities perpetrated by Malian forces in the villages of Ouenkoro, Séguéla, Sossobé, and Thioffol, as well as numerous victims' relatives, community leaders, activists, and representatives of international organizations.
A 45-year-old mother of seven from Thioffol who was shot in the foot described a December 18, 2022 raid by Malian troops.
"One [soldier] asked us: 'Where are the men?' We said they were out grazing animals," she told HRW. "He replied: 'If we found your men, we would have massacred them.' He ordered us out, while other soldiers stole our silver bracelets, kitchen utensils, and water cans... As soldiers started leaving, one turned back, stood on the doorstep, and opened fire. Four of us died on the spot, including a girl."
Mali's army and mercenaries have been waging a U.S.-backed war against al-Qaeda-affiliated Jamaa Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and rival Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) in the Mopti and Ségou regions. The Pentagon's U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is present and conducts operations in Mali.
As Nick Turse noted at The Intercept on Monday:
The U.S. has poured billions of dollars in military assistance into Mali and its neighbors over roughly two decades—enabling human rights abuses by providing weapons and training to militaries that have terrorized civilians, according to the United Nations, human rights advocacy groups, and the U.S. State Department. U.S.-trained military officers have also repeatedly conducted coups, including the putsch leader who toppled Mali's governments in 2020 and 2021. While the coups triggered restrictions on U.S. aid, Pentagon officials have pointed to Wagner's growing influence across Africa as a reason to keep the money flowing.
While Mali's military government, led by Interim President Col. Assimi Goïta since May 2021, has said that Russian military trainers are in the country as part of a bilateral agreement, it denies the presence of Wagner mercenaries.
"However," says HRW, "there is growing evidence of activities and abuses in Mali by [the] private military security company run by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a close ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin until tensions between the Russian defense ministry and Wagner Group escalated in Russia on June 24."
Survivors and witnesses in Ouenkoro, Séguéla, and Sossobé reported the participation of foreign, non-French-speaking fighters in the raids. These men were described as "white," "Russian," and "Wagner" and, according to HRW, committed just a fraction of the reported abuses.
Residents of Séguéla described how foreign fighters in three helicopters attacked the village on February 3, going door-to-door and rounding up men.
"There were almost only white Wagner soldiers, they led the whole operation," one man said. "They were heavily armed, masked, and wore camouflage uniforms and spoke a language we did not understand, but which was not French."
"They took random people, including very old men."
Another man claimed that "two white soldiers broke into my house, searched it, and took away all my wife's jewelry."
The invaders arrested 17 men between the age of 27 and 82, almost all of them members of the Fulani ethnic group.
"They selected 17 men whom they suspected were jihadists or their accomplices," one eyewitness said. "They took random people, including very old men."
More than three weeks later, a group of Séguéla villagers found the bodies of 13 men—including eight of those arrested on February 3—in a deserted area outside a nearby village. All of the victims were bound and appeared to have been shot; four also had their throats slit "to the point where the heads were almost completely cut off," according to one witness.
People interviewed by HRW also said that Malian and foreign forces tortured detainees to force confessions regarding their membership in Islamist groups. HRW has previously documented alleged summary executions, enforced disappearances, and incommunicado detentions by Malian forces in the region.
The apparent presence of Wagner mercenaries in Mali comes as the country's military government has expelled both the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the thousands of French troops who had occupied parts of the country for nearly a decade, sometimes harming civilians, like in the January 2021 airstrike on a wedding party that killed 19 people.
The U.N. says 187 peacekeepers died during the 10-year Mali operation, which is set to fully wind down by the end of the year following Mali's request to leave.
According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), a data collection, analysis, and crisis mapping project, at least 5,750 people have been killed in over 1,740 incidents across Mali between January 2022 and March 2023. The conflict has spilled over into neighboring Sahel countries including Burkina Faso and has worsened a humanitarian crisis in which hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced and nearly 9 million people require humanitarian assistance.
The United States, United Kingdom, and European Union have sanctioned Ivan Maslov, who commands Wagner Group forces in Mali.
HRW, meanwhile, is calling on African transnational organizations to act against human rights violators in Mali.
"The U.N. peacekeepers' impending withdrawal makes it more crucial than ever for the Malian authorities to protect civilians and prevent further abuses during military operations," Carine Kaneza Nantulya, HRW's deputy Africa director, said in a statement Monday.
"The African Union and the Economic Community of West African States should express their concerns about grave abuses by the Malian armed forces and allied apparent Wagner Group fighters," she added, "and increase pressure on the Malian authorities to end these violations and hold those responsible to account."
What's the U.S. military doing in Africa? It's an enigma, wrapped in a riddle, straight-jacketed in secrecy, and hogtied by red tape. Or at least it would be if it were up to the Pentagon.
Ten years ago, I embarked on a quest to answer that question at TomDispatch, chronicling a growing American military presence on that continent, a build-up of both logistical capabilities and outposts, and the possibility that far more was occurring out of sight. "Keep your eye on Africa," I concluded. "The U.S. military is going to make news there for years to come."
I knew I had a story when U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) failed to answer basic questions honestly. And the command's reaction to the article told me that I also had a new beat.
Not long after publication, AFRICOM wrote a letter of complaint to my editor, Tom Engelhardt, attempting to discredit my investigation. (I responded point by point in a follow-up piece.) The command claimed the U.S. was doing little on that continent, had one measly base there, and was transparent about its operations. "I would encourage you and those who have interest in what we do to review our Website, www.AFRICOM.mil, and a new Defense Department Special Web Report on U.S. Africa Command at this link https://www.defense.gov/home/features/2012/0712_AFRICOM/," wrote its director of public affairs Colonel Tom Davis.
A decade later, the link is dead; Davis is a functionary at Pima Community College in Tucson, Arizona; and I'm still keeping an eye on AFRICOM.
A few months ago, in fact, I revealed the existence of a previously unknown AFRICOM investigation of an airstrike in Nigeria that killed more than 160 civilians. A formerly secret 2017 Africa Command document I obtained called for an inquiry into that "U.S.-Nigerian" operation that was never disclosed to Congress, much less the public.
Since then, AFRICOM has steadfastly refused to offer a substantive comment on the strike or the investigation that followed and won't even say if it will release relevant documents to members of Congress. Last month, citing my reporting, a group of lawmakers from the newly formed Protection of Civilians in Conflict Caucus called on Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to turn over the files on, and answer key questions about, the attack. The Pentagon has so far kept mum.
Has AFRICOM then, as Davis contended so long ago, been transparent? Is its website the go-to spot for information about U.S. military missions on that continent? Did its operations there remain few and innocuous? Or was I onto something?
A Kinder, Gentler Combatant Command
From its inception, according to its first commander, General William Ward, AFRICOM was intended "to be a different kind of command": less hardcore, more Peace Corps. "AFRICOM's focus is on war prevention," Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs Theresa Whelan said in 2007, "rather than warfighting."
In 2012, Ward's successor, General Carter Ham, told the House Armed Services Committee that "small teams" of American personnel were conducting "a wide range of engagements in support of U.S. security interests." Years later, retired Army Brigadier General Don Bolduc, who served at AFRICOM from 2013 to 2015 and headed Special Operations Command Africa until 2017, would offer some clarity about those "engagements." Between 2013 and 2017, he explained, American commandos saw combat in at least 13 African countries: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, and Tunisia. U.S. troops, he added, were killed or wounded in action in at least six of them.
Between 2015 and 2017, there were at least 10 unreported attacks on American troops in West Africa alone. A month after that January 2017 Nigerian air strike, in fact, U.S. Marines fought al-Qaeda militants in a battle that AFRICOM still won't admit took place in Tunisia. That April, a U.S. commando reportedly killed a member of warlord Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army in the Central African Republic. The next month, during an advise, assist, and accompany mission, 38-year-old Navy SEAL Kyle Milliken was killed and two other Americans were wounded in a raid on a militant camp in Somalia. That same year, a Navy SEAL reportedly shot and killed a man outside a compound flying an Islamic State (ISIS) flag in Cameroon. And that October, AFRICOM was finally forced to abandon the fiction that U.S. troops weren't at war on the continent after ISIS militants ambushed American troops in Niger, killing four and wounding two more. "We don't know exactly where we're at in the world, militarily, and what we're doing," said Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, then a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, after meeting with Pentagon officials about the attack.
In the 2010s, I would, in fact, help reveal that the U.S. had conducted at least 36 named operations and activities in Africa--more than anywhere else on earth, including the Middle East. Among them were eight 127e programs, named for the budgetary authority that allows Special Operations forces to use foreign military units as surrogates in counterterrorism missions. More recently, I would report on 11 of those proxy programs employed in Africa, including one in Tunisia, code-named Obsidian Tower and never acknowledged by the Pentagon, and another with a notoriously abusive Cameroonian military unit connected to mass atrocities.
Five of those 127e programs were conducted in Somalia by U.S. commandos training, equipping, and directing troops from Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, and Uganda as part of the fight against the Islamist militant group al-Shabaab. In 2018, 26-year-old Alex Conrad of the Army's Special Forces was killed in an attack on a small U.S. military outpost in Somalia.
Such outposts have long been a point of contention between AFRICOM and me. "The U.S. maintains a surprising number of bases in Africa," I wrote in that initial TomDispatch article in July 2012. Colonel Davis denied it. "Other than our base at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti," he claimed, "we do not have military bases in Africa." I had, he insisted, filed that article before AFRICOM could get me further outpost material. "If he had waited, we would have provided the information requested, which could have better informed his story."
I had begun requesting information that May, called in additional questions in June and July, and then (as requested) put them in writing. I followed up on the 9th, mentioning my looming deadline and was told that AFRICOM headquarters might have some answers for me on the 10th. That day came and went, as did the 11th. TomDispatch finally published the piece on July 12th. "I respectfully submit that a vigorous free press cannot be held hostage, waiting for information that might never arrive," I wrote Davis.
When I later followed up, Davis turned out to be on leave, but AFRICOM spokesperson Eric Elliott emailed in August to say: "Let me see what I can give you in response to your request for a complete list of facilities."
Then, for weeks, AFRICOM went dark. A follow-up email in late October went unanswered. Another in early November elicited a response from spokesperson Dave Hecht, who said that he was handling the request and would provide an update by week's end. I'm sure you won't be shocked to learn that he didn't. So, I followed up yet again. On November 16th, he finally responded: "All questions now have answers. I just need the boss to review before I can release. I hope to have them to you by mid next week." Did I get them? What do you think?
In December, Hecht finally replied: "All questions have been answered but are still being reviewed for release. Hopefully this week I can send everything your way." Did he? Hah!
In January 2013, I received answers to some questions of mine, but nothing about those bases. By then, Hecht, too, had disappeared and I was left dealing with AFRICOM's Chief of Media Engagement, Benjamin Benson. When asked about my questions, he replied that public affairs couldn't provide answers and I should instead file a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.
To recap, six months later, Benson recommended I start again. And in good faith, I did. In 2016, three and a half years later, I finally received a partial response to that FOIA request: one page of partially redacted--not to mention useless--information about (yep!) Camp Lemonnier and nothing else.
I would spend years investigating the bases Davis claimed didn't exist. Using leaked secret documents, I shed light on a network of African drone bases integral to U.S. assassination programs on the continent as well as the existence of a secret network of National Security Agency eavesdropping outposts in Ethiopia. Using formerly secret documents, I revealed an even larger network of U.S. bases across Africa, again and again. I used little-noticed open-source information to highlight activities at those facilities, while helping expose murder and torture by local forces at a drone base in Cameroon built-up and frequented by Americans. I also spotlighted the construction of a $100 million drone base in Niger; a previously unreported outpost in Mali apparently overrun by militants after a 2012 coup there by a U.S.-trained officer; the expansion of a shadowy drone base in the Horn of Africa and its role in lethal strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria; hundreds of drone strikes from Libya to Somalia and the resulting civilian casualties; and the flailing, failing U.S. war on terror all across Africa.
Not surprisingly, AFRICOM's website never had much to say about such reporting, nor could you go there to find articles like:
"The AFRICOM Files: Pentagon Undercounts and Ignores Military Sexual Assault in Africa"
"New Data Shows the U.S. Military Is Severely Undercounting Civilian Casualties in Somalia"
"U.S. Troops in Africa Might be in Danger. Why Is the Military Trying to Hide It?"
You Know You're on Target When You're Getting a Lot of Flak(s)
In the years since, a parade of AFRICOM press officials came and went, replying in a by-then-familiar fashion. "Nick, we're not going to respond to any of your questions," Lieutenant Commander Anthony Falvo, head of its public affairs branch, told me in October 2017. Did he, I asked, believe AFRICOM needn't address questions from the press in general or only from me. "No, just you," he replied. "We don't consider you a legitimate journalist, really." Then he hung up.
That same month, I was inadvertently ushered behind the closed doors of the AFRICOM public affairs office. While attempting to hang up on me, a member of the staff accidentally put me on speakerphone and suddenly I found myself listening in to the goings on, from banal banter to shrieking outbursts. And, believe me, it wasn't pretty. While the command regularly claimed its personnel had the utmost respect for their local counterparts, I discovered, for example, that at least certain press officers appeared to have a remarkably low opinion of some of their African partners. At one point, Falvo asked if there was any "new intelligence" regarding military operations in Niger after the 2017 ambush that killed those four American soldiers. "You can't put Nigeriens and intelligence in the same sentence," replied someone in the office. Laughter followed and I published the sordid details. That very month, Anthony Falvo shipped off (literally ending up in the public affairs office of the USS Gerald Ford).
Today, a new coterie of AFRICOM public affairs personnel field questions, but Falvo's successor, Deputy Director of Public Affairs John Manley, a genuine professional, seems to be on call whenever my questions are especially problematic. He swears this isn't true, but I'm sure you won't be shocked to learn that he fielded my queries for this article.
After Col. Tom Davis--who left AFRICOM to join Special Operations Command (where, in a private email, he called me a "turkey")--failed to respond to my interview requests, I asked AFRICOM if his defer-and-deny system was the best way to inform the American public. "We are not going to comment on processes and procedures in place a decade ago or provide opinions on personnel who worked in the office at that time," said Manley.
"Our responsibility is to provide timely, accurate, and transparent responses to queries received from all members of the media," Manley told me. Yes, me, the reporter who's been waiting since 2012 for answers about those U.S. bases. And by AFRICOM standards, maybe that's not really so long, given its endless failures in quelling terrorism and promoting stability in places like Burkina Faso, Libya, and Somalia.
Still, I give Manley a lot of credit. He isn't thin-skinned or afraid to talk and he does offer answers, although sometimes they seem so far-fetched that I can't believe he uttered them with a straight face. Though he agreed to discuss his replies further, I doubted that badgering him would get either of us anywhere, so I'll just let his last one stand as a digital monument to my 10-year relationship with AFRICOM. When I asked if the public affairs office had always been as forthcoming, forthright, and helpful with my queries as possible, he unleashed the perfect capstone to my decade-long dance with U.S. Africa Command by offering up just one lone word: "Yes."
Conflict monitors on Friday drew attention to a series of U.S. airstrikes in Somalia in recent months, attacks that have received relatively little attention in the American corporate media despite having reportedly killed more than 20 people.
"Bottom line, it's been a long time since the United States was not bombing Somalia."
"If you were unaware that we were bombing Somalia, don't feel bad, this is a completely under-the-radar news story, one that was curiously absent from the headlines in all of the major newspapers this morning," wrote Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, a senior adviser at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.
On Wednesday, Antiwar.com's Dave DeCamp reported that U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) launched its second strike on Somalia in a week. AFRICOM said its initial assessment found the attack, which occurred in Beledweyne and killed 13 fighters belonging to the al-Qaeda-linked Somali militant group al-Shabaab, and that no civilians were harmed.
AFRICOM also said it killed four al-Shabaab members in three separate airstrikes near Beledweyne on August 9, two fighters in a joint U.S.-Somali operation near Labi Kus on July 17, and five militants in a June 3 bombing outside Beer Xani.
All of these strikes have taken place since U.S. President Joe Biden approved the redeployment of hundreds of special forces troops to Somalia in May, reversing a drawdown from the war-ravaged nation implemented during the administration of former President Donald Trump.
DeCamp noted that Trump's withdrawal from Somalia merely "repositioned troops in neighboring Djibouti and Kenya, allowing the drone war to continue. But Biden has launched significantly fewer strikes in Somalia compared to his predecessor."
According to data from the U.K.-based monitor group Airwars, U.S. forces have bombed Somalia at least 16 times during Biden's tenure, killing between 465 and 545 suspected militants. On March 13, a joint U.S. drone and Somali airstrike killed a staggering 200 alleged militants.
Airwars identified civilian casualties in just one of the attacks during Biden's presidency, a June 2021 strike attributed to either U.S. or Kenyan forces, which have been battling al-Shabaab since 2011. The attack on the southern town of Ceel Cadde killed Sahro Adan Warsame and seriously injured five of her children, according to local media reports.
Since 2007, the U.S. military has carried out 260 actions in Somalia. While the Pentagon only admits to killing five civilians and wounding 11 others in a campaign it claims killed as many as 3,010 militants, Airwars estimates that 78-153 civilians, including 20-23 children, have died in U.S. attacks.
"Bottom line, it's been a long time since the United States was not bombing Somalia," wrote Vlahos. "This comes after a particularly bloody period during the [so-called War on Terror] in which the CIA was using the country to detain and torture terror suspects from across North Africa."
"Whether this has ultimately been a good thing for the country or for the broader security of the region, one need only to look at the continued instability and impoverishment of the people," she added, "and of course, the persistent presence of al-Shabaab itself."
Human Rights Watch on Friday implored the U.S. military to prioritize protecting Somali civilians after President Joe Biden signed off on the re-deployment of hundreds of Special Forces troops to the war-torn African nation, where American drone and other airstrikes have killed at least scores of noncombatants in recent decades.
"U.S. officials should be very clear on how their forces will avoid harming Somali civilians during military operations."
Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby announced earlier this week that a "small, persistent U.S. military presence" of around 500 troops would return to Somalia 17 months after then-President Donald Trump withdrew the approximately 750 American service members who were in the country waging and supporting the so-called War on Terror under United States Africa Command (AFRICOM). The U.S., which has been targeting the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamist militant group Al-Shabaab since the 2000s, most recently bombed Somalia in February.
"U.S. officials should be very clear on how their forces will avoid harming Somali civilians during military operations," Laetitia Bader, Horn of Africa director at Human Rights Watch (HRW), said in a statement. "They will need to work closely with Somali and African Union authorities to avoid repeating past laws of war violations and promptly and appropriately respond to civilian loss."
The U.S. has carried out at least 200 drone strikes and an indeterminate number of other aerial bombardments of Somalia since 2004, according to the London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism. The U.K.-based monitor group Airwars says at least 68 and as many as 143 Somali civilians have been killed by U.S. drones and warplanes since 2007.
"Human Rights Watch reported on two U.S. airstrikes, on February 2 and March 10, 2020, that killed seven civilians in apparent violation of the laws of war," HRW notes. "While the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) acknowledged responsibility for the February 2 incident, which killed a woman and injured her two sisters, both children, and her grandmother, none of them received compensation."
"AFRICOM has, in recent years, offered some level of transparency around civilian casualty assessments, notably publishing quarterly civilian casualty assessment reports since April 2020," the group continues. "However, these still fall far short of what is needed to ensure credible justice for victims, including for past cases."
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Bader lamented that "a culture of impunity for civilian loss breeds resentment and mistrust among the population and undermines efforts to build a more rights-respecting state."
"The U.S. government recognizes the need to credibly investigate and compensate for civilian harm, but the military has yet to make this a reality," she added.
HRW said Somalia must be included in the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan announced by Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin in January amid progressive pressure on the Pentagon to reckon with the staggering number of noncombatants killed by U.S. bombs and bullets.
In over 20 years of waging the War on Terror, the U.S. military has killed more foreign civilians than any other armed force on the planet by far. According to the Costs of War Project at Brown University's Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, nearly 400,000 civilian men, women, and children have been killed in the U.S.-led post-9/11 wars.
Madogaz Musa Abdullah still remembers the phone call. But what came next was a blur. He drove for hours, deep into the Libyan desert, speeding toward the border with Algeria. His mind buckled, his thoughts reeled, and more than three years later, he's still not certain how he made that six-hour journey.
"What I saw was so terrible," he told me, his voice rising, ragged, and loaded with pain. "I can't even describe it."
The call was about his younger brother, Nasser, who, as he told me, was more than a sibling to him. He was also a close friend. Nasser was polite and caring. He loved music, sang, and played the guitar. Jimi Hendrix, Carlos Santana, and Bob Marley were his favorites.
Abdullah finally found Nasser near the village of Al Awaynat. Or, rather, he found all that remained of him. Nasser and 10 others from their village of Ubari had been riding in three SUVs that were now burnt-out hunks of metal. The 11 men had been incinerated. Abdullah knew one of those charred corpses was his brother, but he was at a loss to identify which one.
If these bodies had recently been found strewn about in the village of Staryi Bykiv, in the streets of Bucha, outside a train station in Kramatorsk, or elsewhere in Ukraine where Russian forces have regularly killed civilians, the images would have been splashed across the Internet, earning worldwide attention and prompting fierce--and justified--outrage. Instead, the day after the attack, November 29, 2018, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) issued a press release that was met with almost universal silence.
"In coordination with the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA), U.S. Africa Command conducted a precision airstrike near Al Awaynat, Libya, November 29, 2018, killing eleven (11) al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorists and destroying three (3) vehicles," it read. "At this time, we assess no civilians were injured or killed in this strike." Photos of the aftermath of the attack, posted on Twitter that same day, have been retweeted less than 30 times in the last three and a half years.
Ever since then, Abdullah and his Tuareg community in Ubari have been insisting to anyone who would listen that Nasser and the others riding in those vehicles were civilians. And not just civilians, but GNA veterans who had fought terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and even, alongside the United States two years earlier, the Islamic State in the city of Sirte. For more than three years now, despite public protests and pleas to the Libyan government for an impartial investigation, the inhabitants of Ubari have been ignored. "Before the strike, we trusted AFRICOM. We believed that they worked for the Libyan people," Abdullah told me. "Now, they have no credibility. Now, we know that they kill innocent people."
Hellfire in Libya
Earlier this month, Abdullah, along with a spokesperson for his ethnic Tuareg community and representatives of three nongovernmental organizations--the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights, Italy's Rete Italiana Pace e Disarmo, and Reprieve, a human rights advocacy group--filed a criminal complaint against Colonel Gianluca Chiriatti, the former Italian commander at the U.S. air base in Sigonella, Italy, from which that American drone took off. They were seeking accountability for his role in the killing of Nasser and those other 10 men. The complainants requested that the public prosecutor's office in Siracusa, where the base is located, prosecute Colonel Chiriatti and other Italian officials involved in that air strike for the crime of murder.
"The drone attack of 29 November 2018 where 11 innocent people lost their lives in Libya is part of the broader U.S. program of extrajudicial killings. This program is based on a notion of pre-emptive self-defense that does not meet the canons of international law, as the use of lethal attacks of this nature is only legitimate where the state is acting to defend itself against an imminent threat to life. In this circumstance, the victims posed no threat," reads the criminal complaint. "In light of this premise, the drone attack on Al Awaynat on 29 November 2018 stands in frontal contrast to the discipline, Italian and international, regarding the use of lethal force in the context of law enforcement operations."
For the last two decades, the United States has been conducting an undeclared war across much of the globe, employing proxy forces from Africa to Asia, deploying commandos from the Philippines to the West African nation of Burkina Faso, and conducting air strikes not only in Libya, but in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. Over those years, the U.S. military has taken pains to normalize the use of drone warfare outside established war zones while relying on allies around the world (as at that Italian base in Siracusa) to help conduct its global war.
"Clearly, a drone operation employing lethal force is not routine," said Chantal Meloni, legal advisor at the European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights. "While AFRICOM is directly responsible, the Italian commander must have known about and approved the operation and can therefore be criminally responsible as an accomplice for having allowed the unlawful lethal attack."
That November 2018 drone attack in Libya was anything but a one-off strike. During just six months in 2011, alone, U.S. MQ-1 Predator drones flying from Sigonella conducted 241 air strikes in Libya during Operation Unified Protector--the NATO air campaign against then-Libyan autocrat Muammar Gaddafi--according to retired Lt. Col. Gary Peppers, the former commander of the 324th Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron. The unit was responsible, he told The Intercept in 2018, for "over 20 percent of the total of all Hellfire [missiles] expended in the 14 years of the system's deployment."
The U.S. air war in Libya accelerated in 2016 with Operation Odyssey Lightning. That summer, the Libyan Government of National Accord requested American help in dislodging Islamic State fighters from Sirte. The Obama administration designated the city an "area of active hostilities," loosening guidelines designed to prevent civilian casualties. Between August and December of that year, according to an AFRICOM press release, the U.S. carried out in Sirte alone "495 precision airstrikes against Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices, heavy guns, tanks, command and control centers, and fighting positions."
The Shores of Tripoli
Those military strikes were nothing new. The United States has been conducting attacks in Libya since before there even was a Libya--and almost a United States. In his first address to Congress in 1801, President Thomas Jefferson spoke of coastal kingdoms in North Africa, including the "least considerable of the Barbary States," Tripoli (now, the capital of modern Libya). His refusal to pay additional tribute to the rulers of those kingdoms in order to stop their state-sponsored privateers from seizing American sailors and cargo kicked off the Barbary Wars. In 1804, Lieutenant Stephen Decatur led a daring nighttime mission, boarding a captured U.S. ship, killing its Tripolitan defenders, and destroying it. And an attack the next year by nine Marines and a host of allied mercenaries on the North African city of Derna ensured that "the shores of Tripoli" would have prime placement in the Marine Corps hymn.
Libya has also been a long-time proving ground for new forms of air war. In November 1911--107 years to the month before that drone attack killed Nasser Musa Abdullah--Italian Lieutenant Giulio Gavotti conducted the world's first modern airstrike. "Today I have decided to try to throw bombs from the aeroplane," he wrote in a letter to his father, while deployed in Libya to fight forces loyal to the Ottoman Empire. "I take the bomb with my right hand, pull off the security tag and throw the bomb out, avoiding the wing."
Gavotti not only pioneered the idea of launching air raids on troops far from the traditional front lines of a war, but also the targeting of civilian infrastructure when he bombed an oasis that served as a social and economic center. As Thomas Hippler put it in his book Governing from the Skies, Gavotti introduced aerial attacks on "hybrid target[s]" that "indifferently mingled civilian and military objectives."
More than a century later, in 2016, Operation Odyssey Lightning again made Libya ground zero for the testing of new air-war concepts--in this case, urban combat involving multiple drones working in combination with local troops and U.S. Special Operations forces. As one of the drone pilots involved was quoted as saying in an Air Force news release: "Some of the tactics were created and some of the persistent attack capabilities that hadn't been used widely before were developed because of this operation."
According to Colonel Case Cunningham, commander of the 432nd Expeditionary Wing at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada--the headquarters of the Air Force's drone operations--about 70% of the MQ-9 Reaper drone strikes conducted during Odyssey Lightning were close-air-support missions backing up local Libyan forces engaged in street-to-street combat. The drones, he reported, often worked in tandem with one another, as well as with Marine Corps attack helicopters and jets, helping guide the airstrikes of those conventional aircraft.
"The Deaths of Thousands of Civilians"
Despite hundreds of attacks in support of the Libyan Government of National Accord, the employment of U.S. proxies in counterterrorism missions, combat by American commandos, and more than $850 million in U.S. assistance since 2011, Libya remains one of the most fragile states on earth. Earlier this year, President Biden renewed its "national emergency" status (first invoked by President Barack Obama in 2011). "Civil conflict in Libya will continue until Libyans resolve their political divisions and foreign military intervention ends," wrote Biden, failing to mention the U.S. "foreign military intervention" there, including that November 2018 airstrike. "The situation in Libya continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States."
In early 2021, the Biden administration imposed limits on drone strikes and commando raids outside of conventional war zones, while launching a review of all such missions, and began writing a new "playbook" to govern counterterrorism operations. More than a year later, the results, or lack thereof, have yet to be made public. In January, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin directed subordinates to draw up a "Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Plan" within 90 days. That, too, has yet to be released.
Until the Defense Department overhauls its airstrike policies, civilians will continue to die in attacks. "The U.S. military has a systemic targeting problem that will continue to cost civilians their lives," said Marc Garlasco, formerly the Pentagon's chief of high-value targeting--in charge, that is, of the effort to kill Iraqi autocrat Saddam Hussein in 2003--and now, the military adviser for PAX, a Dutch civilian protection organization. "Civilian deaths are not discrete events; they are symptoms of larger problems such as a lack of proper investigations, a faulty collateral-damage estimation methodology, overreliance on intelligence without considering open-source data, and a policy that does not recognize the presumption of civilian status."
Such "larger problems" have been revealed again and again. Last March, for example, the Yemen-based group Mwatana for Human Rights released a report examining 12 U.S. attacks in Yemen, 10 of them airstrikes, between January 2017 and January 2019. Its researchers found that at least 38 Yemeni noncombatants had been killed and seven others injured in those attacks.
A June 2021 Pentagon report on civilian casualties did acknowledge one of those incidents, the death of a civilian in al-Bayda, Yemen, on January 22, 2019. Mwatana's investigation determined that the attack killed Saleh Ahmed Mohamed al Qaisi, a 67-year-old farmer who locals said had no terrorist affiliations. The U.S. had previously acknowledged four to 12 civilian deaths in a raid by Navy SEALs on January 29, 2017, also chronicled by Mwatana (though it reported a higher death toll). As for the remaining allegations, Central Command, which oversees U.S. military operations in the Middle East, told Mwatana in an April 2021 letter that it was "confident that each airstrike hit its intended Al Qaeda targets and nothing else."
Rigorous investigative reporting by the New York Times on the last U.S. drone strike of the Afghan War in August 2021 forced an admission from the Pentagon. What General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had originally deemed a "righteous strike" had actually killed 10 civilians, seven of them children. A subsequent Times investigation revealed that a 2019 U.S. airstrike in Baghuz, Syria, had killed up to 64 noncombatants, a toll previously obscured through a multilayered cover-up. The Times followed that up with an investigation of 1,300 reports of civilian casualties in Iraq and Syria, demonstrating, wrote reporter Azmat Khan, that the American air war in those countries was "marked by deeply flawed intelligence, rushed and often imprecise targeting, and the deaths of thousands of civilians, many of them children, a sharp contrast to the American government's image of war waged by all-seeing drones and precision bombs."
Since the Sirte campaign ended in late 2016, U.S. attacks in Libya have slowed considerably. AFRICOM conducted seven declared airstrikes there in 2017, six in 2018, four in 2019, and none since. But the U.S. military has made little effort to reevaluate past strikes and the civilian casualties they caused, including the November 2018 attack that killed Nasser Musa Abdullah. "U.S. Africa Command followed the civilian casualty assessment process in place at the time and determined that the reports were unsubstantiated," said AFRICOM spokesperson Kelly Cahalan. Despite the criminal complaint filed on April 1st, the command is not reexamining the case. "There is nothing new or different regarding the Nov 30, 2018 airstrike," Cahalan told me by email.
Africa Command has clearly moved on, but Abdullah can't. Memories of his brother and those charred bodies are irrevocably lodged in his mind but get caught in his throat. "I was in shock," he told me when discussing the phone call that preceeded his dash across the desert. "I'm so sorry, but I can't explain in words what I felt."
Abdullah was similarly stuck when he attempted to describe the grisly scene that greeted him hours later. He was eloquent in speaking about the justice he seeks and how being branded a "terrorist" robbed his brother and their community of dignity. But of his final memory of Nasser, there is simply nothing that can be said, not by him anyway. "What I saw was so terrible," he told me, his voice rising, ragged and loaded with pain. "I can't even describe it."
A new analysis published Tuesday by the Costs of War Project details how the power of U.S. presidents to greenlight military activities has grown since the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force was first enacted, demonstrating why simply repealing the measure now won't be enough to end so-called "counterterrorism operations" across the globe.
"The AUMF... is the beginning of the story, not the end."
Drawing on Congressional Research Service data updated through August 6, the report documents where and how the 2001 AUMF has been used--and also highlights how counterterrorism operations have taken place in dozens of additional nations without the aid of the law that launched the so-called "War on Terror" just one week after the September 11, 2001 attacks.
"In light of our previous research showing how widespread U.S. counterterrorism activities are globally, this analysis shows where the 2001 AUMF has been used and when and where counterterrorism operations have happened outside the umbrella of the AUMF," report author Stephanie Savell, co-director of the Costs of War Project at Brown University's Watson Institute, said in a statement.
"There are several cases of combat and airstrikes since 2001 that various presidents have not reported to Congress," added Savell.
Earlier this year, Savell found that the U.S. engaged in counterterrorism activities--which range from airstrikes to "training" foreign troops to full-blown occupations--in a whopping 85 countries from 2018 to 2020 alone.

Over the course of two decades, however, former Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, as well as current President Joe Biden, have collectively cited the 2001 AUMF to justify counterterrorism operations in 22 countries.
Notably, the precise number of military activities that have occurred within those 22 countries is "unknown" because "in many cases the executive branch inadequately described the full scope of U.S. actions," wrote Savell.
Furthermore, "much of the executive branch's reporting lacks geographic specificity," she pointed out. "The 2001 AUMF has often been used to justify operations in regions rather than countries."

The report notes that under the 2001 AUMF, which remains in effect today, "Congress relinquished its constitutionally assigned war powers in the fight against 'terrorism,' ceding to the president its responsibility to decide whether, when, and where the United States chooses war."
"There are a large number of U.S. counterterrorism operations, occurring under different legal umbrellas, which makes it difficult to track these activities."
Although the president is required by the 1973 War Powers Resolution to inform Congress within 48 hours whenever U.S. troops are involved in "hostilities" or "imminent hostilities," Savell wrote that "the executive branch has consistently used vague language to describe the locations of operations, failed to accurately describe the full scope of activities in many places, and in some cases simply failed to report on counterterrorism hostilities."
The White House has failed to invoke the 2001 AUMF in multiple instances where evidence of hostilities--including U.S. airstrikes and involvement in combat--are evident, the new report shows, revealing the extent to which such nefarious activities are being carried out under other forms of legal authority that have emerged during the War on Terror.
"There are a large number of U.S. counterterrorism operations, occurring under different legal umbrellas, which makes it difficult to track these activities and assure that there is adequate congressional oversight," said Savell.
The report takes a specific look at operations in Mail and Tunisia, where "the U.S. has conducted airstrikes and/or been involved in combat with militants, but the executive branch has not reported on these actions to Congress and failed to cite the 2001 AUMF." Instead, U.S. military involvement there has been authorized under 127(e) programs.
Savell explained:
Mali and Tunisia, along with other countries, are locations of authorized 127(e) programs. The executive branch has consistently failed to report on the introduction of U.S. service members into imminent hostilities in countries with active programs under 127(e), a U.S. legal authority that allows special operations forces to plan and control missions, remaining in charge of rather than at the side of the African counterparts they are ostensibly advising and assisting. In other words, rather than U.S. forces assisting these foreign military units with their own counterterror objectives, U.S. service members use them as surrogates: they lead these units, determine their goals, and participate in their raids against people they suspect of terrorist activity. Unofficially, U.S. officials have admitted that 'If you're deployed under this combating terrorism authority, 127(e), that's probably combat.'"
In addition to Mali and Tunisia, investigative journalists have also documented 127(e) programs in Cameroon, Kenya, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and Mauritania. Of these, Mauritania, like Mali and Tunisia, has never been cited in reference to the 2001 AUMF. While it is unclear when the 127(e) program began in Mauritania, that country has since ended its partnership in the program, which was "longstanding." According to retired Brig. Gen. Donald Bolduc, commander of numerous U.S. special operations forces in Africa through June 2017, "The host country has to understand what they signed up for, and Mauritania was never comfortable with what they signed up for. It just didn't fit how they saw themselves, giving up authority over one of their units."
Even when the executive branch reported on "support for counterterrorism (CT) operations," Savell pointed out, there were several cases in which the president "did not acknowledge that troops were or could be involved in hostilities with militants."
For example, in Niger in 2017, four U.S. service members were killed in an ambush as they attempted to carry out a raid on a militant compound, but President Trump cited the AUMF only after this incident came to light. Another example is the citation of "support" for CT operations in Kenya but failure to acknowledge a combat incident in January 2020, when Al Shabaab militants attacked a U.S. military base in Manda Bay and killed three Americans, including one Army soldier and two Pentagon contractors. U.S. forces engaged in counterfire and killed five Al Shabaab attackers
"Some experts have argued that the executive branch's failure to adequately warn Congress that the U.S. could be 'sliding towards conflict in a number of African countries' is a failure of the executive branch to comply with the War Powers Resolution," Savell added.
"Repealing the 2001 AUMF, as arduous and necessary a political task as that is, will not be enough to kill the War on Terror."
Journalist Spencer Ackerman, who first reported on the new Costs of War analysis, wrote Tuesday that "one of the legacies of the ongoing War on Terror is it that it provided the U.S. military with its first enduring footprint on the African continent."
"As an aside," he added, drawing attention to countries in and beyond Africa, "look at the commencement dates of those operations in Chad, Kenya, Lebanon, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, and the Philippines and remember the bullshit that MAGA is trying to sell you about Donald Trump not starting any new wars."
Praising the new report, Ackerman wrote that critical "observers have long understood the AUMF as an open-ended grant of lethal, carceral, surveillance, and other military authorities stemming from 9/11. It functions as an Emergency Law, and the U.S. immediately understands such things when, say, Egypt undertakes them."
"But the AUMF, Savell's research underscores, is the beginning of the story, not the end," Ackerman stressed. "For the War on Terror has lasted sufficiently long for the AUMF to have bastard children."
According to Savell, other authorities that presidents have cited to justify military operations include Joint Combined Exchange Trainings, 127(e), Article II of the U.S. Constitution, the 2002 AUMF, and Section 1202.

In the words of Ackerman, "Savell's research reminds us how little we will know about what unfolds after the AUMF blesses a conflict, when it blesses a conflict at all."
Furthermore, he added, the new analysis "underscores that repealing the 2001 AUMF, as arduous and necessary a political task as that is, will not be enough to kill the War on Terror."