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A French soldier enforcing the Vigipirate plan, France's national security alert system, patrols in front of the Arc de Triomphe on Nov. 16, 2015 in Paris. (Photo: Joel Saget/AFP/Getty Images)
Metadata Surveillance Didn't Stop the Paris Attacks
Nov 17, 2015
Since terrorists struck Paris last Friday night, the debate over whether encryption prevents intelligence services from stopping attacks has reignited. The New York Times and Yahoo reported on vague claims that the terrorists' use of encryption stymied investigators who might have thwarted their plans. CIA Director John Brennan made equally vague comments Monday morning, warning that thanks to the privacy protections of the post-Snowden era, it is now "much more challenging" for intelligence agencies to find terrorists. Jeb Bush piled on, saying that the United States needs to restore its program collecting metadata on U.S. phone calls, even though that program won't be shut down until the end of this month.
Following a terrorism incident as shocking as the Paris attacks, it is no surprise that politicians and the intelligence establishment would want to widen American spying capabilities. But their arguments are conflating the forest--bulk metadata collection--and the trees: access to individual communications about the attack. To understand why that's the case, start with this tweet from former NSA and DHS official Stewart Baker: "NSA's 215 program"--and by association the far larger metadata dragnet of which the domestically focused phone-metadata program is just a small part--"was designed to detect a Mumbai/Paris-style attack."
Only it didn't.
The metadata surveillance system appears to have failed before it even got to the encryption stage.
The United States and United Kingdom's metadata collection that focuses on the Middle East and Europe is far more extensive than the phone dragnet being shut down later this month, and its use has far more permissive rules. This dragnet is mostly limited by technology, not law. And France--which rewrote its surveillance laws after the Charlie Hebdo attack earlier this year--has its own surveillance system. Both are in place, yet neither detected the Nov. 13 plot. This means they failed to alert authorities to the people they should more closely target via both electronic and physical surveillance. In significant part, this system appears to have failed before it even got to the stage at which investigators would need to worry about terrorists' use of encryption.
To understand why that's true, it helps to understand how the metadata dragnet relates to surveillance of content as well as human spying.
In most public comments going back to the initial leaks from Edward Snowden (and in Baker's tweet from the weekend), authorities have made a shaky claim: that the surveillance dragnet is "designed to detect" an attack like Paris. Based on that claimed purpose, their dragnets are failing.
But that claim was always an oversimplification. It oversold the importance of the dragnet, by itself, such that citizens might more willingly tolerate the collection of highly revealing personal details. Because it doesn't include the actual content of our conversations, call metadata doesn't seem especially intimate; if it's the only thing authorities say they need to prevent a big terrorist attack, citizens might easily conclude that they're fine with the government collecting it. But the claim also served to hide how quickly metadata analysis can lead to the reading of content.
The intelligence community has given us a more nuanced understanding of the purpose of the metadata dragnet, however, in a National Academy of Sciences paper on "Bulk Collection of Signals Intelligence" released earlier this year. President Obama asked for the paper in early 2014 to assess whether the intelligence apparatus could accomplish what it currently does with metadata dragnets (both those conducted in the U.S. and overseas) via more targeted data collection.
The NAS report measured the dragnet in terms of three functions:
- Contact chaining, which maps out networks of people based on whom they communicate or even spend time with.
- Identifying and keeping current all known identifiers (phone numbers, email addresses, device identifiers, IP addresses, Internet IDs) a person of interest uses. This is done, in part, by using algorithms to match up the communication patterns of different accounts.
- "Triaging" the identifiers collected to categorize the urgency of the threat to national security from the party associated with each one.
If the dragnet accomplishes its purpose, it will provide a fairly comprehensive picture of who is communicating or hanging out with whom, connect all the known communications identities of any given person (which is critical to developing a comprehensive picture of someone's network and the communications tools he uses), and then use those pictures to identify who poses threats that should be followed more closely.
If the metadata dragnet works, that can happen even with encrypted communication.
It's only through that process that authorities get around to actually reading content. Authorities will use the metadata dragnet, for example, to choose what content to keep from bulk content collection. It's likely they'll collect, but maybe not immediately read, communications that are one or two degrees of separation from identifiers of interest just in case it becomes interesting later. Importantly, the NSA will even keep encrypted communications that, because of their metadata, are of interest.
The metadata dragnet also helps the intelligence community decide whom to target in its bulky Section 702 PRISM collection, which last year affected more than 92,000 targets and everyone they communicated with. Here, rather than doing the bulk collection itself, the NSA capitalizes on the fact that much of the world uses American tech companies like Google and Facebook to conduct (and often, store) its online communications. So when the triaging process identifies new foreign identifiers that seem important, NSA can ask the tech companies to preserve and share on an ongoing basis everything that's associated with that identifier, including more metadata. In most cases, NSA will get the content of communications those identifiers have, which they'll read and store and pull up again in the future if a related identifier is involved.
There are a few exceptions where officials cannot get the contents of communications via PRISM because they're encrypted at the user level, rather than server level. The most important of these exceptions are WhatsApp and iMessage (and the latter only if users have opted not to use Apple's cloud to store their communications), as well as any communications users have encrypted on their own. The NSA can't get this content from Facebook, Apple, or other providers, but it can get metadata, so for users of interest, surveilers should at least know who is communicating with whom as well as some other useful details about them, though not what they're saying.
For WhatsApp and iMessage users of interest, as well as those using their own encryption, the intelligence agencies will seek ways to bypass the encryption, often by hacking a user's device or identifying his IP address and then accessing other devices or Internet accounts using that IP.
Importantly, however, it takes the triaging process or a particular event (like Friday's attack) to identify users of such importance that the NSA will make the effort to conduct more targeted spying.
Finally, there's old-fashioned physical surveillance and human intelligence, asking people to spy on others. As reflected by the CIA's recent decision to add a digital innovation unit, even old-fashioned spying is increasingly guided and assisted by communications technology, both in identifying targets but also finding ways and information to compromise those targets. Numerous declassified reports make it clear the FBI uses the American phone dragnet to identify people who might make useful informants. (It also sometimes uses communications content to find intelligence they can use to coerce that cooperation.) Presumably, other intelligence services do the same.
For targets in a known location that are using very good communications security (by using encryption and ensuring their multiple identities cannot be correlated, not even with geolocation), physical surveillance of known targets (as several of the Paris perpetrators were by authorities) is always an option. The problem with that is it is very time- and labor-intensive--and because France and Belgium have so many potentially dangerous extremists, selecting whom would get that level of attention requires a very good combing process.
It all comes back to this triage, which is in significant part about how well the intelligence community uses that forest of metadata to pick whom it should target.
"Knowing who someone communicates with is metadata, not content, and most encrypted protocols (e.g. WhatsApp, Telegram, etc.) don't change this," Nicholas Weaver, a researcher at the International Computer Science Institute at UC-Berkeley explains. "In attempting to identify actual threat actors, 'this person is communicating with ISIS' is probably all you need to justify more intensive targeted actions, such as system compromise, that bypass any effects of encryption."
There are a number of reasons why the dragnet might not work as planned. Some important metadata may be missing, perhaps even from the PlayStation 4 consoles some terrorists have used to communicate, which Belgium's Interior Minister said has posed particular problems in the days before the attack. (Though there's no evidence PS4s played a role in this attack.) Some metadata, especially that scraped from content, may be increasingly unavailable if the content itself is encrypted. When individuals keep their online identities rigorously separate, that too makes the dragnet less useful, as it makes it hard to identify a terrorist network. Finally, it may be that the triage process doesn't always measure the importance of communications effectively.
In any case, news reports on the investigation into Friday's attacks have suggested that some of the terrorists involved in the attack--even a figure identified as the possible planner--have had some of their communications analyzed already. If so, enough metadata was available to partially map out this network. If investigators know about these communications now, they could have known about them on Thursday, before the attack. And if they did, investigators might have been able to bypass whatever encryption the terrorists did use.
The terrorists who conducted Friday's attack may well have been using encryption. But if so, it appears that the metadata dragnet failed well before agencies got to any encrypted communications.
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Marcy Wheeler
Marcy Wheeler is a journalist who writes the blog Emptywheel. She publishes at various outlets including the Guardian, Salon and the Progressive. Wheeler won the 2009 the Hillman Award for blog journalism.
Since terrorists struck Paris last Friday night, the debate over whether encryption prevents intelligence services from stopping attacks has reignited. The New York Times and Yahoo reported on vague claims that the terrorists' use of encryption stymied investigators who might have thwarted their plans. CIA Director John Brennan made equally vague comments Monday morning, warning that thanks to the privacy protections of the post-Snowden era, it is now "much more challenging" for intelligence agencies to find terrorists. Jeb Bush piled on, saying that the United States needs to restore its program collecting metadata on U.S. phone calls, even though that program won't be shut down until the end of this month.
Following a terrorism incident as shocking as the Paris attacks, it is no surprise that politicians and the intelligence establishment would want to widen American spying capabilities. But their arguments are conflating the forest--bulk metadata collection--and the trees: access to individual communications about the attack. To understand why that's the case, start with this tweet from former NSA and DHS official Stewart Baker: "NSA's 215 program"--and by association the far larger metadata dragnet of which the domestically focused phone-metadata program is just a small part--"was designed to detect a Mumbai/Paris-style attack."
Only it didn't.
The metadata surveillance system appears to have failed before it even got to the encryption stage.
The United States and United Kingdom's metadata collection that focuses on the Middle East and Europe is far more extensive than the phone dragnet being shut down later this month, and its use has far more permissive rules. This dragnet is mostly limited by technology, not law. And France--which rewrote its surveillance laws after the Charlie Hebdo attack earlier this year--has its own surveillance system. Both are in place, yet neither detected the Nov. 13 plot. This means they failed to alert authorities to the people they should more closely target via both electronic and physical surveillance. In significant part, this system appears to have failed before it even got to the stage at which investigators would need to worry about terrorists' use of encryption.
To understand why that's true, it helps to understand how the metadata dragnet relates to surveillance of content as well as human spying.
In most public comments going back to the initial leaks from Edward Snowden (and in Baker's tweet from the weekend), authorities have made a shaky claim: that the surveillance dragnet is "designed to detect" an attack like Paris. Based on that claimed purpose, their dragnets are failing.
But that claim was always an oversimplification. It oversold the importance of the dragnet, by itself, such that citizens might more willingly tolerate the collection of highly revealing personal details. Because it doesn't include the actual content of our conversations, call metadata doesn't seem especially intimate; if it's the only thing authorities say they need to prevent a big terrorist attack, citizens might easily conclude that they're fine with the government collecting it. But the claim also served to hide how quickly metadata analysis can lead to the reading of content.
The intelligence community has given us a more nuanced understanding of the purpose of the metadata dragnet, however, in a National Academy of Sciences paper on "Bulk Collection of Signals Intelligence" released earlier this year. President Obama asked for the paper in early 2014 to assess whether the intelligence apparatus could accomplish what it currently does with metadata dragnets (both those conducted in the U.S. and overseas) via more targeted data collection.
The NAS report measured the dragnet in terms of three functions:
- Contact chaining, which maps out networks of people based on whom they communicate or even spend time with.
- Identifying and keeping current all known identifiers (phone numbers, email addresses, device identifiers, IP addresses, Internet IDs) a person of interest uses. This is done, in part, by using algorithms to match up the communication patterns of different accounts.
- "Triaging" the identifiers collected to categorize the urgency of the threat to national security from the party associated with each one.
If the dragnet accomplishes its purpose, it will provide a fairly comprehensive picture of who is communicating or hanging out with whom, connect all the known communications identities of any given person (which is critical to developing a comprehensive picture of someone's network and the communications tools he uses), and then use those pictures to identify who poses threats that should be followed more closely.
If the metadata dragnet works, that can happen even with encrypted communication.
It's only through that process that authorities get around to actually reading content. Authorities will use the metadata dragnet, for example, to choose what content to keep from bulk content collection. It's likely they'll collect, but maybe not immediately read, communications that are one or two degrees of separation from identifiers of interest just in case it becomes interesting later. Importantly, the NSA will even keep encrypted communications that, because of their metadata, are of interest.
The metadata dragnet also helps the intelligence community decide whom to target in its bulky Section 702 PRISM collection, which last year affected more than 92,000 targets and everyone they communicated with. Here, rather than doing the bulk collection itself, the NSA capitalizes on the fact that much of the world uses American tech companies like Google and Facebook to conduct (and often, store) its online communications. So when the triaging process identifies new foreign identifiers that seem important, NSA can ask the tech companies to preserve and share on an ongoing basis everything that's associated with that identifier, including more metadata. In most cases, NSA will get the content of communications those identifiers have, which they'll read and store and pull up again in the future if a related identifier is involved.
There are a few exceptions where officials cannot get the contents of communications via PRISM because they're encrypted at the user level, rather than server level. The most important of these exceptions are WhatsApp and iMessage (and the latter only if users have opted not to use Apple's cloud to store their communications), as well as any communications users have encrypted on their own. The NSA can't get this content from Facebook, Apple, or other providers, but it can get metadata, so for users of interest, surveilers should at least know who is communicating with whom as well as some other useful details about them, though not what they're saying.
For WhatsApp and iMessage users of interest, as well as those using their own encryption, the intelligence agencies will seek ways to bypass the encryption, often by hacking a user's device or identifying his IP address and then accessing other devices or Internet accounts using that IP.
Importantly, however, it takes the triaging process or a particular event (like Friday's attack) to identify users of such importance that the NSA will make the effort to conduct more targeted spying.
Finally, there's old-fashioned physical surveillance and human intelligence, asking people to spy on others. As reflected by the CIA's recent decision to add a digital innovation unit, even old-fashioned spying is increasingly guided and assisted by communications technology, both in identifying targets but also finding ways and information to compromise those targets. Numerous declassified reports make it clear the FBI uses the American phone dragnet to identify people who might make useful informants. (It also sometimes uses communications content to find intelligence they can use to coerce that cooperation.) Presumably, other intelligence services do the same.
For targets in a known location that are using very good communications security (by using encryption and ensuring their multiple identities cannot be correlated, not even with geolocation), physical surveillance of known targets (as several of the Paris perpetrators were by authorities) is always an option. The problem with that is it is very time- and labor-intensive--and because France and Belgium have so many potentially dangerous extremists, selecting whom would get that level of attention requires a very good combing process.
It all comes back to this triage, which is in significant part about how well the intelligence community uses that forest of metadata to pick whom it should target.
"Knowing who someone communicates with is metadata, not content, and most encrypted protocols (e.g. WhatsApp, Telegram, etc.) don't change this," Nicholas Weaver, a researcher at the International Computer Science Institute at UC-Berkeley explains. "In attempting to identify actual threat actors, 'this person is communicating with ISIS' is probably all you need to justify more intensive targeted actions, such as system compromise, that bypass any effects of encryption."
There are a number of reasons why the dragnet might not work as planned. Some important metadata may be missing, perhaps even from the PlayStation 4 consoles some terrorists have used to communicate, which Belgium's Interior Minister said has posed particular problems in the days before the attack. (Though there's no evidence PS4s played a role in this attack.) Some metadata, especially that scraped from content, may be increasingly unavailable if the content itself is encrypted. When individuals keep their online identities rigorously separate, that too makes the dragnet less useful, as it makes it hard to identify a terrorist network. Finally, it may be that the triage process doesn't always measure the importance of communications effectively.
In any case, news reports on the investigation into Friday's attacks have suggested that some of the terrorists involved in the attack--even a figure identified as the possible planner--have had some of their communications analyzed already. If so, enough metadata was available to partially map out this network. If investigators know about these communications now, they could have known about them on Thursday, before the attack. And if they did, investigators might have been able to bypass whatever encryption the terrorists did use.
The terrorists who conducted Friday's attack may well have been using encryption. But if so, it appears that the metadata dragnet failed well before agencies got to any encrypted communications.
Marcy Wheeler
Marcy Wheeler is a journalist who writes the blog Emptywheel. She publishes at various outlets including the Guardian, Salon and the Progressive. Wheeler won the 2009 the Hillman Award for blog journalism.
Since terrorists struck Paris last Friday night, the debate over whether encryption prevents intelligence services from stopping attacks has reignited. The New York Times and Yahoo reported on vague claims that the terrorists' use of encryption stymied investigators who might have thwarted their plans. CIA Director John Brennan made equally vague comments Monday morning, warning that thanks to the privacy protections of the post-Snowden era, it is now "much more challenging" for intelligence agencies to find terrorists. Jeb Bush piled on, saying that the United States needs to restore its program collecting metadata on U.S. phone calls, even though that program won't be shut down until the end of this month.
Following a terrorism incident as shocking as the Paris attacks, it is no surprise that politicians and the intelligence establishment would want to widen American spying capabilities. But their arguments are conflating the forest--bulk metadata collection--and the trees: access to individual communications about the attack. To understand why that's the case, start with this tweet from former NSA and DHS official Stewart Baker: "NSA's 215 program"--and by association the far larger metadata dragnet of which the domestically focused phone-metadata program is just a small part--"was designed to detect a Mumbai/Paris-style attack."
Only it didn't.
The metadata surveillance system appears to have failed before it even got to the encryption stage.
The United States and United Kingdom's metadata collection that focuses on the Middle East and Europe is far more extensive than the phone dragnet being shut down later this month, and its use has far more permissive rules. This dragnet is mostly limited by technology, not law. And France--which rewrote its surveillance laws after the Charlie Hebdo attack earlier this year--has its own surveillance system. Both are in place, yet neither detected the Nov. 13 plot. This means they failed to alert authorities to the people they should more closely target via both electronic and physical surveillance. In significant part, this system appears to have failed before it even got to the stage at which investigators would need to worry about terrorists' use of encryption.
To understand why that's true, it helps to understand how the metadata dragnet relates to surveillance of content as well as human spying.
In most public comments going back to the initial leaks from Edward Snowden (and in Baker's tweet from the weekend), authorities have made a shaky claim: that the surveillance dragnet is "designed to detect" an attack like Paris. Based on that claimed purpose, their dragnets are failing.
But that claim was always an oversimplification. It oversold the importance of the dragnet, by itself, such that citizens might more willingly tolerate the collection of highly revealing personal details. Because it doesn't include the actual content of our conversations, call metadata doesn't seem especially intimate; if it's the only thing authorities say they need to prevent a big terrorist attack, citizens might easily conclude that they're fine with the government collecting it. But the claim also served to hide how quickly metadata analysis can lead to the reading of content.
The intelligence community has given us a more nuanced understanding of the purpose of the metadata dragnet, however, in a National Academy of Sciences paper on "Bulk Collection of Signals Intelligence" released earlier this year. President Obama asked for the paper in early 2014 to assess whether the intelligence apparatus could accomplish what it currently does with metadata dragnets (both those conducted in the U.S. and overseas) via more targeted data collection.
The NAS report measured the dragnet in terms of three functions:
- Contact chaining, which maps out networks of people based on whom they communicate or even spend time with.
- Identifying and keeping current all known identifiers (phone numbers, email addresses, device identifiers, IP addresses, Internet IDs) a person of interest uses. This is done, in part, by using algorithms to match up the communication patterns of different accounts.
- "Triaging" the identifiers collected to categorize the urgency of the threat to national security from the party associated with each one.
If the dragnet accomplishes its purpose, it will provide a fairly comprehensive picture of who is communicating or hanging out with whom, connect all the known communications identities of any given person (which is critical to developing a comprehensive picture of someone's network and the communications tools he uses), and then use those pictures to identify who poses threats that should be followed more closely.
If the metadata dragnet works, that can happen even with encrypted communication.
It's only through that process that authorities get around to actually reading content. Authorities will use the metadata dragnet, for example, to choose what content to keep from bulk content collection. It's likely they'll collect, but maybe not immediately read, communications that are one or two degrees of separation from identifiers of interest just in case it becomes interesting later. Importantly, the NSA will even keep encrypted communications that, because of their metadata, are of interest.
The metadata dragnet also helps the intelligence community decide whom to target in its bulky Section 702 PRISM collection, which last year affected more than 92,000 targets and everyone they communicated with. Here, rather than doing the bulk collection itself, the NSA capitalizes on the fact that much of the world uses American tech companies like Google and Facebook to conduct (and often, store) its online communications. So when the triaging process identifies new foreign identifiers that seem important, NSA can ask the tech companies to preserve and share on an ongoing basis everything that's associated with that identifier, including more metadata. In most cases, NSA will get the content of communications those identifiers have, which they'll read and store and pull up again in the future if a related identifier is involved.
There are a few exceptions where officials cannot get the contents of communications via PRISM because they're encrypted at the user level, rather than server level. The most important of these exceptions are WhatsApp and iMessage (and the latter only if users have opted not to use Apple's cloud to store their communications), as well as any communications users have encrypted on their own. The NSA can't get this content from Facebook, Apple, or other providers, but it can get metadata, so for users of interest, surveilers should at least know who is communicating with whom as well as some other useful details about them, though not what they're saying.
For WhatsApp and iMessage users of interest, as well as those using their own encryption, the intelligence agencies will seek ways to bypass the encryption, often by hacking a user's device or identifying his IP address and then accessing other devices or Internet accounts using that IP.
Importantly, however, it takes the triaging process or a particular event (like Friday's attack) to identify users of such importance that the NSA will make the effort to conduct more targeted spying.
Finally, there's old-fashioned physical surveillance and human intelligence, asking people to spy on others. As reflected by the CIA's recent decision to add a digital innovation unit, even old-fashioned spying is increasingly guided and assisted by communications technology, both in identifying targets but also finding ways and information to compromise those targets. Numerous declassified reports make it clear the FBI uses the American phone dragnet to identify people who might make useful informants. (It also sometimes uses communications content to find intelligence they can use to coerce that cooperation.) Presumably, other intelligence services do the same.
For targets in a known location that are using very good communications security (by using encryption and ensuring their multiple identities cannot be correlated, not even with geolocation), physical surveillance of known targets (as several of the Paris perpetrators were by authorities) is always an option. The problem with that is it is very time- and labor-intensive--and because France and Belgium have so many potentially dangerous extremists, selecting whom would get that level of attention requires a very good combing process.
It all comes back to this triage, which is in significant part about how well the intelligence community uses that forest of metadata to pick whom it should target.
"Knowing who someone communicates with is metadata, not content, and most encrypted protocols (e.g. WhatsApp, Telegram, etc.) don't change this," Nicholas Weaver, a researcher at the International Computer Science Institute at UC-Berkeley explains. "In attempting to identify actual threat actors, 'this person is communicating with ISIS' is probably all you need to justify more intensive targeted actions, such as system compromise, that bypass any effects of encryption."
There are a number of reasons why the dragnet might not work as planned. Some important metadata may be missing, perhaps even from the PlayStation 4 consoles some terrorists have used to communicate, which Belgium's Interior Minister said has posed particular problems in the days before the attack. (Though there's no evidence PS4s played a role in this attack.) Some metadata, especially that scraped from content, may be increasingly unavailable if the content itself is encrypted. When individuals keep their online identities rigorously separate, that too makes the dragnet less useful, as it makes it hard to identify a terrorist network. Finally, it may be that the triage process doesn't always measure the importance of communications effectively.
In any case, news reports on the investigation into Friday's attacks have suggested that some of the terrorists involved in the attack--even a figure identified as the possible planner--have had some of their communications analyzed already. If so, enough metadata was available to partially map out this network. If investigators know about these communications now, they could have known about them on Thursday, before the attack. And if they did, investigators might have been able to bypass whatever encryption the terrorists did use.
The terrorists who conducted Friday's attack may well have been using encryption. But if so, it appears that the metadata dragnet failed well before agencies got to any encrypted communications.
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LATEST NEWS
Trump White House Says Military Occupation of Nation's Capital Set to Expand
One critic accused the president of "testing the limits of his power, hoping to intimidate other cities into submission to his every vengeful whim."
Aug 13, 2025
The Trump administration's military occupation of Washington, D.C. is expected to expand, a White House official said Wednesday, with President Donald Trump also saying he will ask Congress to approve a "long-term" extension of federal control over local police in the nation's capital.
The unnamed Trump official told CNN that a "significantly higher" number of National Guard troops are expected on the ground in Washington later Wednesday to support law enforcement patrols in the city.
"The National Guard is not arresting people," the official said, adding that troops are tasked with creating "a safe environment" for the hundreds of federal officers and agents from over a dozen agencies who are fanning out across the city over the strong objection of local officials.
Trump dubiously declared a public safety emergency Monday in order to take control of Washington police under Section 740 of the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act. The president said Wednesday that he would ask the Republican-controlled Congress to authorize an extension of his federal takeover of local police beyond the 30 days allowed under Section 740.
"Already they're saying, 'He's a dictator,'" Trump said of his critics during remarks at the Kennedy Center in Washington. "The place is going to hell. We've got to stop it. So instead of saying, 'He's a dictator,' they should say, 'We're going to join him and make Washington safe.'"
According to official statistics, violent crime in Washington is down 26% from a year ago, when it was at its second-lowest level since 1966,
House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) and Senate Majority Leader John Thune (R-S.D.) have both expressed support for Trump's actions. However, any legislation authorizing an extension of federal control over local police would face an uphill battle in the Senate, where Democratic lawmakers can employ procedural rules to block the majority's effort.
Trump also said any congressional authorization could open the door to targeting other cities in his crosshairs, including Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles, New York, and Oakland. Official statistics show violent crime trending downward in all of those cities—with some registering historically low levels.
While some critics have called Trump's actions in Washington a distraction from his administration's mishandling of the Jeffrey Epstein scandal, others say his occupation of the nation's capital is a test case to see what he can get away with in other cities.
Kat Abughazaleh, a Democratic candidate for Congress in Illinois, said Monday that the president's D.C. takeover "is another telltale sign of his authoritarian ambitions."
Some opponents also said Trump's actions are intended to intimidate Democrat-controlled cities, pointing to his June order to deploy thousands of National Guard troops to Los Angeles in response to protests against his administration's mass deportation campaign.
Testifying Wednesday at a San Francisco trial to determine whether Trump violated the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878—which generally prohibits use of the military for domestic law enforcement—by sending troops to Los Angeles, California Deputy Attorney General Meghan Strong argued that the president wanted to "strike fear into the hearts of Californians."
Roosevelt University political science professor and Newsweek contributor David Faris wrote Wednesday that "deploying the National Guard to Washington, D.C. is an unconscionable abuse of federal power and another worrisome signpost on our road to autocracy."
"Using the military to bring big, blue cities to heel, exactly as 'alarmists' predicted during the 2024 campaign, isn't about a crisis in D.C.—violent crime is actually at a 30-year low," he added. "President Trump is, once again, testing the limits of his power, hoping to intimidate other cities into submission to his every vengeful whim by making the once unimaginable—an American tyrant ordering a military occupation of our own capital—a terrifying reality."
Report Warns of Anti-Family Pronatalist Movement's Growing Influence on Trump White House
"Underneath shiny motherhood medals and promises of baby bonuses is a movement intent on elevating white supremacist ideology and forcing women out of the workplace," said one advocate.
Aug 13, 2025
The Trump administration's push for Americans to have more children has been well documented, from Vice President JD Vance's insults aimed at "childless cat ladies" to officials' meetings with "pronatalist" advocates who want to boost U.S. birth rates, which have been declining since 2007.
But a report released by the National Women's Law Center (NWLC) on Wednesday details how the methods the White House have reportedly considered to convince Americans to procreate moremay be described by the far right as "pro-family," but are actually being pushed by a eugenicist, misogynist movement that has little interest in making it any easier to raise a family in the United States.
The proposals include bestowing a "National Medal of Motherhood" on women who have more than six children, giving a $5,000 "baby bonus" to new parents, and prioritizing federal projects in areas with high birth rates.
"Underneath shiny motherhood medals and promises of baby bonuses is a movement intent on elevating white supremacist ideology and forcing women out of the workplace," said Emily Martin, chief program officer of the National Women's Law Center.
The report describes how "Silicon Valley tech elites" and traditional conservatives who oppose abortion rights and even a woman's right to work outside the home have converged to push for "preserving the traditional family structure while encouraging women to have a lot of children."
With pronatalists often referring to "declining genetic quality" in the U.S. and promoting the idea that Americans must produce "good quality children," in the words of evolutionary psychologist Diana Fleischman, the pronatalist movement "is built on racist, sexist, and anti-immigrant ideologies."
If conservatives are concerned about population loss in the U.S., the report points out, they would "make it easier for immigrants to come to the United States to live and work. More immigrants mean more workers, which would address some of the economic concerns raised by declining birth rates."
But pronatalists "only want to see certain populations increase (i.e., white people), and there are many immigrants who don't fit into that narrow qualification."
The report, titled "Baby Bonuses and Motherhood Medals: Why We Shouldn't Trust the Pronatalist Movement," describes how President Donald Trump has enlisted a "pronatalist army" that's been instrumental both in pushing a virulently anti-immigrant, mass deportation agenda and in demanding that more straight couples should marry and have children, as the right-wing policy playbook Project 2025 demands.
Trump's former adviser and benefactor, billionaire tech mogul Elon Musk, has spoken frequently about the need to prevent a collapse of U.S. society and civilization by raising birth rates, and has pushed misinformation fearmongering about birth control.
Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy proposed rewarding areas with high birth rates by prioritizing infrastructure projects, and like Vance has lobbed insults at single women while also deriding the use of contraception.
The report was released days after CNN detailed the close ties the Trump administration has with self-described Christian nationalist pastor Doug Wilson, who heads the Communion of Reformed Evangelical Churches, preaches that women should not vote, and suggested in an interview with correspondent Pamela Brown that women's primary function is birthing children, saying they are "the kind of people that people come out of."
Wilson has ties to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, whose children attend schools founded by the pastor and who shared the video online with the tagline of Wilson's church, "All of Christ for All of Life."
But the NWLC noted, no amount of haranguing women over their relationship status, plans for childbearing, or insistence that they are primarily meant to stay at home with "four or five children," as Wilson said, can reverse the impact the Trump administration's policies have had on families.
"While the Trump administration claims to be pursuing a pro-baby agenda, their actions tell a different story," the report notes. "Rather than advancing policies that would actually support families—like lowering costs, expanding access to housing and food, or investing in child care—they've prioritized dismantling basic need supports, rolling back longstanding civil rights protections, and ripping away people's bodily autonomy."
The report was published weeks after Trump signed the One Big Beautiful Bill Act into law—making pregnancy more expensive and more dangerous for millions of low-income women by slashing Medicaid funding and "endangering the 42 million women and children" who rely on the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program for their daily meals.
While demanding that women have more children, said the NWLC, Trump has pushed an "anti-women, anti-family agenda."
Martin said that unlike the pronatalist movement, "a real pro-family agenda would include protecting reproductive healthcare, investing in childcare as a public good, promoting workplace policies that enable parents to succeed, and ensuring that all children have the resources that they need to thrive not just at birth, but throughout their lives."
"The administration's deep hostility toward these pro-family policies," said Martin, "tells you all that you need to know about pronatalists' true motives.”
Rights Group Pushes Delaware AG to Revoke Gaza Humanitarian Foundation's Corporate Charter
A Center for Constitutional Rights lawyer called on Kathy Jennings to "use her power to stop this dangerous entity that is masquerading as a charitable organization while furthering death and violence in Gaza."
Aug 13, 2025
A leading U.S. legal advocacy group on Wednesday urged Delaware Attorney General Kathy Jennings to pursue revoking the corporate charter of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, whose aid distribution points in the embattled Palestinian enclave have been the sites of near-daily massacres in which thousands of Palestinians have reportedly been killed or wounded.
Last week, the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) urgently requested a meeting with Jennings, a Democrat, whom the group asserted has a legal obligation to file suit in the state's Chancery Court to seek revocation of the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation's (GHF) charter because the purported charity "is complicit in war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide."
CCR said Wednesday that Jennings "has neither responded" to the group's request "nor publicly addressed the serious claims raised against the Delaware-registered entity."
"GHF woefully fails to adhere to fundamental humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence and has proven to be an opportunistic and obsequious entity masquerading as a humanitarian organization," CCR asserted. "Since the start of its operations in late May, at least 1,400 Palestinians have died seeking aid, with at least 859 killed at or near GHF sites, which it operates in close coordination with the Israeli government and U.S. private military contractors."
One of those contractors, former U.S. Army Green Beret Col. Anthony Aguilar, quit his job and blew the whistle on what he said he saw while working at GHF aid sites.
"What I saw on the sites, around the sites, to and from the sites, can be described as nothing but war crimes, crimes against humanity, violations of international law," Aguilar told Democracy Now! host Amy Goodman earlier this month. "This is not hyperbole. This is not platitudes or drama. This is the truth... The sites were designed to lure, bait aid, and kill."
Israel Defense Forces officers and soldiers have admitted to receiving orders to open fire on Palestinian aid-seekers with live bullets and artillery rounds, even when the civilians posed no security threat.
"It is against this backdrop that [President Donald] Trump's State Department approved a $30 million United States Agency for International Development grant for GHF," CCR noted. "In so doing, the State Department exempted it from the audit usually required for new USAID grantees."
"It also waived mandatory counterterrorism and anti-fraud safeguards and overrode vetting mechanisms, including 58 internal objections to GHF's application," the group added. "The Center for Constitutional Rights has submitted a [Freedom of Information Act] request seeking information on the administration's funding of GHF."
CCR continued:
The letter to Jennings opens a new front in the effort to hold GHF accountable. The Center for Constitutional Rights letter provides extensive evidence that, far from alleviating suffering in Gaza, GHF is contributing to the forced displacement, illegal killing, and genocide of Palestinians, while serving as a fig leaf for Israel's continued denial of access to food and water. Given this, Jennings has not only the authority, but the obligation to investigate GHF to determine if it abused its charter by engaging in unlawful activity. She may then file suit with the Court of Chancery, which has the authority to revoke GHF's charter.
CCR's August 5 letter notes that Jennings has previously exercised such authority. In 2019, she filed suit to dissolve shell companies affiliated with former Trump campaign officials Paul Manafort and Richard Gates after they pleaded guilty to money laundering and other crimes.
"Attorney General Jennings has the power to significantly change the course of history and save lives by taking action to dissolve GHF," said CCR attorney Adina Marx-Arpadi. "We call on her to use her power to stop this dangerous entity that is masquerading as a charitable organization while furthering death and violence in Gaza, and to do so without delay."
CCR's request follows a call earlier this month by a group of United Nations experts for the "immediate dismantling" of GHF, as well as "holding it and its executives accountable and allowing experienced and humanitarian actors from the U.N. and civil society alike to take back the reins of managing and distributing lifesaving aid."
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