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How the U.S. handles the Pakistani
arrest of the top Afghan Taliban military commander, and the
aftermath of the U.S. military assault in Marja, may have a decisive
impact on whether we get to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan soon,
or in the far-off future. Some analysts -- like Gareth Porter --
think the key motivation of the present U.S. military escalation is
political in the bad sense: in order to negotiate with the Afghan
Taliban, first the U.S. has to "show that nobody pushes us around,"
just as President Bush had to escalate militarily in Iraq before he
could cut deals with the Sunni Awakening and the Mahdi Army militia.
It's a grim world in which the most powerful country kills people to
look tough; but right now, the way to minimize human suffering is for
the U.S. to take advantage of recent "successes" to take a high road
towards going home.
The arrest of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar could cut two ways, the
New York Times notes.
While it's obviously a psychological blow, at the least, against the
Afghan Taliban, it could complicate efforts to reach a peace deal:
the Pakistani move could come at the expense of the Afghan
government of Hamid Karzai and complicate reconciliation efforts his
government has begun. An American intelligence official in Europe
conceded as much, while also acknowledging Mullah Baradar's key role
in the reconciliation process. "I know that our people had been in
touch with people around him and were negotiating with him," the
official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was
not authorized to discuss the issue. "So it doesn't make sense why we
bite the hand that is feeding us," the official added. "And now the
Taliban will have no reason to negotiate with us; they will not
believe anything we will offer or say."
But the deed is done. The U.S. government has different parts, and
they don't always sing from the same hymnal. That, who reads the news
knows; other governments are the same way. By handling this arrest
well, the U.S. could still make it a turning point towards
reconciliation in Afghanistan.
First, the U.S. must guarantee that Mullah Baradar is not mistreated
in detention. If folks in the Afghan Taliban find out that Mullah
Baradar has been mistreated -- and you can be sure that they would find
out -- it would be a huge setback to political efforts to end the war.
Second, the political people in the U.S. government -- and here I mean
the word in its best sense, the people devoted to solving problems
through politics, as opposed to the people focused on killing people,
"enhanced interrogation techniques," and blowing things up -- must
demand access to Mullah Baradar for political dialogue. What Baradar
knows about the politics of the Afghan Taliban is more important than
what he knows about its logistics. Bandar has been regarded as the
person in the Afghan Taliban leadership most amenable to negotiations;
he was the person anyone went to when they needed to negotiate
anything with the Afghan Taliban. So, more than any person alive, he
has insight on how to negotiate a resolution of the conflict.
The idea that a prisoner could play a key role in ending or reducing
violent conflict might seem counterintuitive, but there are plenty of
recent precedents, including in Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine,
and Turkish Kurdistan.
For Mullah Baradar to play such a role will require a credible
political process to address the issues feeding Afghanistan's
longstanding civil war. That would include a willingess by the United
States to talk about ending night raids and arbitrary detentions,
freeing prisoners, a timetable for withdrawal of foreign military
forces, reform of the Afghan constitution, and integration of
disaffected Pashtun communities into the political process, not only
as individuals, but also as groups.
They taught us in school that President Lincoln delayed issuing the
Emancipation Proclamation until he had a military victory that he
could do it in the wake of, so he would not look weak. Let Baradar's
capture provide that victory for Obama. Let's not carry on another 18
months of killing to look tough; let the past demonstrations of force
suffice. Let Obama call now for a political process to end the war in
Afghanistan, so Afghans can be freed from the curse of war, and so our
troops can come home.
Dear Common Dreams reader, It’s been nearly 30 years since I co-founded Common Dreams with my late wife, Lina Newhouser. We had the radical notion that journalism should serve the public good, not corporate profits. It was clear to us from the outset what it would take to build such a project. No paid advertisements. No corporate sponsors. No millionaire publisher telling us what to think or do. Many people said we wouldn't last a year, but we proved those doubters wrong. Together with a tremendous team of journalists and dedicated staff, we built an independent media outlet free from the constraints of profits and corporate control. Our mission has always been simple: To inform. To inspire. To ignite change for the common good. Building Common Dreams was not easy. Our survival was never guaranteed. When you take on the most powerful forces—Wall Street greed, fossil fuel industry destruction, Big Tech lobbyists, and uber-rich oligarchs who have spent billions upon billions rigging the economy and democracy in their favor—the only bulwark you have is supporters who believe in your work. But here’s the urgent message from me today. It's never been this bad out there. And it's never been this hard to keep us going. At the very moment Common Dreams is most needed, the threats we face are intensifying. We need your support now more than ever. We don't accept corporate advertising and never will. We don't have a paywall because we don't think people should be blocked from critical news based on their ability to pay. Everything we do is funded by the donations of readers like you. When everyone does the little they can afford, we are strong. But if that support retreats or dries up, so do we. Will you donate now to make sure Common Dreams not only survives but thrives? —Craig Brown, Co-founder |
How the U.S. handles the Pakistani
arrest of the top Afghan Taliban military commander, and the
aftermath of the U.S. military assault in Marja, may have a decisive
impact on whether we get to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan soon,
or in the far-off future. Some analysts -- like Gareth Porter --
think the key motivation of the present U.S. military escalation is
political in the bad sense: in order to negotiate with the Afghan
Taliban, first the U.S. has to "show that nobody pushes us around,"
just as President Bush had to escalate militarily in Iraq before he
could cut deals with the Sunni Awakening and the Mahdi Army militia.
It's a grim world in which the most powerful country kills people to
look tough; but right now, the way to minimize human suffering is for
the U.S. to take advantage of recent "successes" to take a high road
towards going home.
The arrest of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar could cut two ways, the
New York Times notes.
While it's obviously a psychological blow, at the least, against the
Afghan Taliban, it could complicate efforts to reach a peace deal:
the Pakistani move could come at the expense of the Afghan
government of Hamid Karzai and complicate reconciliation efforts his
government has begun. An American intelligence official in Europe
conceded as much, while also acknowledging Mullah Baradar's key role
in the reconciliation process. "I know that our people had been in
touch with people around him and were negotiating with him," the
official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was
not authorized to discuss the issue. "So it doesn't make sense why we
bite the hand that is feeding us," the official added. "And now the
Taliban will have no reason to negotiate with us; they will not
believe anything we will offer or say."
But the deed is done. The U.S. government has different parts, and
they don't always sing from the same hymnal. That, who reads the news
knows; other governments are the same way. By handling this arrest
well, the U.S. could still make it a turning point towards
reconciliation in Afghanistan.
First, the U.S. must guarantee that Mullah Baradar is not mistreated
in detention. If folks in the Afghan Taliban find out that Mullah
Baradar has been mistreated -- and you can be sure that they would find
out -- it would be a huge setback to political efforts to end the war.
Second, the political people in the U.S. government -- and here I mean
the word in its best sense, the people devoted to solving problems
through politics, as opposed to the people focused on killing people,
"enhanced interrogation techniques," and blowing things up -- must
demand access to Mullah Baradar for political dialogue. What Baradar
knows about the politics of the Afghan Taliban is more important than
what he knows about its logistics. Bandar has been regarded as the
person in the Afghan Taliban leadership most amenable to negotiations;
he was the person anyone went to when they needed to negotiate
anything with the Afghan Taliban. So, more than any person alive, he
has insight on how to negotiate a resolution of the conflict.
The idea that a prisoner could play a key role in ending or reducing
violent conflict might seem counterintuitive, but there are plenty of
recent precedents, including in Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine,
and Turkish Kurdistan.
For Mullah Baradar to play such a role will require a credible
political process to address the issues feeding Afghanistan's
longstanding civil war. That would include a willingess by the United
States to talk about ending night raids and arbitrary detentions,
freeing prisoners, a timetable for withdrawal of foreign military
forces, reform of the Afghan constitution, and integration of
disaffected Pashtun communities into the political process, not only
as individuals, but also as groups.
They taught us in school that President Lincoln delayed issuing the
Emancipation Proclamation until he had a military victory that he
could do it in the wake of, so he would not look weak. Let Baradar's
capture provide that victory for Obama. Let's not carry on another 18
months of killing to look tough; let the past demonstrations of force
suffice. Let Obama call now for a political process to end the war in
Afghanistan, so Afghans can be freed from the curse of war, and so our
troops can come home.
How the U.S. handles the Pakistani
arrest of the top Afghan Taliban military commander, and the
aftermath of the U.S. military assault in Marja, may have a decisive
impact on whether we get to withdraw our troops from Afghanistan soon,
or in the far-off future. Some analysts -- like Gareth Porter --
think the key motivation of the present U.S. military escalation is
political in the bad sense: in order to negotiate with the Afghan
Taliban, first the U.S. has to "show that nobody pushes us around,"
just as President Bush had to escalate militarily in Iraq before he
could cut deals with the Sunni Awakening and the Mahdi Army militia.
It's a grim world in which the most powerful country kills people to
look tough; but right now, the way to minimize human suffering is for
the U.S. to take advantage of recent "successes" to take a high road
towards going home.
The arrest of Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar could cut two ways, the
New York Times notes.
While it's obviously a psychological blow, at the least, against the
Afghan Taliban, it could complicate efforts to reach a peace deal:
the Pakistani move could come at the expense of the Afghan
government of Hamid Karzai and complicate reconciliation efforts his
government has begun. An American intelligence official in Europe
conceded as much, while also acknowledging Mullah Baradar's key role
in the reconciliation process. "I know that our people had been in
touch with people around him and were negotiating with him," the
official said, speaking on the condition of anonymity because he was
not authorized to discuss the issue. "So it doesn't make sense why we
bite the hand that is feeding us," the official added. "And now the
Taliban will have no reason to negotiate with us; they will not
believe anything we will offer or say."
But the deed is done. The U.S. government has different parts, and
they don't always sing from the same hymnal. That, who reads the news
knows; other governments are the same way. By handling this arrest
well, the U.S. could still make it a turning point towards
reconciliation in Afghanistan.
First, the U.S. must guarantee that Mullah Baradar is not mistreated
in detention. If folks in the Afghan Taliban find out that Mullah
Baradar has been mistreated -- and you can be sure that they would find
out -- it would be a huge setback to political efforts to end the war.
Second, the political people in the U.S. government -- and here I mean
the word in its best sense, the people devoted to solving problems
through politics, as opposed to the people focused on killing people,
"enhanced interrogation techniques," and blowing things up -- must
demand access to Mullah Baradar for political dialogue. What Baradar
knows about the politics of the Afghan Taliban is more important than
what he knows about its logistics. Bandar has been regarded as the
person in the Afghan Taliban leadership most amenable to negotiations;
he was the person anyone went to when they needed to negotiate
anything with the Afghan Taliban. So, more than any person alive, he
has insight on how to negotiate a resolution of the conflict.
The idea that a prisoner could play a key role in ending or reducing
violent conflict might seem counterintuitive, but there are plenty of
recent precedents, including in Northern Ireland, Israel-Palestine,
and Turkish Kurdistan.
For Mullah Baradar to play such a role will require a credible
political process to address the issues feeding Afghanistan's
longstanding civil war. That would include a willingess by the United
States to talk about ending night raids and arbitrary detentions,
freeing prisoners, a timetable for withdrawal of foreign military
forces, reform of the Afghan constitution, and integration of
disaffected Pashtun communities into the political process, not only
as individuals, but also as groups.
They taught us in school that President Lincoln delayed issuing the
Emancipation Proclamation until he had a military victory that he
could do it in the wake of, so he would not look weak. Let Baradar's
capture provide that victory for Obama. Let's not carry on another 18
months of killing to look tough; let the past demonstrations of force
suffice. Let Obama call now for a political process to end the war in
Afghanistan, so Afghans can be freed from the curse of war, and so our
troops can come home.