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The merger would connect the US and Israeli militaries in unprecedented ways and make it exceedingly difficult for any future president to unwind this partnership with a foreign government, no matter what public opinion says.
It's called Section 219. Tucked away in the massive congressional spending bill known as the National Defense Authorization Act, or NDAA, this provision of the law would effectively require our nation to permanently entangle the American military with the Israeli military.
Among other things, the United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative would require the US to share intelligence with Israel and establish a system of weapons research, development, and production, particularly in the domains crucial to warfare in the modern age: artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, and various other fields of high defense technology.
The House provision, which has a Senate version known as Section 1217, would also forbid the president of the United States from limiting intelligence collaboration with Israel over its human rights abuses. If the President ever wants to limit such collaboration, he or she must tell Congress and can only cite American national security as a basis.
In other words, these bills would connect the US and Israeli militaries in unprecedented ways and make it exceedingly difficult for any future president to unwind this partnership with a foreign government.
There’s a reason why members of Congress are trying to sneak this bill through right now, buried in a massive and must-pass defense spending bill: This might be their best, last chance to thwart the will of the American people.
If these bills pass in their current form, the US military would be more integrated with Israel’s than with that of any other country, including America's NATO allies.
There’s a reason why members of Congress are trying to sneak this bill through right now, buried in a massive and must-pass defense spending bill: This might be their best, last chance to thwart the will of the American people.
Over the past three years, American public opinion has turned sharply against the Israeli government.
Thanks to the modern miracle of social media, Americans were able to directly see the human carnage as the Israeli military slaughtered and starved, by the most conservative estimate, over 73,000 people in Gaza.
Americans were also able to see the consequences of the Israeli military's ethnic cleansing in Lebanon, which has destroyed ancient cities, including Christian towns, and displaced a million people from their homes.
Most recently, the American people watched as the Israeli government openly convinced the Trump administration to launch an unnecessary, illegal and failed war on Iran that has resulted in the deaths of thousands of civilians, over a dozen American soldiers, and a global economic crisis, including a sharp rise in gas prices.
The American people are simply fed up.
Members of Congress who recognize American sovereignty and respect American democracy must join Rep. Smith and others in opposing these provisions, and all Americans should call on their members of Congress to do so.
According to recent Pew data, 60% of American adults have an unfavorable view of Israel, up from 42% in 2022.
Majorities of voters under 50 in both parties feel this way: 57% of young Republicans and 84% of young Democrats.
Most Americans oppose further unconditional US military aid for the Netanyahu government.
Recent election results, in which candidates who staked their campaigns on investing American taxpayer dollars here at home instead of overseas in the Israeli military, have also shown that the tide is rapidly changing.
Even prominent conservatives like Tucker Carlson have decried the Israeli government's influence on our political system while once-dominant conservative voices like Ben Shapiro known for supporting Israel have flailed and bled support.
Instead of respecting the clear will of the American people, members of Congress dedicated to maintaining unconditional US support for Israel have introduced bills meant to ensure changes in American public opinion never become changes in American public policy.
This should be unacceptable to everyone in our nation.
Although the US-Israel merger bills are currently making their way through Congress, the fight to strip these provisions from the NDAA is not over.
Just this week, Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.)—the ranking member on the House Armed Services committee—announced that he was withdrawing his support for the provision.
“I cannot support endless conflict even though I support Israel’s right to exist,” said Smith. “For these reasons, I will vote to remove Section 224 from the National Defense Authorization Act if it comes to the Floor.”
If the joint technology development, intelligence sharing, and weapons production are enshrined in law, they would become extraordinarily difficult for future presidents or Congresses to undo, regardless of changing public opinion or policy priorities.
The United States would be permanently locked into a strategic alignment with a foreign government, taking away the American people’s ability to decide on the future of the relationship.
Members of Congress who recognize American sovereignty and respect American democracy must join Rep. Smith and others in opposing these provisions, and all Americans should call on their members of Congress to do so.
If joint technology development, intelligence sharing, and weapons production are required by law, they would become extraordinarily difficult for another Congress or future presidents to undo, regardless of changing public opinion or policy priorities.
Our nation would be trapped a strategic alignment with a foreign government, taking away the American people’s ability to decide on the future of the relationship.
The US military is meant to protect American interests, and Congress is meant to serve the American people.
That's why Section the US-Israel merger bills must go.
Instead of being a “groundbreaking” speech that changes the US debate over Israel, Emanuel’s speech only serves to define what has emerged as the new conventional wisdom: Netanyahu is bad. But that's not nearly enough.
Several observations can be made regarding Rahm Emanuel’s recent speech at Tel Aviv University: what he said and didn’t say, and what impact (if any) his words might have.
For the past 35 years, Emanuel has been a fixture in US politics. After a short stint as a volunteer with the Israeli Defense Forces in 1991, he returned to the US to work on Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign, then joined the White House staff in 1993. He went on to serve three terms in Congress, leaving to serve as President Obama’s Chief of Staff. Emanuel then ran and won two terms as mayor of Chicago. Finally, in 2021 he was appointed by President Biden as US Ambassador to Japan.
With such an expansive resume, it’s not surprising that Emanuel would consider running for president. At the same time, given the dramatic shifts in Democratic voters’ attitudes toward Israel and Emanuel’s long history of support for Israel (e.g., his father was born there, his uncle served in the terror group, Irgun, and he volunteered with the IDF during the first Gulf War), questions were immediately raised as to how he would navigate these turbulent waters in a presidential primary.
The way out of this bind for Emanuel was to heed the maxim: “Shine a light on your problem.” Instead of ignoring Israel and how out of sync he might be with the majority of Democrats, Emanuel decided to go Tel Aviv to deliver a major speech that laying out his bona fides as a long-time supporter of Israel, while delivering a sharp rebuke to that government’s policies.
It was, however, a strange hodgepodge of a speech. After noting his family ties with Israel, Emanuel launched into the Israeli historical narrative of the post-Oslo period, echoing the well-worn “Palestinians never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity.” As a member of the Clinton team, he appears comfortable repeating their false claims that Palestinians turned down “the best deals ever” offered by former Prime Ministers Rabin, Barak, and Olmert and then unleashed violence against innocent Israelis. While this fabrication served the Clintons’ electoral purposes, it doesn’t jibe with what actually happened.
I was in the Occupied Territories in the ‘90s working on a project created by the Clinton administration, and saw firsthand how the Israeli government was expanding settlements, blocking Palestinian economic development, and establishing cruel and humiliating restrictions on Palestinian movement and employment. After the first few years of Oslo, Palestinians were poorer, less free to move about, had less control of land, and were losing hope in peace. As a result, Palestinian support for their leaders who had signed agreements with Israel was collapsing and support for rejectionists was on the rise. And so, it’s true that Hamas used terror against innocent Israelis in order to sabotage Oslo and discredit the Palestinian Authority. Instead of strengthening peace, the Israeli government sidelined the PA, treated all Palestinians as guilty, and in the process created more anger. Because the Clinton administration did nothing to challenge Israel’s role in sabotaging Oslo, it is inexcusable for Emanuel to blame Palestinians and absolve Israel.
As for Barak’s offer, Palestinians never rejected it. They continued to negotiate with Israel at Taba until Barak, facing electoral defeat, ended the negotiations leaving Palestinians in the lurch. Olmert’s offer of 98% was indeed enticing, but—as he was facing imminent removal from office and a prison term—his “offer” was dismissed by Palestinians as not serious.
From here, Emanuel launches into a full-throated criticism of Israel’s recent policies in the Occupied Territories which he laments have made the country a “territorial pariah” in the world. It is hard to argue with his cataloguing of the horrors Israel has visited upon Palestinians or with his assessment that the US’s coddling of Israel with unconditional support has contributed to the sense of impunity that has fueled Israel’s inhumane behaviors. Even more interesting is Emanuel’s embrace of the threat of applying sanctions not only to settlers who violate Palestinian rights, but also to government ministers, banks, and contractors as well.
While Emanuel’s criticisms are harsher than those of his fellow mainstream Democrats, instead of seeing the problem as systemic, he focuses blame on Benjamin Netanyahu. In fact, much of the speech sounds like a plea to Israelis to see how Netanyahu’s policies have damaged their reputation in the world. It was less a US campaign speech than a plea to Israelis to rid themselves of the leader who has damaged their international standing.
But ridding themselves of Netanyahu isn’t enough, as those who are running against him do not oppose his overall approach to Palestinians. That will not change until the US takes measures to punish Israel’s bad behaviors. Threats won’t do it. Only by shocking the Israeli polity with punitive sanctions will a new Israeli leadership emerge that is willing to both abandon their fantasy of Greater Israel and embrace Palestinian humanity.
Instead of taking this direct approach, Emanuel sidesteps it, embracing what is an equally dangerous fantasy of a broad regional peace between Israel and the 21 Arab states as the way forward. In this liberal Zionist vision, the Arabs, instead of exploiting Palestinian suffering for their own ends, would be assigned the responsibility of getting the Palestinians to stop rewarding those who kill Israelis and to stop teaching hatred of Israel. In this fantasy world, Israel would become the center of global trade between East and West and once again admired for its genius and accomplishments.
As compelling as this vision might be to liberal Zionists in Israel and the US, it fails to address existing realities. Instead of turning the corner by first imposing restraints on Israel, the burden is placed on Palestinians. Emanuel falls silent on what will be done: to compensate Palestinians for their losses of lands, homes, and lives; to rein in the Israeli military and border police in the occupied lands, Lebanon, and Syria, or the out-of-control settler movement that is rampaging and terrorizing Palestinians; to force the Israeli government to free the thousands of Palestinians hostages detained for years without charges or trials, and take down the abusive checkpoints, remove the hundreds of thousands of settlers living on stolen lands, free up the Palestinian tax monies they collect (which by treaty should turned over to the PA), and end the impediments to economic development that have impoverished Palestinians for decades. About all of these steps, Emanuel says nothing.
In the end, instead of being a “groundbreaking” speech that changes the US debate over Israel, Emanuel’s speech only serves to define what has emerged as the new conventional wisdom: Netanyahu is bad, the US shouldn’t be paying for Israel’s misbehavior, and if only the Arabs would step in and control the Palestinians and make peace with Israel all would be well. This is, as we say, “nice, but no cigar.”
What was gained—and what did they refuse to admit—when the powerful military bloc held talks in Türkiye?
Despite its well-advertised tensions and tectonic geopolitical changes, this week’s NATO summit demonstrated that NATO has survived and is resilient. It remains committed to reinforcing US hegemony across Europe and globally. Not a lot has changed since former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote that US global dominance relies on controlling the periphery of Eurasia: NATO in the West, in Southwest Asia to the South, as well as its Asia-Pacific allies from South Korea and Japan through the Philippines and Australia. In the 21st century, military planning as well as trade is deeply integrated across these three regions.
The Summit served to reinforce what is emerging as a new bloc system for our yet to be named era. Threatened by the US and NATO, as John Mearsheimer remarked, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea each see the US as a mortal enemy. While each of these nations’ situations and ambitions are vastly different, they share an interest in fending off threats from the US. They are thus increasingly binding themselves to one another economically, militarily, and diplomatically.
There were four major dimensions to the summit: 1) NATO’s survival despite its fault lines, 2) the first day’s focus on expanding and integrating European and US military production infrastructures and weapons sales contracts. 3) The final declaration celebrated and committed to still more European military spending. And 4) support for Ukraine was manifest.
The move to what is termed NATO 3.0, with European nations assuming greater responsibilities for the European theater, reflects the United States relative decline, something which has been glaringly demonstrated in its failed war against Iran. Trump and his coterie understand that US “leadership” is only possible with NATO. Despite his rhetoric, Trump and company value NATO because it allows them to do what they want to do elsewhere, especially in the most economically dynamic part of the world: the Indo-Pacific.
The transatlantic and increasingly global NATO alliance remains strong despite its fault lines due to what the elites understand as overlapping US and European shared interests, if not values.
NATO Secretary General Rutte and his allies insulated the alliance from Trump, from his madness, his dementia, his claim that US ships have been attacked by the Islamic Republic of Japan, demands for Greenland, and his complaints that European nations didn’t deliver all that he wanted in his war on Iran. Toward that end, the summit was convened and adjourned in less than a day, and the final declaration was limited to just six paragraphs, leaving little room for debate.
In fact, although not widely reported, during the war European allies have allowed US warplanes and ships to operate from bases across the continent, and they have provided access to their facilities for repairs and refueling.
As we could read in Carnegie Europe, “…trans-Atlanticism was never only a values project. It was—and remains—a convergence of security, economic, and technological interests between two regions that together account for roughly 43 percent of global GDP and comprise the world’s most capable alliance.”
The best way to understand what transpired in Ankara may be to use the lens of transactional dealmaking among Mafia families. Trump and Colby got what they wanted: European elites signed onto NATO 3.0 with increased European military spending and preparations to militarily contain and press Russia, so that the US can focus on containing China’s ambitions and reinforcing its 21st century Indo-Pacific hegemony. Remember, this has been a US goal that began with Obama’s “pivot to Asia.”
With NATO 3.0, the US intends to gradually reduce its ostensible role in guaranteeing European security. It is worth noting that European NATO members already massively outspending Russia on their militaries. They have conventional military superiority over Russia. And with NATO 3.0 these differentials will only become greater.
In time, the US will provide only what its European allies cannot: nuclear threats and high-tech intelligence. But it is also worth noting is that Trump said nothing in Ankara about pulling more troops out of Europe. The announced 5,000 troop reduction in Germany has yet to begin, and a commitment for increased US troop rotations in Poland was made. The Hegseth-Colby campaign for major US force reductions in Europe has been slowed by the two-month review won by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. In the end, Trump, and no one else, is the decision maker. Remember too that despite Trump ranting about NATO’s limited support for his war against Iran, the US would be very limited in its Southwest Asian and North African power projection without it bases still in Europe.
The West wasn’t shattered. In the transactional exchange, the US joined the dominant European narrative forged by the Baltic states and Poland about Russia and signed onto the summit’s final declaration with its commitments to support Ukraine in the war with Russia. This includes blessing Ukrainian debilitating attacks on Russian energy infrastructure deep within Russia. The declaration identified Russia as a long-term threat and reinterred the Treaty’s Article V commitment to come to the aid of any NATO member that is attacked. Ukraine won’t be joining NATO any time soon, but its advanced military technologies and warfighting experience make it an increasingly powerful adjunct to NATO.
In fact, the arms sales announced as the summit began serve as glue for the alliance’s future. Fifty billion dollars in weapons contracts were signed, with commitments made to Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Palantir, Anduril, Germany’s Rheinmetall, French Airbus, Sweden’s Saab, and Turkey’s Aselsan. Even Denmark, despite Trump’s Greenland threats, will be buying US Hellfire missiles and ships to patrol the Arctic.
NATO 3.0 makes it possible for the US to reinforce its lattice-like military alliance system and its military buildup across the Indo-Pacific. Note that the RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) naval show of force was held at the same time as the NATO summit. It includes the forces of 10 of 30 NATO nations. Almost one-third of all NATO countries sent military forces: land, air, and sea to Hawaii to participate in the RIMPAC 38-day war drills.
The summit also demonstrated Turkey’s increased role in NATO, both in relation to Southwest Asia, but also via its increased weapons production capacity for the alliance. Trump tossed Erdogan what may prove to be only a symbolic military bone with his offer to endorse the sale of F-35s to Turkey. There remain two major obstacles to those sales: Turkey’s S-400 air defense systems which were purchased from Moscow and the need for Congressional authorization for those sales.
On the subject of weapons sales, in his ostensible tilt toward Ukraine, Trump authorized the much-ballyhooed licensing for Ukraine to produce Patriot missile defense systems. This is too little too late to be meaningful. It will take at least a year to get such a complex weapons manufacturing system up and running. And Putin would certainly make these weapons facilities a primary target while they are being built. Moreover, to defend the construction of these facilities the already beleaguered Ukraine would need to divert its very limited missile and drone defenses to protect the construction, leaving the country still more vulnerable.
Reinforcing the global commitments of NATO, at a meeting on the sidelines of the summit the Japanese government called for deeper cooperation between NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand at a meeting on the summit sidelines. Japan, which hosts more than 100 US military bases and installations, and has its most militarist government since 1945, has a security and defense pact with the EU. In recent months, Tokyo has created or deepened strategic partnerships and weapons development agreements with countries including Britain, Germany, Italy, and Sweden.
Tokyo is in the process of doubling its military spending. It is moving to trash Article 9, the heart of its Peace Constitution. It has deployed conventional preemptive strike missiles that can reach China and North Korea. And it has declared its readiness to go to war for Taiwan.
Despite the still open wounds of Japanese conquest and colonization of Korea in the last century, the US backed Japanese-ROK alliance is the strongest it has ever been. And there is increasing discussion in South Korea about returning US nuclear weapons to the Peninsula or developing its own nuclear arsenal.
Filling out the network of Indo-Pacific alliances, the US has been deepening military ties with its former colony, the Philippines. Add to this AUKUS (Australia, Britain and the US) and the QUAD (US, Japan, Australia, and India).
Several other points are worth noting. Europe’s massive military spending increases, trending at an annual rate of 20%, have been financed by increasing debt. That can’t continue. As Stop Re/Arm Europe network warns, if this increased spending continues it can only come at the expense of essential social services. Those cuts, and the suffering they cause, will further open the way for far-right wing political gains.
In truth, we are still a long way from an operational NATO 3.0. As the French and German refusal to cooperate on development of the next jet fighter indicates, continuing divisions among the leading European powers remain very real. Issues of command and control and many other concerns will be challenging for NATO to address. And while not widely reported in the US media, US and European national security mandarins have been remarking about the failure to announce a NATO summit in 2027. The absence of a NATO summit next year may serve to prevent a new round of headlines and reports about US-NATO divisions, and it will also allow for more backroom deals.
For more than 60 years (1945 – 1980) humanity was plagued by the clash of competing block systems. The Cold War was not always cold, and on several occasions, we were confronted by the specter of nuclear annihilation.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy and his advisors believed the odds were 50-50 that the crisis would end in a thermonuclear exchange.
Computer and human errors were not uncommon. NATO’s 1983 Abel Archer military exercise sparked fears that they were under attack. That same year computer Soviet systems mistook a rare alignment of sunlight on high-altitude clouds for incoming US nuclear armed missiles. Most of us are alive today because Soviet Colonel Petrov, believed it to be a false alarm, defied his standing orders, dismissed the nuclear alert, and was later reprimanded for his courageous act.
Millions, from Vietnam to Afghanistan and Greece to Mozambique died in proxy wars between the US and Soviet led blocs. As President Dwight Eisenhower warned, the US military-industrial complex threatened democratic values and practice. And trillions of dollars, rubles, francs and other currencies were wasted on weaponry at the cost of essential medical care, education, housing and more.
One definition of stupidity is doing the same thing twice but expecting different results. With the creation of a new bloc system, the expansion and upgrading of the world’s nuclear arsenals, the climate emergency’s fires and rising seas, and uncertainty over where new high-tech weaponry will lead, it appears that NATO, Russian, and many other elites failed to learn the Cold War’s existential lessons.
But there is still time. It should be obvious that the only way to end the war between Russia and Ukraine is with a dirty deal that includes a ceasefire in place, security guarantees for both Ukraine and Russia, and a commitment to negotiate the status of currently occupied territories over time. How many more Russian and Ukrainian lives should be sacrificed in the killing fields of Donbass? How long should we tolerate spiraling military spending at the sacrifice of our living standards which in turn opens the way for fascist forces on the right?
There is also the lesson of Common Security diplomacy which thankfully provided the foundation for détente and the end of the Cold War. We can take some hope from off the record Track II discussions and others among elite Europeans, Russians, and US figures that there are increasing references to building on the traditions and surviving resources of the Helsinki process and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) to build a post-war Common Security European and transatlantic strategic architecture. Too few among us now remember that three decades ago the Cold War came to an end when NATO and Russian leaders finally came to understand that security cannot be achieved against a nation’s rival, but only through hard won win-win diplomacy that addresses the fears of all parties to a conflict.
And Trump, in particular, does not have time on his side when taking into account both economic and political realities, and even some military factors.
For all practical purposes, the US-Iran Memorandum of (Mis)Understanding is over. The dispute over how to manage the Strait of Hormuz in the interim has pushed the two sides back into open war. But to what end?
There is little reason to believe another round of fighting can alter the fundamentals enough to change the reality from which the two sides must ultimately negotiate. If they are fortunate, the MOU’s collapse may yield another round of talks in which the allure of reshaping facts on the ground through force has finally faded.
As I have written elsewhere, the dispute over the Strait turns, at least on the surface, on Paragraph 5 of the MOU: whether Iran is responsible for safe passage throughout the Strait for the duration of the agreement, or only for the waterway’s northern corridor.
Beneath the surface, however, lies a more fundamental strategic disagreement. Even before the MOU was signed, Tehran believed Washington's objective was to establish a southern shipping corridor through Omani waters that would gradually erode Iran's control over the Strait. Such a corridor would require Oman's cooperation, which may explain why Trump at one point threatened to bomb Oman unless it abandoned its proposal for joint management of the Strait, with administrative fees collected by Muscat and Tehran.
The corridor would remain operational even if war resumed and Iran sought once again to close the Strait. From Tehran's perspective, Washington used the MOU to strengthen this alternative route, and the US military's escort of commercial shipping without coordinating with Iran marked a significant step in that direction. If successful, the strategy would deprive Iran of its most important source of leverage — which is precisely why it appeals to Washington.
This is why Tehran has insisted that all ships transiting the Strait — regardless of the corridor they use — coordinate with Iran, consistent with its reading of Paragraph 5 of the MOU. Washington, by contrast, argues that the MOU merely assigns Iran responsibility for ensuring the safe passage of commercial vessels, without granting it operational control over all maritime traffic.
Before the funeral of former Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, the two sides explored a compromise under which ships would coordinate their transit with both Iran and a designated Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) state. As I wrote in my Substack, “Under such an arrangement, ships would notify Tehran while also reporting to a GCC maritime authority, balancing Iran's demand for oversight with Washington's desire to avoid granting Tehran exclusive control.” But no agreement was reached before diplomacy was suspended for the duration of the funeral.
Accounts of what transpired in Muscat over the weekend naturally differ, but three proposals emerged. Iran advanced a variation of the earlier compromise: a dual-notification system for all vessels transiting the Strait. Qatar proposed three channels—an Iranian corridor in the north, an Omani corridor in the south, and a neutral corridor in the middle. For Tehran, this was a nonstarter, as it would effectively restore the Strait to its pre-February status.
According to Tehran, the United States and Oman favored separate management of the Iranian and Omani corridors: Iran could require coordination for vessels using its corridor, while Oman's would remain unrestricted.
Tehran saw this as an attempt to formalize what it had long suspected was Washington's strategy: creating a southern corridor through the Strait beyond Iran's influence, leaving Tehran no means of challenging it short of war with Oman. Iran also contends that Muscat advanced the proposal only under intense US pressure, noting that Oman had previously supported a joint management system.
Washington disputes this account. US officials maintain they were open to several arrangements, provided commercial vessels could transit the Strait safely. According to the American version, the talks unraveled only after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi consulted Tehran regarding a joint Iranian-Omani statement declaring the Strait open. From Washington's perspective, negotiations had been progressing until Araghchi was overruled by hardliners in the IRGC, who chose confrontation over compromise.
Whether such a fracture proved decisive in this instance is unclear. What is clear is that the outlook of Iranian strategists has hardened markedly in recent weeks as they have become increasingly convinced that Trump intends to restart the war. Several developments have reinforced that belief. First, Trump's rhetoric shifted dramatically: he called the Iranians "scum," declared the ceasefire over, and said he might resume bombing to "finish the job."
Second, as I argued here, Tehran believes Washington brokered the Lebanese-Israeli agreement — which contradicts the US-Iran MOU by conditioning Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon on Hezbollah's disarmament — to enable Israel to retain key positions that would weaken Hezbollah's ability to support Iran in the next war.
Third, White House officials leaked the US demand that Tehran declare the Strait open and, at least implicitly, accept responsibility for attacks on shipping. Rather than seeing the leak as political posturing to make Trump appear tough, Tehran increasingly viewed it as a deliberate attempt to derail the talks and steer the crisis back toward military confrontation.
Taken together, these developments convinced Tehran that Washington was preparing to resume the war. From that perspective, Iran's best option was to close the Strait immediately. Rather than an attempt to extract additional concessions or an instance of overplaying its hand, Tehran's decision appears to have been driven by the fear of losing its most important source of leverage before the next round of fighting.
In the view of Iranian decision-makers, closing the Strait would not trigger war because war was already coming. (If their assessment was incorrect, however, Tehran’s own actions have likely created a self-fulfilling prophecy by taking actions that made a military response from Washington next to inevitable).
Still, much indicates that another round of war will not fundamentally change realities on the ground or the balance between the US and Iran. Trump, in particular, does not have time on his side when taking into account both economic and political realities, and even some military factors.
By almost every meaningful measure, the global oil inventory position is materially weaker today than it was before the February war. Since the end of February, observed global oil inventories have fallen by roughly 360–370 million barrels, with only about 21 million barrels rebuilt after the US-Iran MOU—recovering just 5% of the wartime draw.
More importantly, the apparent recovery reflects oil in transit rather than replenished storage: oil on water increased by 117 million barrels, while onshore inventories fell by 96 million barrels. OECD inventories declined by another 62 million barrels in June alone, including roughly 44 million barrels released from government emergency stocks.
The United States also enters any renewed conflict with a substantially smaller strategic cushion. It has fallen from about 415 million barrels before the war to roughly 337 million barrels, while commercial crude, gasoline and distillate inventories all remain below their five-year seasonal averages. Consequently, Washington has significantly less capacity than in February to absorb another major disruption to global oil flows.
In addition, the United States is now only four months away from the midterm elections, dramatically shortening Trump's economic and political pain threshold. In February, the administration could plausibly argue that the oil shock was temporary and that prices would normalize before voters went to the polls. A renewed conflict today would push its most visible economic consequences directly into the campaign: higher gasoline prices, inflation, interest rates, and rising food, airline, freight, and utility costs.
As a Pentagon source told me last year, Iran builds missiles faster than the United States produces missile interceptors. And while Washington must divide its attention and resources among multiple theaters—from Ukraine to Taiwan—Iran has only one.
Thus, although the United States could, given enough time, degrade Iran's ability to threaten shipping in the Persian Gulf, there is little reason to believe it could do so before the economic and political costs became prohibitive for Trump. It is essentially the same strategic reality he confronted in February. The difference is that he lacked the benefit of hindsight then. Now he has it—though it does not appear to have mattered.