The Dangers of a War Without an Off-Ramp

The recent escalation of hostilities involving United States and Israeli strikes on Iranian territory has raised urgent questions about where the conflict is headed. As military actions unfold and rhetoric intensifies, a sober assessment of the strategic structure of the conflict becomes increasingly necessary. Wars often generate powerful narratives shaped by domestic politics, alliance commitments, and wartime psychology. Yet beneath these narratives lie strategic realities that ultimately determine whether a conflict moves toward escalation, stalemate, or settlement.

Two recent interviews conducted by Norwegian political scientist Glenn Diesen offer a revealing window into these realities. In separate conversations, Diesen spoke with professor John Mearsheimer of the University of Chicago and professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi of the University of Tehran. The two scholars speak from vastly different institutional and national contexts, yet their analyses converge on a troubling conclusion: The present conflict may lack a credible pathway toward termination.

From the perspective of realist international relations theory, Mearsheimer emphasizes a familiar strategic principle. Wars initiated without clearly defined political objectives often drift toward escalation and attrition. Military operations may achieve tactical success while simultaneously deepening the strategic trap in which policymakers find themselves. When leaders cannot articulate what political outcome would constitute victory—or how such an outcome might realistically be achieved—military escalation risks becoming an end in itself.

The dynamics described by Marandi from Tehran reinforce this concern from the opposite side of the conflict. His remarks suggest that Iranian policymakers increasingly interpret US actions not as limited or coercive strikes but as part of a broader effort to impose strategic defeat. When a state believes that external pressure is intended to undermine its economic survival or political system, the incentives for compromise diminish dramatically. Resistance and escalation become the rational response.

Wars rarely end well when they begin without a clear understanding of how they are supposed to end.

Under such conditions, both sides tend to view their own actions as defensive while interpreting the other side’s moves as steps toward existential pressure. This reciprocal perception forms what strategists sometimes describe as an escalation trap. Each escalation appears justified in the moment, yet each step simultaneously reduces the space for diplomatic resolution.

Recent commentary from Tehran reinforces these concerns about escalation dynamics. In a separate interview with Diesen, Marandi of the University of Tehran pointed to the strategic importance of Kharg Island, the hub through which the majority of Iran’s oil exports pass. Speculation in strategic circles about possible attempts to strike or seize the island illustrates how the conflict could quickly move beyond limited military operations toward attacks on critical economic infrastructure. Such a move, he suggested, would likely be interpreted in Tehran not as a tactical action but as an attempt to cripple the country’s economic lifeline, increasing the risk of wider regional retaliation and drawing additional states into the confrontation.

One particularly revealing example emerged in the discussion between Diesen and Marandi regarding the possibility—circulating in strategic commentary—of a US attempt to strike or seize Kharg Island. Located in the Persian Gulf, Kharg Island is the central hub for Iranian oil exports, reportedly handling roughly 80-90% of the country’s shipments. Because of its economic importance, targeting the island would represent a dramatic shift in the character of the conflict.

Military strikes against discrete installations can sometimes be framed as limited actions intended to degrade specific capabilities. Attacks on critical economic infrastructure are different. They signal an effort to impose systemic economic damage on the opposing state. From Tehran’s perspective, such an action would likely be interpreted not as a tactical move but as an attempt to cripple the Iranian economy itself.

Strategically, this kind of escalation rarely remains confined to its original target. Marandi noted that any attempt to seize or attack the island would likely require the use of airspace or facilities in neighboring Gulf states. That reality alone would expand the number of actors drawn directly into the conflict. Iran would almost certainly interpret such involvement as participation in the attack and respond accordingly.

The result could be a widening regional confrontation affecting maritime routes, energy infrastructure, and shipping lanes across the Persian Gulf. Given the centrality of the region to global oil markets, such developments would quickly carry worldwide economic consequences.

Yet even from a strictly military standpoint, Marandi argues that such escalation might prove strategically futile. Iran’s geographic proximity to the island and its coastal defense capabilities could complicate any attempt to seize or neutralize it. More broadly, attacks on economic lifelines rarely produce the decisive political outcomes their planners hope for. Instead, they tend to deepen the resolve of the targeted state while increasing the scale of retaliation.

This dynamic highlights a deeper structural problem in the current conflict: the absence of a clearly defined off-ramp. When wars begin without clear termination conditions, each new escalation step appears tactically rational while simultaneously making political settlement more difficult. Military actions generate retaliation; retaliation generates justification for further escalation; and over time the original political objectives become increasingly obscured.

History provides many examples of wars drifting into such patterns. Once conflict becomes self-sustaining, the political cost of de-escalation rises even as the strategic benefits of continued escalation diminish. Leaders fear appearing weak if they pursue negotiations, yet continuing the war often produces mounting risks without delivering a decisive outcome. These dynamics are precisely what realist analysts warn about when conflicts begin to expand without clearly defined political objectives or credible pathways toward de-escalation.

For the United States, these strategic concerns intersect with constitutional questions as well. Sustained hostilities raise fundamental issues regarding congressional authority over war powers and democratic accountability in decisions that may carry enormous human and geopolitical consequences. When a conflict expands without clear political objectives, the need for transparent debate about strategy and legal authority becomes all the more urgent.

The convergence between realist analysis in Washington and strategic signaling from Tehran therefore deserves careful attention. Despite their very different vantage points, both perspectives point toward the same underlying concern: The present conflict may be drifting toward a prolonged confrontation without clearly defined limits or exit mechanisms.

Recognizing that danger does not require accepting the strategic narratives of any particular side. It simply requires acknowledging a central lesson of international politics. Wars rarely end well when they begin without a clear understanding of how they are supposed to end.

If policymakers hope to avoid an open-ended escalation spiral, renewed emphasis on political strategy and diplomatic pathways will be essential. Without a credible off-ramp, even limited conflicts can evolve into prolonged confrontations whose costs far exceed their original causes.