Warmonger: Bush in His Own Words

Why
should George W. Bush have been "angry" to learn in late 2007 of the "high-confidence"
unanimous judgment of all 16 U.S. intelligence agencies that Iran had stopped
working on a nuclear weapon four years earlier? Seems to me he might have said
"Hot Dog!" rather than curse under his breath.

Nowhere
in his memoir, Decision Points, is Bush's
bizarre relationship with truth so manifest as when he describes his dismay at
learning that the intelligence community had redeemed itself for its lies about
Iraq by preparing an honest National Intelligence Estimate on Iran. As the Bush-book makes abundantly
clear, that NIE rammed an iron rod through the wheels of the juggernaut rolling
toward war.

Nowhere
is Bush's abiding conviction clearer, now as then, that his role as "decider"
include the option to create his own reality.

The
Fawning Corporate Media (FCM) has missed that part of the book. And hundreds of
Dallas "sheriffs," assembled to ensure decorum at the Bush library
groundbreaking last week, kept us hoi polloi
well out of presidential earshot.

But
someone should ask Bush why he was not relieved, rather than angered, to learn
from U.S. intelligence that Iran had had no active nuclear weapons program
since 2003. And would someone dare ask why Bush thought Israel should have been
"furious with the United States over the NIE?"

It
seems likely that Bush actually dictated this part of the book himself.
For, in setting down his reaction to the NIE on Iran, he unwittingly confirmed
an insight that Dr. Justin Frank, M.D., who teaches psychiatry at George
Washington University Hospital, gave us veteran intelligence officers into how
Bush comes at reality - or doesn't.

"His
pathology is a patchwork of false beliefs and incomplete information woven into
what he asserts is the whole truth... He lies - not just to us, but to himself
as well... What makes lying so easy for Bush is his contempt - for language,
for law, and for anybody who dares question him.... So his words mean nothing.
That is very important for people to understand." [See Consortiumnews.com's "Dangers of a Cornered Bush."]

Not Enough Sycophants

When
the NIE on Iran came out in late 2007, Bush may have pined for his
sycophant-in-chief, former CIA Director George Tenet and his co-conspirator
deputy, John McLaughlin, who had shepherded the bogus Iraq-WMD analysis through
the process in 2002 but had resigned in 2004 when their role in the deceptions
became so obvious that it shamed even them.

Tenet
and his CIA cronies had been expert at preparing estimates-to-go - to go to
war, that is. They had proved themselves worthy rivals of the other CIA, the
Culinary Institute of America, in cooking intelligence to the White House menu.

On
Iraq, they had distinguished themselves by their willingness to conjure up
"intelligence" that Senate Intelligence Committee chair Jay Rockefeller
described as "uncorroborated, unconfirmed, and nonexistent," after a five-year
review by his panel. (That finding was no news to any attentive observer,
despite Herculean - and largely successful - efforts by the FCM to promote
drinking the White House Kool-Aid.)

What
is surprising in the case of Iran is the candor with which George W. Bush
explains his chagrin at learning of the unanimous judgment of the intelligence
community that Iran had not been working on a nuclear weapon since late 2003. [There
is even new doubt about reports that the Iranians were working on a nuclear
warhead before 2003. See Consortiumnews.com's "Iranian Nuke Documents
May Be Fake."]

The
Estimate's findings were certainly not what the Israelis and their neoconservative
allies in Washington had been telling the White House - and not what President
Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were dutifully proclaiming to the rest of
us.

Shocked at Honesty

Bush
lets it all hang out in Decision Points. He
complains bitterly that the NIE "tied my hands on the military side." He notes
that the Estimate opened with this "eye-popping" finding of the intelligence
community:

"We judge
with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons
program."

The
former president adds, "The NIE's conclusion was so stunning that I felt it
would immediately leak to the press." He writes that he authorized
declassification of the key findings "so that we could shape the news stories
with the facts." Facts?

The
mind boggles at the thought that Bush actually thought the White House, even
with de rigueur help from an
ever-obliging FCM, could put a positive spin on intelligence conclusions that
let a meretricious cat out of the bag-that showed that the Bush
administration's case for war against Iran was as flimsy as its bogus case for
invading Iraq.

How
painful it was to watch the contortions the hapless Stephen Hadley, national
security adviser at the time, went through in trying to square that circle. His
task was the more difficult since, unlike the experience with the dishonestly
edited/declassified version of what some refer to as the Whore of Babylon - the
Oct. 1, 2002 NIE on WMD in Iraq, this time the managers of the Estimate made
sure that the declassified version of the key judgments presented a faithful
rendering of the main points in the classified Estimate.

A
disappointed Bush writes, "The backlash was immediate. [Iranian President
Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad hailed the NIE as a 'great victory.'" Bush's apparent
"logic" here is to use the widespread disdain for Ahmadinejad to discredit the
NIE through association, i.e. whatever Ahmadinejad praises must be false.

But
can you blame Bush for his chagrin? Alas, the NIE had knocked out the props
from under the anti-Iran propaganda machine, imported duty-free from Israel and
tuned up by neoconservatives here at home.

How
embarrassing. Here before the world were the key judgments of an NIE, the most
authoritative genre of intelligence analysis, unanimously approved "with high
confidence" by16 agencies and signed by the Director of National Intelligence,
saying, in effect, that Bush and Cheney were lying about the "Iranian nuclear
threat."

It
is inconceivable that as the drafting of the Estimate on Iran proceeded during
2007, the intelligence community would have kept the White House in the dark
about the emerging tenor of its conclusions. And yet, just a month before the
Estimate was issued, Bush was claiming that the threat from Iran could lead to
"World War III."

The Russians More Honest?

Ironically,
Russian President Vladimir Putin, unencumbered by special pleading and faux
intelligence, had come to the same conclusions as the NIE.

Putin
told French President Nicolas Sarkozy in early October 2007:

"We don't
have information showing that Iran is striving to produce nuclear weapons.
That's why we're proceeding on the basis that Iran does not have such plans."

In
a mocking tone, Putin asked what evidence the U.S. and France had for asserting
that Iran intends to make nuclear weapons. And, adding insult to injury, during
a visit to Tehran on Oct. 16, 2007, Putin warned: "Not only should we reject
the use of force, but also the mention of force as a possibility."

This
brought an interesting outburst by President Bush the next day at a press conference,
a bizarre reaction complete with his famously tortured syntax:

Q. "Mr.
President, I'd like to follow on Mr.--on President Putin's visit to Tehran ...
about the words that Vladimir Putin said there. He issued a stern warning
against potential U.S. military action against Tehran. ...Were you disappointed
with [Putin's] message?"

Bush: "I --
as I say, I look forward to -- if those are, in fact, his comments, I look
forward to having him clarify those ... And so I will visit with him about it."

Q. "But you definitively
believe Iran wants to build a nuclear weapon?"

Bush: "I
think so long -- until they suspend and/or make it clear that they -- that
their statements aren't real, yes, I believe they want to have the capacity,
the knowledge, in order to make a nuclear weapon. And I know it's in the
world's interest to prevent them from doing so. I believe that the Iranian --
if Iran had a nuclear weapon, it would be a dangerous threat to world peace.

"But this is
-- we got a leader in Iran who has announced that he wants to destroy Israel.
So I've told people that if you're interested in avoiding world war III, it
seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them from have the
knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon. I take the threat of Iran with a nuclear
weapon very seriously, and we'll continue to work with all nations about the
seriousness of this threat."

Can't Handle the Truth

In
his memoir, Bush laments: "I don't know why the NIE was written the way it was.
... Whatever the explanation, the NIE had a big impact - and not a good one." Spelling
out how the Estimate had tied his hands "on the military side," Bush included
this (apparently unedited) kicker:

"But after
the NIE, how could I possible explain using the military to destroy the nuclear
facilities of a country the intelligence community said had no active nuclear
weapons program?"

Thankfully,
not even Dick Cheney could persuade Bush to repair the juggernaut and let it
loose for war on Iran. The avuncular Vice President has made it clear that he
was very disappointed in his protege. On Aug. 30, 2009, he told "Fox News
Sunday" that he was isolated among Bush advisers in his enthusiasm for war with
Iran.

"I was
probably a bigger advocate of military action than any of my colleagues,"
Cheney said when asked whether the Bush administration should have launched a
pre-emptive attack on Iran before leaving office.

Bush
briefed Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert before the NIE was released. Bush
later said publicly that he did not agree with his own intelligence agencies.
[For more on the Bush memoir's conflicts with the truth, see
Consortiumnews.com's "George
W. Bush: Dupe or Deceiver?"]

And
it is entirely possible that the Iran-war juggernaut would have been repaired
and turned loose anyway, were it not for strong opposition by the top military
brass who convinced Bush that Cheney, his neocon friends and Olmert had no idea
of the chaos that war with Iran would unleash.

There's
lots of evidence that this is precisely what Joint Chiefs Chairman Mike Mullen
and then-CENTCOM commander Adm. William Fallon told Bush, in no uncertain
terms. And it is a safe bet that these two were among those hinting broadly to
Bush that the NIE was likely to "leak," if he did not himself make its key
judgments public.

Whew!

What About Now

The
good news is that Cheney is gone and that Adm. Mullen is still around.

The
bad news is that Adm. Fallon was sacked for making it explicitly clear that, "We're
not going to do Iran on my watch," and there are few flag officers with
Fallon's guts and honesty. Moreover, President Barack Obama continues to show
himself to be an invertebrate vis-a-vis Israel and its neocon disciples.

Meanwhile,
a draft NIE update on Iran's nuclear program, completed earlier this year, is
dead in its tracks, apparently because anti-Iran hawks inside the Obama
administration are afraid it will leak. It is said to repeat pretty much the same
conclusions as the NIE from 2007.

There
are other ominous signs. The new Director of National Intelligence, retired Air
Force Lt. Gen. James Clapper, is a subscriber to the Tenet school of
malleability. It was Clapper whom former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld put
in charge of imagery analysis to ensure that no one would cast serious doubt on
all those neocon and Iraqi "defector" reports of WMD in Iraq.

And,
when no WMD caches were found, it was Clapper who blithely suggested, without a
shred of good evidence, that Saddam Hussein had sent them to Syria. This was a
theory also being pushed by neocons both to deflect criticism of their false
assurances about WMD in Iraq and to open a new military front against another
Israeli nemesis, Syria.

In
these circumstances, there may be some value in keeping the NIE update bottled
up. At least that way, Clapper and other malleable managers won't have the
chance to play chef to another "cooked-to-order" analysis.

On
the other hand, the neocons and our invertebrate President may well decide to order
Clapper to "fix" the updated Estimate to fit in better with a policy of confrontation
toward Iran. In that case, the new
Director of National Intelligence might want to think twice. For Clapper could
come a cropper. How?

The
experience of 2007 showed that there are still some honest intelligence
analysts around with integrity and guts-and with a strong aversion to managers
who prostitute their work. This time
around, such truth-tellers could opt for speedy, anonymous ways of getting the
truth out-like, say, WikiLeaks.