To Stop Failing in the Middle East, the US Must Consider the Needs of Arab People

One reason why US policy in the Middle East has been so problematic is because policymakers refuse to consider its impact on the needs of Arab people. With Israel, it’s a different story. Overattentiveness to Israeli concerns coupled with the lack of sensitivity to what Arabs think about our actions has led to deep fractures between Arabs and the US and within the Arab World.

Since 2000, we’ve conducted over 50 multination opinion polls on a variety of topics. We explored Arab attitudes toward other Arabs, the US, China, Russia, Iran, and Israel. We also examined attitudes toward conflicts in the region.

It’s been over two years since we’ve polled across the Arab World, but based on what we saw developing during our two and a half decades of work, it’s clear that US policies are headed toward disaster—not only for the US and its stated goals, but also, and more importantly, for the Arab people.

What follows are some observations based on the trend lines we have culled from our surveys:

• After 9/11, President George W. Bush famously claimed, “They hate us because they hate our values.” Our 2002 polling found the opposite: Arabs liked American people, products, education, and values, but strongly disliked US policies toward the Arab world—especially regarding Palestinians. As I said during a congressional hearing on my polling: “Arabs like us and our values—what they resent is that we don’t apply those values to them.”

Bush’s Iraq war and neglect of Palestinians further lowered US ratings. They rose with President Barack Obama’s promise of change but fell when he didn’t deliver on them. Attitudes further plummeted with President Donald Trump’s pro-Israel, anti-Muslim policies.

By late 2023, our last multination poll showed President Joe Biden’s support for Israel’s war on Gaza generating even stronger negatives. To make matters worse, the complications created by President Trump’s US-Israel attacks on Iran, coupled with his assault on the very aspects of America that were respected worldwide—our universities, press freedom, and immigration policy—make it likely that Arabs are now finding it difficult to even like American values.

• Over the years, we have often polled on favorable and unfavorable attitudes toward China and the US. During this time, while opinions toward the US ebbed and flowed, attitudes toward China remained steady. By the end of 2023, for the first time, China’s ratings were competitive with those of the US in areas that had previously been the US’s strong suits—education and doing business. And in several Arab countries, China was seen as a more reliable partner than the US.

• Arab attitudes toward Iran have followed a consistent pattern. When Iran was perceived to be under attack for resisting the US and the West, it found a strong base of support among many Arabs. But when Iran directly meddled in Arab countries, opinion turned against it. And when its ally Hezbollah turned its weapons against its domestic Lebanese opponents and joined Iran in direct involvement in Syria’s civil war, majorities in most Arab countries turned against Iran.

Following this trajectory, one can reasonably assume that the US-Israel attacks on Iran coupled with Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and Syria, and Israel’s boasts of becoming the regional power that was “defending Western civilization against barbarism,” won Iran some sympathy in Arab public opinion. The same might be true for the recent US-Israel attacks on Iran, except that instead of seeking Arab support, Iran deliberately attacked its Arab Gulf neighbors—the very countries that had been trying to restore relationships with the meddlesome Islamic Republic. This, no doubt, turned opinion among many in the Gulf against Iran. It is uncertain, however, how much intra-Arab friction this is causing in the rest of Arab world.

• Support for Palestinians has long been a central Arab concern. They showed little interest in making peace with Israel—even in those countries that had signed peace agreements with Israel. As Israeli repression of Palestinians intensified and the fractured and visionless Palestinian leadership failed to inspire, Arab opinion began to change. In late 2019, we asked Arabs if they felt it would be desirable to make peace with Israel, even if Israel didn’t accept the terms of the Arab Peace Initiative. When significant numbers said that it might be desirable, we asked why. The responses varied but many told us that it might help end the violence and give Arabs more leverage to convince Israel to grant Palestinian rights.

We repeated this question at the end of September 2023 and had completed about half of the questionnaires by October 7, the date of the Hamas attack. We interrupted the survey and only went back a few weeks later to complete it. The changes in the results were significant. Before October 7, responses were similar to the 2019 poll, but by the end of October, in reaction to the intensity of Israel’s assault on Gaza, attitudes shifted dramatically against any attempt to deal with Israel. Three years later, one can reasonably assume this hasn’t changed.

In 2024 and 2025, on three occasions, we polled in the Occupied Lands. Results were disturbing. Israeli policy had worked to discredit the Palestinian Authority, weakening its ability to govern. Opinion in the West Bank had turned against the PA, with respondents saying they preferred Hamas. In Gaza, we found that Hamas had fallen into deep disfavor, with a strong plurality of Gazans preferring the PA. In both the West Bank and Gaza there was little support for US, Israeli, or international governance. They preferred Palestinian unity.

Meanwhile, Israel continues to lay waste to Gaza and is running roughshod over the West Bank and East Jerusalem, further angering Palestinians and discrediting the PA. All the while Israel rejects any role for the PA in Gaza. As the situation further unravels, the US ignores Palestinians’ wishes and turns a blind eye to Israeli misdeeds.

• In Lebanon, when Hezbollah was seen as resisting Israel, it found favor among many Lebanese, especially since Israel frequently bombed Lebanon and occupied a swatch of its land from the late 1970s to 2000. However, when in 2008, Hezbollah turned its weapons against the state and in 2019 against the popular revolt, Lebanese opinion divided along sectarian lines. Our polling before 2023 showed that most Lebanese wanted Hezbollah disarmed or under the control of the Lebanese army. But Israel’s recent devastating assault on Lebanon; its bombing throughout the country; its forced expulsion of 1 million Lebanese from the south; its destruction of homes, farmlands, and entire villages; and explicit intention to annex a large portion of the country has no doubt restored some support for Hezbollah and exacerbated internal sectarian tensions, while turning more Lebanese against Israel and the US.

Seen in this light, US efforts to pressure the Lebanese government to forcibly disarm Hezbollah and make a peace agreement with Israel is dangerous for Lebanon’s stability.

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In each instance, it is America’s lack of attentiveness to Arab sensitivities and needs that contributes to making a bad situation even worse—further embittering Arabs toward the US, deepening fissures within the Arab World, while fostering every-expanding Israeli impunity.