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We can't know without more detail why the FBI's typical use of informants failed against Omar Mateen, but it's a question well worth asking. (Photo: via MySpace)
One detail of the FBI's 2013 investigation into Omar Mateen that seems to be getting inadequate attention is that they used multiple informants with him, per Jim Comey's press conference on Monday:
One detail of the FBI's 2013 investigation into Omar Mateen that seems to be getting inadequate attention is that they used multiple informants with him, per Jim Comey's press conference on Monday:
Our investigation involved introducing confidential sources to him, recording conversations with him, following him, reviewing transactional records from his communications, and searching all government holdings for any possible connections, any possible derogatory information. We then interviewed him twice. [my emphasis]
Normally, when the FBI identifies a Muslim mouthing off about joining ISIS, they throw one or more informants at him, develop his trust, then have him press a button or buy a plane ticket to Syria, which they use to arrest the guy.
That didn't happen here. While they did record the conversations between these informants and Mateen, they never got him to do something they could arrest him for.
And I suspect we won't get answers why they didn't, though it seems an absolutely critical question for assessing how the FBI investigates terrorism. If FBI's chosen method of using informants only works with the dopes and not the real threats, all it does is juice the FBI's prosecution numbers, without keeping us safe. Alternately, it's possible FBI assumes certain things about a potential "Islamic" threat, which turned out to be wrong in this case.
I can think of several possible reasons why FBI's informants might not have worked the way they normally do (these are speculative):
Again, these are all speculative. We can't know without more detail why the FBI's typical use of informants failed this time.
But we deserve answers to the question, because if the Muslim community is going to be riddled with informants, they had better be serving some purpose other than selective surveillance of a minority group.
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One detail of the FBI's 2013 investigation into Omar Mateen that seems to be getting inadequate attention is that they used multiple informants with him, per Jim Comey's press conference on Monday:
Our investigation involved introducing confidential sources to him, recording conversations with him, following him, reviewing transactional records from his communications, and searching all government holdings for any possible connections, any possible derogatory information. We then interviewed him twice. [my emphasis]
Normally, when the FBI identifies a Muslim mouthing off about joining ISIS, they throw one or more informants at him, develop his trust, then have him press a button or buy a plane ticket to Syria, which they use to arrest the guy.
That didn't happen here. While they did record the conversations between these informants and Mateen, they never got him to do something they could arrest him for.
And I suspect we won't get answers why they didn't, though it seems an absolutely critical question for assessing how the FBI investigates terrorism. If FBI's chosen method of using informants only works with the dopes and not the real threats, all it does is juice the FBI's prosecution numbers, without keeping us safe. Alternately, it's possible FBI assumes certain things about a potential "Islamic" threat, which turned out to be wrong in this case.
I can think of several possible reasons why FBI's informants might not have worked the way they normally do (these are speculative):
Again, these are all speculative. We can't know without more detail why the FBI's typical use of informants failed this time.
But we deserve answers to the question, because if the Muslim community is going to be riddled with informants, they had better be serving some purpose other than selective surveillance of a minority group.
One detail of the FBI's 2013 investigation into Omar Mateen that seems to be getting inadequate attention is that they used multiple informants with him, per Jim Comey's press conference on Monday:
Our investigation involved introducing confidential sources to him, recording conversations with him, following him, reviewing transactional records from his communications, and searching all government holdings for any possible connections, any possible derogatory information. We then interviewed him twice. [my emphasis]
Normally, when the FBI identifies a Muslim mouthing off about joining ISIS, they throw one or more informants at him, develop his trust, then have him press a button or buy a plane ticket to Syria, which they use to arrest the guy.
That didn't happen here. While they did record the conversations between these informants and Mateen, they never got him to do something they could arrest him for.
And I suspect we won't get answers why they didn't, though it seems an absolutely critical question for assessing how the FBI investigates terrorism. If FBI's chosen method of using informants only works with the dopes and not the real threats, all it does is juice the FBI's prosecution numbers, without keeping us safe. Alternately, it's possible FBI assumes certain things about a potential "Islamic" threat, which turned out to be wrong in this case.
I can think of several possible reasons why FBI's informants might not have worked the way they normally do (these are speculative):
Again, these are all speculative. We can't know without more detail why the FBI's typical use of informants failed this time.
But we deserve answers to the question, because if the Muslim community is going to be riddled with informants, they had better be serving some purpose other than selective surveillance of a minority group.