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"It is a question of deciding whether or not NATO countries are directly involved in a military conflict," said Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Russian President Vladimir Putin said Thursday that if the United States and the United Kingdom allow Ukraine to strike deep inside Russia with Western missiles, "it will mean nothing less than the direct involvement of NATO countries."
"This is not a question of allowing the Ukrainian regime to strike Russia with these weapons or not. It is a question of deciding whether or not NATO countries are directly involved in a military conflict," Putin told Russian state TV. "This will be their direct participation, and this, of course, will significantly change the very essence, the very nature of the conflict."
Putin's remarks came amid reports that U.S. President Joe Biden appears poised to let Ukraine use long-range missiles against Russia, signaling a perilous new phase in a deadly war that has dragged on for two and a half years since Russia's invasion in February 2022.
According to The New York Times, "President Biden appears on the verge of clearing the way for Ukraine to launch long-range Western weapons deep inside Russian territory, as long as it doesn't use arms provided by the United States."
"The issue, which has long been debated in the administration, is coming to a head on Friday with the first official visit to the White House by Britain's new prime minister, Keir Starmer," the Times reported Thursday. "Britain has already signaled to the United States that it is eager to let Ukraine use its 'Storm Shadow' long-range missiles to strike at Russian military targets far from the Ukrainian border. But it wants explicit permission from Mr. Biden in order to demonstrate a coordinated strategy with the United States and France, which makes a similar missile."
Ahead of the decision, the Pentagon pointed to Iran's alleged transfer of ballistic missiles to Russia as further reason to bolster Ukraine's military capabilities. A spokesperson for Iran's foreign ministry said in response that "the publication of false and misleading reports about the transfer of Iranian weapons to some countries is simply ugly propaganda to conceal the large illegal arms support of the United States and some Western countries for the genocide in Gaza."
Ukraine, which has received roughly $55.7 billion in military assistance from the U.S. since February 2022, has already launched repeated drone attacks deep inside Russia, but Western permission for Kyiv to use long-range missiles could be a dire escalation.
As Politico noted, Moscow could retaliate against a long-range missile strike on Russia by hitting "a target inside NATO, such as the critical weapons supply hub in the Polish city of Rzeszów." Such an exchange could result in direct conflict between the nuclear-armed powers.
"Military experts argue any guidelines agreed for the British weapons at the two-hour summit in Washington could also then pave the way for the Ukrainians to fire U.S.-supplied ATACMS—a tactical ballistic missile system—at airfields and army bases deep inside Russia," the outlet observed.
The potential intensification and spread of the war comes as the prospect of a diplomatic resolution appears nonexistent, at least in the near term.
Aída Chávez, communications director and policy adviser at Just Foreign Policy, wrote for The Intercept earlier this week that members of the U.S. Congressional Progressive Caucus were "pilloried" over an October 2022 letter urging Biden to "make vigorous diplomatic efforts in support of a negotiated settlement and ceasefire, engage in direct talks with Russia, explore prospects for a new European security arrangement acceptable to all parties that will allow for a sovereign and independent Ukraine, and, in coordination with our Ukrainian partners, seek a rapid end to the conflict and reiterate this goal as America's chief priority."
Today, Chávez wrote, the progressives who signed the letter—which was ultimately withdrawn by the CPC leadership—"look more prescient than ever."
"Since the ill-fated letter, the war has ground on—with devastating results for the people of Ukraine," Chávez continued. "Ukraine is not in a position to win the war, nor does it have a stronger bargaining position in talks than it did in late 2022 when the CPC letter came out."
Relitigating these details two years later cannot be dismissed as an exercise in political archeology. More than two years later, the war drags on with no end in sight.
Victoria Nuland, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and one of the principal architects of the Biden administration’s Russia policy, has now opined on what is perhaps the foggiest episode in a war distinguished by a nearly impenetrable kind of diplomatic opacity: the April 2022 Istanbul peace talks between Russia and Ukraine.
Furthermore she acknowledges that there was a deal on the table and that Western powers didn’t like conditions that would have limited Ukraine's military arsenal, lending credence to the theory that Ukraine’s supporters had a hand in ultimately scuttling it.
To be sure, neither the topic nor the content of Nuland’s comments is new. She is but the latest in a cavalcade of high-profile insiders, including former Israeli Prime Minister Nafatli Bennett and Ukrainian politician Davyd Arakhamia, whose testimony has shed light on the external pressures possibly informing the Zelenskyy government’s fateful decision to pull the plug on Turkish-brokered talks surrounding a draft treaty that would have ended the Ukraine war.
But, if we are to arrive at something approximating a full and unprejudiced post-mortem, it remains a necessary even if ungrateful task to carefully catalog all of these accounts — especially one from as influential a Russia policy figure as Nuland.
“Relatively late in the game the Ukrainians began asking for advice on where this thing was going and it became clear to us, clear to the Brits, clear to others that (Russian President Vladimir) Putin's main condition was buried in an annex to this document that they were working on,” she said, referencing Russia’s stipulation for hard caps and other limits on military personnel and types of weaponry that Ukraine can possess.
Such concessions, she argued, should be rejected by Kyiv because they would leave Ukraine “basically neutered as a military force.” She intimated, unsurprisingly without indulging specifics, that these anxieties were expressed by Western officials: “People inside Ukraine and people outside Ukraine started asking questions about whether this was a good deal and it was at that point that it fell apart,” Nuland said.
Just who “outside Ukraine” posed these questions and precisely what effect did these pointed queries exercise on Ukrainian officials? The full story of that short-lived diplomatic interlude is unlikely to be unraveled until after the war, in no small part due to the obvious political sensitivities at play. But there is now what appears to be, even in the most conservative estimation, a large body of circumstantial evidence that Western actors, quite possibly hailing from the UK and other countries which were designated as “guarantors” of Ukraine’s security under the Istanbul draft treaty, expressed reservations about the Istanbul format.
The extent to which these Western reservations were decisive insofar as they constituted a hard veto over the peace talks is a trickier question. One can reasonably surmise that Ukraine would have found it difficult to ink a deal that did not command at least tacit support from the Western countries on which it overwhelmingly relies, but it is no less true that the talks were fraught and, though there were positive signs of a slow convergence between the Moscow and Kyiv on key issues, the two sides were a considerable ways off from fully harmonizing their positions when the deal was terminated.
Victoria Nuland's comments lend further credence to the proposition that a settlement between Russia and Ukraine was on the table in Istanbul, that the West played a role in shaping Ukrainian thinking on the desirability of pursuing negotiations, and that Western leaders apparently conveyed the view that it was a bad deal.
Relitigating these details two years later cannot be dismissed as an exercise in political archeology; the facts of what transpired in Istanbul are as relevant as ever in informing our thinking about endgame scenarios as the war roils into its third year.
"They have a mindset of a master sitting somewhere out there overseas and believing to be totally safe and secure, thinking that not only Ukrainians, but also... Europeans would be willing to do the dirty work and die for them."
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on Tuesday warned the United States that if the war in Ukraine escalates into a wider military conflict, a potential World War III would not be limited to battlefields in Europe.
While taking questions from journalists two-and-a-half years after Russian President Vladimir Putin's invasion, Lavrov was asked to address recent reporting in The Guardian about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy wanting to use long-range Storm Shadow missiles that "threaten Moscow and St. Petersburg" to force Russia to the negotiating table.
As the British newspaper explained: "Storm Shadow missiles were developed primarily by an Anglo-French collaboration and are made by European joint venture MBDA, which also has an Italian partner. But because some of its components are supplied by the U.S., the White House also has to agree to its use inside Russia. It has so far refused to do so, fearing an escalation of the conflict."
Lavrov declared that "this is blackmail, an attempt to pretend that the West seeks to avoid any excessive escalation. In reality, they are full of mischief. Avoiding escalation is not what the West is after. To put it into plain language, they are simply picking a fight."
The longtime Russian minister also pointed to various remarks from John Kirby, the White House national security communications adviser, along the lines of what he said Friday: "We've been watching escalation risks since the beginning of this conflict, and that ain't gonna change. We're always going to be concerned about the potential for the aggression in Ukraine to lead to escalation on the European continent."
Lavrov said that "for Americans, any talk about the Third World War comes down to something that would affect Europe alone, and God forbid if it ever happened. This is quite telling, since this idea reflects the mindset of the American planners and geostrategy experts who believe that they can simply sit the whole thing out. I think that it is important to understand in this situation that we have our own doctrine, including the one governing the use of nuclear weapons. An effort to update it is underway."
"Moreover, these Americans are well aware of the provisions it sets forth. This fact transpires from the Freudian slips they make when they say that having a Third World War would be a bad thing because they do not want Europe to suffer," he continued. "This is what this American mindset comes down to. They have a mindset of a master sitting somewhere out there overseas and believing to be totally safe and secure, thinking that not only Ukrainians, but also, as it turns out, Europeans would be willing to do the dirty work and die for them."
"We have long been hearing speculation about authorizing Ukraine to use not only the Storm Shadow missiles, but also U.S.-made long-range missiles," the minister noted. "Now, all we can do is confirm once again that playing with fire is a dangerous thing for the men and women in charge of nuclear weapons across the Western world, but they are playing with matches as if they never grew up."
While there are nine nuclear-armed nations, the United States and Russia collectively have roughly 90% of the global arsenal. Since the Kremlin launched its invasion in February 2022, as the U.S. and Europe have armed Ukraine's soldiers, Putin and other Russian officials—along with NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg—have stoked fears of nuclear weapons use.
Mikhail Sheremet, who represents Crimea—which Russia invaded and annexed from Ukraine a decade ago—in Russia's State Duma, told TASS on Tuesday that the U.S. should consider the consequences of giving Ukrainian troops long-range cruise missiles.
"The ball is now in the U.S.' court but it's clearly finding it difficult to play the game because it will have to take reality into consideration and carefully weigh everything before passing the ball to Ukraine, which aims to drag the U.S. and Europe into a potential World War III," Sheremet told the Russian news agency.
"Undoubtedly, the U.S. will try to implement its far-reaching aggressive plans to provide cruise missiles to the Kyiv regime. They will probably try to do that through Europe, which they have under their thumb," he added. "But in any case, the price of this decision will be too high for them to pay, leading to the loss of their own statehood."
Earlier this month, Ukraine attacked Russia's Kursk region and "has carved out a slice of territory in the biggest foreign attack on Russia since World War II," Reuters reported Tuesday. As the outlet detailed:
Russia has said that Western weaponry, including British tanks and U.S. rocket systems, have been used by Ukraine in Kursk. Kyiv has confirmed using U.S. HIMARS missiles to take out bridges in Kursk.
Washington says it was not informed about Ukraine's plans ahead of the surprise incursion into Kursk. The United States has also said it did not take any part in the operation.
Multiple Russian government officials have made clear that they don't believe those U.S. claims.
Still, based on interviews that Anatol Lieven of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft recently conducted with "members of the Russian establishment, including former diplomats, members of think tanks, academics, and businesspeople, as well as a few members of the wider public," the majority of them want "an early cease-fire roughly along the existing battle lines."
"Most of my conversations took place before the Ukrainian invasion of the Russian province of Kursk. As far as I can make out, however, this Ukrainian success has not changed basic Russian calculations and views," Lieven wrote Tuesday for Foreign Policy.
"In the end, of course, Russia's negotiating position will be decided by Putin—with whom I did not speak," he acknowledged. "Nobody I spoke to in Moscow claimed to know for sure what Putin is thinking. However, the consensus was that while he made terrible mistakes at the start of the war, he is a pragmatist capable of taking military advice and recognizing military reality."