To donate by check, phone, or other method, see our More Ways to Give page.
In this world, where everything and everyone is for sale, we must sustain independent media we can trust. If you believe independent journalism is critical to protecting democracy and the common good, please support Common Dreams this Giving Tuesday! We wouldn't exist without you.
Has the drone war in Pakistan's rugged frontier finally come home?
Was Faisal Shahzad, the bumbling Times Square bomb maker, a blowback
from the Obama administration's increased use of killer robots? David
Sanger of The New York Times asks the question, and the New York Post says an "anonymous law enforcement" source claims Shahzad was driven to his act after witnessing drone attacks in Pakistan.
In fact, there is little evidence that the bomber ever saw drone
assaults, or even that he received training. While one wing of the
Pakistan Taliban initially claimed credit, they later denied it. If he was trained in Pakistan, it was by the Pakistani version of the Gang That Couldn't Bomb Straight.
But the question is real. And if the United States thought that
killing people at a great distance was not likely to end up being a
messy business, then the White House is deeply deluded.
The drone war has stirred up considerable anti-Americanism in
Pakistan. Some of the designers of the current counterinsurgency war in
Afghanistan, David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum, have denounced it as a
"technology" fix that has alienated Pakistanis by chalking up a kill
ratio of 50 civilians for every targeted Taliban or al-Qaeda leader.
"Every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family,
a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement,"
the two wrote in The New York Times.
The number of civilian deaths caused by the drones is a sharply debated issue. The Long War Journal blog puts the number at around 30, Pakistani sources argue the figure is over a thousand, and a recent study by the New American Foundation concludes that civilian casualties make up about 30 percent of the fatalities.
But the word "civilian" is a slippery one, because no one knows
exactly what criteria the United States uses to distinguish a
"militant" from a civilian. Is someone with a gun a "militant"? Since
large numbers of males in the frontier regions of Pakistan carry guns,
that definition would end up targeting a huge number of people. Is
someone who offers hospitality to a Taliban member a "militant," and
thus a legitimate target, even if it includes his whole extended family?
Who is targeted and how those decisions are made are the subjects of
a growing controversy that has sparked at least one lawsuit in the
United States and spilled over into international law.
According to the CIA, the drone war is legal, although the
intelligence organization refuses to even admit it is using the killer
robots in Pakistan. "The agency's counterterrorism operations -- lawful,
aggressive, precise, and effective -- continue without pause," says CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano.
No one disputes the program is "aggressive," particularly under the
Obama administration, which has launched more drone attacks in a little
over a year than the Bush administration did in eight.
Whether the attacks have been "precise" and "effective" is
debatable. A drone did kill Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud,
but only after 16 tries in which over 300 people were killed,
at least half of whom were civilians. The agency also took credit for
killing Baitullah's successor, Hakimullah Mehsud, but reports of his
demise turned out to be premature. The Pakistan Taliban leader surfaced in early May to claim credit for the Times Square bomber.
But "lawful" is promising to cause the Obama administration a major headache.
The CIA strikes are "a clear violation of international law," argues
Notre Dame Law School professor Mary Ellen O'Connell, who says it would
be like Mexican authorities bombing houses and hotels in the American
Southwest because they may harbor drug lords.
In testifying before the House Subcommittee on National Security,
Kenneth Anderson, a professor at Washington College of Law at American
University warned
that "CIA officers or for that matter military officers or their
lawyers" could be called before "international tribunals or courts in
Spain or some place that say you've engaged in extra judicial execution
or simple murder and we're going to investigate and indict."
Last October, Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, said,
"The CIA is running a program that is killing significant numbers of
people, and there is absolutely no accountability in terms of the
relevant international law." He called on the United States "to reveal
more about the ways in which it makes sure that arbitrary extrajudicial
executions aren't, in fact, being carried out though the use of these
weapons."
This lack of accountability is the target of a lawsuit, filed March 16 by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), demanding
"information on when, where and against whom drone strikes can be
authorized, the number and rate of civilian casualties and other basic
information essential for assessing the wisdom and legality of using
armed drones to conduct targeted killings."
"The government's use of drones to conduct targeted killings raises
complicated questions," said Jameel Jaffer, director of the ACLU's
National Security Project. "These questions ought to be discussed and
debated publicly, not resolved secretly behind closed doors."
However, the CIA has problems with being open that have nothing to
do with national security. The agents and contractors who fly and
direct the drones are civilians, who are prohibited from waging war by
the Geneva Conventions.
"In terms of international armed conflict, those CIA agents are,
unlike their military counterparts, but like the fighters they target,
unlawful combatants," says Gary Solis, law professor and author of The Law of Armed Conflict. According to Solis,
the CIA employees, like their targets, "are fighters without uniforms
or insignia, directly participating in hostilities, employing armed
force contrary to the laws and customs of war."
This is hardly an arcane legal issue. The Obama administration is in the process of vastly increasing
the number of lethal drones for the U.S. military, adding everything
from more Predators and Reapers -- the current killers of choice -- to
unmanned attack aircraft and tanks, and tiny but deadly "nanobots."
Many of these will be directed by military personnel -- next year the Air Force will train more drone pilots than fighter and bomber pilots -- but some will end up with the CIA.
For the time being, drones are super weapons. But they aren't the
first, and it's instructive to consider a few examples from the past.
At one point in European history the armored knight was pretty much
invincible, until someone figured out that a peasant welding a crossbow
could bring down a very expensive piece of military technology with a
simple bolt.
In Vietnam, the United States spent many hundreds of thousands of
dollars developing a sniffing device to seek concentrations of urine
indicating enemy campsites, which would then be bombed by B-52s. The
Vietnamese finessed that piece of high tech with buckets of buffalo pee
hung in trees.
And NATO thought they had bombed Yugoslavia's armor back to the
Middle Ages during the Kosovo War, until they found out that most of
the "tanks" were wooden dummies with little primus stoves in them to
fool infrared detectors.
"The more the drone campaign works, the more it fails," says
Naval Post Graduate School analyst John Arquilla. "Increased attacks
only make the Pakistanis angrier at the collateral damage and the
sustained violation of their sovereignty."
Drones are a high-tech solution to a deeply complex political
problem. The longer they stalk the skies over Pakistan, Yemen, and
Somalia, the more difficult those political problems become. It is time
to stop bombing and start talking.
Common Dreams is powered by optimists who believe in the power of informed and engaged citizens to ignite and enact change to make the world a better place. We're hundreds of thousands strong, but every single supporter makes the difference. Your contribution supports this bold media model—free, independent, and dedicated to reporting the facts every day. Stand with us in the fight for economic equality, social justice, human rights, and a more sustainable future. As a people-powered nonprofit news outlet, we cover the issues the corporate media never will. |
Has the drone war in Pakistan's rugged frontier finally come home?
Was Faisal Shahzad, the bumbling Times Square bomb maker, a blowback
from the Obama administration's increased use of killer robots? David
Sanger of The New York Times asks the question, and the New York Post says an "anonymous law enforcement" source claims Shahzad was driven to his act after witnessing drone attacks in Pakistan.
In fact, there is little evidence that the bomber ever saw drone
assaults, or even that he received training. While one wing of the
Pakistan Taliban initially claimed credit, they later denied it. If he was trained in Pakistan, it was by the Pakistani version of the Gang That Couldn't Bomb Straight.
But the question is real. And if the United States thought that
killing people at a great distance was not likely to end up being a
messy business, then the White House is deeply deluded.
The drone war has stirred up considerable anti-Americanism in
Pakistan. Some of the designers of the current counterinsurgency war in
Afghanistan, David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum, have denounced it as a
"technology" fix that has alienated Pakistanis by chalking up a kill
ratio of 50 civilians for every targeted Taliban or al-Qaeda leader.
"Every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family,
a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement,"
the two wrote in The New York Times.
The number of civilian deaths caused by the drones is a sharply debated issue. The Long War Journal blog puts the number at around 30, Pakistani sources argue the figure is over a thousand, and a recent study by the New American Foundation concludes that civilian casualties make up about 30 percent of the fatalities.
But the word "civilian" is a slippery one, because no one knows
exactly what criteria the United States uses to distinguish a
"militant" from a civilian. Is someone with a gun a "militant"? Since
large numbers of males in the frontier regions of Pakistan carry guns,
that definition would end up targeting a huge number of people. Is
someone who offers hospitality to a Taliban member a "militant," and
thus a legitimate target, even if it includes his whole extended family?
Who is targeted and how those decisions are made are the subjects of
a growing controversy that has sparked at least one lawsuit in the
United States and spilled over into international law.
According to the CIA, the drone war is legal, although the
intelligence organization refuses to even admit it is using the killer
robots in Pakistan. "The agency's counterterrorism operations -- lawful,
aggressive, precise, and effective -- continue without pause," says CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano.
No one disputes the program is "aggressive," particularly under the
Obama administration, which has launched more drone attacks in a little
over a year than the Bush administration did in eight.
Whether the attacks have been "precise" and "effective" is
debatable. A drone did kill Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud,
but only after 16 tries in which over 300 people were killed,
at least half of whom were civilians. The agency also took credit for
killing Baitullah's successor, Hakimullah Mehsud, but reports of his
demise turned out to be premature. The Pakistan Taliban leader surfaced in early May to claim credit for the Times Square bomber.
But "lawful" is promising to cause the Obama administration a major headache.
The CIA strikes are "a clear violation of international law," argues
Notre Dame Law School professor Mary Ellen O'Connell, who says it would
be like Mexican authorities bombing houses and hotels in the American
Southwest because they may harbor drug lords.
In testifying before the House Subcommittee on National Security,
Kenneth Anderson, a professor at Washington College of Law at American
University warned
that "CIA officers or for that matter military officers or their
lawyers" could be called before "international tribunals or courts in
Spain or some place that say you've engaged in extra judicial execution
or simple murder and we're going to investigate and indict."
Last October, Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, said,
"The CIA is running a program that is killing significant numbers of
people, and there is absolutely no accountability in terms of the
relevant international law." He called on the United States "to reveal
more about the ways in which it makes sure that arbitrary extrajudicial
executions aren't, in fact, being carried out though the use of these
weapons."
This lack of accountability is the target of a lawsuit, filed March 16 by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), demanding
"information on when, where and against whom drone strikes can be
authorized, the number and rate of civilian casualties and other basic
information essential for assessing the wisdom and legality of using
armed drones to conduct targeted killings."
"The government's use of drones to conduct targeted killings raises
complicated questions," said Jameel Jaffer, director of the ACLU's
National Security Project. "These questions ought to be discussed and
debated publicly, not resolved secretly behind closed doors."
However, the CIA has problems with being open that have nothing to
do with national security. The agents and contractors who fly and
direct the drones are civilians, who are prohibited from waging war by
the Geneva Conventions.
"In terms of international armed conflict, those CIA agents are,
unlike their military counterparts, but like the fighters they target,
unlawful combatants," says Gary Solis, law professor and author of The Law of Armed Conflict. According to Solis,
the CIA employees, like their targets, "are fighters without uniforms
or insignia, directly participating in hostilities, employing armed
force contrary to the laws and customs of war."
This is hardly an arcane legal issue. The Obama administration is in the process of vastly increasing
the number of lethal drones for the U.S. military, adding everything
from more Predators and Reapers -- the current killers of choice -- to
unmanned attack aircraft and tanks, and tiny but deadly "nanobots."
Many of these will be directed by military personnel -- next year the Air Force will train more drone pilots than fighter and bomber pilots -- but some will end up with the CIA.
For the time being, drones are super weapons. But they aren't the
first, and it's instructive to consider a few examples from the past.
At one point in European history the armored knight was pretty much
invincible, until someone figured out that a peasant welding a crossbow
could bring down a very expensive piece of military technology with a
simple bolt.
In Vietnam, the United States spent many hundreds of thousands of
dollars developing a sniffing device to seek concentrations of urine
indicating enemy campsites, which would then be bombed by B-52s. The
Vietnamese finessed that piece of high tech with buckets of buffalo pee
hung in trees.
And NATO thought they had bombed Yugoslavia's armor back to the
Middle Ages during the Kosovo War, until they found out that most of
the "tanks" were wooden dummies with little primus stoves in them to
fool infrared detectors.
"The more the drone campaign works, the more it fails," says
Naval Post Graduate School analyst John Arquilla. "Increased attacks
only make the Pakistanis angrier at the collateral damage and the
sustained violation of their sovereignty."
Drones are a high-tech solution to a deeply complex political
problem. The longer they stalk the skies over Pakistan, Yemen, and
Somalia, the more difficult those political problems become. It is time
to stop bombing and start talking.
Has the drone war in Pakistan's rugged frontier finally come home?
Was Faisal Shahzad, the bumbling Times Square bomb maker, a blowback
from the Obama administration's increased use of killer robots? David
Sanger of The New York Times asks the question, and the New York Post says an "anonymous law enforcement" source claims Shahzad was driven to his act after witnessing drone attacks in Pakistan.
In fact, there is little evidence that the bomber ever saw drone
assaults, or even that he received training. While one wing of the
Pakistan Taliban initially claimed credit, they later denied it. If he was trained in Pakistan, it was by the Pakistani version of the Gang That Couldn't Bomb Straight.
But the question is real. And if the United States thought that
killing people at a great distance was not likely to end up being a
messy business, then the White House is deeply deluded.
The drone war has stirred up considerable anti-Americanism in
Pakistan. Some of the designers of the current counterinsurgency war in
Afghanistan, David Kilcullen and Andrew Exum, have denounced it as a
"technology" fix that has alienated Pakistanis by chalking up a kill
ratio of 50 civilians for every targeted Taliban or al-Qaeda leader.
"Every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family,
a new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement,"
the two wrote in The New York Times.
The number of civilian deaths caused by the drones is a sharply debated issue. The Long War Journal blog puts the number at around 30, Pakistani sources argue the figure is over a thousand, and a recent study by the New American Foundation concludes that civilian casualties make up about 30 percent of the fatalities.
But the word "civilian" is a slippery one, because no one knows
exactly what criteria the United States uses to distinguish a
"militant" from a civilian. Is someone with a gun a "militant"? Since
large numbers of males in the frontier regions of Pakistan carry guns,
that definition would end up targeting a huge number of people. Is
someone who offers hospitality to a Taliban member a "militant," and
thus a legitimate target, even if it includes his whole extended family?
Who is targeted and how those decisions are made are the subjects of
a growing controversy that has sparked at least one lawsuit in the
United States and spilled over into international law.
According to the CIA, the drone war is legal, although the
intelligence organization refuses to even admit it is using the killer
robots in Pakistan. "The agency's counterterrorism operations -- lawful,
aggressive, precise, and effective -- continue without pause," says CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano.
No one disputes the program is "aggressive," particularly under the
Obama administration, which has launched more drone attacks in a little
over a year than the Bush administration did in eight.
Whether the attacks have been "precise" and "effective" is
debatable. A drone did kill Pakistan Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud,
but only after 16 tries in which over 300 people were killed,
at least half of whom were civilians. The agency also took credit for
killing Baitullah's successor, Hakimullah Mehsud, but reports of his
demise turned out to be premature. The Pakistan Taliban leader surfaced in early May to claim credit for the Times Square bomber.
But "lawful" is promising to cause the Obama administration a major headache.
The CIA strikes are "a clear violation of international law," argues
Notre Dame Law School professor Mary Ellen O'Connell, who says it would
be like Mexican authorities bombing houses and hotels in the American
Southwest because they may harbor drug lords.
In testifying before the House Subcommittee on National Security,
Kenneth Anderson, a professor at Washington College of Law at American
University warned
that "CIA officers or for that matter military officers or their
lawyers" could be called before "international tribunals or courts in
Spain or some place that say you've engaged in extra judicial execution
or simple murder and we're going to investigate and indict."
Last October, Philip Alston, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions, said,
"The CIA is running a program that is killing significant numbers of
people, and there is absolutely no accountability in terms of the
relevant international law." He called on the United States "to reveal
more about the ways in which it makes sure that arbitrary extrajudicial
executions aren't, in fact, being carried out though the use of these
weapons."
This lack of accountability is the target of a lawsuit, filed March 16 by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), demanding
"information on when, where and against whom drone strikes can be
authorized, the number and rate of civilian casualties and other basic
information essential for assessing the wisdom and legality of using
armed drones to conduct targeted killings."
"The government's use of drones to conduct targeted killings raises
complicated questions," said Jameel Jaffer, director of the ACLU's
National Security Project. "These questions ought to be discussed and
debated publicly, not resolved secretly behind closed doors."
However, the CIA has problems with being open that have nothing to
do with national security. The agents and contractors who fly and
direct the drones are civilians, who are prohibited from waging war by
the Geneva Conventions.
"In terms of international armed conflict, those CIA agents are,
unlike their military counterparts, but like the fighters they target,
unlawful combatants," says Gary Solis, law professor and author of The Law of Armed Conflict. According to Solis,
the CIA employees, like their targets, "are fighters without uniforms
or insignia, directly participating in hostilities, employing armed
force contrary to the laws and customs of war."
This is hardly an arcane legal issue. The Obama administration is in the process of vastly increasing
the number of lethal drones for the U.S. military, adding everything
from more Predators and Reapers -- the current killers of choice -- to
unmanned attack aircraft and tanks, and tiny but deadly "nanobots."
Many of these will be directed by military personnel -- next year the Air Force will train more drone pilots than fighter and bomber pilots -- but some will end up with the CIA.
For the time being, drones are super weapons. But they aren't the
first, and it's instructive to consider a few examples from the past.
At one point in European history the armored knight was pretty much
invincible, until someone figured out that a peasant welding a crossbow
could bring down a very expensive piece of military technology with a
simple bolt.
In Vietnam, the United States spent many hundreds of thousands of
dollars developing a sniffing device to seek concentrations of urine
indicating enemy campsites, which would then be bombed by B-52s. The
Vietnamese finessed that piece of high tech with buckets of buffalo pee
hung in trees.
And NATO thought they had bombed Yugoslavia's armor back to the
Middle Ages during the Kosovo War, until they found out that most of
the "tanks" were wooden dummies with little primus stoves in them to
fool infrared detectors.
"The more the drone campaign works, the more it fails," says
Naval Post Graduate School analyst John Arquilla. "Increased attacks
only make the Pakistanis angrier at the collateral damage and the
sustained violation of their sovereignty."
Drones are a high-tech solution to a deeply complex political
problem. The longer they stalk the skies over Pakistan, Yemen, and
Somalia, the more difficult those political problems become. It is time
to stop bombing and start talking.