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A group of security experts have issued a report on Friday warning that the FBI's wiretapping expansion proposal is "unwise, ineffective" and "poses serious security risks."
As the New York Times' Charlie Savage reported, the FBI plan would entail a "sweeping overhaul of surveillance laws that would make it easier to wiretap people who communicate using the Internet rather than by traditional phone services."
Specifically, "The proposal would extend technical design mandates for 'wiretap readiness' to peer-to-peer communications tools," Joseph Lorenzo Hall of the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) writes. The reports adds that it "could encompass a wide range of products and services, from instant messaging and chat to Skype to Google Hangouts to Xbox Live. It could include services offered through a variety of means, from stand-alone services to features built into web browser software and social networking sites."
And, the Washington Post reported,
Under the draft proposal, a court could levy a series of escalating fines, starting at tens of thousands of dollars, on firms that fail to comply with wiretap orders, according to persons who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. A company that does not comply with an order within a certain period would face an automatic judicial inquiry, which could lead to fines. After 90 days, fines that remain unpaid would double daily.
In their report, "CALEA II: Risks of Wiretap Modifications to Endpoints," the 20 experts warn that "A wiretap design mandate on communications tools is, plainly put, an opportunity for increased exploitation."
Hall sums up the security experts' argument:
First, wiretap functionality allows covert access to communications that can be exploited not only by law enforcement, but by criminals, terrorists, and foreign military and intelligence agencies. Wiretap endpoints will be vulnerable to exploitation and difficult to secure. Second, imposing the obligation to facilitate wiretapping on software developers forces them to choose between two dangerous, expensive, cumbersome options: they can either create a compliance department capable of responding 24/7 to law enforcement demands, or they can show personnel in law enforcement agencies world wide how to exploit their software to harvest user communications. Finally, the wiretap capability that the FBI seeks will be ineffective because it is easily disabled and because knock-off products that lack the wiretap functionality can be readily downloaded from websites abroad. Because many of the tools that people use to communicate are built on open standards and open source software, it will be trivial to remove or disable wiretap functionality.
Ultimately, the group concludes, enacting this proposal would present greater security risks than not wiretapping at all. They write:
We believe that on balance mandating that endpoint software vendors build intercept functionality into their products will be much more costly to personal, economic and governmental security overall than the risks associated with not being able to wiretap all communications.
______________________________
Dear Common Dreams reader, It’s been nearly 30 years since I co-founded Common Dreams with my late wife, Lina Newhouser. We had the radical notion that journalism should serve the public good, not corporate profits. It was clear to us from the outset what it would take to build such a project. No paid advertisements. No corporate sponsors. No millionaire publisher telling us what to think or do. Many people said we wouldn't last a year, but we proved those doubters wrong. Together with a tremendous team of journalists and dedicated staff, we built an independent media outlet free from the constraints of profits and corporate control. Our mission has always been simple: To inform. To inspire. To ignite change for the common good. Building Common Dreams was not easy. Our survival was never guaranteed. When you take on the most powerful forces—Wall Street greed, fossil fuel industry destruction, Big Tech lobbyists, and uber-rich oligarchs who have spent billions upon billions rigging the economy and democracy in their favor—the only bulwark you have is supporters who believe in your work. But here’s the urgent message from me today. It's never been this bad out there. And it's never been this hard to keep us going. At the very moment Common Dreams is most needed, the threats we face are intensifying. We need your support now more than ever. We don't accept corporate advertising and never will. We don't have a paywall because we don't think people should be blocked from critical news based on their ability to pay. Everything we do is funded by the donations of readers like you. When everyone does the little they can afford, we are strong. But if that support retreats or dries up, so do we. Will you donate now to make sure Common Dreams not only survives but thrives? —Craig Brown, Co-founder |
A group of security experts have issued a report on Friday warning that the FBI's wiretapping expansion proposal is "unwise, ineffective" and "poses serious security risks."
As the New York Times' Charlie Savage reported, the FBI plan would entail a "sweeping overhaul of surveillance laws that would make it easier to wiretap people who communicate using the Internet rather than by traditional phone services."
Specifically, "The proposal would extend technical design mandates for 'wiretap readiness' to peer-to-peer communications tools," Joseph Lorenzo Hall of the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) writes. The reports adds that it "could encompass a wide range of products and services, from instant messaging and chat to Skype to Google Hangouts to Xbox Live. It could include services offered through a variety of means, from stand-alone services to features built into web browser software and social networking sites."
And, the Washington Post reported,
Under the draft proposal, a court could levy a series of escalating fines, starting at tens of thousands of dollars, on firms that fail to comply with wiretap orders, according to persons who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. A company that does not comply with an order within a certain period would face an automatic judicial inquiry, which could lead to fines. After 90 days, fines that remain unpaid would double daily.
In their report, "CALEA II: Risks of Wiretap Modifications to Endpoints," the 20 experts warn that "A wiretap design mandate on communications tools is, plainly put, an opportunity for increased exploitation."
Hall sums up the security experts' argument:
First, wiretap functionality allows covert access to communications that can be exploited not only by law enforcement, but by criminals, terrorists, and foreign military and intelligence agencies. Wiretap endpoints will be vulnerable to exploitation and difficult to secure. Second, imposing the obligation to facilitate wiretapping on software developers forces them to choose between two dangerous, expensive, cumbersome options: they can either create a compliance department capable of responding 24/7 to law enforcement demands, or they can show personnel in law enforcement agencies world wide how to exploit their software to harvest user communications. Finally, the wiretap capability that the FBI seeks will be ineffective because it is easily disabled and because knock-off products that lack the wiretap functionality can be readily downloaded from websites abroad. Because many of the tools that people use to communicate are built on open standards and open source software, it will be trivial to remove or disable wiretap functionality.
Ultimately, the group concludes, enacting this proposal would present greater security risks than not wiretapping at all. They write:
We believe that on balance mandating that endpoint software vendors build intercept functionality into their products will be much more costly to personal, economic and governmental security overall than the risks associated with not being able to wiretap all communications.
______________________________
A group of security experts have issued a report on Friday warning that the FBI's wiretapping expansion proposal is "unwise, ineffective" and "poses serious security risks."
As the New York Times' Charlie Savage reported, the FBI plan would entail a "sweeping overhaul of surveillance laws that would make it easier to wiretap people who communicate using the Internet rather than by traditional phone services."
Specifically, "The proposal would extend technical design mandates for 'wiretap readiness' to peer-to-peer communications tools," Joseph Lorenzo Hall of the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT) writes. The reports adds that it "could encompass a wide range of products and services, from instant messaging and chat to Skype to Google Hangouts to Xbox Live. It could include services offered through a variety of means, from stand-alone services to features built into web browser software and social networking sites."
And, the Washington Post reported,
Under the draft proposal, a court could levy a series of escalating fines, starting at tens of thousands of dollars, on firms that fail to comply with wiretap orders, according to persons who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. A company that does not comply with an order within a certain period would face an automatic judicial inquiry, which could lead to fines. After 90 days, fines that remain unpaid would double daily.
In their report, "CALEA II: Risks of Wiretap Modifications to Endpoints," the 20 experts warn that "A wiretap design mandate on communications tools is, plainly put, an opportunity for increased exploitation."
Hall sums up the security experts' argument:
First, wiretap functionality allows covert access to communications that can be exploited not only by law enforcement, but by criminals, terrorists, and foreign military and intelligence agencies. Wiretap endpoints will be vulnerable to exploitation and difficult to secure. Second, imposing the obligation to facilitate wiretapping on software developers forces them to choose between two dangerous, expensive, cumbersome options: they can either create a compliance department capable of responding 24/7 to law enforcement demands, or they can show personnel in law enforcement agencies world wide how to exploit their software to harvest user communications. Finally, the wiretap capability that the FBI seeks will be ineffective because it is easily disabled and because knock-off products that lack the wiretap functionality can be readily downloaded from websites abroad. Because many of the tools that people use to communicate are built on open standards and open source software, it will be trivial to remove or disable wiretap functionality.
Ultimately, the group concludes, enacting this proposal would present greater security risks than not wiretapping at all. They write:
We believe that on balance mandating that endpoint software vendors build intercept functionality into their products will be much more costly to personal, economic and governmental security overall than the risks associated with not being able to wiretap all communications.
______________________________