Drug War Doublespeak

Through
late February and early March, a blitzkrieg of declarations from U.S.
government and military officials and pundits hit the media, claiming
that Mexico was alternately at risk of being a failed state, on the verge of a civil war, losing control of its territory, and posing a threat to U.S. national security.

In the same breath, we're told that Mexican President Felipe Calderon, with the aid of the U.S. government, is winning the war on drugs, significantly weakening organized crime, and restoring order and legality.

None of these claims is true. Instead they're critical elements in waging the hypocritical drug war in Mexico.

Drug-war doublespeak pervades and defines the U.S.-Mexico
relationship today. The discourse aims not to win the war on drugs but
to assure funding and public support for the military model of
combating illegal drug trafficking, despite the losses and overwhelming
evidence that current strategies are not working.

Sorting Reality from Hype

Mexico, particularly in border cities and other key points along the
drug routes, has a serious problem. In these places, violence
characterizes daily life. But Mexico isn't a failed state. It's a
tragic example of the results of failed policies - on both sides of the
border. Both governments want to obscure this simple fact.

In the past, exaggerated risk assessments, amplified by the media
and accompanied by dire warnings to the public, prepare the ground for
military intervention. They usually pack hyperbole or outright lies,
the most recent example being the "weapons of mass destruction" in Iraq.

While military intervention in Mexico isn't on the horizon, the
recent hype has been accompanied by requests for military build-up on
the border. Texas Governor Rick Perry jetted to Washington to ask for
$135 million and 1,000 soldiers. Talk of sending more National Guard
circulated, along with mentions of a border "surge." The Texas state
government announced a rapid-mobilization plan in case Mexico
"collapsed," replete with tanks and aircraft.

After outgoing Homeland Security head Michael Chertoff spoke of a
contingency plan for the border, the media wondered aloud whether
incoming head Janet Napolitano would be tough enough. She responded by
calling the situation a "top priority." Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates called the Mexican drug war "a serious problem." He raised a
maelstrom of protest in Mexico with the announcement that the
disappearance of Mexico's anti-Pentagon biases had cleared the way for
tighter cooperation. The U.S. embassy was forced to issue a press
release declaring that the United States had no intention of sending
troops into Mexico.

Congress also leapt to respond to the rhetoric. Hearings have been
called in both houses, including the Senate Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee under Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-CT) who,
according to news reports, will be looking for "potential implications
for increased terrorist activity." The committees will likely hear
testimony primarily from persons who confirm the perceived threat in
lurid and imprecise terms.

The Mexican government has responded by lobbing counter-accusations
at the United States. Calderon cites the U.S. role in gun-running,
money-laundering, and demand for narcotics.

The motivations behind the recent hype vary. Alarmist cries of a
collapse of Mexico help clinch the passage of measures to further
militarize the southern border and obtain juicy contracts for private
defense and security firms. Local politicians are finding they can be a
cash cow for federal aid.

The flurry of panic about the spillover of violence from Mexico also
arises just as Congress considers the latest installment of the Merida
Initiative, now tucked inside the omnibus spending bill. The Merida
Initiative, designed by the Bush administration, is the $1.4 billion
vehicle for bolstering the war on drugs launched by Calderon in 2006.
It provides military-to-military aid for the domestic battles being
waged by some 40,000 Mexican army troops, and imposes U.S. training in
policing, forensics, penal, and judicial practices.

The Meaning of Success

The most glaring example of drug-war doublespeak is the definition
of "success." Although Mexico is supposedly on the brink of collapse,
members of the Obama administration, Congress and the Pentagon have
unanimously proclaimed the contradictory message that since Calderon
launched the offensive against organized crime in December 2006, his
government has made great progress against illegal drug trafficking and
the power of cartels, with the help of the U.S. government through the
Merida Initiative.

But this assertion doesn't stand up to scrutiny. Congress has wisely
begun to place measurable benchmarks in appropriations to avoid the
budgetary and military quagmires of the past. The Merida Initiative
contains four performance measurements: break the power and impunity of
criminal organizations, assist the governments of Mexico and Central
America in strengthening border air and maritime control, improve the
capacity of justice systems in the region, curtail gang activity in
Mexico and Central America, and diminish the demand for drugs in the
region.

In any other context, performance measurements so patently weak,
vague, and one-sided would be considered useless for real evaluation.
They avoid accomplishing their stated purpose by being immeasurable as
written and containing no indicators of success or failure. Given the
failure of the similar Plan Colombia to meet its objectives as shown in
a recent GAO evaluation, the omission was probably intentional.

For instance, the second item on the list - assisting the
governments - isn't a performance measure, unless exporting U.S.
defense goods and services is indeed the end goal. Improving the
capacity of justice systems could conceivably be measured in shortened
court times and a higher ratio of convictions to arrests, but that data
is not yet available. It will be interesting to see if it is accurately
compiled and presented at a later date.

For the measurement calling for the curtailing of gang activity and
demand for narcotics, the United States excluded its own market - the
driving force of the illicit drug trade. The performance measurement
requires the initiative to show reduction of drug demand only in the
southern countries. Despite the dictates of common sense, the Merida
Initiative contains no funds or commitments whatsoever for the
reduction of U.S. demand.

This leaves us with the first benchmark. Common indicators for
reduced "power and impunity of criminal organizations" would logically
entail a reduction in production of illegal drugs, and an increase in
confiscation, thus attacking the earnings of the cartels. It would also
imply more arrests and fewer violent confrontations. We can compare
these goals with the findings of the 2009 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
to see if the first installment of the $1.4 billion dollar plan is on
track. Between 2007 and 2008 net cultivation of opium and cannabis in
Mexico increased. Production of opium gum, heroin, and cannabis all increased. Eradication of poppies and cannabis both decreased
significantly since the beginning of the 2006 drug war. Meanwhile,
seizures of opium gum, heroin, methamphetamines, cannabis, and cocaine all decreased significantly. Destruction of labs fell by nearly half. In addition, the report notes, drug use among Mexican youth is rising.

The drug war model maintains that the opposite should be occurring.
In fact, the only statistic that could be construed as positive in the
report is an increase in arrests. But to truly evaluate this as
progress, we would need to know the conviction figures as well.

The conclusion of the Mexico section of the report flies in the face
of its own data. "The restructuring of security forces, coupled with
the military's strong engagement in the fight to dismantle major drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs), has proven to be effective. These
efforts led to numerous arrests of key narco-traffickers, the discovery
of clandestine drug laboratories, and a dramatic decline in the
importation of methamphetamine and precursors." Curiously, there are no
statistics offered for the last claim. The report is forced into
bizarre contortions to spin the drop by half in seizures of illegal
drugs as "success": "U.S. law enforcement agencies attribute this
reduction to better enforcement which has forced traffickers to seek
alternate routes or alternative enterprises."

The U.S. report acknowledges the shocking increase in violence. But
nowhere does it say that from 2007 to 2008, drug-related deaths more
than doubled, from 2,500 to 6,290. Faced with yet another inconvenient
fact, the report concludes: "The increase in violence may be due to the
success of President Calderon's aggressive anticrime campaign which has
broadly deployed the military in searches and regional security plans,
while more effectively using tools such as extraditions."

The U.S. government comes up with a speculative excuse for almost
every poor result listed in its own report. In the doublespeak of the
Mexican drug war, organized crime branching out into new regions and
new enterprises - human trafficking, for example - is a positive sign.
Violence is progress. Murder is an indicator of success.

Toward True Stories and Corrected Policies

Organized crime isn't the sole and leading actor in the U.S.-Mexico
relationship. We share a rich and highly integrated relationship, with
common interests and challenges but different responsibilities. Each
nation must assume its own responsibilities to face the very real
transnational threats.

A real solution to the drug war violence and the power of organized
crime would require both governments to stop playing the blame game and
recognize that transnational crime is transnational. Its
growth is a phenomenon of globalization. Transnational crime escalates
as a result of the convenient frequency of border crossings that make
real inspection impossible, internationalized, and unscrupulous
financial systems for moving and laundering mega-earnings, and other
byproducts of globalization. Mechanisms of cooperation are necessary
but pointing the finger at Mexico is a grave mistake.

Second, both countries need to cut off pork-barrel contracts to
defense contractors and private security companies, and factor public
health into the equation. The call to treat drug addicts as patients,
not criminals, and to deal with the illegal drug trade at least in part
on the community level through rehabilitation, prevention, and harm
reduction programs is growing throughout the world. Meanwhile, the Mexican drug war moves us in the complete opposite direction.
Third, a new approach means opening up debate to all options, including
legalization. For the most part, this option has been slapped down in
the U.S. discussion as untimely, non-viable, or immoral. It's time to
bring it back to the table, with serious studies on potential impacts,
positive and negative, of a selective end to prohibitionist laws.

That's exactly the proposal of the Latin American Commission on
Drugs and Democracy, led by former presidents and drug warriors
Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil, Cesar Gaviria of Colombia, and
Ernesto Zedillo of Mexico. In a recently released report, they pronounce the war on drugs a failure and call for a "paradigm shift."

The authors state: "The traumatic Colombian experience is a useful reference for countries not to make themistake of adopting the U.S. prohibitionist policies and to move forward in the search for innovative alternatives." Theysuggest
that Mexico, an "epicenter of violent activities," could take the lead
in encouraging global debate on the current policies of the U.S.
government. And they call on Europe and the United States to take
seriously the challenge of demand reduction. The paradigm shift they
propose focuses on public health, reducing consumption, and opening up
debate, even on the legalization of marijuana possession.

Real bilateral cooperation along the lines of these more humane,
lasting solutions could end the collateral violence and social costs of
the failed drug wars. In the long run, they will likely be more
effective in fighting organized crime. They can't be any less effective
that the drug war being waged today by the U.S. and Mexican governments.