Mar 30, 2009
Let's start by stopping.
It's time, as a start, to stop calling our expanding war in Central and
South Asia "the Afghan War" or "the Afghanistan War." If Obama's
special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke
doesn't want to, why should we? Recently, in a BBC interview,
he insisted that "the 'number one problem' in stabilizing Afghanistan
was Taliban sanctuaries in western Pakistan, including tribal areas
along the Afghan border and cities like Quetta" in the Pakistani
province of Baluchistan.
And isn't he right? After all, the U.S. seems to be in the process of trading in
a limited war in a mountainous, poverty-stricken country of 27 million
people for one in an advanced nation of 167 million, with a crumbling
economy, rising extremism, advancing corruption, and a large military
armed with nuclear weapons. Worse yet, the war in Pakistan seems to be
expanding inexorably (and in tandem with American war planning) from the tribal borderlands ever closer to the heart of the country.
These days, Washington has even come up with
a neologism for the change: "Af-Pak," as in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
theater of operations. So, in the name of realism and accuracy,
shouldn't we retire "the Afghan War" and begin talking about the far
more disturbing "Af-Pak War"?
And while we're at it, maybe we should retire the word "surge" as well.
Right now, as the Obama plan for that Af-Pak War is being "rolled out,"
newspaper headlines have been surging when it comes to accepting the
surge paradigm. Long before the administration's "strategic review" of
the war had even been completed, President Obama was reportedly persuaded
by former Iraq surge commander, now CentCom commander, General David
Petraeus to "surge" another 17,000 troops into Afghanistan, starting
this May.
For the last two weeks, news has been filtering out of Washington of an accompanying civilian "surge" into Afghanistan ("Obama's Afghanistan 'surge':
diplomats, civilian specialists"). Oh, and then there's to be that
opium-eradication surge and a range of other so-called surges. As the
headlines have had it: "1,400 Isle Marines to join Afghanistan surge," "U.S. troop surge to aid Afghan police trainers," "Seabees build to house surge," "Afghan Plan Detailed As Iraq Surge 'Lite,'" and so on.
It seems to matter little that even General Petraeus wonders
whether the word should be applied. ("The commander of the U.S. Central
Command said Friday that an Iraq-style surge cannot be a solution to
the problems in Afghanistan.") There are, however, other analogies that
might better capture the scope and nature of the new strategic plan for
the Af-Pak War. Think bailout. Think A.I.G.
The Costs of an Expanding War
In truth, what we're about to watch should be considered nothing less than the Great Afghan (or Af-Pak) bailout.
On Friday morning, the president officially rolled out his long-awaited "comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan," a plan without a name.
If there was little news in it, that was only because of the furious
leaking of prospective parts of it over the previous weeks. So many
trial balloons, so little time.
In a recent "60 Minutes" interview (though not in his Friday announcement), the president also emphasized the need for an "exit strategy" from the war. Similarly, American commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, has been speaking of
a possible "tipping point," three to five years away, that might lead
to "eventual departure." Nonetheless, almost every element of the new
plan -- both those the president mentioned Friday and the
no-less-crucial ones that didn't receive a nod -- seem to involve the
word "more"; that is, more U.S. troops, more U.S. diplomats, more civilian advisors, more American and NATO military advisors to train more Afghan troops
and police, more base and outpost building, more opium-eradication
operations, more aid, more money to the Pakistani military -- and
strikingly large-scale as that may be, all of that doesn't even include
the "covert war," fought mainly via unmanned aerial vehicles, along the
Pakistani tribal borderlands, which is clearly going to intensify.
In the coming year, that CIA-run drone war, according to leaked reports, may be expanded
from the tribal areas into Pakistan's more heavily populated
Baluchistan province where some of the Taliban leadership is supposedly
holed up. In addition, so reports in British papers claim, the U.S. is
seriously considering a soft coup-in-place against Afghan President
Hamid Karzai. Disillusioned with the widespread corruption in, and
inefficiency of, his government, the U.S. would create a new "chief
executive" or prime ministerial post not in the Afghan constitution --
and then install some reputedly less corrupt (and perhaps more malleable) figure. Karzai would supposedly be turned into a figurehead "father of the nation." Envoy Holbrooke has officially denied
that Washington is planning any such thing, while a spokesman for
Karzai denounced the idea (both, of course, just feeding the flames of
the Afghan rumor mill).
What this all adds up to is an ambitious doubling down on just about
every bet already made by Washington in these last years -- from the
counterinsurgency war against the Taliban and the counter-terrorism war
against al-Qaeda to the financial love/hate
relationship with the Pakistani military and its intelligence services
underway since at least the Nixon years of the early 1970s. (Many of
the flattering things now being said by U.S. officials about Pakistani
Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, for instance,
were also said about the now fallen autocrat Pervez Musharraf when he held the same position.)
Despite that mention of the need for an exit strategy and a
presidential assurance that both the Afghan and Pakistani governments
will be held to Iraqi-style "benchmarks" of accountability in the
period to come, Obama's is clearly a jump-in-with-both-feet strategy
and, not surprisingly, is sure to involve a massive infusion of new
funds. Unlike with A.I.G., where the financial inputs of the U.S.
government are at least announced, we don't even have a ballpark figure
for how much is actually involved right now, but it's bound to be
staggering. Just supporting those 17,000 new American troops already
ordered into Afghanistan, many destined to be dispatched to
still-to-be-built bases and outposts in the embattled southern and
eastern parts of the country for which all materials must be trucked
in, will certainly cost billions.
Recently, the Washington Post's Walter Pincus dug up
some of the construction and transportation costs associated with the
war in Afghanistan and found that, as an employer, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers comes in second only to the Afghan government in that
job-desperate country. The Corps is spending about $4 billion this year
alone on road-building activities, and has slated another $4-$6 billion
for more of the same in 2010; it has, according to Pincus, already
spent $2 billion constructing facilities for the expanding Afghan army
and police forces, and has another $1.2 billion set aside for more such
facilities this year. It is also likely to spend between $400 million
and $1.4 billion on as many as six new bases, assorted outposts, and associated air fields American troops will be sent to in the south.
Throw
in hardship pay, supplies, housing, and whatever else for the hundreds
of diplomats and advisors in that promised "civilian surge"; add in the
$1.5 billion a year the president promised in economic aid to Pakistan
over the next five years, a tripling of such aid (as urged
by Vice President Biden when he was still a senator); add in unknown
amounts of aid to the Pakistani and Afghan militaries. Tote it up and
you've just scratched the surface of Washington's coming investment in
the Af-Pak War. (And lest you imagine that these costs might, at least,
be offset by savings from Obama's plan to draw down American forces in
Iraq, think again. A recent study by the Government Accountability
Office suggests that "Iraq-related expenditures" will actually increase "during the withdrawal and for several years after its completion.")
Put all this together and you can see why the tactical word "surge"
hardly covers what's about to happen. The administration's "new"
strategy and its "new" thinking -- including its urge to peel off less
committed Taliban supporters and reach out for help to regional powers
-- should really be re-imagined as but another massive attempted
bailout, this time of an Afghan project, now almost 40 years old, that
in foreign policy terms is indeed our A.I.G.
Graveyard Thinking
As Obama's economic team overseeing the various financial bailouts is made up of figures long cozy
with Wall Street, so his foreign policy team is made up of figures
deeply entrenched in Washington's national security state -- former
Clintonistas (including the penultimate Clinton herself), military
figures like National Security Adviser General James Jones, and that
refugee from the H.W. Bush era, Defense Secretary Robert Gates. They
are classic custodians of empire. Like the economic team, they represent the ancien regime.
They've now done their "stress tests," which, in the world of foreign
policy, are called "strategic reviews." They recognize that unexpected
forces are pressing in on them. They grasp that the American global
system, as it existed since the truncated American century began, is in
danger. They're ready to bite the bullet and bail it out. Their goal is
to save what they care about in ways that they know.
Unfortunately, the end result is likely to be that, as with A.I.G., we,
the American people, could end up "owning" 80% of the Af-Pak project
without ever "nationalizing" it -- without ever, that is, being in
actual control. In fact, if things go as badly as they could in the
Af-Pak War, A.I.G. might end up looking like a good deal by comparison.
The foreign policy team is no more likely to exhibit genuinely outside-the-box thinking than the team
of Tim Geithner and Larry Summers has been. Their clear and desperate
urge is to operate in the known zone, the one in which the U.S. is
always imagined to be part of the solution to any problem on the
planet, never part of the problem itself.
In foreign policy (as in economic policy), it took the Bush team less
than eight years to steer the ship of state into the shallows where it
ran disastrously aground. And yet, in response, after months of
"strategic review," this team of inside-the-Beltway realists has come
up with a combination of Af-Pak War moves that are almost blindingly
expectable.
In the end, this sort of thinking is likely to leave the Obama
administration hostage to its own projects as well as unprepared for
the onrush of the unexpected and unknown, whose arrival may be the only
thing that can be predicted with assurance right now. Whether as
custodians of the imperial economy or the imperial frontier, Obama's
people are lashed to the past, to Wall Street and the national security
state. They are ill-prepared to take the necessary full measure of our
world.
If you really want a "benchmark" for measuring how our world has
been shifting on its axis, consider that we have all lived to see a
Chinese premier appear at what was, in essence, an international news
conference and seriously upbraid Washington for its handling of the
global economy. That might have been surprising in itself. Far more
startling was the response of Washington. A year ago, the place would
have been up in arms. This time around, from White House Press
Secretary Robert Gibbs ("There's no safer investment in the world than in the United States...") to the president himself
("Not just the Chinese government, but every investor can have absolute
confidence in the soundness of investments in the United States..."),
Washington's response was to mollify and reassure.
Face it, we've entered a new universe. The "homeland" is in turmoil,
the planetary frontiers are aboil. Change -- even change we don't want
to believe in -- is in the air.
In the end, as with the Obama economic team, so the foreign policy
team may be pushed in new directions sooner than anyone imagines and,
willy-nilly, into some genuinely new thinking about a collapsing world.
But not now. Not yet. Like our present financial bailouts, like that
extra $30 billion that went into A.I.G. recently, the new Obama plan is superannuated on arrival. It represents graveyard thinking.
A.I.G...
Af-Pak War...
R.I.P.
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Tom Engelhardt
Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Type Media Center's TomDispatch.com. His books include: "A Nation Unmade by War" (2018, Dispatch Books), "Shadow Government: Surveillance, Secret Wars, and a Global Security State in a Single-Superpower World" (2014, with an introduction by Glenn Greenwald), "Terminator Planet: The First History of Drone Warfare, 2001-2050"(co-authored with Nick Turse), "The United States of Fear" (2011), "The American Way of War: How Bush's Wars Became Obama's" (2010), and "The End of Victory Culture: a History of the Cold War and Beyond" (2007).
Let's start by stopping.
It's time, as a start, to stop calling our expanding war in Central and
South Asia "the Afghan War" or "the Afghanistan War." If Obama's
special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke
doesn't want to, why should we? Recently, in a BBC interview,
he insisted that "the 'number one problem' in stabilizing Afghanistan
was Taliban sanctuaries in western Pakistan, including tribal areas
along the Afghan border and cities like Quetta" in the Pakistani
province of Baluchistan.
And isn't he right? After all, the U.S. seems to be in the process of trading in
a limited war in a mountainous, poverty-stricken country of 27 million
people for one in an advanced nation of 167 million, with a crumbling
economy, rising extremism, advancing corruption, and a large military
armed with nuclear weapons. Worse yet, the war in Pakistan seems to be
expanding inexorably (and in tandem with American war planning) from the tribal borderlands ever closer to the heart of the country.
These days, Washington has even come up with
a neologism for the change: "Af-Pak," as in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
theater of operations. So, in the name of realism and accuracy,
shouldn't we retire "the Afghan War" and begin talking about the far
more disturbing "Af-Pak War"?
And while we're at it, maybe we should retire the word "surge" as well.
Right now, as the Obama plan for that Af-Pak War is being "rolled out,"
newspaper headlines have been surging when it comes to accepting the
surge paradigm. Long before the administration's "strategic review" of
the war had even been completed, President Obama was reportedly persuaded
by former Iraq surge commander, now CentCom commander, General David
Petraeus to "surge" another 17,000 troops into Afghanistan, starting
this May.
For the last two weeks, news has been filtering out of Washington of an accompanying civilian "surge" into Afghanistan ("Obama's Afghanistan 'surge':
diplomats, civilian specialists"). Oh, and then there's to be that
opium-eradication surge and a range of other so-called surges. As the
headlines have had it: "1,400 Isle Marines to join Afghanistan surge," "U.S. troop surge to aid Afghan police trainers," "Seabees build to house surge," "Afghan Plan Detailed As Iraq Surge 'Lite,'" and so on.
It seems to matter little that even General Petraeus wonders
whether the word should be applied. ("The commander of the U.S. Central
Command said Friday that an Iraq-style surge cannot be a solution to
the problems in Afghanistan.") There are, however, other analogies that
might better capture the scope and nature of the new strategic plan for
the Af-Pak War. Think bailout. Think A.I.G.
The Costs of an Expanding War
In truth, what we're about to watch should be considered nothing less than the Great Afghan (or Af-Pak) bailout.
On Friday morning, the president officially rolled out his long-awaited "comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan," a plan without a name.
If there was little news in it, that was only because of the furious
leaking of prospective parts of it over the previous weeks. So many
trial balloons, so little time.
In a recent "60 Minutes" interview (though not in his Friday announcement), the president also emphasized the need for an "exit strategy" from the war. Similarly, American commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, has been speaking of
a possible "tipping point," three to five years away, that might lead
to "eventual departure." Nonetheless, almost every element of the new
plan -- both those the president mentioned Friday and the
no-less-crucial ones that didn't receive a nod -- seem to involve the
word "more"; that is, more U.S. troops, more U.S. diplomats, more civilian advisors, more American and NATO military advisors to train more Afghan troops
and police, more base and outpost building, more opium-eradication
operations, more aid, more money to the Pakistani military -- and
strikingly large-scale as that may be, all of that doesn't even include
the "covert war," fought mainly via unmanned aerial vehicles, along the
Pakistani tribal borderlands, which is clearly going to intensify.
In the coming year, that CIA-run drone war, according to leaked reports, may be expanded
from the tribal areas into Pakistan's more heavily populated
Baluchistan province where some of the Taliban leadership is supposedly
holed up. In addition, so reports in British papers claim, the U.S. is
seriously considering a soft coup-in-place against Afghan President
Hamid Karzai. Disillusioned with the widespread corruption in, and
inefficiency of, his government, the U.S. would create a new "chief
executive" or prime ministerial post not in the Afghan constitution --
and then install some reputedly less corrupt (and perhaps more malleable) figure. Karzai would supposedly be turned into a figurehead "father of the nation." Envoy Holbrooke has officially denied
that Washington is planning any such thing, while a spokesman for
Karzai denounced the idea (both, of course, just feeding the flames of
the Afghan rumor mill).
What this all adds up to is an ambitious doubling down on just about
every bet already made by Washington in these last years -- from the
counterinsurgency war against the Taliban and the counter-terrorism war
against al-Qaeda to the financial love/hate
relationship with the Pakistani military and its intelligence services
underway since at least the Nixon years of the early 1970s. (Many of
the flattering things now being said by U.S. officials about Pakistani
Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, for instance,
were also said about the now fallen autocrat Pervez Musharraf when he held the same position.)
Despite that mention of the need for an exit strategy and a
presidential assurance that both the Afghan and Pakistani governments
will be held to Iraqi-style "benchmarks" of accountability in the
period to come, Obama's is clearly a jump-in-with-both-feet strategy
and, not surprisingly, is sure to involve a massive infusion of new
funds. Unlike with A.I.G., where the financial inputs of the U.S.
government are at least announced, we don't even have a ballpark figure
for how much is actually involved right now, but it's bound to be
staggering. Just supporting those 17,000 new American troops already
ordered into Afghanistan, many destined to be dispatched to
still-to-be-built bases and outposts in the embattled southern and
eastern parts of the country for which all materials must be trucked
in, will certainly cost billions.
Recently, the Washington Post's Walter Pincus dug up
some of the construction and transportation costs associated with the
war in Afghanistan and found that, as an employer, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers comes in second only to the Afghan government in that
job-desperate country. The Corps is spending about $4 billion this year
alone on road-building activities, and has slated another $4-$6 billion
for more of the same in 2010; it has, according to Pincus, already
spent $2 billion constructing facilities for the expanding Afghan army
and police forces, and has another $1.2 billion set aside for more such
facilities this year. It is also likely to spend between $400 million
and $1.4 billion on as many as six new bases, assorted outposts, and associated air fields American troops will be sent to in the south.
Throw
in hardship pay, supplies, housing, and whatever else for the hundreds
of diplomats and advisors in that promised "civilian surge"; add in the
$1.5 billion a year the president promised in economic aid to Pakistan
over the next five years, a tripling of such aid (as urged
by Vice President Biden when he was still a senator); add in unknown
amounts of aid to the Pakistani and Afghan militaries. Tote it up and
you've just scratched the surface of Washington's coming investment in
the Af-Pak War. (And lest you imagine that these costs might, at least,
be offset by savings from Obama's plan to draw down American forces in
Iraq, think again. A recent study by the Government Accountability
Office suggests that "Iraq-related expenditures" will actually increase "during the withdrawal and for several years after its completion.")
Put all this together and you can see why the tactical word "surge"
hardly covers what's about to happen. The administration's "new"
strategy and its "new" thinking -- including its urge to peel off less
committed Taliban supporters and reach out for help to regional powers
-- should really be re-imagined as but another massive attempted
bailout, this time of an Afghan project, now almost 40 years old, that
in foreign policy terms is indeed our A.I.G.
Graveyard Thinking
As Obama's economic team overseeing the various financial bailouts is made up of figures long cozy
with Wall Street, so his foreign policy team is made up of figures
deeply entrenched in Washington's national security state -- former
Clintonistas (including the penultimate Clinton herself), military
figures like National Security Adviser General James Jones, and that
refugee from the H.W. Bush era, Defense Secretary Robert Gates. They
are classic custodians of empire. Like the economic team, they represent the ancien regime.
They've now done their "stress tests," which, in the world of foreign
policy, are called "strategic reviews." They recognize that unexpected
forces are pressing in on them. They grasp that the American global
system, as it existed since the truncated American century began, is in
danger. They're ready to bite the bullet and bail it out. Their goal is
to save what they care about in ways that they know.
Unfortunately, the end result is likely to be that, as with A.I.G., we,
the American people, could end up "owning" 80% of the Af-Pak project
without ever "nationalizing" it -- without ever, that is, being in
actual control. In fact, if things go as badly as they could in the
Af-Pak War, A.I.G. might end up looking like a good deal by comparison.
The foreign policy team is no more likely to exhibit genuinely outside-the-box thinking than the team
of Tim Geithner and Larry Summers has been. Their clear and desperate
urge is to operate in the known zone, the one in which the U.S. is
always imagined to be part of the solution to any problem on the
planet, never part of the problem itself.
In foreign policy (as in economic policy), it took the Bush team less
than eight years to steer the ship of state into the shallows where it
ran disastrously aground. And yet, in response, after months of
"strategic review," this team of inside-the-Beltway realists has come
up with a combination of Af-Pak War moves that are almost blindingly
expectable.
In the end, this sort of thinking is likely to leave the Obama
administration hostage to its own projects as well as unprepared for
the onrush of the unexpected and unknown, whose arrival may be the only
thing that can be predicted with assurance right now. Whether as
custodians of the imperial economy or the imperial frontier, Obama's
people are lashed to the past, to Wall Street and the national security
state. They are ill-prepared to take the necessary full measure of our
world.
If you really want a "benchmark" for measuring how our world has
been shifting on its axis, consider that we have all lived to see a
Chinese premier appear at what was, in essence, an international news
conference and seriously upbraid Washington for its handling of the
global economy. That might have been surprising in itself. Far more
startling was the response of Washington. A year ago, the place would
have been up in arms. This time around, from White House Press
Secretary Robert Gibbs ("There's no safer investment in the world than in the United States...") to the president himself
("Not just the Chinese government, but every investor can have absolute
confidence in the soundness of investments in the United States..."),
Washington's response was to mollify and reassure.
Face it, we've entered a new universe. The "homeland" is in turmoil,
the planetary frontiers are aboil. Change -- even change we don't want
to believe in -- is in the air.
In the end, as with the Obama economic team, so the foreign policy
team may be pushed in new directions sooner than anyone imagines and,
willy-nilly, into some genuinely new thinking about a collapsing world.
But not now. Not yet. Like our present financial bailouts, like that
extra $30 billion that went into A.I.G. recently, the new Obama plan is superannuated on arrival. It represents graveyard thinking.
A.I.G...
Af-Pak War...
R.I.P.
Tom Engelhardt
Tom Engelhardt, co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Type Media Center's TomDispatch.com. His books include: "A Nation Unmade by War" (2018, Dispatch Books), "Shadow Government: Surveillance, Secret Wars, and a Global Security State in a Single-Superpower World" (2014, with an introduction by Glenn Greenwald), "Terminator Planet: The First History of Drone Warfare, 2001-2050"(co-authored with Nick Turse), "The United States of Fear" (2011), "The American Way of War: How Bush's Wars Became Obama's" (2010), and "The End of Victory Culture: a History of the Cold War and Beyond" (2007).
Let's start by stopping.
It's time, as a start, to stop calling our expanding war in Central and
South Asia "the Afghan War" or "the Afghanistan War." If Obama's
special representative to Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke
doesn't want to, why should we? Recently, in a BBC interview,
he insisted that "the 'number one problem' in stabilizing Afghanistan
was Taliban sanctuaries in western Pakistan, including tribal areas
along the Afghan border and cities like Quetta" in the Pakistani
province of Baluchistan.
And isn't he right? After all, the U.S. seems to be in the process of trading in
a limited war in a mountainous, poverty-stricken country of 27 million
people for one in an advanced nation of 167 million, with a crumbling
economy, rising extremism, advancing corruption, and a large military
armed with nuclear weapons. Worse yet, the war in Pakistan seems to be
expanding inexorably (and in tandem with American war planning) from the tribal borderlands ever closer to the heart of the country.
These days, Washington has even come up with
a neologism for the change: "Af-Pak," as in the Afghanistan-Pakistan
theater of operations. So, in the name of realism and accuracy,
shouldn't we retire "the Afghan War" and begin talking about the far
more disturbing "Af-Pak War"?
And while we're at it, maybe we should retire the word "surge" as well.
Right now, as the Obama plan for that Af-Pak War is being "rolled out,"
newspaper headlines have been surging when it comes to accepting the
surge paradigm. Long before the administration's "strategic review" of
the war had even been completed, President Obama was reportedly persuaded
by former Iraq surge commander, now CentCom commander, General David
Petraeus to "surge" another 17,000 troops into Afghanistan, starting
this May.
For the last two weeks, news has been filtering out of Washington of an accompanying civilian "surge" into Afghanistan ("Obama's Afghanistan 'surge':
diplomats, civilian specialists"). Oh, and then there's to be that
opium-eradication surge and a range of other so-called surges. As the
headlines have had it: "1,400 Isle Marines to join Afghanistan surge," "U.S. troop surge to aid Afghan police trainers," "Seabees build to house surge," "Afghan Plan Detailed As Iraq Surge 'Lite,'" and so on.
It seems to matter little that even General Petraeus wonders
whether the word should be applied. ("The commander of the U.S. Central
Command said Friday that an Iraq-style surge cannot be a solution to
the problems in Afghanistan.") There are, however, other analogies that
might better capture the scope and nature of the new strategic plan for
the Af-Pak War. Think bailout. Think A.I.G.
The Costs of an Expanding War
In truth, what we're about to watch should be considered nothing less than the Great Afghan (or Af-Pak) bailout.
On Friday morning, the president officially rolled out his long-awaited "comprehensive new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan," a plan without a name.
If there was little news in it, that was only because of the furious
leaking of prospective parts of it over the previous weeks. So many
trial balloons, so little time.
In a recent "60 Minutes" interview (though not in his Friday announcement), the president also emphasized the need for an "exit strategy" from the war. Similarly, American commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, has been speaking of
a possible "tipping point," three to five years away, that might lead
to "eventual departure." Nonetheless, almost every element of the new
plan -- both those the president mentioned Friday and the
no-less-crucial ones that didn't receive a nod -- seem to involve the
word "more"; that is, more U.S. troops, more U.S. diplomats, more civilian advisors, more American and NATO military advisors to train more Afghan troops
and police, more base and outpost building, more opium-eradication
operations, more aid, more money to the Pakistani military -- and
strikingly large-scale as that may be, all of that doesn't even include
the "covert war," fought mainly via unmanned aerial vehicles, along the
Pakistani tribal borderlands, which is clearly going to intensify.
In the coming year, that CIA-run drone war, according to leaked reports, may be expanded
from the tribal areas into Pakistan's more heavily populated
Baluchistan province where some of the Taliban leadership is supposedly
holed up. In addition, so reports in British papers claim, the U.S. is
seriously considering a soft coup-in-place against Afghan President
Hamid Karzai. Disillusioned with the widespread corruption in, and
inefficiency of, his government, the U.S. would create a new "chief
executive" or prime ministerial post not in the Afghan constitution --
and then install some reputedly less corrupt (and perhaps more malleable) figure. Karzai would supposedly be turned into a figurehead "father of the nation." Envoy Holbrooke has officially denied
that Washington is planning any such thing, while a spokesman for
Karzai denounced the idea (both, of course, just feeding the flames of
the Afghan rumor mill).
What this all adds up to is an ambitious doubling down on just about
every bet already made by Washington in these last years -- from the
counterinsurgency war against the Taliban and the counter-terrorism war
against al-Qaeda to the financial love/hate
relationship with the Pakistani military and its intelligence services
underway since at least the Nixon years of the early 1970s. (Many of
the flattering things now being said by U.S. officials about Pakistani
Chief of the Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, for instance,
were also said about the now fallen autocrat Pervez Musharraf when he held the same position.)
Despite that mention of the need for an exit strategy and a
presidential assurance that both the Afghan and Pakistani governments
will be held to Iraqi-style "benchmarks" of accountability in the
period to come, Obama's is clearly a jump-in-with-both-feet strategy
and, not surprisingly, is sure to involve a massive infusion of new
funds. Unlike with A.I.G., where the financial inputs of the U.S.
government are at least announced, we don't even have a ballpark figure
for how much is actually involved right now, but it's bound to be
staggering. Just supporting those 17,000 new American troops already
ordered into Afghanistan, many destined to be dispatched to
still-to-be-built bases and outposts in the embattled southern and
eastern parts of the country for which all materials must be trucked
in, will certainly cost billions.
Recently, the Washington Post's Walter Pincus dug up
some of the construction and transportation costs associated with the
war in Afghanistan and found that, as an employer, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers comes in second only to the Afghan government in that
job-desperate country. The Corps is spending about $4 billion this year
alone on road-building activities, and has slated another $4-$6 billion
for more of the same in 2010; it has, according to Pincus, already
spent $2 billion constructing facilities for the expanding Afghan army
and police forces, and has another $1.2 billion set aside for more such
facilities this year. It is also likely to spend between $400 million
and $1.4 billion on as many as six new bases, assorted outposts, and associated air fields American troops will be sent to in the south.
Throw
in hardship pay, supplies, housing, and whatever else for the hundreds
of diplomats and advisors in that promised "civilian surge"; add in the
$1.5 billion a year the president promised in economic aid to Pakistan
over the next five years, a tripling of such aid (as urged
by Vice President Biden when he was still a senator); add in unknown
amounts of aid to the Pakistani and Afghan militaries. Tote it up and
you've just scratched the surface of Washington's coming investment in
the Af-Pak War. (And lest you imagine that these costs might, at least,
be offset by savings from Obama's plan to draw down American forces in
Iraq, think again. A recent study by the Government Accountability
Office suggests that "Iraq-related expenditures" will actually increase "during the withdrawal and for several years after its completion.")
Put all this together and you can see why the tactical word "surge"
hardly covers what's about to happen. The administration's "new"
strategy and its "new" thinking -- including its urge to peel off less
committed Taliban supporters and reach out for help to regional powers
-- should really be re-imagined as but another massive attempted
bailout, this time of an Afghan project, now almost 40 years old, that
in foreign policy terms is indeed our A.I.G.
Graveyard Thinking
As Obama's economic team overseeing the various financial bailouts is made up of figures long cozy
with Wall Street, so his foreign policy team is made up of figures
deeply entrenched in Washington's national security state -- former
Clintonistas (including the penultimate Clinton herself), military
figures like National Security Adviser General James Jones, and that
refugee from the H.W. Bush era, Defense Secretary Robert Gates. They
are classic custodians of empire. Like the economic team, they represent the ancien regime.
They've now done their "stress tests," which, in the world of foreign
policy, are called "strategic reviews." They recognize that unexpected
forces are pressing in on them. They grasp that the American global
system, as it existed since the truncated American century began, is in
danger. They're ready to bite the bullet and bail it out. Their goal is
to save what they care about in ways that they know.
Unfortunately, the end result is likely to be that, as with A.I.G., we,
the American people, could end up "owning" 80% of the Af-Pak project
without ever "nationalizing" it -- without ever, that is, being in
actual control. In fact, if things go as badly as they could in the
Af-Pak War, A.I.G. might end up looking like a good deal by comparison.
The foreign policy team is no more likely to exhibit genuinely outside-the-box thinking than the team
of Tim Geithner and Larry Summers has been. Their clear and desperate
urge is to operate in the known zone, the one in which the U.S. is
always imagined to be part of the solution to any problem on the
planet, never part of the problem itself.
In foreign policy (as in economic policy), it took the Bush team less
than eight years to steer the ship of state into the shallows where it
ran disastrously aground. And yet, in response, after months of
"strategic review," this team of inside-the-Beltway realists has come
up with a combination of Af-Pak War moves that are almost blindingly
expectable.
In the end, this sort of thinking is likely to leave the Obama
administration hostage to its own projects as well as unprepared for
the onrush of the unexpected and unknown, whose arrival may be the only
thing that can be predicted with assurance right now. Whether as
custodians of the imperial economy or the imperial frontier, Obama's
people are lashed to the past, to Wall Street and the national security
state. They are ill-prepared to take the necessary full measure of our
world.
If you really want a "benchmark" for measuring how our world has
been shifting on its axis, consider that we have all lived to see a
Chinese premier appear at what was, in essence, an international news
conference and seriously upbraid Washington for its handling of the
global economy. That might have been surprising in itself. Far more
startling was the response of Washington. A year ago, the place would
have been up in arms. This time around, from White House Press
Secretary Robert Gibbs ("There's no safer investment in the world than in the United States...") to the president himself
("Not just the Chinese government, but every investor can have absolute
confidence in the soundness of investments in the United States..."),
Washington's response was to mollify and reassure.
Face it, we've entered a new universe. The "homeland" is in turmoil,
the planetary frontiers are aboil. Change -- even change we don't want
to believe in -- is in the air.
In the end, as with the Obama economic team, so the foreign policy
team may be pushed in new directions sooner than anyone imagines and,
willy-nilly, into some genuinely new thinking about a collapsing world.
But not now. Not yet. Like our present financial bailouts, like that
extra $30 billion that went into A.I.G. recently, the new Obama plan is superannuated on arrival. It represents graveyard thinking.
A.I.G...
Af-Pak War...
R.I.P.
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