Moving the Political Center

When they write their retrospectives about
the era that ended with the 2008 election, economic historians will
undoubtedly credit George W. Bush with almost single-handedly moving
the country to embrace extremist conservatism. It's a simple storyline:
Cowboy president drives bewildered American herd over laissez-faire
cliff. What such reductionism will ignore, though, is what we must
remember now: namely, that Congress also played a decisive role in the
stampede.

As former House Republican leader Tom DeLay said, he and his
colleagues deliberately started "every policy initiative from as far to
the political right" as possible, so as to shift "the center farther to
the right." The formula emulated Franklin D. Roosevelt's fabled
admonishment to allies: "I agree with you, I want to do it, now make me
do it."

With Bush, congressional Republicans knew they had an ideological
comrade in the White House. But they also knew he was confined by the
(minimally) moderating desire for re-election and the (even more
minimally) moderating limits of his national office. So, to reach their
goals, conservatives had to compel their presidential friend to do what
they wanted - and compel him they did. When Bush's tax cuts and
deregulatory schemes hit the Capitol, Republicans inevitably expanded
them to fully achieve the right's objectives.

Of course, that triumph was the country's loss, as Republican
policies thrust the political center off a conservative precipice and
America into an economic freefall. And as we plummet, we are
desperately groping for a lifeline.

If we are lucky and we end up snagging one that saves us - a huge if
- it will be one that is strong enough to snap the center back from the
conservative brink. This super-durable bungee cord must have the force
of law, meaning it will be woven by Democratic legislators now exerting
as much pressure on President Obama's left as congressional Republicans
focused on President Bush's right.

When, for instance, Obama hedged on his promise to revoke $226
billion worth of Bush's upper-income tax cuts, House Speaker Nancy
Pelosi, D-San Francisco, pushed him to fulfill the pledge and put the
money into programs that better guarantee job creation.

When Obama initially offered up a stimulus bill filled with
discredited business tax breaks, Democratic senators forced him to back
off. Reps. David Obey, D-Wis., and Jim Oberstar, D-Minn., then argued
that the president's proposed infrastructure investments were too small
to boost the economy. That led House Democrats to increase Obama's
spending targets.

As stimulus negotiations continued, Rep. John Conyers, D-Mich.,
tried to add provisions letting courts renegotiate banks'
primary-residence mortgages so as to prevent more foreclosures. It's a
commonsense proposal: Judges already have the power to renegotiate
vacation-home mortgages, and the New York Federal Reserve Bank says
existing bankruptcy laws are exacerbating the foreclosure crisis. While
Obama opposed the initiative out of fear that banking industry
opposition might slow the underlying stimulus bill, Conyers' effort
ultimately made the president commit to supporting the reforms in
future legislation.

Then there was the progressive reaction to Obama's demand for more
financial bailout money. Turning a routine committee hearing into a
modern-day incarnation of the Great Depression's Pecora Commission,
Rep. Alan Grayson, D-Fla., upbraided a Federal Reserve official for
refusing to disclose which banks are receiving taxpayer dollars. The
spectacle was one of many that whipped the House into passing a bill
attaching strings to the funds. Obama responded by committing to enact
some of the restrictions by fiat.

At once complementary and adversarial, this intragovernmental
squabbling probably makes the conflict-averse Obama uncomfortable. But
the "make him do it" dynamic could finally bring the center of
Washington's political debate closer to the progressive center of
American public opinion. Even more important, it is precisely what will
help the new president avert an economic disaster.