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A few years back, when President Bush described Libya's decision to put aside its programs for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, he applauded the Qaddafi regime for abandoning its quest for "weapons of mass murder."
When it became clear that Iran was seeking to develop its own capacity to enrich uranium the Bush administration engaged in a vigorous campaign of saber-rattling that included military threats in the form of ominous statements that "no options are off the table" in addressing Iran's program.
After years of calling for sanctions and other "tough" measures, the Bush administration engaged in serious negotiations with North Korea about its nuclear weapons programs.
And the administration justified its war with Iraq in large part by scaring the American public about the need to act quickly to destroy Saddam Hussein's regime, before waiting for the "smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."
This record of anti-proliferation activity - however uneven in its application - certainly gives the impression that stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is a top administration priority. But a closer look at its policy on this issue suggests that nothing could be further from the truth.
Perhaps the clearest example of President Bush's "do as I say, not as I do" policy is the Department of Energy's "Complex 2030" plan to build a new generation of nuclear weapons. With a potential price tag of $175 billion or more over the next two decades, the initiative calls for the replacement of every deployed warhead in the U.S. arsenal and the construction of a series of new facilities, including a multi-billion dollar plutonium production plant. It's hard to tell other countries that building nuclear weapons is dangerous and unnecessary while the United States proceeds with a plan that will have us in the nuclear weapons business well into the middle of this century.
A second thread in the policy of nuclear hypocrisy involves the myth that there can be "good" nuclear weapons states and "bad" nuclear weapons states, based entirely on which countries happen to be U.S. allies. When India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, they received a brief slap on the wrist from the Clinton administration; no outrage, no long-term sanctions, and no serious attempts at negotiations to cap and reverse this dangerous development. In fact, in the past few years these countries have essentially been rewarded with large military packages ($5 billion worth of F-16 combat aircraft for
Pakistan) and proposals to transfer nuclear technology (the provocative U.S.-India nuclear deal).
And of course, Israel's estimated arsenal of 200 nuclear weapons is never spoken of by U.S. officials, and certainly has never figured in any public discussions about how to achieve peace in the Middle East.
Despite acknowledging in the 2004 presidential campaign that the greatest danger to U.S. security could be the acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons by a terrorist group, President Bush has failed to accelerate programs designed to eliminate or secure loose nuclear weapons or nuclear bomb-making materials in Russia. This is a huge strategic blunder when one considers that the massive Russian stockpiles are the most likely source for terrorists seeking the bomb.
If this administration or the next is serious about stemming the spread of nuclear weapons, it needs to abandon plans to develop new nuclear weapons; pressure its allies to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons programs; and invest more resources in putting bombs and bomb-making materials out of terrorist reach. Perhaps most importantly of all, it must get back to the business of radically reducing our own nuclear arsenal, in parallel with efforts to organize a global summit on reducing the nuclear danger. A policy of nuclear hypocrisy is not just unethical - it is also an unacceptable danger to the future of humanity.
William D. Hartung is a Senior Research Fellow at the World Policy Institute at the New School in New York.
Dear Common Dreams reader, It’s been nearly 30 years since I co-founded Common Dreams with my late wife, Lina Newhouser. We had the radical notion that journalism should serve the public good, not corporate profits. It was clear to us from the outset what it would take to build such a project. No paid advertisements. No corporate sponsors. No millionaire publisher telling us what to think or do. Many people said we wouldn't last a year, but we proved those doubters wrong. Together with a tremendous team of journalists and dedicated staff, we built an independent media outlet free from the constraints of profits and corporate control. Our mission has always been simple: To inform. To inspire. To ignite change for the common good. Building Common Dreams was not easy. Our survival was never guaranteed. When you take on the most powerful forces—Wall Street greed, fossil fuel industry destruction, Big Tech lobbyists, and uber-rich oligarchs who have spent billions upon billions rigging the economy and democracy in their favor—the only bulwark you have is supporters who believe in your work. But here’s the urgent message from me today. It's never been this bad out there. And it's never been this hard to keep us going. At the very moment Common Dreams is most needed, the threats we face are intensifying. We need your support now more than ever. We don't accept corporate advertising and never will. We don't have a paywall because we don't think people should be blocked from critical news based on their ability to pay. Everything we do is funded by the donations of readers like you. When everyone does the little they can afford, we are strong. But if that support retreats or dries up, so do we. Will you donate now to make sure Common Dreams not only survives but thrives? —Craig Brown, Co-founder |
A few years back, when President Bush described Libya's decision to put aside its programs for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, he applauded the Qaddafi regime for abandoning its quest for "weapons of mass murder."
When it became clear that Iran was seeking to develop its own capacity to enrich uranium the Bush administration engaged in a vigorous campaign of saber-rattling that included military threats in the form of ominous statements that "no options are off the table" in addressing Iran's program.
After years of calling for sanctions and other "tough" measures, the Bush administration engaged in serious negotiations with North Korea about its nuclear weapons programs.
And the administration justified its war with Iraq in large part by scaring the American public about the need to act quickly to destroy Saddam Hussein's regime, before waiting for the "smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."
This record of anti-proliferation activity - however uneven in its application - certainly gives the impression that stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is a top administration priority. But a closer look at its policy on this issue suggests that nothing could be further from the truth.
Perhaps the clearest example of President Bush's "do as I say, not as I do" policy is the Department of Energy's "Complex 2030" plan to build a new generation of nuclear weapons. With a potential price tag of $175 billion or more over the next two decades, the initiative calls for the replacement of every deployed warhead in the U.S. arsenal and the construction of a series of new facilities, including a multi-billion dollar plutonium production plant. It's hard to tell other countries that building nuclear weapons is dangerous and unnecessary while the United States proceeds with a plan that will have us in the nuclear weapons business well into the middle of this century.
A second thread in the policy of nuclear hypocrisy involves the myth that there can be "good" nuclear weapons states and "bad" nuclear weapons states, based entirely on which countries happen to be U.S. allies. When India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, they received a brief slap on the wrist from the Clinton administration; no outrage, no long-term sanctions, and no serious attempts at negotiations to cap and reverse this dangerous development. In fact, in the past few years these countries have essentially been rewarded with large military packages ($5 billion worth of F-16 combat aircraft for
Pakistan) and proposals to transfer nuclear technology (the provocative U.S.-India nuclear deal).
And of course, Israel's estimated arsenal of 200 nuclear weapons is never spoken of by U.S. officials, and certainly has never figured in any public discussions about how to achieve peace in the Middle East.
Despite acknowledging in the 2004 presidential campaign that the greatest danger to U.S. security could be the acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons by a terrorist group, President Bush has failed to accelerate programs designed to eliminate or secure loose nuclear weapons or nuclear bomb-making materials in Russia. This is a huge strategic blunder when one considers that the massive Russian stockpiles are the most likely source for terrorists seeking the bomb.
If this administration or the next is serious about stemming the spread of nuclear weapons, it needs to abandon plans to develop new nuclear weapons; pressure its allies to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons programs; and invest more resources in putting bombs and bomb-making materials out of terrorist reach. Perhaps most importantly of all, it must get back to the business of radically reducing our own nuclear arsenal, in parallel with efforts to organize a global summit on reducing the nuclear danger. A policy of nuclear hypocrisy is not just unethical - it is also an unacceptable danger to the future of humanity.
William D. Hartung is a Senior Research Fellow at the World Policy Institute at the New School in New York.
A few years back, when President Bush described Libya's decision to put aside its programs for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, he applauded the Qaddafi regime for abandoning its quest for "weapons of mass murder."
When it became clear that Iran was seeking to develop its own capacity to enrich uranium the Bush administration engaged in a vigorous campaign of saber-rattling that included military threats in the form of ominous statements that "no options are off the table" in addressing Iran's program.
After years of calling for sanctions and other "tough" measures, the Bush administration engaged in serious negotiations with North Korea about its nuclear weapons programs.
And the administration justified its war with Iraq in large part by scaring the American public about the need to act quickly to destroy Saddam Hussein's regime, before waiting for the "smoking gun that could come in the form of a mushroom cloud."
This record of anti-proliferation activity - however uneven in its application - certainly gives the impression that stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is a top administration priority. But a closer look at its policy on this issue suggests that nothing could be further from the truth.
Perhaps the clearest example of President Bush's "do as I say, not as I do" policy is the Department of Energy's "Complex 2030" plan to build a new generation of nuclear weapons. With a potential price tag of $175 billion or more over the next two decades, the initiative calls for the replacement of every deployed warhead in the U.S. arsenal and the construction of a series of new facilities, including a multi-billion dollar plutonium production plant. It's hard to tell other countries that building nuclear weapons is dangerous and unnecessary while the United States proceeds with a plan that will have us in the nuclear weapons business well into the middle of this century.
A second thread in the policy of nuclear hypocrisy involves the myth that there can be "good" nuclear weapons states and "bad" nuclear weapons states, based entirely on which countries happen to be U.S. allies. When India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons in 1998, they received a brief slap on the wrist from the Clinton administration; no outrage, no long-term sanctions, and no serious attempts at negotiations to cap and reverse this dangerous development. In fact, in the past few years these countries have essentially been rewarded with large military packages ($5 billion worth of F-16 combat aircraft for
Pakistan) and proposals to transfer nuclear technology (the provocative U.S.-India nuclear deal).
And of course, Israel's estimated arsenal of 200 nuclear weapons is never spoken of by U.S. officials, and certainly has never figured in any public discussions about how to achieve peace in the Middle East.
Despite acknowledging in the 2004 presidential campaign that the greatest danger to U.S. security could be the acquisition of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons by a terrorist group, President Bush has failed to accelerate programs designed to eliminate or secure loose nuclear weapons or nuclear bomb-making materials in Russia. This is a huge strategic blunder when one considers that the massive Russian stockpiles are the most likely source for terrorists seeking the bomb.
If this administration or the next is serious about stemming the spread of nuclear weapons, it needs to abandon plans to develop new nuclear weapons; pressure its allies to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons programs; and invest more resources in putting bombs and bomb-making materials out of terrorist reach. Perhaps most importantly of all, it must get back to the business of radically reducing our own nuclear arsenal, in parallel with efforts to organize a global summit on reducing the nuclear danger. A policy of nuclear hypocrisy is not just unethical - it is also an unacceptable danger to the future of humanity.
William D. Hartung is a Senior Research Fellow at the World Policy Institute at the New School in New York.