At Tuesday's State Department briefing, spokesman Robert Wood --
admittedly speaking quickly, and off the cuff -- said the following
about Pakistan, when asked about the political tensions between
President Asif Ali Zardari and his rival, Nawaz Sharif:
"It's a complex country. It's got a major problem that it's dealing with, and that's called terrorism."
I don't mean to criticize Wood, because I'm sure he knows better. But
the fact is, Pakistan's "major problem" is not "terrorism." The real
problem that Pakistan has is that it's entire political system is
broken: for nearly half a century, it's been ruled by the military; its
political parties are utterly ineffective, having functioned for
decades as fiefdoms for two families, the Bhuttos and the Sharifs; and
the country is desperately poor, in fact, virtually bankrupt, and its
population is being pushed to the brink of desperation. Yes, it's
plagued by a terrorist movement, too, but the threat from the Pakistani
Taliban and its Al Qaeda allies is nowhere close to existential -- that
is, radical Muslims are not about to seize power in Islamabad.
The idea that Pakistan's "major problem" is "terrorism" is the chief
shortcoming of US policy toward Pakistan. For nearly a decade, the
United States has viewed Pakistan exclusively through the
counterterrorism lens. Very few Pakistanis see terrorism as their chief
problem, and they quite rightly criticize the United States for
demanding that Pakistan make terrorism its first priority. For
Pakistanis, the top priorities are economic development and political
stability.
Take politics first. The political showdown pitting Zardari against
the Sharif brothers is not new. They've been bitter rivals for decades.
They represent two clans, both corrupt. As Tariq Ali writes in his
book, The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power,
politics in Pakistan is a "desert [and] not even an imaginary oasis is
in sight." It will take a generation, at least, for Pakistan to develop
the rudiments of democratic political institutions, including healthy,
grassroots-based political parties with legitimate constituencies. At
present, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) -- the party of Zardari and
the Bhuttos -- which once upon a time had the potential to become a
real, democratic party representing Pakistani intellectuals, workers,
and students, is a corrupt shell. And the Muslim League, an echo of the
original party of Muslim nationalists that founded Pakistan in 1947,
has split into pieces and its major chunk is a corrupted tool for Nawaz
and Shahbaz Sharif, two brothers.
There is a thriving political class in Pakistan, especially among the
professions -- above all, the lawyers -- and among students, who could
provide the seeds for rebuilding democracy in Pakistan. The powerful
movement in favor of restoring the chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad
Chaudhry, to office is only one sign of the power of that movement. But
for the pro-democracy movement in Pakistan to grow, for it to take over
one or both of Pakistan's two dominant political parties -- or to
create new ones -- will take a long time. And it will only occur if two
conditions are met: first, the Pakistani military must stay out of
politics and allows the political class to reassert itself; and,
second, the crippling economic crisis in Pakistan must be eased.
Pakistan was already wobbling when it was hit by the oil price increase
of 2007-2008 and then by the worldwide economic crisis since last
summer. It's now a basket case, and it will take a Marshall Plan --
with not only the United States, but China, Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, and other friends of Pakistan -- pitching in to help.
A year ago, Zardari -- the widower of Benazir Bhutto -- and Sharif
agreed to form a coalition to run Pakistan, but their accord was
short-lived.
Since then Zardari has sought to rule as a despot, though his days seem numbered now.
In the late 1960s, Zardari's PPP -- led, then, by Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto -- was the most promising political institution in Pakistan.
Tariq Ali, who met Benazir Bhutto, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's daughter, in
1969, recalls:
"She agreed that land reform, mass education programs,
a health service, and an independent foreign policy were constructive
aims and crucial if the country was to be saved from the vultures in
and out of uniform. Her constituency was the poor, and she was proud of
that."
Over the years, however, the promise of the PPP deteriorated. Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto, who ruled in the 1970s, was overthrown in 1977 by a coup
d'etat and hanged in 1979. Radicalized by her father's hanging at the
hands of General Zia ul-Haq, the Pakistani dictator who waged the
American-funded anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, Benazir
Bhutto battled Zia and, with her brothers, established Al-Zulfiqar, an
armed movement, to fight him. But Benazir Bhutto never realized her
potential, and perhaps her biggest mistake was to marry Zardari, a
wealthy and corrupt polo-playing womanizer. When Zia died in a plane
crash in 1988, Bhutto and Sharif took turns serving as prime minister
-- with the Pakistani army hovering in the background. Both Bhutto and
Sharif used their positions to accumulate vast wealth. (Tariq Ali
estimates that Bhutto and Zardari stole $1.5 billion and that the
Sharifs, probably $3 billion.) By the late 1990s, the Bhutto-Sharif tag
team had exhausted Pakistan, and even many liberal Pakistani's greeted
General Pervez Musharraf's coup d'etat in 1999 with relief, hoping that
the military at least would restore stability to the country.
Both Bhutto and Sharif fled into exile in the Arab Gulf. Musharraf?
Well, that didn't work out so well. And the PPP and the Muslim League
didn't exactly thrive during Musharraf's military dictatorship,
deteriorating even further. As Tariq Ali writes:
"The Peoples Party needed to be refounded as a modern
and democratic organization, open to serious debate and discussion,
defending social and human rights, uniting the many disparate groups
and individuals in Pakistan desperate for any halfway decent
alternative. ... [But] the Peoples Party had now formally become a
family heirloom, a property to be disposed of at the will of its
proprietor."
That "heirloom" was passed on, when Benazir Bhutto was assassinated, to her husband.
With Zardari's rule today collapsing, thanks to his mishandling of the
popular demand to restore Chaudhry, the chief justice, it is looking
more and more like Nawaz Sharif will return to power. That's not a
surprise. During the year-long battle between Zardari and Sharif, many
observers have believed that Sharif would eventually get the upper
hand, and he deftly inserted himself at the front of the pro-Chaudhry
movement. People I've spoken to in Washington have long believed that
Sharif, ultimately, would prevail.
Now to the Sharifs. The Sharif family, prominent on its own, rose to
great power because General Zia favored the Sharifs in the 1980s.
They'd long been enemies of the Bhutto family, and their roots in
industry were far less progressive than the Bhutto clan's roots in the
PPP. As Ali writes:
"The day Zia ordered Bhutto's execution, Muhammad
Sharif [father of Nawaz and Shahbaz] and his sons gave thanks to Allah
for responding so rapidly to their prayers. The oldest son, Nawaz,
became a protege of the general's and was made leader of the khaki
Muslim League."
When Musharraf took power in 1999, Nawaz Sharif was arrested and
charged with treason. He probably would have been executed, but his
escape was facilitated by President Clinton, and he settled in Saudi
Arabia in exile. To the extent that the Bhutto-Zardari axis, as corrupt
as it is, can be considered "left leaning," the Sharif brothers ought
to be considered "right leaning." The Sharifs are far closer both to
Pakistan's Muslim fundamentalist establishment, including the Muslim
Brotherhood-linked Jamaat-i Islam (JI) party, and to Pakistan's
military. (Indeed, it's likely that the shadowy Pakistan army and its
intelligence service, the ISI, are quietly backing Sharif now against
Zardari.) As a Punjabi, Sharif represents the majority ethnic bloc in
Pakistan, and as a devout Sunni Muslim, Sharif has had a edge over the
Bhutto clan, which has Shiite Muslim ties.
In addition, Nawaz Sharif has been involved in recent, secret talks --
sponsored by Saudi Arabia -- with the Taliban. Saudi Arabia, which has
tremendous clout in Pakistan, would be supporting Sharif over Zardari,
too. During his last term as prime minister (1997-1999) Sharif took
steps to introduce sharia laws to Pakistan.
The war between Zardari and Sharif is a battle between corrupt
politicians with ugly histories. Unfortunately, they are the
politicians that Pakistan has. And unless the military takes power once
again -- and that's not impossible, although President Obama's team
ought to be telling them in no uncertain terms to stay put in their
barracks -- they are the politicians who will be running Pakistan for
the foreseeable future. Sad, but true.
