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"Computers are everywhere.
Cory's right, of course. And that's why the recent New York Times story on the NSA's systematic effort to weaken and sabotage commercially available encryption used by individuals and businesses around the world is so important--and not just to people who care about political organizing, journalists or whistleblowers. Thanks to additional reporting, we now know it matters deeply to companies including Brazil's Petrobras and Belgium's Belgacom, who are concerned about protecting their infrastructure, negotiating strategies and trade secrets. But really, it matters to all of us.
We all live in an increasingly networked world. And one of the preconditions of that world has to be basic computer security--freedom to use strong technologies that are fully trustworthy.
Every casual Internet user, whether they know it or not, uses encryption daily. It's the "s" in https and the little lock you see in your browser--signifying a secure connection--when you purchase something online, when you're at your bank's website or accessing your webmail, financial records, and medical records. Cryptography security is also essential in the computers in our cars, airplanes, houses and pockets.
By weakening encryption, the NSA allows others to more easily break it. By installing backdoors and other vulnerabilities in systems, the NSA exposes them to other malicious hackers--whether they are foreign governments or criminals. As security expert Bruce Schneier explained, "It's sheer folly to believe that only the NSA can exploit the vulnerabilities they create."
The New York Times presented internal NSA documents with some specifics. They are written in bureaucratese, but we have some basic translations:
Each of these alone would be terrible for security; collectively they are a nightmare. They are also a betrayal of the very public political process we went through in the 1990s to ensure that technology users had access to real security tools to keep them safe.
Ensuring your ability to have real security and privacy online was one of EFF's earliest goals and protecting your ability to use strong encryption was one of our first victories.
In the 1990s, the Clinton administration tried several things to ensure that our technologies were not very safe, including proposing the now-infamous "Clipper Chip," which sought to compel companies insert backdoors into commercial encryption technologies and enforcing export regulations that effectively prevented the development and distribution of strong encryption.
But in the 1990s, we had a long list of supporters for strong security online, including then-Senator (later Bush Attorney General) John Ashcroft, Senator (current Secretary of State) John Kerry, the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computer Machinery, National Computer Security Association and the American Association For The Advancement Of Science.
At the time, the Internet Architecture Board and the Internet Engineering Steering Group, the bodies that oversee architecture and standards for the Internet, put it best, stating:
[a]s more and more companies connect to the Internet, and as more and more commerce takes place there, security is becoming more and more critical. Cryptography is the most powerful single tool that users can use to secure the Internet. Knowingly making that tool weaker threatens their ability to do so, and has no proven benefit.
(emphasis added). These risks have only increased substantially over the past 15-20 years, as virtually all records, both public and private are maintained electronically and stored in networked environments.
The Clipper Chip proposal was defeated in the late 1990s and the encryption regulations were rolled back shortly thereafter. And we thought the matter was settled: the government had no business sabotaging the security of digital devices or communications.
That's why the revelations last week were so shocking and, frankly, angering. Having lost its efforts to make us less safe in Congress, in the public debate, and in the courts, the NSA simply thumbed its nose at our democratic mechanisms and proceeded to sabotage our security anyway--in secret.
Making matters worse, the NSA put itself on the front lines of "cybersecurity" debate, ostensibly because it was concerned about computer security of ordinary people and businesses. That is supposed to be one of NSA's roles. Yet, one of the most disturbing anecdotes from the New York Times story on encryption was the NSA meeting confidentially with companies under the guise of helping with cybersecurity but then using information they gleaned to weaken systems or induce the companies to do so:
Even agency programs ostensibly intended to guard American communications are sometimes used to weaken protections. The N.S.A.'s Commercial Solutions Center, for instance, invites the makers of encryption technologies to present their products to the agency with the goal of improving American cybersecurity. But a top-secret N.S.A. document suggests that the agency's hacking division uses that same program to develop and "leverage sensitive, cooperative relationships with specific industry partners" to insert vulnerabilities into Internet security products.
This should give any company pause. It should give Congress pause when crafting dangerous new laws, like an "information sharing" bill just proposed by Sen. Feinstein, that give the NSA new powers. And it should give all of us pause as we consider whether the NSA has become an agency that believes itself to be above the law and beyond our democratic processes.
Thankfully, the recent disclosures have led to at least some change. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the government agency in charge of one of the cryptographic standards the NSA has alleged to have secretly weakened, has reopened public comment on its standard and has even gone as far as to recommend people do not use it anymore.
And we're beginning to see the international computer security community come to grips with this disturbing news.
But we must do more.
But the public debate must start from a fundamental principle: The NSA has been making us less safe and it must stop. Now.
Trump and Musk are on an unconstitutional rampage, aiming for virtually every corner of the federal government. These two right-wing billionaires are targeting nurses, scientists, teachers, daycare providers, judges, veterans, air traffic controllers, and nuclear safety inspectors. No one is safe. The food stamps program, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid are next. It’s an unprecedented disaster and a five-alarm fire, but there will be a reckoning. The people did not vote for this. The American people do not want this dystopian hellscape that hides behind claims of “efficiency.” Still, in reality, it is all a giveaway to corporate interests and the libertarian dreams of far-right oligarchs like Musk. Common Dreams is playing a vital role by reporting day and night on this orgy of corruption and greed, as well as what everyday people can do to organize and fight back. As a people-powered nonprofit news outlet, we cover issues the corporate media never will, but we can only continue with our readers’ support. |
Cory's right, of course. And that's why the recent New York Times story on the NSA's systematic effort to weaken and sabotage commercially available encryption used by individuals and businesses around the world is so important--and not just to people who care about political organizing, journalists or whistleblowers. Thanks to additional reporting, we now know it matters deeply to companies including Brazil's Petrobras and Belgium's Belgacom, who are concerned about protecting their infrastructure, negotiating strategies and trade secrets. But really, it matters to all of us.
We all live in an increasingly networked world. And one of the preconditions of that world has to be basic computer security--freedom to use strong technologies that are fully trustworthy.
Every casual Internet user, whether they know it or not, uses encryption daily. It's the "s" in https and the little lock you see in your browser--signifying a secure connection--when you purchase something online, when you're at your bank's website or accessing your webmail, financial records, and medical records. Cryptography security is also essential in the computers in our cars, airplanes, houses and pockets.
By weakening encryption, the NSA allows others to more easily break it. By installing backdoors and other vulnerabilities in systems, the NSA exposes them to other malicious hackers--whether they are foreign governments or criminals. As security expert Bruce Schneier explained, "It's sheer folly to believe that only the NSA can exploit the vulnerabilities they create."
The New York Times presented internal NSA documents with some specifics. They are written in bureaucratese, but we have some basic translations:
Each of these alone would be terrible for security; collectively they are a nightmare. They are also a betrayal of the very public political process we went through in the 1990s to ensure that technology users had access to real security tools to keep them safe.
Ensuring your ability to have real security and privacy online was one of EFF's earliest goals and protecting your ability to use strong encryption was one of our first victories.
In the 1990s, the Clinton administration tried several things to ensure that our technologies were not very safe, including proposing the now-infamous "Clipper Chip," which sought to compel companies insert backdoors into commercial encryption technologies and enforcing export regulations that effectively prevented the development and distribution of strong encryption.
But in the 1990s, we had a long list of supporters for strong security online, including then-Senator (later Bush Attorney General) John Ashcroft, Senator (current Secretary of State) John Kerry, the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computer Machinery, National Computer Security Association and the American Association For The Advancement Of Science.
At the time, the Internet Architecture Board and the Internet Engineering Steering Group, the bodies that oversee architecture and standards for the Internet, put it best, stating:
[a]s more and more companies connect to the Internet, and as more and more commerce takes place there, security is becoming more and more critical. Cryptography is the most powerful single tool that users can use to secure the Internet. Knowingly making that tool weaker threatens their ability to do so, and has no proven benefit.
(emphasis added). These risks have only increased substantially over the past 15-20 years, as virtually all records, both public and private are maintained electronically and stored in networked environments.
The Clipper Chip proposal was defeated in the late 1990s and the encryption regulations were rolled back shortly thereafter. And we thought the matter was settled: the government had no business sabotaging the security of digital devices or communications.
That's why the revelations last week were so shocking and, frankly, angering. Having lost its efforts to make us less safe in Congress, in the public debate, and in the courts, the NSA simply thumbed its nose at our democratic mechanisms and proceeded to sabotage our security anyway--in secret.
Making matters worse, the NSA put itself on the front lines of "cybersecurity" debate, ostensibly because it was concerned about computer security of ordinary people and businesses. That is supposed to be one of NSA's roles. Yet, one of the most disturbing anecdotes from the New York Times story on encryption was the NSA meeting confidentially with companies under the guise of helping with cybersecurity but then using information they gleaned to weaken systems or induce the companies to do so:
Even agency programs ostensibly intended to guard American communications are sometimes used to weaken protections. The N.S.A.'s Commercial Solutions Center, for instance, invites the makers of encryption technologies to present their products to the agency with the goal of improving American cybersecurity. But a top-secret N.S.A. document suggests that the agency's hacking division uses that same program to develop and "leverage sensitive, cooperative relationships with specific industry partners" to insert vulnerabilities into Internet security products.
This should give any company pause. It should give Congress pause when crafting dangerous new laws, like an "information sharing" bill just proposed by Sen. Feinstein, that give the NSA new powers. And it should give all of us pause as we consider whether the NSA has become an agency that believes itself to be above the law and beyond our democratic processes.
Thankfully, the recent disclosures have led to at least some change. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the government agency in charge of one of the cryptographic standards the NSA has alleged to have secretly weakened, has reopened public comment on its standard and has even gone as far as to recommend people do not use it anymore.
And we're beginning to see the international computer security community come to grips with this disturbing news.
But we must do more.
But the public debate must start from a fundamental principle: The NSA has been making us less safe and it must stop. Now.
Cory's right, of course. And that's why the recent New York Times story on the NSA's systematic effort to weaken and sabotage commercially available encryption used by individuals and businesses around the world is so important--and not just to people who care about political organizing, journalists or whistleblowers. Thanks to additional reporting, we now know it matters deeply to companies including Brazil's Petrobras and Belgium's Belgacom, who are concerned about protecting their infrastructure, negotiating strategies and trade secrets. But really, it matters to all of us.
We all live in an increasingly networked world. And one of the preconditions of that world has to be basic computer security--freedom to use strong technologies that are fully trustworthy.
Every casual Internet user, whether they know it or not, uses encryption daily. It's the "s" in https and the little lock you see in your browser--signifying a secure connection--when you purchase something online, when you're at your bank's website or accessing your webmail, financial records, and medical records. Cryptography security is also essential in the computers in our cars, airplanes, houses and pockets.
By weakening encryption, the NSA allows others to more easily break it. By installing backdoors and other vulnerabilities in systems, the NSA exposes them to other malicious hackers--whether they are foreign governments or criminals. As security expert Bruce Schneier explained, "It's sheer folly to believe that only the NSA can exploit the vulnerabilities they create."
The New York Times presented internal NSA documents with some specifics. They are written in bureaucratese, but we have some basic translations:
Each of these alone would be terrible for security; collectively they are a nightmare. They are also a betrayal of the very public political process we went through in the 1990s to ensure that technology users had access to real security tools to keep them safe.
Ensuring your ability to have real security and privacy online was one of EFF's earliest goals and protecting your ability to use strong encryption was one of our first victories.
In the 1990s, the Clinton administration tried several things to ensure that our technologies were not very safe, including proposing the now-infamous "Clipper Chip," which sought to compel companies insert backdoors into commercial encryption technologies and enforcing export regulations that effectively prevented the development and distribution of strong encryption.
But in the 1990s, we had a long list of supporters for strong security online, including then-Senator (later Bush Attorney General) John Ashcroft, Senator (current Secretary of State) John Kerry, the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computer Machinery, National Computer Security Association and the American Association For The Advancement Of Science.
At the time, the Internet Architecture Board and the Internet Engineering Steering Group, the bodies that oversee architecture and standards for the Internet, put it best, stating:
[a]s more and more companies connect to the Internet, and as more and more commerce takes place there, security is becoming more and more critical. Cryptography is the most powerful single tool that users can use to secure the Internet. Knowingly making that tool weaker threatens their ability to do so, and has no proven benefit.
(emphasis added). These risks have only increased substantially over the past 15-20 years, as virtually all records, both public and private are maintained electronically and stored in networked environments.
The Clipper Chip proposal was defeated in the late 1990s and the encryption regulations were rolled back shortly thereafter. And we thought the matter was settled: the government had no business sabotaging the security of digital devices or communications.
That's why the revelations last week were so shocking and, frankly, angering. Having lost its efforts to make us less safe in Congress, in the public debate, and in the courts, the NSA simply thumbed its nose at our democratic mechanisms and proceeded to sabotage our security anyway--in secret.
Making matters worse, the NSA put itself on the front lines of "cybersecurity" debate, ostensibly because it was concerned about computer security of ordinary people and businesses. That is supposed to be one of NSA's roles. Yet, one of the most disturbing anecdotes from the New York Times story on encryption was the NSA meeting confidentially with companies under the guise of helping with cybersecurity but then using information they gleaned to weaken systems or induce the companies to do so:
Even agency programs ostensibly intended to guard American communications are sometimes used to weaken protections. The N.S.A.'s Commercial Solutions Center, for instance, invites the makers of encryption technologies to present their products to the agency with the goal of improving American cybersecurity. But a top-secret N.S.A. document suggests that the agency's hacking division uses that same program to develop and "leverage sensitive, cooperative relationships with specific industry partners" to insert vulnerabilities into Internet security products.
This should give any company pause. It should give Congress pause when crafting dangerous new laws, like an "information sharing" bill just proposed by Sen. Feinstein, that give the NSA new powers. And it should give all of us pause as we consider whether the NSA has become an agency that believes itself to be above the law and beyond our democratic processes.
Thankfully, the recent disclosures have led to at least some change. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), the government agency in charge of one of the cryptographic standards the NSA has alleged to have secretly weakened, has reopened public comment on its standard and has even gone as far as to recommend people do not use it anymore.
And we're beginning to see the international computer security community come to grips with this disturbing news.
But we must do more.
But the public debate must start from a fundamental principle: The NSA has been making us less safe and it must stop. Now.
A spokesperson for the news agency said the ruling "affirms the fundamental right of the press and public to speak freely without government retaliation."
A federal judge appointed by U.S. President Donald Trump during his first term ruled Tuesday that the White House cannot cut off The Associated Press' access to the Republican leader because of the news agency's refusal to use his preferred name for the Gulf of Mexico.
"About two months ago, President Donald Trump renamed the Gulf of Mexico the Gulf of America. The Associated Press did not follow suit. For that editorial choice, the White House sharply curtailed the AP's access to coveted, tightly controlled media events with the president," wrote Judge Trevor N. McFadden, who is based in Washington, D.C.
Specifically, according to the news outlet, "the AP has been blocked since February 11 from being among the small group of journalists to cover Trump in the Oval Office or aboard Air Force One, with sporadic ability to cover him at events in the East Room."
The AP responded to the restrictions by suing White House Chief of Staff Susie Wiles, Deputy Chief of Staff Taylor Budowich, and Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt, "seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining the government from excluding it because of its viewpoint," McFadden noted in his 41-page order. "Today, the court grants that relief."
The judge explained that "this injunction does not limit the various permissible reasons the government may have for excluding journalists from limited-access events. It does not mandate that all eligible journalists, or indeed any journalists at all, be given access to the president or nonpublic government spaces. It does not prohibit government officials from freely choosing which journalists to sit down with for interviews or which ones' questions they answer. And it certainly does not prevent senior officials from publicly expressing their own views."
"The court simply holds that under the First Amendment, if the government opens its doors to some journalists—be it to the Oval Office, the East Room, or elsewhere—it cannot then shut those doors to other journalists because of their viewpoints," he stressed. "The Constitution requires no less."
McFadden blocked his own order from taking effect before next week, giving the Trump administration time to respond or appeal. Still, AP spokesperson Lauren Easton said Tuesday that "we are gratified by the court's decision."
"Today’s ruling affirms the fundamental right of the press and public to speak freely without government retaliation," Easton added. "This is a freedom guaranteed for all Americans in the U.S. Constitution."
NPR reported that "an AP reporter and photographer were turned back from joining a reporting pool on a presidential motorcade early Tuesday evening, almost two hours after the decision came down."
"The AEA has only ever been a power invoked in time of war, and plainly only applies to warlike actions," the lawsuit asserts.
The ACLU and allied groups filed a lawsuit Tuesday in a bid to stop U.S. President Donald Trump from "abusing the Alien Enemies Act"—an 18th-century law only ever invoked during wartime—to deport foreign nationals to a prison in El Salvador with allegedly rampant human rights abuses.
According to a statement, the ACLU and New York Civil Liberties Union, "in partnership with the Legal Aid Society whose clients are plaintiffs in the litigation, filed an emergency lawsuit this morning in federal court in New York to again halt removals under the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) for people within that court's judicial district."
The lawsuit—which names Trump, U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi, Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem, Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and other officials as plaintiffs—follows Monday's 5-4 U.S. Supreme Court
ruling that largely reversed a lower court's decision blocking the deportation of Venezuelan nationals to the notorious Terrorism Confinement Center (CECOT) prison in El Salvador.
BREAKING: Today the NYCLU and @aclu.org filed an emergency lawsuit to ensure the Trump administration does not deport people under the Alien Enemies Act without due process. No one should face the horrifying prospect of lifelong imprisonment without a fair hearing, let alone in another country.
— NYCLU (@nyclu.org) April 8, 2025 at 11:00 AM
While the high court said the Trump administration can resume deportations under the 1798 AEA, the justices included the caveat that people subject to such removals must be afforded due process under the law.
"The AEA has only ever been a power invoked in time of war, and plainly only applies to warlike actions," the ACLU argued in the new lawsuit. "It cannot be used here against nationals of a country—Venezuela—with whom the United States is not at war, which is not invading the United States, and which has not launched a predatory incursion into the United States."
Not only has Trump sent foreign nationals—including at least one wrongfully deported man—to CECOT, he has also floated the idea of sending U.S. citizens there at the invitation of right-wing Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele, who is scheduled to visit the White House next week.
This, despite widespread reports of serious human rights violations at the facility and throughout El Salvador in general.
"The administration is shattering what little trust remains between immigrant communities and the government and putting critical revenue streams at risk," said one critic.
Migrant and privacy rights advocates this week are sounding the alarm over a deal signed by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem to hand sensitive taxpayer data over to immigration authorities as part of U.S. President Donald Trump's mass deportation effort.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) "to establish a clear and secure process to support law enforcement's efforts to combat illegal immigration," a Treasury Department spokesperson told Fox News, which reported on the development after a late Monday court filing.
"The bases for this MOU are founded in long-standing authorities granted by Congress, which serve to protect the privacy of law-abiding Americans while streamlining the ability to pursue criminals," the spokesperson said. "After four years of [former President] Joe Biden flooding the nation with illegal aliens, President Trump's highest priority is to ensure the safety of the American people."
After weeks of warnings about a potential data transfer deal, it was revealed as part of a legal case brought by Centro de Trabajadores Unidos, Immigrant Solidarity DuPage, Inclusive Action for the City, and Somos Un Pueblo Unido, which are represented by Alan Morrison, Public Citizen Litigation Group, and Raise the Floor Alliance.
"Taxpayer privacy is a cornerstone of the U.S. tax system," Public Citizen co-president Lisa Gilbert said in a Tuesday statement. "This move by the IRS is an unprecedented breach of taxpayer privacy laws and confidentiality, which has been respected by both political parties for decades."
"The Trump administration's terror tactic of using immigrants' tax data against them will drive some of our most vulnerable communities further underground," she warned. "If this taxpayer information isn't safe from the prying eyes of the Trump administration's goons, then no one's taxpayer information is safe."
Juliette Kayyem, a former Department of Homeland Security official now lecturing at the Harvard Kennedy School, wrote on social media: "Bad policy. Bad economics. And cruel. They are so desperate to get their deportation numbers up that they are doing this."
Multiple members of Congress also blasted the move. Rep. Jimmy Gomez (D-Calif.) said that "the IRS should NEVER be weaponized to target immigrant families. This backdoor deal with ICE shatters decades of trust—and may be illegal."
"I will fight this with everything I've got," vowed Gomez, a member of the House Ways and Means Committee. "No one should fear that filing taxes puts their family at risk."
Congressman Joaquin Castro (D-Texas) was among the critics who emphasized that the MOU doesn't just affect migrants.
"First things first: The impact of folks not filing their taxes because they are afraid of deportation would be detrimental to our economy," he explained. "Two: Immigrants pay taxes but do not benefit from the social programs that most taxpayers do. Three: Everyone should be concerned about the privacy implications here. This sets the precedent that the federal government can arbitrarily share your personal information with law enforcement. And it's just wrong."
Rep. Juan Vargas (D-Calif.) similarly said: "For decades, undocumented immigrants have trusted the IRS when it encouraged them to file. They've paid taxes in good faith, contributing nearly $100 BILLION per year and supporting social services they can't even access. Not only is this a total betrayal, but it's also illegal. We'll fight this."
The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy also highlighted that "turning the IRS away from its job (collecting taxes) to instead focus on mass deportation efforts will mean less tax revenue collected on top of the harm done to families and communities affected by deportations."
In response to The New York Times' reporting on the deal, American Immigration Council senior fellow Aaron Reichlin-Melnick pointed out on social media that the MOU "is, on its face, limited to criminal investigations (not deportation investigations)."
"There are many questions raised about this new [agreement], which seems to violate previous understandings of the laws requiring IRS not to share taxpayer information," he continued. "But at its heart it does not seem that the MOU permits ICE to ask for taxpayer data for deportation reasons."
"It seems primarily to be aimed at criminal investigations for willful failure to depart after the issuance of a removal order, a crime on the books which (until now) is virtually never prosecuted," Reichlin-Melnick added. "Despite the fact that this MOU is limited only to criminal law enforcement, it will likely have a chilling effect on undocumented taxpayers."
How the Trump administration actually proceeds remains to be seen. The court filing says no information has been shared between the agenices yet—but the deal comes as part of a wave of anti-immigrant policies and rhetoric from the president and his officials.
"With the Supreme Court greenlighting Trump's use of the Alien Enemies Act and the administration now gaining access to sensitive IRS data, we continue to slip into a new era of authoritarianism in America," Beatriz Lopez, co-executive director of the Immigration Hub, said a Tuesday statement "The digital and physical dragnets that Trump is building mean millions of immigrants—many of whom have followed the law and paid their taxes for decades—are now vulnerable to indiscriminate brutality and quiet erasure with little opportunity for redress."
Lopez stressed that "undocumented immigrants already contribute billions to our economy—often paying a higher effective tax rate than 55 major corporations and some of the wealthiest individuals in America. By weaponizing private taxpayer data, the administration is shattering what little trust remains between immigrant communities and the government and putting critical revenue streams at risk."
"Coupled with Trump's xenophobic tariff threats and a $350 billion demand to fund mass disappearances and deportations, this is more than an attack on immigrants—it's a calculated effort to destabilize the country and remake its image," she concluded. "Congress must reject this funding and the authoritarian playbook behind it. This is not policy. It's punishment."