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climate
Study Shows How Climate-Mitigating Reforestation Can Be Done Much More Cheaply
New research shows that a mix of natural forest regrowth and tree planting could remove up to 10 times more carbon at $20 per metric ton than previously estimated by the IPCC.
Aug 18, 2024
Trees are allies in the struggle against climate change, and regrowing forests to capture carbon may be cheaper than we thought. According to new research published in Nature Climate Change, a strategic mix of natural regrowth and tree planting could be the most cost-effective way to capture carbon.
Researchers analyzed reforestation projects in 138 low- and middle-income countries to compare the costs of different reforestation approaches. They found it’s possible to remove 10 times more carbon at $20 per metric ton, and almost three times more at $50, compared to what the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had previously estimated.
"It's exciting that the opportunity for low-cost reforestation appears much more plentiful than previously thought."
Neither natural regeneration nor tree planting consistently outperforms the other. Instead, the most cost-effective method varies depending on local conditions. Natural regeneration, which involves letting forests regrow on their own, is cheaper in about 46% of suitable areas. Tree planting, on the other hand, is more cost-effective in 54% of areas.
“Natural regeneration is more cost-effective in areas where tree planting is expensive, regrowing forests accumulate carbon more quickly, or timber infrastructure is distant,” said lead author Jonah Busch, who conducted the study while working for Conservation International. “On the other hand, plantations outperform in areas far from natural seed sources, or where more of the carbon from harvested wood is stored in long-lasting products.”
The research team estimates that by using the cheapest method in each location, we could remove a staggering 31.4 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere over 30 years, at a cost of less than $50 per metric ton. This is about 40% more carbon removal than if only one method was used universally.
“It’s exciting that the opportunity for low-cost reforestation appears much more plentiful than previously thought; this suggests reforestation projects are worth a second look by communities that might have prejudged them to be cost prohibitive,” said Busch. “While reforestation can’t be the only solution to climate change, our findings suggest it should be a bigger piece of the puzzle than previously thought.”
To reach these conclusions, the research team gathered data from hundreds of reforestation projects and used machine-learning techniques to map costs across different areas at a 1-kilometer (0.6-mile) resolution. This detailed approach allowed them to consider crucial factors such as tree growth rates and potential species in different regions.
Ecologist Robin Chazdon, who wasn’t involved in the research, praised the comprehensive approach but highlighted important considerations beyond cost-effectiveness.
“These eye-opening findings add nuance and complexity to our understanding of the net costs of carbon storage for naturally regenerating forests and monoculture plantations,” Chazdon said. However, she emphasized that “the relative costs of carbon storage should not be the only factor to consider regarding spatial planning of reforestation.”
Chazdon pointed out some of the ecological trade-offs involved in different reforestation methods. Monoculture tree plantations, while potentially cost-effective in certain areas, often create excessive water demand and provide poor opportunities for native biodiversity conservation. In contrast, naturally regenerating forests typically offer a wider range of ecosystem services and better support local biodiversity.
“Ultimately, these environmental costs and benefits — which can be difficult to monetize — need to be incorporated in decisions regarding how and where to grow plantations or foster natural regeneration,” Chazdon said.
The study’s authors acknowledge these limitations and suggest several directions for future research. They propose extending the analysis to high-income countries and exploring other forms of reforestation, such as agroforestry or planting patches of trees and allowing the rest of an area to regrow naturally.
Additionally, the researchers emphasize the need to integrate their findings on cost-effectiveness with data on biodiversity, livelihoods and other societal needs to guide reforestation efforts in different contexts.
While the study’s findings are promising, the researchers caution that reforestation alone won’t solve the climate crisis. Even at its maximum potential, reforestation would only remove as much carbon dioxide in 30 years as eight months of current global emissions.
Reforestation is very important, but it won’t solve climate change on its own, Busch said. Ultimately, “we still need to reduce emissions from fossil fuels.”
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The Gaza War in This Dangerous Era of Polycrisis
The events triggered by the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel show the irrationality, unpredictability, uncontrollability, and folly that human actions have acquired in the era of the polycrisis.
Aug 04, 2024
This commentary, the fifth in a series on “The Polycrisis and the Global Green New Deal,” takes the war that began in Gaza and is spreading throughout the Middle East as a laboratory for dissecting the dynamics of the concatenation of crises now being referred to as the “polycrisis.”
In previous commentaries in this series we have explored the emergence and dynamics of the polycrisis. In this commentary we will see how these dynamics are playing out in the increasingly global struggle that first broke out in Palestine at the end of 2023.
Conflict in the Middle East has been endemic for a very long time. It would not take a global polycrisis to ignite a new round of war and escalation. But the global polycrisis gives the current war in the Middle East some distinctive elements, and conversely what started as the war in Gaza vividly illustrates what the polycrisis means in practice.
Backstory
European anti-Semitism, from the expulsion of the Jews from England in 1290 and from Spain in 1492 to the extermination of six million Jews by the Nazis, created a worldwide diaspora. This led many diasporic Jews to seek a national home, and a small number of pioneers began to establish settlements in the predominantly Arab territory historically known as Palestine. In World War I Britain attacked and ultimately replaced the Ottoman Empire as the ruler of Palestine. During the war Britain announced support for a “national home for the Jewish people” in Palestine. Jews were divided on how to relate to their Arab neighbors, but a Zionist movement opted to seize Arab lands and establish an Israeli state. They won support from many countries, including the US and the USSR. The establishment of the Israeli state was followed by repeated wars between Israel and its Arab neighbors, nearly all won by Israel.
In the post-World War II period the US developed a policy for de facto control of the Middle East based on the “strategic dyad” of Israel and Iran. The purpose was to maintain control of Middle Eastern oil and contain Arab nationalism and leftism. However, the Iranian revolution of 1979 turned Iran into an opponent of the US role in the Middle East. As a result, the US became dependent on Israel as its primary “reliable” ally in the Middle East, supplemented by Saudi Arabia and other conservative monarchies. The effort to restore stable US dominance in the Middle East contributed to numerous wars not only in Palestine but in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in and near the region. With the failures of US military operations there, the US turned to an effort to stabilize relations between Israel and the Arab monarchies through a series of agreements known as the Abraham Accords, first signed in 2020.
The Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023 and Israel’s subsequent attack on Gaza, initiated a dynamic that illustrates many aspects of the polycrisis. In this commentary I will focus primarily on the first few months of the conflict; while much has happened in the meantime, the dynamics visible from early days have so far persisted.
Polycrisis dynamics in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
While many elements of the Gaza war and its ramifying effects resemble various examples from the past, the overarching context of global polycrisis that I have described in previous commentaries gives them a different significance and portends a different result.
Unpredictability The Hamas attack on Israel shows the unpredictability of events in the polycrisis. Despite their enormous espionage and surveillance resources, neither the US nor Israel nor any other state appears to have had or taken seriously advance knowledge of the devastating attack that Hamas had been preparing for months. Indeed, in a speech just a week before the Hamas attacks, US national security advisor Jake Sullivan proclaimed, “The Middle East is quieter today than it has been in decades.”
“Butterfly-wing effect” The vast violence and disruption unleashed in and beyond at least half-a-dozen countries by the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel illustrates the disproportionate scale of cause and effect that characterizes the polycrisis. It would be hard to find a fitter illustration of chaos theory’s paradigm example of non-linear causation: the wind from a butterfly’s wing that at an early stage can shift the direction of a mighty storm.
Proliferation The war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza and its rapid spread to at least five countries (so far) and the Red Sea exemplify the overall proliferation of war in the era of polycrisis. Further, the conflict polarized and mobilized a dozen other nations and armed groups for war. As the Guardian synopsized the early stages of this process:
Within hours of the outbreak of the Gaza war, the Hezbollah Shia militia in Lebanon began to fire on northern Israeli towns and villages in solidarity with Palestinians, triggering Israeli air strikes in response, and Houthi forces in Yemen attacked ships in the Red Sea with real or perceived Israeli connections.
At the same time the West Bank erupted in protests at the bombing of civilians in Gaza and extremist Jewish settlers quickly sought to ride the wave of Israeli anger by seizing Palestinian land and terrorizing its residents.
Each of these theatres of conflict has the potential to ignite a much-feared Middle East conflagration, and the past few days have demonstrated just how easily escalation, intended or not, could bring Israel into open confrontation with Iran and suck in the US too.
The US moved two aircraft carriers and their accompanying strike groups to the region as American bases in Syria and Iraq came under repeated attacks from Iran-affiliated groups, drawing swift retaliation from Washington.
Tehran’s Houthi allies have meanwhile been firing on the US-led “Prosperity Guardian” naval task force assembled to protect shipping in the Red Sea. American warships shot down dozens of drones and also a handful of ballistic missiles. US Central Command issued a statement to say that Washington had “every reason to believe that these attacks, while launched by the Houthis in Yemen, are fully enabled by Iran.
Escalation Tit-for-tat escalation illustrates the polycrisis dynamic of a “systemic self-amplifying feedback loop,” aka a vicious circle. Mohamed Khaled Khiari, a UN assistant secretary-general, told security council members that, while most of the exchange of fire between Israel and Hezbollah had been around the border, some strikes were going deeper into each other’s territory, “raising the spectre of an uncontained conflict with devastating consequences for the people of both countries.” Khiari added that “the risk of miscalculation and further escalation is increasing as the conflict in Gaza continues.”A similar dynamic is manifested in the escalating conflict between the US and various non-state groups it alleges are proxies for Iran.
Glocalism As discussed in a previous Commentary, a characteristic of the polycrisis is the intertwining of local non-state actors with international power centers. The wars now touching at least five countries in the Middle East show the interpenetration of local non-state actors and international power politics.
Limits of US hegemony The ability of the US to supply the weapons and diplomatic support that are essential to Israel’s genocide in Gaza shows the continuing power of the US; but the inability of the US to effectively control the other players in the Middle East shows the change from the unipolar era. The US relation to Israel in particular shows how little even the greatest remaining great power is able to impose its own interests, even on those who are supposedly its allies. While in the past the US has from time to time successfully pressured Israel to back off from its military actions, in this case the tail so far is wagging the dog. The limits of US hegemony are also indicated by its inability to shape world opinion, the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, or the UN General Assembly, and its isolation within the UN Security Council. The US has become both the greatest of the world’s Great Powers, and, in the memorable phrase of Spiro T. Agnew, a “helpless, pitiful giant.”
Neither unipolar nor bipolar The dynamics of the Gaza war exhibit neither the bipolar character of the Cold War nor the US hegemony of the “unipolar moment.” While the US role so far is quite consistent, the role of the other great powers is ambiguous. The supposedly overarching geopolitical antagonism between the US and China is so far a relatively minor factor – even though China has been mediating between Palestinian factions, the US has gone so far as to politely ask China to intercede with Iran on its behalf. The future may well see a great power polarization around the Middle Eastern war, but at the moment Great Power rivalry is subordinated to other factors.
Post-colonial disunity The so-called “West,” defined as the European colonial powers and white settler colonial states, initially functioned as a bloc, lining up with Israel. Over time, especially with Israel’s genocidal action in Gaza, this unity has become progressively less solid. According to commentator Eldar Mamedov, EU-NATO countries are “entirely split over Israel, Iran, and Houthis.” There is “no sign so far that the EU is gearing up to join the U.S. conflict with the Iran-backed forces in Syria and Iraq, either militarily or through diplomatic support.”
Breakdown of peacemaking The inability of the UN to impose a ceasefire, despite the overwhelming international support for such a move, is an example of the general breakdown of peacemaking capacity in the polycrisis era.
Breakdown of norms and moral limits The initial Hamas attack on Israel and the rapid development of what is undoubtedly the most visible genocide in world history on the part of Israel illustrate the general breakdown of international norms and any sense of moral or human rights limits on state action. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs says that the situation in the Middle East had probably “never been worse” since it began collating records in 1991. Jeff Feltman, a senior fellow at the UN Foundation, says: “The combination of humanitarian crises across the Middle East – including the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza – have put more strains than most of us have ever seen on the financial ability of donors to respond and the ability of humanitarian actors to meet the needs.” Jens Laerke, a senior official at OCHA, says, “Despite 70 years of international efforts to solve problems by diplomacy and by non-violent means, leaders around the world are now reaching for the gun to resolve their differences as a first option. The question is: are we entering an age of war?” As one journalist put it, such actions reveal “a collective erosion of self-restraint and the rule of law.”
Cascading consequences Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea illustrate the way in which consequences cascade across different sectors of the world order in the era of polycrisis. The attacks sharply impeded world transit and trade, as shipping companies rerouted their vessels via circuitous, expensive routes. The volume of traffic moving through the Red Sea’s Bab al-Mandab strait was cut in half. The trade impact was particularly strong in vulnerable countries like Egypt.
The Houthi attacks, unsurprisingly, led to internal pressures in the US to retaliate, even at risk of provoking a wider war, including the possibility of a US war with Iran. US warships were sent into the Red Sea, ostensibly to protect against Houthi attacks. Iran in turn sent warships into the Red Sea. US attacks on Houthi and other alleged “Iran surrogates” led to a breakdown of the Yemen peace process. As Guardian columnist Nesrine Malik put it,
All of this is happening in a wider context of crises and divisions in individual countries. Each escalation results in a rippling series of repercussions. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea have diverted commercial traffic headed to North America and Europe away from the waterway, affecting Egypt’s much-needed revenues from the Suez canal and potentially the country’s stability in the middle of a prolonged financial crisis.
Nascent rise of the nonaligned Overwhelming votes in the UN General Assembly, and the isolation of Israel and the US, even in the Security Council, point to the possible emergence of a non-aligned global coalition that could potentially challenge international crimes and the struggle for great power hegemony. However, the inability of this potential “great power” to even slow down the genocide in Gaza also illustrates that it is not yet able to exercise significant power.
As the Israeli attack on Gaza continued month after month, the genocide death count grew steadily higher. Tit-for-tat escalation between Israel and Hezbollah made full-scale war increasingly likely. In mid-June, when Hezbollah released a drone video of potential targets in northern Israel, Israeli officials warned of “an all-out war” in which Hezbollah will be destroyed and Lebanon would be sent “back to the Stone Age.” Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah thereupon threatened a war with “no restraint and no rules and no ceilings.” In late June Iran’s mission to the United Nations warned that if Israel embarks on a “full-scale military aggression” in Lebanon, “an obliterating war will ensue” and that in such an event, “all options, including the full involvement of all resistance fronts, are on the table.” Even if the various parties agree to a ceasefire, it is less likely to be a step toward peace than primarily a means to acquire military and political advantage before the next round of war and genocide.
The events triggered by the October 7 Hamas attack on Israel show the irrationality, unpredictability, uncontrollability, and folly that human actions have acquired in the era of the polycrisis. While events are unpredictable, the dynamics of the polycrisis have made it substantially less likely that this story will have a happy or even bearable outcome.
You can read the original version of this essay, including footnotes, at the Labor Network for Sustainabilty website where it first appeared.
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Beyond Shame and Blame: Why Do Republicans Vote Against Their Self-Interest?
With the courage to step out comes the joy of bonding, not from shared finger-pointing but through acting together in shared problem-solving.
Aug 02, 2024
In the presidential race, Democrats and Republicans remain neck and neck. But how could this be?
Afterall, free-market mythology, politically popular since the 1980s, has led us to believe that humans are essentially selfish creatures, eager to put ourselves first. Yet, Trump’s many policies that harm the vast majority of us do not seem to diminish his appeal.
Before puzzling over “why,” here are a just a few examples of party differences that one might think would have brought the truly self-interested to abandon Trump and jump on the Democratic bandwagon.
On Social Security. Trump remains ambiguous, failing to provide any specific measures on how he would protect Social Security. In contrast, Democrats promise not only to protect but to strengthen benefits, including—if needed to cover the cost—raising taxes on those earning more than $400,000. They have also expressed support for raising benefits for low-income recipients and improving Social Security’s cost-of-living adjustment formula.
On taxes. The 2017 Republican tax reform was skewed to benefit the rich and Trump now proposes reducing taxes on capital gains. Democrats, however, seek to expand tax credits for workers and families and to increase tax rates on wealth for corporations and individuals.
On the minimum wage. Trump says he would consider raising it but prefers to leave the decision to states. The Democrats pledge an increase, underscoring that the minimum wage has not risen since President Obama and still only brings the worker to the poverty line.
On abortion. Trump promised in 2016 to appoint Supreme Court justices who would overturn Roe v. Wade. He also appointed abortion opponents to the federal judiciary, including three Supreme Court justices who voted to overturn the federal right to abortion. However, Democrats support women’s right to choose, as do two-thirds of Americans.
On education. As president, Trump called for eliminating the Public Service Loan Forgiveness initiative and ended loan forgiveness for students defrauded by their schools.
In contrast, President Biden’s 2021 American Rescue Plan—the largest one-time investment in education—helped schools reopen and regain ground faster.
On healthcare. Trump calls Medicare “socialism” and supports appealing or overturning the Affordable Care Act in favor of a private market. He also supports spending caps and work requirements on Medicaid. With these changes, certain low-income populations, pregnant women, and people with disabilities would lose Medicaid coverage. Democrats support the Affordable Care Act and Medicaid as a federal program.
On climate. Trump has promised to roll back regulation of the fossil fuel industry in exchange for $1 billion in campaign contributions. Under Biden’s presidency, carbon emissions fell by 2 percent even as the economy grew, and his administration is devoting $2 billion to encourage electric vehicles.
On immigration. Trump declared an “illegal immigrant invasion, the worst that’s ever been seen anywhere in world.” Yet, between 2020 and 2022 the percent of foreign-born grew just one point, reports the U.S. Census Bureau. Between 2019 and 2023, our immigrant-labor force grew yearly on average 2.3 percent; yet there’s no evidence of harm to the native-born, as our economy has also been growing. Thus, for U.S.-born workers, 2022-2023 was a time of “very low unemployment—and strong employment growth,” notes the Economic Policy Institute. Plus, job growth continues to exceed expectations.
Hmm. If on policy questions, direct self-interest seems to take a back seat, what is shaping today’s highly charged political divergence that might be less obvious?
Our free-market mythology teaches us that anyone worth their salt can make it if they try. So, those who don’t are, well, either too lazy or too stupid. From that root myth, it is easy to grasp why those at the lower rungs of the economic ladder can feel shame. I know I’d be vulnerable, too.
But we also know enough about our nature to realize that shame is perhaps the most painful of human emotions. We can cope with loss, anger, and embarrassment…but shame? Hmm, it hits hard. So, what can we do to evade that terrible feeling?
Well, there seems to be one easy, effective way: Blame.
As long as we can blame “the other,” we can find some solace. Feeling oneself to be a victim isn’t great, of course, but it’s definitely preferable to shame. For one, we can enjoy self-righteousness and create bonds with others based on common grievances.
Another plus? We don’t have to be troubled by coming up with solutions ourselves, including how to tackle profound economic inequality. Note that worldwide in income inequality, the U.S. is ranked more extreme than 115 countries, while most of our peers come in far above us in the top 50.
Acknowledging our standing and coming up with solutions is hard. Blaming “them”—immigrants, LGBTQ+, welfare recipients—is easy.
Recognizing that blaming is an all-too-human pitfall, let’s strive to replace its simple satisfaction with those enriching, positive emotions that emerge through mutual empowerment as we shape and offer solutions through interaction with others. Millions of Americans are now building that courage through groups such as those in the broad network Declaration for American Democracy.
Among the deepest of human needs is power—from the Latin posse, meaning “to be able.” It is not power over others, but rather a sense of agency that only democracy can offer. Yet, for most of us, action requires courage—risking the new by reaching out, asking tough questions, and doing something we’ve never done before.
Courage, however, is also a human need. Its root lies in “coeur,” meaning “heart” in French. With the courage to step out comes the joy of bonding, not from shared finger-pointing but through acting together in shared problem-solving.
And… in all, it is vastly more satisfying than blaming.
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