Let's
be clear: President Barack Obama inherited an economy in freefall and
could not possibly have turned things around in the short time since
his election. Unfortunately, what he is doing is not enough.
The
real failings in the Obama recovery program lie not in the stimulus
package -- though it is too heavily weighted toward tax cuts, and much
of it merely offsets cutbacks by states -- but in its efforts to revive
financial markets. America's failures provide important lessons to
countries around the world that are or will be facing increasing
problems with their banks:
- Delaying
bank restructuring is costly, in terms of both the eventual bailout
costs and the damage to the overall economy in the interim. - Governments
do not like to admit the full costs of the problem, so they give the
banking system just enough to survive, but not enough to return it to
health.
- Confidence
is important, but it must rest on sound fundamentals. Policies must not
be based on the fiction that good loans were made, and that the
business acumen of financial-market leaders and regulators will be
validated once confidence is restored. - Bankers
can be expected to act in their self-interest on the basis of
incentives. Perverse incentives fueled excessive risk-taking, and banks
that are near collapse but are too big to fail will engage in even more
of it. Knowing that the government will pick up the pieces if
necessary, they will postpone resolving mortgages and pay out billions
in bonuses and dividends. - Socializing
losses while privatizing gains is more worrisome than the consequences
of nationalizing banks. American taxpayers are getting an increasingly
bad deal. In the first round of cash infusions, they got about 67 cents
in assets for every dollar they gave (though the assets were almost
surely overvalued, and quickly fell in value). But in the recent cash
infusions, it is estimated that Americans are getting 25 cents, or
less, for every dollar. Bad terms mean a large national debt in the
future. - Don't confuse
saving bankers and shareholders with saving banks. America could have
saved its banks, but let the shareholders go, for far less than it has
spent. - Trickle-down
economics almost never works. Throwing money at the banks hasn't helped
homeowners: foreclosures continue to increase. Letting AIG fail might
have hurt some systemically important institutions, but dealing with
that would have been better than to gamble upwards of $150 billion and
hope that some of it might stick where it is important. One of the
reasons we may be getting bad terms is that if we got fair value for
our money, we would by now be the dominant shareholder in at least one
of the major banks. - Lack of
transparency got America's financial system into this trouble. Lack of
transparency will not get it out. The Obama administration is promising
to pick up losses to persuade hedge funds and other private investors
to buy out banks' bad assets. But this will not establish ''market
prices,'' as the administration claims. Banks' losses have already
occurred, and their gains must now come at taxpayers' expense. Bringing
in hedge funds as third parties will simply increase the cost. - Better to be
forward looking than backward looking, focusing on reducing the risk of
new loans and ensuring that funds create new lending capacity.
There
is no ''mystique'' in finance: The era of believing that something can
be created out of nothing should be over. Short-sighted responses by
politicians -- who hope to get by with a deal that is small enough to
please taxpayers and large enough to please the banks -- will merely
prolong the problem.
An impasse is looming. More money will be
needed, but Americans are in no mood to provide it -- certainly not on
the terms that we have seen The well of money may be running dry, and
so, too, may be America's legendary optimism and hope.
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© 2023 Project Syndicate
Joseph StiglitzJoseph E. Stiglitz is a Nobel laureate economist at Columbia University. His most recent book is "Measuring What Counts: The Global Movement for Well-Being" (2019). Among his many other books, he is the author of "The Price of Inequality: How Today's Divided Society Endangers Our Future" (2013), "Globalization and Its Discontents" (2003), "Free Fall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy" (2010), and (with co-author Linda Bilmes) "The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Costs of the Iraq Conflict" (2008). He received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2001 for research on the economics of information.
Let's
be clear: President Barack Obama inherited an economy in freefall and
could not possibly have turned things around in the short time since
his election. Unfortunately, what he is doing is not enough.
The
real failings in the Obama recovery program lie not in the stimulus
package -- though it is too heavily weighted toward tax cuts, and much
of it merely offsets cutbacks by states -- but in its efforts to revive
financial markets. America's failures provide important lessons to
countries around the world that are or will be facing increasing
problems with their banks:
- Delaying
bank restructuring is costly, in terms of both the eventual bailout
costs and the damage to the overall economy in the interim. - Governments
do not like to admit the full costs of the problem, so they give the
banking system just enough to survive, but not enough to return it to
health.
- Confidence
is important, but it must rest on sound fundamentals. Policies must not
be based on the fiction that good loans were made, and that the
business acumen of financial-market leaders and regulators will be
validated once confidence is restored. - Bankers
can be expected to act in their self-interest on the basis of
incentives. Perverse incentives fueled excessive risk-taking, and banks
that are near collapse but are too big to fail will engage in even more
of it. Knowing that the government will pick up the pieces if
necessary, they will postpone resolving mortgages and pay out billions
in bonuses and dividends. - Socializing
losses while privatizing gains is more worrisome than the consequences
of nationalizing banks. American taxpayers are getting an increasingly
bad deal. In the first round of cash infusions, they got about 67 cents
in assets for every dollar they gave (though the assets were almost
surely overvalued, and quickly fell in value). But in the recent cash
infusions, it is estimated that Americans are getting 25 cents, or
less, for every dollar. Bad terms mean a large national debt in the
future. - Don't confuse
saving bankers and shareholders with saving banks. America could have
saved its banks, but let the shareholders go, for far less than it has
spent. - Trickle-down
economics almost never works. Throwing money at the banks hasn't helped
homeowners: foreclosures continue to increase. Letting AIG fail might
have hurt some systemically important institutions, but dealing with
that would have been better than to gamble upwards of $150 billion and
hope that some of it might stick where it is important. One of the
reasons we may be getting bad terms is that if we got fair value for
our money, we would by now be the dominant shareholder in at least one
of the major banks. - Lack of
transparency got America's financial system into this trouble. Lack of
transparency will not get it out. The Obama administration is promising
to pick up losses to persuade hedge funds and other private investors
to buy out banks' bad assets. But this will not establish ''market
prices,'' as the administration claims. Banks' losses have already
occurred, and their gains must now come at taxpayers' expense. Bringing
in hedge funds as third parties will simply increase the cost. - Better to be
forward looking than backward looking, focusing on reducing the risk of
new loans and ensuring that funds create new lending capacity.
There
is no ''mystique'' in finance: The era of believing that something can
be created out of nothing should be over. Short-sighted responses by
politicians -- who hope to get by with a deal that is small enough to
please taxpayers and large enough to please the banks -- will merely
prolong the problem.
An impasse is looming. More money will be
needed, but Americans are in no mood to provide it -- certainly not on
the terms that we have seen The well of money may be running dry, and
so, too, may be America's legendary optimism and hope.