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banking system
The Fed Can Give States and Cities Money Power to Fund Essential Social Programs
Just as it offers credit to banks at policy-dictated interest rates, the Fed can create credit facilities for states and cities at a policy rate that will further its mandate of price stability and maximum employment.
Jun 22, 2025
In the face of President Donald Trump’s efforts to reduce the size of the federal government and the slashing of the federal budget, states, cities, and universities can target the Federal Reserve to demand access to 0% lines of credit.
Here are the central talking points of this article:
- States and cities are not helpless. The money for what we need is there if we demand it.
- The money is there for banks and corporations; it’s time we make it available for us.
- Jerome Powell doesn’t need to go along with Trump and create a recession. He can give us the same money power he gives banks to prevent an economic disaster.
- In 2020, the Fed opened up the money power to states and cities. We need them to do it again, before it’s too late.
States, cities, and universities are facing a potentially catastrophic level of austerity from Republicans in Congress and the White House. The massive budget cuts to healthcare, education, transit, and any discretionary program related to “equity” (alongside tax cuts and deregulation) would intensely constrain the possibilities for expanding social services and benefits for workers at the local level.
The federal government is the legal authority of the U.S. monetary system and faces different constraints on its power to mobilize resources than states, cities, and universities do. While the former brings money into existence through spending and “deletes” money through taxation, the latter do not have access to this “money power” and must tax and borrow in order to spend. The dollars created through federal spending can be called “government money.”
However, the federal government is not the only entity with the money power. Banks create money through loans. When a borrower gets a mortgage, for example, a deposit is created that introduces new dollars into the system, and repayment of the loan “deletes” that money out of circulation. Banks are delegated access to the money power from their legal charter, which grants them rights and responsibilities with the Federal Reserve, federal deposit insurance, and other regulations. The dollars created through bank lending can be called “bank money,” which makes up more than 95% of money in circulation.
States, cities, and universities fiscal policy exists downstream from government money and bank money. Their lack of access to money power is a fundamental political problem by design. The federal government retaining the sole power to create government money keeps states and cities subordinate to Washington as a power center; the Federal Reserve granting access only to privately owned banks means our society prioritizes private wealth accumulation first above social needs. As Congress and the president push to stop the flow of new government money, states and cities can use this as an opportunity to refocus on bank money and the discrepancy between giving private banks the money power instead of the public.
The Federal Reserve can resolve this unjust dynamic by opening up the money power to states, cities, and universities directly. Just as it offers credit to banks at policy-dictated interest rates, the Fed can create credit facilities for states and cities at a policy rate that will further its mandate of price stability and maximum employment. Toward that end, the best default interest rate would be permanently at 0%.
The Fed did open credit access to states and cities during the Covid-19 pandemic via the Municipal Liquidity Facility (MLF). However, they set a policy rate at a premium to the prevailing interest rate on offer by the municipal securities market. This backstop facility stabilized the municipal debt market in the immediate wake of lockdowns and their economic impacts but was only used by the state of Illinois and New York City’s Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA). While the MLF was created using the Fed’s “emergency powers” under section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, analysts such as Nathan Tankus affirm that ongoing credit lines to states and cities are plainly legal under the Fed’s normal statutory authority.
The upshot of an unlimited 0% line of credit from the Fed would be a profound expansion of the potential fiscal space for states, cities, and universities. In economic downturns, they would be able to “monetize” similarly to the federal government: expand public spending to lower unemployment and increase economic activity, while increasing taxes and fees to pay back the 0% loan over time. They would also save a significant amount on the interest paid to bondholders and debt servicing costs. This is why in 2021, the Philadelphia City Council unanimously passed a resolution calling on the Fed to do just this proposal, which states and cities could build upon today.
It is important to note that this would not be the same unrestricted capacity for mobilizing resources as the federal government. While an unrestricted 0% line of credit would be the ideal, the practical negotiation around implementation would be around constraints to address “moral hazard” concerns, which may include restrictions on the budget priorities or decisions made by states and cities. But just as with the Payroll Protection Program, which was a forgivable loan program provided to businesses during the Covid-19 pandemic, or as proposed by proponents of student debt cancellation, loans to states and cities could be de facto converted into grants through cancellation as needed. Over the long term, a public bank would be the ideal coordinating mechanism for a state, city, or university interfacing with the Federal Reserve, rather than their comptroller or treasurer’s office.
The economic crisis created by the Trump administration’s policies will likely initiate a next wave of “disaster capitalism,” gutting public services and outsourcing jobs to the private sector (and “AI”). The Fed has a duty to act to prevent the price instability and unemployment rise we can anticipate from this willful negligence and malice. It will only do so if the public recognizes the money power where it exists and makes clear that we will not accept inaction in the face of economic catastrophe.
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Will Crypto’s Roaring 20s Lead to a Second Great Depression?
Crypto “bros” invested big-time in 2024’s presidential and congressional campaigns and want unrestricted access to the global banking system. What could possibly go wrong?
Jan 28, 2025
Life in the United States has never been better—if your personal fortune stretches well into the thousands of millions.
Our new year has dawned with 813 Americans cavorting in billionaire land. These deep pockets ended 2024, notes an Institute for Policy Studies analysis, with a combined wealth over $6.7 trillion. They averaged over $8.2 billion each.
Need some perspective on that $8.2 billion? The typical American worker, according to the latest U.S. Bureau of Labor stats, would have to work over 136,000 years to earn that much.
Growing linkages between crypto and the more traditional economy have expanded the economic peril.
Billionaires, of course, don’t have to actually do any labor to collect their billions. They just let their money do the heavy lifting.
That money, if invested in enterprises that provide us with useful goods and services, can add real value to an economy. But these days our billionaires and their billions don’t have to produce anything of value to climb up the wealth ladder. They can make big bucks manufacturing—at a heavy environmental cost—a product that has no real-life value whatsoever.
Welcome to the world of cryptocurrency.
Crypto emerged amid the turmoil of the Great Recession, an economic catastrophe that began late in 2007 with the bursting of a housing bubble that U.S. financial institutions had pumped up with subprime mortgages and assorted other exotic financing schemes.
Crypto’s early aficionados, notes the British economist Michael Roberts, claimed that cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin would eliminate “the need for financial intermediaries like banks.” Cryptocurrencies existed only electronically, as elaborate computer code that takes huge amounts of energy to “mine.” No government guarantees backed their value, and no crypto champs sought those guarantees.
Within this frame, crypto values spent a dozen years bouncing mostly upward. By mid-2024, the crypto world had turned into a speculative colossus worth some $2.5 trillion. But crypto’s biggest players were doing little celebrating. The industry seemed to be losing its big-time momentum.
Just two years before, a spectacular crypto crash had cost the sector’s founders and investors a combined $116 billion. By the end of 2023, some 20 nations had banned banks from dealing with crypto exchanges, and critics were blasting the crypto industry for pumping ever more fossil fuels into the atmosphere “to solve complex mathematical problems that have no productive purpose.”
Early in 2024, Pew Research polling found the American public exceedingly “skeptical” about cryptocurrency, with almost two-thirds of the nation’s adults having little to no confidence that cryptocurrencies rated as either reliable or safe. Only 19% of Americans who had actually invested in crypto, Pew found, deemed themselves “confident” with the industry’s “reliability and safety.”
Last June, one of the nation’s most influential financial market analysts, Securities and Exchange Commission chair Gary Gensler, gave cause for even more public unease. In congressional testimony, Gensler described the crypto market as a “Wild West” that has investors putting “hard-earned assets at risk in a highly speculative asset class.”
“Many of those investments,” Gensler added, “have disappeared after a crypto platform or service went under due to fraud or mismanagement, leaving investors in line at bankruptcy court.”
In the battle for public opinion, crypto kings realized, they were losing. Their response? Crypto’s big guns moved to lock down as much political help they could buy. They spent last year flooding millions upon millions of dollars into primary and general election races against lawmakers who had dared to support meaningful moves to regulate crypto’s digital highways and byways.
“It’s time to take our country back,” roared one deep-pocketed crypto mover-and-shaker, Tyler Winklevoss. “It’s time for the crypto army to send a message to Washington. That attacking us is political suicide.”
In no time at all, the Lever’s Freddy Brewster notes, this new crypto offensive had lawmakers in Congress, from both sides of the aisle, signaling their openness to minimizing any serious attempts at crypto regulation. The November elections would go on to generate a substantial crypto-friendly majority in the House and a Senate almost as crypto-committed.
Helping to produce this smashing crypto triumph: over $250 million in campaign contributions from the three top cryptocurrency political action committees.
No one would ultimately jump on the 2024 crypto political bandwagon more dramatically than Donald Trump. Up until then, the former president had been a pronounced crypto skeptic.
“I am not a fan of Bitcoin and other Cryptocurrencies, which are not money, and whose value is highly volatile and based on thin air,” Trump announced on social media in 2019. “Unregulated Crypto Assets can facilitate unlawful behavior, including drug trade and other illegal activity.”
But Trump would eventually come to see the potential in crypto campaign dollars and turn himself into the political world’s most visible crypto booster. In May 2024, Trump became the first major presidential candidate to accept donations in cryptocurrency. In July, he gave a fawning keynote address at one of the crypto world’s premiere annual conferences.
Trump saw something else in crypto as well. The industry, he ever so accurately perceived, could turbocharge his own personal wealth, to levels far outpacing his old-school investments in office towers and classic hotels—and all without engaging in any sort of real risk.
So Trump did that crypto engaging. By Inauguration Day, thanks to the release of his own “red-hot” crypto token, Trump had more than 90% of his personal net worth in crypto assets.
To protect that investment, Trump will undoubtedly put his signature on legislation—first introduced by Wyoming Republican Sen. Cynthia Lummis—designed to force the federal government to buy up a national stockpile of cryptocurrency as a reserve just like the gold in Fort Knox. Getting crypto reserve status, cheers billionaire MicroStrategy executive chair Michael Saylor, would rank as a truly noble 21st-century “Louisiana Purchase.”
But independent analysts see “no discernible logic” to any move in that direction.
“I get why the crypto investor would love it,” observes Mark Zandi, the chief economist at Moody’s Analytics. “Other than the crypto investor, I don’t see the value, particularly if taxpayers have to ante up.”
Turning crypto into a reserve currency, explain other analysts, would “prop up” cryptocurrency prices. Reserve status, note Wall Street on Parade editors Pam and Russ Martens, would enable crypto billionaires to sell their crypto “without driving down” cryptocurrency prices—because these billionaires would have “a perpetual buyer on the other side of their trade.”
Having the government buy up crypto, as Dean Baker at the Center for Economic and Policy Research recently told The Nation, has “literally no rationale other than to give money to Trump and Musk and their crypto buddies.”
Not surprisingly, conventional financial institutions—outfits ranging from Goldman Sachs and Citigroup to BlackRock and other big asset manager funds—would like to share in that money harvest. They’ve all begun entering the crypto “fray,” points out the economist Ramaa Vasudevan, and institutional investors “are also banging at the door.”
Crypto, adds Vasudevan, is “turning on a spigot of financial fortune-hunting.”
That sort of hunting, historically, has almost always ended in crashes that left average people the hardest hit. In our new crypto age, that could easily happen again.
The various crypto crashes we’ve seen over recent years, as the Lever’s Freddy Brewster noted last month, have “mostly affected” people already invested in cryptocurrencies. But the growing linkages between crypto and the more traditional economy have expanded the economic peril.
“Potential victims of future crashes,” Brewster warns, “could balloon if the nascent industry is allowed to become more entrenched with traditional banks.”
And that entrenching is approaching overdrive.
“Crypto bros are heading into 2025 with great expectations,” notes Bloomberg columnist Andy Mukherjee.
These “bros” invested big-time in 2024’s presidential and congressional campaigns. Now they want, Mukherjee adds, “unhindered access to the global banking system.”
What could possibly go wrong?
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How to Bust the Bankers’ Club
C. J. Polychroniou speaks with progressive economist Gerald Epstein about why alternative banking is possible and urgently needed.
Feb 29, 2024
It’s been almost a year since the banking crisis kicked off last March. On Friday, March 10, 2023, Silicon Valley Bank, or SVB, a state-chartered commercial bank based in Santa Clara, California, collapsed after facing a sudden bank run and capital crisis. SVB’s collapse was the second largest bank failure in U.S. history since Washington Mutual in 2008. Two days later, New York-based Signature Bank also collapsed due to yet another bank run. But that was not the end of bank failures in 2023. On May 1, the San Francisco-based First Republic Bank, plagued by many of the same problems as those that doomed SVB and Signature Bank, also went under and was seized in turn by regulators who promptly sold all of its deposits and most assets to JP Morgan Chase. Two more banks would go on to declare insolvency later in the year, bringing the number of failed banks to a total of five.
Indeed, 2023 was the worst year for U.S. banks since 2008. But why do U.S. banks continue to fail after the reforms that were implemented in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis? Why does the business model of commercial banks remain so fragile? World renowned progressive economist Gerald Epstein, author of the recently published book
Busting the Bankers’ Club: Finance for the Rest of Us, tackles these questions in the interview that follows. Epstein is professor of economics and co-director of the Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) at the University of Massachusetts Amherst.
C. J. Polychroniou: Jerry, in your new book Busting the Bankers’ Club, you describe the business model of commercial banks in the age of neoliberalism as “roaring banking” and you juxtapose it with that of “boring banking,” which prevailed from the New Deal era right through the Reagan era. Under “boring banking,” banks were prohibited from many of today’s financial engineering practices and financial shenanigans. The result was relative financial stability and economic growth. Obviously, bankers hated this business model, but what factors made possible the transition from “boring banking” to “roaring banking?” Was it simply because of the “logic” of the free-enterprise system at work, or did it happen because of actual intervention in the realm of policymaking?
Gerald Epstein: Like much historical change, the evolution from “boring banking” to “roaring banking” was the outcome of the underlying dynamics and pressures of the economic system and specific historical conjunctures, all with plenty of involvement of actual human beings and classes.
The major Wall Street bankers were never happy with the New Deal financial regulatory rules that made it harder for them to charge excessively high interest rates, make highly leveraged bets, or engineer fraudulent Ponzi or “pump and dump” frauds against customers. The numbers on Wall Street bankers’ incomes show why. As The Bankers’ Club reports, prior to 1929, bankers scarfed down incomes almost twice as high as the average wage in the economy; but after the Depression and up until the late 1970s, their incomes were about average for the whole economy. As my colleague James Crotty put it, these bankers wanted to break out of their New Deal cages to restore their superior incomes and power.
So, starting in the 1960s the major Wall Street banks organized “the Bankers’ Club,” an army of politicians, lawyers, economists, regulators, and fellow business associates to incrementally poke holes, then ditches and finally massive canals through the wall of New Deal financial regulations. According to Robert Weissman, now president of Public Citizen, these financial firms spent over $5 billion, just counting from the early 80s, on the club and its activities. This effort led, most famously, to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 under the Clinton administration, which then officially ended the separation of commercial from investment banking.
The Bankers’ Club had a different idea: Tear down the New Deal model and usher in a new era in banking, the “roaring banking” system of mega financial institutions and high-risk banking strategies.
These efforts, carried out by real (mostly) men, were aided by underlying dynamic changes in the U.S. and world economies. The U.S. experienced phenomenal economic growth in the aftermath of World War II, and the world also witnessed the resurrection of the European and Asian economies. In due time, competition facing the U.S. in trade and finance intensified, leading to the demise of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and relatively stable interest rates. Massive military spending by the U.S. government on the war in Vietnam from 1964 to 1973 combined with the effects of the geopolitics of energy driven by the formation of OPEC led in the 1970s to large increases in commodity prices and inflation, again putting upward pressure on interest rates to keep up with inflation. Then-Fed Chair Paul Volcker jacked up interest rates in an attempt to break the inflationary pressure, once again destabilizing the interest rate structure in banking. All of these forces put enormous pressure on the New Deal framework, partly because the system depended on relatively stable interest rates. The New Deal model chose to stabilize interest rates in order to try to stabilize bank profits and promote borrowing and investment in non-speculative activities.
Thus, something had to give. In principle, the government could have reformed the system. But the Bankers’ Club had a different idea: Tear down the New Deal model and usher in a new era in banking, the “roaring banking” system of mega financial institutions and high-risk banking strategies.
CJP: The neoliberal era is replete with financial crises and bank failures. In 2008, the world experienced the worst economic disaster since the Great Depression because of a financial crisis that originated in the U.S. There was a sharp decline in economic activity which led to a loss of more than $2 trillion from the global economy while millions of people lost their homes and unemployment skyrocketed. Yet, the regulations that followed in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis were essentially cosmetic, as evidenced by the collapse of five major banks in 2023. What were the reasons that SVB, Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank failed, especially since the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System insisted at the time that the banking system was “sound and resilient”?
GE: It is good that you bring up the collapse of SVB and the failures of Signature Bank and First Republic, since we are about to reach the one-year anniversary of these important events which occurred in early March 2023.
The Dodd-Frank Act, signed into law by then-President Barack Obama in 2010, was supposed to bring about the end of the “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) banks and government bailouts. But a year ago when these banks got into trouble, the turmoil threatened to spread panic into the broader U.S. financial markets, signaling a possible series of bank runs in It’s a Wonderful Life style throughout the system. The Dodd-Frank Act had tried to forestall these types of events by making larger banks (those with assets of at least $50 billion) be subject to more careful monitoring by the Federal Reserve, requiring them to hold more capital of their own so that they could withstand larger shocks, and have greater liquidity (cash or cash-like assets) in order to help forestall bank runs. But during the Trump administration, these “medium-sized banks” lobbied to be exempt from the tougher rules. A major player in the fight was Silicon Valley Bank.
The Fed was still acting as chairman of the Bankers’ Club rather than steward of the public interest.
But on March 10, 2023, after a major bank run hit Silicon Valley Bank, it was forced to close. The Fed did not bail out the bank’s executives, but guaranteed the deposits of its remaining depositors even when these were far above the $250,000 amount covered by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insurance. When contagion spread to other banks in the U.S., the Fed guaranteed all deposits, no matter how big.
In April, the Federal Reserve published a major exercise of “self-crit” in its handling of SVB, prior to and after the crisis. It’s pretty accurate assessment included the following four problems:
- SVB’s board of directors and management failed to manage their risks.
- Federal Reserve supervisors did not understand SVB’s vulnerabilities.
- When the Fed supervisors did understand risks, they did not take sufficient steps to prevent a crisis.
- The Fed should not have allowed SVB to fly under the radar even though Congress had raised the threshold bank size in order to strictly monitor and regulate banks.
Though accurate as far as they go, these criticisms miss a crucial point: These are essentially the same problems that allowed bigger banks to instigate the Great Financial Crisis in 2008-2009. The Fed itself had done much to block more fundamental reforms during the Dodd-Frank negotiations and afterward as the rules were finalized. And the Fed under Jerome Powell supported the weakening of rules for the medium-sized banks.
In other words, the Fed was still acting as chairman of the Bankers’ Club rather than steward of the public interest. This, the Fed’s post-mortem would not admit.
CJP: Speaking of the Federal Reserve, in your book you do label it as the “chairman” of the Bankers’ Club. Briefly explain what you mean by that, and does the Fed actually have any input in regulatory reforms proposed by lawmakers?
GE: The Federal Reserve, the central bank of the United States, has two main functions. It is in charge of U.S. monetary policy, which includes trying to manage short-term interest rates and the overall supply of money and credit in the economy. And it also has a major role to play in regulating and supervising banks, including the mega banks or what I call the “roaring banks.” The Federal Reserve has been delegated these powers by the U.S. Congress, which, along with the president, establishes the mandates, or major goals, which the Federal Reserve is supposed to try to achieve. The question of the Fed’s mandates or goals has been a subject of long-term political fights in the United States, which explains why the Federal Reserve is a “contested terrain.” I say that the Fed is the “chairman” of the Bankers’ Club because history shows that, for most of the time, the big banks and the capitalist class at large win the contest for dominance of the Fed, both with respect to its monetary policy and regulatory policy. For example, after a long political battle, the Federal Reserve was given by Congress a dual mandate: to achieve high employment and stable prices (steady and low inflation). In addition, more recently, the Federal Reserve was given a mandate to maintain financial stability. But if one studies the Fed’s record, we find that when there is a conflict between keeping inflation very low (which finance normally prefers) and achieving full employment (which workers tend to prefer) the Fed almost always chooses low inflation. And when it comes to regulating banks tightly in order to maintain financial stability, or bailing them out after they get into trouble, the Fed has preferred to simply bail them out. More generally, the Fed offers significant favors to the banks, and in return expects the banks to protect its operations from the intrusive hands of Congress and the president.
To answer your question more directly, the Fed has a big influence on the regulations that Congress eventually passes, as one can see from the inordinate influence that Alan Greenspan had in the legislation to gut Glass-Steagall, and the inordinate role that Ben Bernanke and the Fed had in ensuring that Dodd-Frank regulations were riddled with loopholes.
CJP: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act has been treated as one of the most significant U.S. regulatory reforms since the Great Depression. But it does remain a highly flawed regulatory framework, and even plugging all the holes in it won’t do the job, you argue in your book. What are the strategic shortcomings of the Dodd-Frank approach to financial regulation?
GE: To identify the flaws in Dodd-Frank, one can start by identifying the causes of the major financial crises we have experienced as well as the rocks and hard places the regulators found themselves between in responding to these crises. These causes are:
- Financial institutions that were allowed to become too big to fail, to manage, to regulate, and to jail.
- Lack of accountability for bad actors who took on excessive risk, even engaged in fraudulent activities, and were left free after the crash to take the money and run and hit the restart button on their next gig.
- Insufficient limits on the debt that these financial institutions could take on and the interconnectedness they could create between themselves and other financial institutions so that when one financial institution got into trouble it could threaten to bring down others like a house of cards.
- Insufficient controls on the short-term financing of long-term or excessively risky financial investments.
- Leaving dark holes in the financial system, that is, institutions and markets that are subject to little or no monitoring, much less regulation. These include hedge funds, private equity firms, and others. Post-crisis problems often emerged from these dark corners of the financial markets.
- Lack of precaution in the implementation of new financial products, so that dangerous products could infect the financial system before sufficient controls could be fashioned.
- No quid pro quos for government support: for example, bailouts with no strings attached.
Dodd-Frank did not really address these problems, and the Trump administration weakened the Dodd-Frank rules even further. As such, these problems are still very much with us.
CJP: What measures do you propose for improving financial regulation, so we won’t have bank failures and severe recessions triggered by financial crises?
GE: At a minimum, we must address these “causes” of the problems that I identified above:
- Cut down the size of the mega banks. For example, implement a modern Glass-Steagall Act that would reduce the maximum size of these banks and separate core banking functions from riskier, more speculative ones.
- Make traders and CEOs responsible for the steps and missteps they take. For example, implement “clawbacks” so that the incomes they are promised to receive from trades or decisions are held in escrow and only paid out when the investment pays off, without the need for government support. These bankers also need stricter legal consequences for breaking the law, including jail time for egregious offenses.
- Strict capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements for all banks that have significance for the overall economy, including “medium-sized banks” on the order of Silicon Valley Bank.
- Comprehensive monitoring and regulation of all financial institutions, markets, and products; no dark holes in the financial system.
- A precautionary principle for new financial innovations, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) cryptocurrencies. Rules should ensure that these are safe and effective before they are allowed to be introduced into the core financial system. If anything, they should first be tested on the fringes where they cannot do significant harm.
- Support from the Federal Reserve or the U.S. Department of the Treasury in the case of a crisis should only be forthcoming as a last resort and should only come with strict strings (and quid pro quos) attached: Those responsible should be held accountable; the bank should have to change its business model to a safer form; the bank should engage in social services for the community, much like an individual legal offender, at least until it has paid back its bailout funds in full. A more reasonable quid pro quo is that the bank should always have to engage in more socially responsible behaviors simply by virtue of benefiting from this implicit insurance policy from the Federal Reserve or the U.S. government.
This last point touches on an important and more general issue. Financial regulation, at least since the New Deal, has been a negative screen: a list of things banks should NOT do. However, we have many crucial societal problems that the financial system should be taking a more proactive role to help solve. These include, for example, helping to build a green energy economy and ending our reliance on fossil fuels. Also, and this is equally important, contributing to the economic development of marginalized communities. Financial institutions that get government support—and that means ALL of them—should not only avoid crashing our economy but also contribute to our society’s important needs.
CJP: In Busting the Bankers’ Club, you advocate the establishment of banks without bankers because financial regulation alone will not be sufficient to address the plethora of problems (poverty, inequality, discrimination, climate change) facing the contemporary United States. How far can public banking go in addressing these problems, and how do we overcome the resistance of the political system to radical proposals that aim toward the making of a democratic economy?
GE: Yes. Private banks, no matter how regulated, or how incentivized to do socially useful activities, will not be sufficiently motivated to provide many of the key long-term social goods that we need: green energy, healthy communities for all, sufficient financial resources for the development of our rural areas. The reason is that these banks focus on maximizing profits in the short to medium term. Many of these other activities are socially profitable but might not be sufficiently privately profitable, at least in the short to medium term. As a result, we need more publicly oriented financial institutions, such as public banks that are dedicated to broader social goals.
There are activist groups in more than 20 states across the U.S. who are pushing for public banks of various kinds. The most successful ones so far are located in California, but New Jersey is also moving closer to establishing a public bank and there is a strong public bank campaign underway in Massachusetts.
The Federal Reserve should give the same level of support to public banking organizations as it has to private banks.
Still, there are several general obstacles to implementing an ecosystem of public banks adequate to face the problems we have. One is the intense opposition of the Bankers’ Club even though most of these public bank initiatives are structured to minimize competition with the private banks. For example, they do not take deposits; they do not lend directly to customers but rather to other banks who then lend to final customers, etc. Apparently, the Bankers’ Club simply does not want to legitimize any competitive sources of finance that could undercut their power.
Moreover, even if you add up all the public banking initiatives, they would still not be large enough or widespread enough to make a huge dent in the problems we are facing. What we need are national public banking institutions. For example, the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) created a small Green Development Bank that, with support, could grow and thrive. A more activist and socially oriented Federal Reserve could play an important role here. The Federal Reserve should give the same level of support to public banking organizations as it has to private banks. And it should broaden its tools to promote key social goals: For example, the Fed could buy Green Bonds. It has already bought asset backed securities to bailout the banks.
How do we overcome resistance from the Bankers’ Club and right-wingers to these kinds of reforms? Two things: Join the Club Busters, those activists who are trying to block the Bankers’ Club and promote more socially useful institutions; and protect democracy by helping to get money out of the financial system (eg. repeal
Citizen’s United), expand voting rights, and fight against fascism.
In the last chapter of my book, I suggest that we all bite off what we can chew. Look around and join others who are fighting one of more of these battles. Join them and pitch in. As our forces gather, we will have impacts that build on each other. If some of our initiatives get blocked, other initiatives will move forward.
There are many Club Busters around the country, and indeed the world. In the U.S. we have public banking organizations,
Americans for Financial Reform, Better Markets, Rainforest Action Network, and many others. Support politicians who fight for these issues, including Elizabeth Warren, Sherrod Brown, Jeff Merkley, and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.
There are plenty of places to join others and take a stand. That’s how we fight the Bankers’ Club.
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Senators Unveil Bipartisan SAFER Banking Act for Legal Marijuana Industry
Co-sponsors said it "will help make our communities and small businesses safer by giving legal cannabis businesses access to traditional financial institutions, including bank accounts and small business loans."
Sep 20, 2023
A bipartisan group of senators, including Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, on Wednesday unveiled a revised bill that aims to "ensure that all businesses—including state-sanctioned cannabis businesses—have access to deposit accounts, insurance, and other financial services."
The bill is now called the Secure and Fair Enforcement Regulation (SAFER) Banking Act, as a few journalists revealed late Tuesday.
In addition to Schumer (D-N.Y.), the legislation is led by Sens. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore), Steve Daines (R-Mt.), Kyrsten Sinema (I-Ariz.), Cynthia Lummis (R-Wy.), Kevin Cramer (R-N.D.), Cory Booker (D-N.J.), Dan Sullivan (R-Alaska), and Bob Menendez (D-N.J.). Merkley and Daines put out a previous version of the bill earlier this year.
"This legislation will help make our communities and small businesses safer by giving legal cannabis businesses access to traditional financial institutions, including bank accounts and small business loans," some of the co-sponsors said in a statement. "It also prevents federal bank regulators from ordering a bank or credit union to close an account based on reputational risk. We look forward to the markup of this bill in the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on September 27th."
Separately, Schumer, a supporter of legalization, said that "for too long, the federal government has continued to punish marijuana users and business owners—even when doing so is actively harmful to our country. This 'war on drugs' has turned into a war on people and communities—specifically people and communities of color—and a war on business."
"This agreement allows cannabis businesses that have traditionally operated in cash to finally have the opportunity to accept credit and debit cards, allowing them to grow their businesses, pay their employees, protect their customers, and ensure public safety," he continued. "I intend to bring the SAFER Banking Act to the Senate floor with all due speed."
The majority leader added that he is "committed to including" the Harnessing Opportunities by Pursuing Expungement (HOPE) Act and Gun Rights and Marijuana (GRAM) Act. The former would provide federal grants to help states with expunging cannabis offenses while the latter would end the ban of gun sales to cannabis users in states that allow medical or recreational use.
Marijuana Moment reported that "the newly released bill reveals the types of compromises senators made over recent weeks. Most of the new provisions are described under Section 10—a component of the reform that Republicans have strongly favored and certain Democrats opposed over concerns it could undermine broader banking regulations."
The legislation's introduction answers demands for federal action by drug policy reform groups and unions as well as banking, cannabis, and insurance trade associations. One joint letter sent to Congress on Tuesday argued that "it is a moral imperative" to pass some version of the bill this year, "in order to progress our country toward a safe environment for the workers, owners, customers, and other visitors of state-legal cannabis retail stores."
Medicinal use of marijuana is permitted by 38 states, three U.S. territories, and the District of Columbia, and recreational adult use is allowed in 23 states, two territories, and D.C., according to the National Conference of State Legislatures.
Cannabis not only remains illegal at the federal level but is a Schedule I drug, the most restricted category under the Controlled Substance Act. However, following a review requested by President Joe Biden, a Department of Health and Human Services official last month urged the Drug Enforcement Administration chief to reclassifying it as Schedule III.
While welcoming "the historic nature" of that move, Cat Packer at the Drug Policy Alliance stressed at the time that "rescheduling falls woefully short of President Biden's promise and the relief our communities need," and urged the administration to "actively work with Congress to pass comprehensive legislation such as the Cannabis Administration and Opportunity Act," which would federally decriminalize marijuana and begin to address decades of harm caused by criminalization.
The new Senate proposal was introduced as the Republican-controlled U.S. House Oversight and Accountability Committee on Wednesday voted 30-14 in favor of the bipartisan Cannabis Users' Restoration of Eligibility (CURE) Act, which would allow past marijuana users to serve as federal employees and qualify for security clearances.
NORML political director Morgan Fox said in a statement that "while it is disappointing that the committee did not see fit to stop federal agencies from discriminating against responsible adults and patients who are current consumers of cannabis, this legislation will nonetheless open up new opportunities to millions of Americans, increase the talent pool available to federal employers, and ultimately make our country safer."
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Challenging First Republic Bank Sale, Warren Says JPMorgan Chase Is Big Enough
"The single biggest threat to the U.S. banking system is more concentration," said the Massachusetts Democrat. "A bank as big as JPMorgan shouldn't be allowed to get even bigger."
May 18, 2023
U.S. Sen. Elizabeth Warren raised alarm about the recent sale of First Republic Bank to JPMorgan Chase—which followed a government takeover of the former—in a letter to financial regulators and a series of questions during a Thursday hearing.
"The failure of First Republic Bank shows how deregulation has made the too-big-to-fail problem even worse," the Massachusetts Democrat said after the controversial sale earlier this month. "Congress needs to make major reforms to fix a broken banking system."
Ahead of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs hearing, Warren wrote to two officials who appeared before the panel Thursday morning: Martin Gruenberg, chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and Michael Hsu, acting head of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
"The executives at First Republic—who took excessive risks and did not appropriately manage them as interest rates increased throughout 2022 and 2023—bear primary responsibility for this failure," Warren wrote in the letter, dated Wednesday. "I am continuing to seek answers from the bank's executives, and attempting to pass bipartisan legislation that would claw back their excessive compensation."
"But the outcome of this seizure and sale were deeply troubling: It resulted in a $13 billion cost to the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund—which will ultimately be passed on to ordinary bank consumers across the country—and made JPMorgan, the nation's biggest bank, even bigger," she added. "JPMorgan will also record a $2.6 billion gain from the deal."
Warren asked Gruenberg and Hsu to prepare to address the topic at the committee's hearing and also requested written responses to a series of questions by the end of the month.
"One set of questions involves the $13 billion loss to the Federal Deposit Insurance Fund, and why the fund was allowed to take this loss while the FDIC deal made nearly $50 billion worth of uninsured deposits at First Republic—including $30 billion in uninsured deposits from big banks—whole," she noted. "My second set of concerns involves the decision to choose JPMorgan—which was already the nation's largest bank—to acquire First Republic and become even bigger."
During the hearing, Warren explained that "when the FDIC sells a failed bank, the law requires that you choose the highest bidder that will result in the lowest cost to the Deposit Insurance Fund—but the law also requires signoff from the OCC, and the OCC's job, by law, is to consider whether the merger would pose 'risk to the stability of the United States banking or financial system.'"
The senator questioned Hsu about the decision to sell to JPMorgan versus PNC or Citizens Bank, given that selling to either of the latter would have posed less of a risk, based on one metric used by financial regulators that is notably influenced by bank size.
"Comptroller Hsu, your job, by law, is to determine risk to the system from making big banks even bigger, and you have a clear metric for doing that," Warren said. "So how do you explain approving a sale to a banking giant that increases the risk to the banking system by somewhere between nearly 800% and 1,400% more than selling to other bidders? Did you just ignore the fact that a failure at JPMorgan would blow a hole in our banking system... and let them grow by $200 billion?"
After insisting that "for every merger application we follow the law, we follow our guidelines, we follow our policies and procedures," Hsu said focusing only on the metric Warren cited would not have been "wise," and if that approach had been taken, "I fear that there would have been greater financial instability that weekend."
As her time expired, Warren—who was visibly frustrated by Hsu's lack of a broader explanation for choosing JPMorgan Chase—declared that "the single biggest threat to the U.S. banking system is concentration."
"We're all pushing harder for merger guidelines so that we don't get more concentration in the banking system," she told Hsu. "You are the one person who was supposed to use judgment on the question... 'Between multiple sales, which one was the right one to go with, and which one presented more risk to the banking system?'"
"According to your own metric, you chose the one that gives us more concentration in the system," the senator stressed. "I am very troubled by that decision."
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Rewarding Risk Drove First Republic to Failure
Risk was at the center of every financial upheaval since the 1980s. What can be done to keep history from repeating itself and threatening the banking system, economy, and jobs of everyday people?
May 02, 2023
First Republic Bank became the second-biggest bank failure in U.S. history after the lender was seized by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. and sold to JPMorgan Chase on May 1, 2023. First Republic is the latest victim of the panic that has roiled small and midsize banks since the failure of Silicon Valley Bank in March 2023.
The collapse of SVB and now First Republic underscores how the impact of risky decisions at one bank can quickly spread into the broader financial system. It should also provide the impetus for policymakers and regulators to address a systemic problem that has plagued the banking industry from the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s to the financial crisis of 2008 to the recent turmoil following SVB’s demise: incentive structures that encourage excessive risk-taking.
The Federal Reserve’s top regulator seems to agree. On April 28, the central bank’s vice chair for supervision delivered a stinging report on the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank, blaming its failures on its weak risk management, as well as supervisory missteps.
In each of the financial upheavals since the 1980s, the common denominator was risk.
We are professors of economics who study and teach the history of financial crises. In each of the financial upheavals since the 1980s, the common denominator was risk. Banks provided incentives that encouraged executives to take big risks to boost profits, with few consequences if their bets turned bad. In other words, all carrot and no stick.
One question we are grappling with now is what can be done to keep history from repeating itself and threatening the banking system, economy, and jobs of everyday people.
S&L Crisis Sets the Stage
The precursor to the banking crises of the 21st century was the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s.
The so-called S&L crisis, like the collapse of SVB, began in a rapidly changing interest rate environment. Savings and loan banks, also known as thrifts, provided home loans at attractive interest rates. When the Federal Reserve under Chairman Paul Volcker aggressively raised rates in the late 1970s to fight raging inflation, S&Ls were suddenly earning less on fixed-rate mortgages while having to pay higher interest to attract depositors. At one point, their losses topped US$100 billion.
S&L executives were often paid based on the size of their institutions’ assets, and they aggressively lent to commercial real estate projects, taking on riskier loans to grow their loan portfolios quickly.
To help the teetering banks, the federal government deregulated the thrift industry, allowing S&Ls to expand beyond home loans to commercial real estate. S&L executives were often paid based on the size of their institutions’ assets, and they aggressively lent to commercial real estate projects, taking on riskier loans to grow their loan portfolios quickly.
In the late 1980s, the commercial real estate boom turned bust. S&Ls, burdened by bad loans, failed in droves, requiring the federal government take over banks and delinquent commercial properties and sell the assets to recover money paid to insured depositors. Ultimately, the bailout cost taxpayers more than $100 billion.
Short-Term Incentives
The 2008 crisis is another obvious example of incentive structures that encourage risky strategies.
At all levels of mortgage financing–from Main Street lenders to Wall Street investment firms–executives prospered by taking excessive risks and passing them to someone else. Lenders passed mortgages made to people who could not afford them onto Wall Street firms, which in turn bundled those into securities to sell to investors. It all came crashing down when the housing bubble burst, followed by a wave of foreclosures.
Incentives rewarded short-term performance, and executives responded by taking bigger risks for immediate gains. At the Wall Street investment banks Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, profits grew as the firms bundled increasingly risky loans into mortgage-backed securities to sell, buy, and hold.
Incentives rewarded short-term performance, and executives responded by taking bigger risks for immediate gains.
As foreclosures spread, the value of these securities plummeted, and Bear Stearns collapsed in early 2008, providing the spark of the financial crisis. Lehman failed in September of that year, paralyzing the global financial system and plunging the U.S. economy into the worst recession since the Great Depression.
Executives at the banks, however, had already cashed in, and none were held accountable. Researchers at Harvard University estimated that top executive teams at Bear Stearns and Lehman pocketed a combined $2.4 billion in cash bonuses and stock sales from 2000 to 2008.
A Familiar Ring
That brings us back to Silicon Valley Bank.
Executives tied up the bank’s assets in long-term Treasury and mortgage-backed securities, failing to protect against rising interest rates that would undermine the value of these assets. The interest rate risk was particularly acute for SVB, since a large share of depositors were startups, whose finances depend on investors’ access to cheap money.
When the Fed began raising interest rates last year, SVB was doubly exposed. As startups’ fundraising slowed, they withdrew money, which required SVB to sell long-term holdings at a loss to cover the withdrawals. When the extent of SVB’s losses became known, depositors lost trust, spurring a run that ended with SVB’s collapse.
For executives, however, there was little downside in discounting or even ignoring the risk of rising rates.
For executives, however, there was little downside in discounting or even ignoring the risk of rising rates. The cash bonus of SVB CEO Greg Becker more than doubled to $3 million in 2021 from $1.4 million in 2017, lifting his total earnings to $10 million, up 60% from four years earlier. Becker also sold nearly $30 million in stock over the past two years, including some $3.6 million in the days leading up to his bank’s failure.
The impact of the failure was not contained to SVB. Share prices of many midsize banks tumbled. Another American bank, Signature, collapsed days after SVB did.
First Republic survived the initial panic in March after it was rescued by a consortium of major banks led by JPMorgan Chase, but the damage was already done. First Republic recently reported that depositors withdrew more than $100 billion in the six weeks following SVB’s collapse, and on May 1, the FDIC seized control of the bank and engineered a sale to JPMorgan Chase.
The crisis isn’t over yet. Banks had over $620 billion in unrealized losses at the end of 2022, largely due to rapidly rising interest rates.
The Big Picture
So, what’s to be done?
We believe the bipartisan bill recently filed in Congress, the Failed Bank Executives Clawback, would be a good start. In the event of a bank failure, the legislation would empower regulators to claw back compensation received by bank executives in the five-year period preceding the failure.
Clawbacks, however, kick in only after the fact. To prevent risky behavior, regulators could require executive compensation to prioritize long-term performance over short-term gains. And new rules could restrict the ability of bank executives to take the money and run, including requiring executives to hold substantial portions of their stock and options until they retire.
To prevent risky behavior, regulators could require executive compensation to prioritize long-term performance over short-term gains.
The Fed’s new report on what led to SVB’s failure points in this direction. The 102-page report recommends new limits on executive compensation, saying leaders “were not compensated to manage the bank’s risk,” as well as stronger stress-testing and higher liquidity requirements.
We believe these are also good steps, but probably not enough.
It comes down to this: Financial crises are less likely to happen if banks and bank executives consider the interest of the entire banking system, not just themselves, their institutions, and shareholders.
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Jamie Dimon Is Poised to Benefit Most From This Banking Crisis
Depositors in small and medium-sized banks are now fleeing to the safety of JPMorgan and other giant banks that have been deemed "too big to fail" because the government bailed them out in 2008.
Mar 18, 2023
Former Silicon Valley Bank CEO Greg Becker sold $3.6 million worth of shares on February 27, just days before the bank disclosed a large loss that triggered its stock slide and collapse. Over the previous two years, Becker sold nearly $30 million of stock.
But Becker won't rake in the most from this mess. Jamie Dimon, chair and CEO of JPMorgan Chase, the biggest Wall Street bank, will likely make much more.
That's because depositors in small and medium-sized banks are now fleeing to the safety of JPMorgan and other giant banks that have been deemed "too big to fail" because the government bailed them out in 2008.
Last Friday afternoon, the deputy Treasury secretary, Wally Adeyemo, met with Dimon at his office in New York. He asked Dimon whether the failure of Silicon Valley Bank could spread to other banks. "There's a potential," Dimon responded. Presumably, Dimon knew such contagion would mean vastly more business for JPMorgan. In a note to clients on Monday, bank analyst Mike Mayo wrote that JPMorgan in particular is "battle-tested" in volatile markets and "epitomizes" how the largest U.S. banks have shed risk since the 2008 financial crisis. "Recent industry developments should further its ability to gather core funding and act as a source of strength."
Recall that the 2008 financial crisis generated a gigantic shift of assets to the biggest Wall Street banks, with the result that JPMorgan and the other giants became far bigger. In the early 1990s, the five largest banks had accounted for only 12% of U.S. bank deposits. After the crisis, they accounted for nearly half.
After this week, they'll be even bigger.
Their giant size has already given them a huge but hidden federal subsidy estimated to be $83 billion annually—a premium that investors and depositors willingly pay to these enormous banks in the form of higher fees and lower returns, because they're too big to fail. Some of this hidden federal subsidy goes into the pockets of bank executives. Last year alone, Dimon earned $34.5 million. (Greg Becker is a piker by comparison.)
The 2008 financial crisis generated a gigantic shift of assets to the biggest Wall Street banks, with the result that JPMorgan and the other giants became far bigger. After this week, they'll be even bigger.
Jamie Dimon was at the helm in 2008 when JPMorgan received $25 billion from the federal government to help stem the financial crisis brought on largely by the careless and fraudulent lending practices of JPMorgan and other big banks. Dimon earned $20 million that year.
In March 2009, President Obama summoned Dimon and other top bank executives to the White House and warned them that "my administration is the only thing between you and the pitchforks." But Obama never publicly rebuked Dimon or the other big bankers. When asked about the generous pay Dimon and other Wall Street CEOs continued to rake in, Obama defended them as "very savvy businessmen" and said he didn't "begrudge peoples' success or wealth. That's part of the free market system."
What free market system? Taxpayers had just bailed out the banks, and the bank CEOs were still raking in fat paychecks. Yet 8.7 million Americans lost their jobs, causing the unemployment rate to soar to 10%. Total U.S. household net worth dropped by $11.1 trillion. Housing prices dropped by a third nationwide from their 2006 peak, causing some 10 million people to lose their homes.
Rather than defend those CEO paychecks, Obama might have demanded, as a condition of getting bailed out, that the banks help underwater homeowners on Main Street.
Another sensible proposal would have been to let bankruptcy judges restructure shaky home mortgages so that borrowers didn't owe as much and could remain in their homes. Yet the big banks, led by Dimon, opposed this. They thought they'd do better by squeezing as much as possible out of distressed homeowners, and then collecting as much as they could on foreclosed homes. In April 2008, Dimon and the banks succeeded: The Senate formally voted down a bill that would have allowed bankruptcy judges to modify mortgages to help financially distressed homeowners.
In the run-up to the 2020 election, Dimon warned against policies that Bernie Sanders and AOC were then advocating, including Medicare for All, paid sick leave, and free public higher education. Dimon said they amounted to "socialism." "Socialism," he wrote, "inevitably produces stagnation, corruption, and often worse—such as authoritarian government officials who often have an increasing ability to interfere with both the economy and individual lives—which they frequently do to maintain power," adding that socialism would be "a disaster for our country."
Dimon also warned against "over-regulation" of banking, cautioning that in the next financial crisis, big institutions like JPMorgan wouldn't be able to provide the lending they did during the last crisis. "When the next real downturn begins, banks will be constrained—both psychologically and by new regulations—from lending freely into the marketplace, as many of us did in 2008 and 2009. New regulations mean that banks will have to maintain more liquidity going into a downturn, be prepared for the impacts of even tougher stress tests, and hold more capital," he wrote.
But as was demonstrated again this past week, American capitalism needs strict guardrails. Otherwise, it is subject to periodic crises that summon bailouts. The result is socialism for the rich while everyone else is subject to harsh penalties: Bankers get bailed out, and the biggest banks and bankers do even better. Yet average people who cannot pay their mortgages lose their homes. Meanwhile, almost 30 million Americans still lack health insurance, most workers who lose their job aren't eligible for unemployment insurance, most have no paid sick leave, child labor is on the rise, and nearly 51 million households can't afford basic monthly expenses such as housing, food, child care, and transportation.
Is it any wonder that so many Americans see the system as rigged against them? Is it surprising that some of them become susceptible to dangerous snake-oil peddled by demagogues?
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Barney Frank Under Fire for Downplaying Deregulation While Being Paid by Signature Bank
After he had received more than $1 million as a Signature board member, the architect of the Dodd-Frank banking regulations minimized the risks of weakening rules he helped enact post-2008 financial crisis.
Mar 13, 2023
Barney Frank, a former House Democrat from Massachusetts, has been the subject of criticism since federal regulators took over Signature Bank on Sunday.
That's because Frank, architect of the Dodd-Frank banking regulations implemented in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, played a key role in whitewashing the bipartisan effort to weaken those rules in 2018—after he had received more than $1 million while serving on Signature's board following his departure from Congress.
Since federal regulators seized Signature's assets on Sunday—two days after they intervened to protect depositors amid the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB)—progressive critics have been quick to blame a deregulatory measure approved five years ago by the then-Republican-controlled Congress for engendering two of the three largest bank failures in U.S. history.
The GOP, however, wasn't alone in supporting Sen. Mike Crapo's (R-Idaho) Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act. As Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.), a trenchant critic of the legislation, observed when it was moving through Congress, several Democrats—including Sens. Mark Warner (Va.), Joe Manchin (W.Va.), and Jon Tester (Mont.)—were integral to its passage.
To justify their decision, many of them pointed to Frank. The originator of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act used his cachet as a presumed banking expert to legitimize a rollback of the very framework he helped enact in 2010 as chair of the House Financial Services Committee. But the ex-lawmaker wasn't merely an uninterested bystander. In 2015, he joined the board of directors at Signature, a crypto-friendly bank that was poised to benefit from less stringent oversight.
Frank said Crapo's Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act "would not help the biggest Wall Street banks and denied it would increase the risks of another financial crisis," The Washington Post reported when then-President Donald Trump signed the bill into law in May 2018. "Some Democrats leaned heavily on those words as they pushed back against the plan's liberal critics."
However, the newspaper noted, "proponents of the law rarely, if ever, mentioned that Frank is not just the author of the 2010 law, but also sits on the board of New York-based Signature Bank."
In the wake of Signature's collapse on Sunday night, Frank's role in downplaying the risks of deregulation—while being paid by a bank that stood to gain from it—has received fresh light.
As the Post reported in May 2018: "Dodd-Frank imposed additional regulatory safeguards on banks with more than $50 billion in assets, but the rollback that passed this week, among other things, raises that threshold to $250 billion. Signature Bank has more than $40 billion in assets and can now grow significantly without automatically facing additional regulation."
But the bank's growth over the past half-decade came to a screeching halt over the weekend when its customers, alarmed by the failure of SVB, quickly withdrew $10 billion.
"Frank acknowledged that Signature stood to benefit, but he said his role on the bank's board did not influence his thinking," the Post reported five years ago. "Frank said his position on the threshold predates his compensation from the financial sector."
As Politico reported on Monday, Frank disputes that Trump-era deregulation "had anything to do with" Signature's failure, even though it weakened oversight of "mid-size and regional banks like his own."
"I don't think that had any impact," Frank told the outlet. "They hadn't stopped examining banks."
Frank went so far as to tell CNBC that there was "no real objective reason" that Signature had to enter federal receivership.
"I think part of what happened was that regulators wanted to send a very strong anti-crypto message," Frank argued. "We became the poster boy because there was no insolvency based on the fundamentals."
Warren, by contrast, has focused her ire directly on the deregulatory moves minimized by Frank.
"Had Congress and the Federal Reserve not rolled back the stricter oversight, SVB and Signature would have been subject to stronger liquidity and capital requirements to withstand financial shocks," Warren wrote Monday in a New York Times opinion piece.
"They would have been required to conduct regular stress tests to expose their vulnerabilities and shore up their businesses," the lawmaker continued. "But because those requirements were repealed, when an old-fashioned bank run hit SVB, the bank couldn't withstand the pressure—and Signature's collapse was close behind."
"These bank failures were entirely avoidable if Congress and the Fed had done their jobs and kept strong banking regulations in place since 2018," she added. "SVB and Signature are gone, and now Washington must act quickly to prevent the next crisis."
Like Warren, Independent Sen. Bernie Sanders of Vermont has called for fully repealing "the disastrous 2018 bank deregulation law."
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Sanders Calls for Repeal of Trump-Era Deregulation Blamed for Bank Collapses
"We cannot continue down the road of more socialism for the rich and rugged individualism for everyone else," said the U.S. Senator from Vermont.
Mar 13, 2023
Sen. Bernie Sanders on Sunday night called for a full repeal of the 2018 banking deregulations signed into law by former President Donald Trump and declared that "now is not the time for taxpayers bail out Silicon Valley Bank"—the California bank that collapsed Friday.
On Sunday evening, the U.S. Treasury Department, Federal Reserve, and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) issued a joint statement outlining a plan to make all deposits for Silicon Valley Bank as well as Signature Bank, which was shuttered by New York regulators earlier in the day, available to costumers Monday morning.
In his statement, Sanders said, "If there is a bailout of Silicon Valley Bank, it must be 100 percent financed by Wall Street and large financial institutions. We cannot continue down the road of more socialism for the rich and rugged individualism for everyone else. Let us have the courage to stand up to Wall Street, repeal the disastrous 2018 bank deregulation law, break up too big to fail banks and address the needs of working families, not the risky bets of vulture capitalists."
The statement the Fed, Treasury, and FDIC noted that "no losses" associated with the rescue plan "will be borne by the taxpayer," though the extraordinary intervention—the largest of its kind since the 2008 financial collapse—is still seen by many economists and financial experts, even if bank investors and debt holders are not protected, as a "bailout" for the financial industry only made possible by taxpayers.
"Let us have the courage to stand up to Wall Street, repeal the disastrous 2018 bank deregulation law, break up too big to fail banks and address the needs of working families, not the risky bets of vulture capitalists."
Warren Gunnels, longtime staffer and top advisor to Sanders, made the connection between venture capitalists clamoring for a speedy government intervention to save the banking sector from a wider shock and the same kind of people who have adamantly opposed financial relief for the struggling middle- and working-class Americans:
As the Washington Post reports, "The decision by Treasury to backstop all deposits at SVB and Signature — not just those up to $250,000 that are insured under federal law — rested on a judgment that it was necessary to avoid a wider 'systemic' meltdown. The move will likely ignite a political firestorm over the decision to protect the assets of tech firms, venture capitalists, and other rich people in California."
In 2018, as Sen. Mike Crapo's (R-Idaho) Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act was making its way through Congress, Sanders took to the floor of the U.S. Senate to oppose the bill, warning of exactly this kind of economic disaster if the deregulation was approved:
"Let's be clear," Sanders said Sunday night in his statement. "The failure of Silicon Valley Bank is a direct result of an absurd 2018 bank deregulation bill signed by Donald Trump that I strongly opposed. Five years ago, the Republican Director of the Congressional Budget Office released a report finding that this legislation would 'increase the likelihood that a large financial firm with assets of between $100 billion and $250 billion would fail.'"
"Unfortunately," he added, "that is precisely what happened."
On Monday, Lindsey Owens, executive directive of the progressive economic watchdog Groundwork Collaborative, focused on the additional lending facility made available to the bank customers and said the latest actions expose a deep "rot" within the Federal Reserve—especially as the central bank squeezes workers with increasingly higher interest rates, hikes that played at least a part in the banks' failures.
"This weekend, the Federal Reserve moved mountains to protect wealthy venture capitalists from the fallout of its aggressive interest rate hikes," said Owens. " Today, the Fed will return to its core work of pushing hardworking Americans out on the street to meet its inflation goals."
Such a set of policies, said Owens, shows the Fed "is irreparably broken and can no longer be trusted to go it alone on monetary policy. As Congress works to re-regulate mid-size banks after the misguided 2018 rollbacks that set this weekend's crisis in motion, they should also address the rot at the Fed."
In a statement on Sunday ahead of the government's rescue plan announcement, Matt Stoller, research director for the American Economic Liberties Project, made the case against any taxpayer bailout for SVB.
"Silicon Valley Bank was a badly managed and corrupt institution that entangled itself with powerful actors in the technology industry," Stoller argued. "The operative question government regulators are now facing is whether to use taxpayer funds to bail out the depositors from the failures of SVB's management."
But a full bailout, Stoller warned, "will only encourage other large regional banks to take similar risks in the future, just as Silicon Valley Bank did."
While bank investors and executives will not be included in the emergency actions announced on Sunday, Rep. Ro Khanna, the California Democrat who represents Silicon Valley, applauded the actions taken by Treasury to keep depositors whole.
Among his constituents impacted by the bank's collapse, he said, were "non-profit leaders, small business owners, start-up founders, and impacted employees of small businesses."
While expressly arguing that government intervention "should not and need not ... cost taxpayers a dime" during a news interview Sunday morning, Khanna later applauded the government plan while echoing Sanders' call for a reversal of the deregulation that led to the current crisis.
"I am glad that the Department of Treasury listened and moved to protect workers, the innovation pipeline, and the economy at large," Khanna said. "But the work doesn't end here. We've known since 2008 that stronger regulations are needed to prevent exactly this type of crisis. Congress must come together to reverse the deregulation policies that were put in place under Trump to avert future instability.”
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