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I've been reading through the hot-off-the-presses, exciting 100+ page report from the Commission on Wartime Contracting: "At What Cost? Contingency Contracting In Iraq and Afghanistan." There have been several good pieces
that covered the Congressional hearings related to this report, so I
thought I would just post some of the more important excerpts from the
report. One general note: The Commission, which was created due to the
diligent efforts of Senators Jim Webb and Claire McCaskill, has been
doing some incredibly important work digging deep into the corruption,
waste, abuse, fraud, etc of the US war contracting system. The statute
that created the commission "requires the Commission to assess a number
of factors related to wartime contracting, including the extent of
waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement of wartime contracts. The
Commission has the authority to hold hearings and to refer to the
Attorney General any violation or potential violation of law it
identifies in carrying out its duties."
While the new report
reveals some critical details about issues of waste and abuse, the
general tone is very pro-contractor, which is not surprising. However,
I find it disturbing that one of the members of the Commission, Dov Zakheim,
is, according to his Commission bio, a current vice-president of Booz
Allen Hamilton, a major defense, homeland security and intelligence
contractor with a direct stake in US policy on contractors.
Booze is now majority owned by The Carlyle Group, which has deep political connections. In an Op-ed in The Washington Post
last year, Zakheim campaigned against "More regulations and
bureaucratic restrictions on contractors" and advocated for "a larger,
more diversified base of prime contractors and suppliers." Zakheim, who
was a foreign policy advisor to Bush and part of the circle of the
Vulcans, is now a key member of the primary body that is responsible
for investigating the industry and making formal recommendations on US
policy. While the Commission is made up of appointees from both
political parties, (Zakheim was appointed by President Bush) Zakheim's
corporate stake on these matters should be cause for a review of his
position on the Commission.
***
One fact that jumped out at me in the report is that, at present,
according to the Commission, "contracting oversight" in Afghanistan is
being done remotely from Iraq. And remember, there are 70,000
contractors (and growing) in Afghanistan.
Here are some excerpts from the report, which I have categorized and in some cases highlighted or analyzed:
EXTENT OF US RELIANCE ON CONTRACTORS
THE NUMBERS
ARMED "SECURITY CONTRACTORS"
According to a chart contained in the report, the total number of
DoD PSCs in Iraq is: 12,942 and 3,321 for the State Department. In
Afghanistan, there are 4,373 DoD PSCs and 689 State Department PSCs.
As we previously reported, in the first quarter of 2009, there has been
a 29% increase in the number of PSCs in Afghanistan and will continue
to grow. The report also raises concerns about the poor or inadequate
training some of the PSCs receive, particularly Third Country Nationals
hired to guard US bases and facilities: "Poorly trained and
ill-equipped contractor employees providing security for our operating
bases put American forces at increased risk of harm."
Regarding accountability, the report notes that the US civilian laws covering contractors are rarely enforced:
WASTE, FRAUD ABUSE
According to the Commission's report, there is a severe
shortage of oversight personnel to monitor these massive contracts and
contractors. The report notes that within the Defense Contract Audit
Agency "overall staffing levels have remained relatively constant at
roughly 4,000 since FY 2000, even though DoD contract transactions have
increased by 328 percent-from 304,500 in FY 2000 to over 1.3 million in FY 2006."
CONTRACTORS "SELF-POLICING"
The Defense Contract Management Agency "told the Commissioners that
contractor 'self policing' had been tried, but 'did not work out.'"
Some contracts are actually being "monitored" by investigators
physically located in the United States. While the Commission asserts
there have been improvements in contractor oversight in Iraq, the
system in Afghanistan "is very different and raises significant
concerns about contracting for certain functions generally performed by
the government." Similar to what happened in Iraq, a contractor was
hired to monitor contractors as part of the Armed Contractor Oversight
Division (ACOD). The company that won the contract is Aegis, the
British-owned firm headed by famed mercenary Tim Spicer. According to
the report, ACOD is "primarily staffed" by the company:
Aegis's work raises heightened inherently governmental concerns because the ACOD receives limited U.S. government supervision. Since its establishment, ACOD in Afghanistan has primarily been run by contractor personnel from Aegis.
Aegis's responsibilities include working with the Afghan Ministry of
Interior in investigations concerning PSC escalation-of-force
incidents. CJTF-101 submitted an expedited request for four field-grade
officers for ACOD; however, as of mid-May the request had yet to be
approved and there were still no senior U.S. military officials
assigned full-time to the directorate. A review of the Aegis
contracting documents showed that without these military officers in
place, Aegis is in a role of significant official responsibility in reviewing activities of other private security contractors.
According to the report, "DoD interviewees informed the Commission
that sufficient military manpower and/or expertise did not exist in
Afghanistan, and that contracting with Aegis allowed the Combined Joint
Task Force (CJTF-101) to obtain expertise quickly. Aegis does not
currently provide armed contractors in Afghanistan, and as the ACOD is
currently structured, an Aegis contractor serves as the Deputy Director
and has day-to-day responsibility for managing the directorate. Should
they be awarded a PSC contract under the current structure, there would
be a conflict of interest."
KBR
The report notes that KBR is still firmly entrenched in the latest LOGCAP contract:
The full report can be downloaded on the website of the Commission on Wartime Contracting.
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I've been reading through the hot-off-the-presses, exciting 100+ page report from the Commission on Wartime Contracting: "At What Cost? Contingency Contracting In Iraq and Afghanistan." There have been several good pieces
that covered the Congressional hearings related to this report, so I
thought I would just post some of the more important excerpts from the
report. One general note: The Commission, which was created due to the
diligent efforts of Senators Jim Webb and Claire McCaskill, has been
doing some incredibly important work digging deep into the corruption,
waste, abuse, fraud, etc of the US war contracting system. The statute
that created the commission "requires the Commission to assess a number
of factors related to wartime contracting, including the extent of
waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement of wartime contracts. The
Commission has the authority to hold hearings and to refer to the
Attorney General any violation or potential violation of law it
identifies in carrying out its duties."
While the new report
reveals some critical details about issues of waste and abuse, the
general tone is very pro-contractor, which is not surprising. However,
I find it disturbing that one of the members of the Commission, Dov Zakheim,
is, according to his Commission bio, a current vice-president of Booz
Allen Hamilton, a major defense, homeland security and intelligence
contractor with a direct stake in US policy on contractors.
Booze is now majority owned by The Carlyle Group, which has deep political connections. In an Op-ed in The Washington Post
last year, Zakheim campaigned against "More regulations and
bureaucratic restrictions on contractors" and advocated for "a larger,
more diversified base of prime contractors and suppliers." Zakheim, who
was a foreign policy advisor to Bush and part of the circle of the
Vulcans, is now a key member of the primary body that is responsible
for investigating the industry and making formal recommendations on US
policy. While the Commission is made up of appointees from both
political parties, (Zakheim was appointed by President Bush) Zakheim's
corporate stake on these matters should be cause for a review of his
position on the Commission.
***
One fact that jumped out at me in the report is that, at present,
according to the Commission, "contracting oversight" in Afghanistan is
being done remotely from Iraq. And remember, there are 70,000
contractors (and growing) in Afghanistan.
Here are some excerpts from the report, which I have categorized and in some cases highlighted or analyzed:
EXTENT OF US RELIANCE ON CONTRACTORS
THE NUMBERS
ARMED "SECURITY CONTRACTORS"
According to a chart contained in the report, the total number of
DoD PSCs in Iraq is: 12,942 and 3,321 for the State Department. In
Afghanistan, there are 4,373 DoD PSCs and 689 State Department PSCs.
As we previously reported, in the first quarter of 2009, there has been
a 29% increase in the number of PSCs in Afghanistan and will continue
to grow. The report also raises concerns about the poor or inadequate
training some of the PSCs receive, particularly Third Country Nationals
hired to guard US bases and facilities: "Poorly trained and
ill-equipped contractor employees providing security for our operating
bases put American forces at increased risk of harm."
Regarding accountability, the report notes that the US civilian laws covering contractors are rarely enforced:
WASTE, FRAUD ABUSE
According to the Commission's report, there is a severe
shortage of oversight personnel to monitor these massive contracts and
contractors. The report notes that within the Defense Contract Audit
Agency "overall staffing levels have remained relatively constant at
roughly 4,000 since FY 2000, even though DoD contract transactions have
increased by 328 percent-from 304,500 in FY 2000 to over 1.3 million in FY 2006."
CONTRACTORS "SELF-POLICING"
The Defense Contract Management Agency "told the Commissioners that
contractor 'self policing' had been tried, but 'did not work out.'"
Some contracts are actually being "monitored" by investigators
physically located in the United States. While the Commission asserts
there have been improvements in contractor oversight in Iraq, the
system in Afghanistan "is very different and raises significant
concerns about contracting for certain functions generally performed by
the government." Similar to what happened in Iraq, a contractor was
hired to monitor contractors as part of the Armed Contractor Oversight
Division (ACOD). The company that won the contract is Aegis, the
British-owned firm headed by famed mercenary Tim Spicer. According to
the report, ACOD is "primarily staffed" by the company:
Aegis's work raises heightened inherently governmental concerns because the ACOD receives limited U.S. government supervision. Since its establishment, ACOD in Afghanistan has primarily been run by contractor personnel from Aegis.
Aegis's responsibilities include working with the Afghan Ministry of
Interior in investigations concerning PSC escalation-of-force
incidents. CJTF-101 submitted an expedited request for four field-grade
officers for ACOD; however, as of mid-May the request had yet to be
approved and there were still no senior U.S. military officials
assigned full-time to the directorate. A review of the Aegis
contracting documents showed that without these military officers in
place, Aegis is in a role of significant official responsibility in reviewing activities of other private security contractors.
According to the report, "DoD interviewees informed the Commission
that sufficient military manpower and/or expertise did not exist in
Afghanistan, and that contracting with Aegis allowed the Combined Joint
Task Force (CJTF-101) to obtain expertise quickly. Aegis does not
currently provide armed contractors in Afghanistan, and as the ACOD is
currently structured, an Aegis contractor serves as the Deputy Director
and has day-to-day responsibility for managing the directorate. Should
they be awarded a PSC contract under the current structure, there would
be a conflict of interest."
KBR
The report notes that KBR is still firmly entrenched in the latest LOGCAP contract:
The full report can be downloaded on the website of the Commission on Wartime Contracting.
I've been reading through the hot-off-the-presses, exciting 100+ page report from the Commission on Wartime Contracting: "At What Cost? Contingency Contracting In Iraq and Afghanistan." There have been several good pieces
that covered the Congressional hearings related to this report, so I
thought I would just post some of the more important excerpts from the
report. One general note: The Commission, which was created due to the
diligent efforts of Senators Jim Webb and Claire McCaskill, has been
doing some incredibly important work digging deep into the corruption,
waste, abuse, fraud, etc of the US war contracting system. The statute
that created the commission "requires the Commission to assess a number
of factors related to wartime contracting, including the extent of
waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement of wartime contracts. The
Commission has the authority to hold hearings and to refer to the
Attorney General any violation or potential violation of law it
identifies in carrying out its duties."
While the new report
reveals some critical details about issues of waste and abuse, the
general tone is very pro-contractor, which is not surprising. However,
I find it disturbing that one of the members of the Commission, Dov Zakheim,
is, according to his Commission bio, a current vice-president of Booz
Allen Hamilton, a major defense, homeland security and intelligence
contractor with a direct stake in US policy on contractors.
Booze is now majority owned by The Carlyle Group, which has deep political connections. In an Op-ed in The Washington Post
last year, Zakheim campaigned against "More regulations and
bureaucratic restrictions on contractors" and advocated for "a larger,
more diversified base of prime contractors and suppliers." Zakheim, who
was a foreign policy advisor to Bush and part of the circle of the
Vulcans, is now a key member of the primary body that is responsible
for investigating the industry and making formal recommendations on US
policy. While the Commission is made up of appointees from both
political parties, (Zakheim was appointed by President Bush) Zakheim's
corporate stake on these matters should be cause for a review of his
position on the Commission.
***
One fact that jumped out at me in the report is that, at present,
according to the Commission, "contracting oversight" in Afghanistan is
being done remotely from Iraq. And remember, there are 70,000
contractors (and growing) in Afghanistan.
Here are some excerpts from the report, which I have categorized and in some cases highlighted or analyzed:
EXTENT OF US RELIANCE ON CONTRACTORS
THE NUMBERS
ARMED "SECURITY CONTRACTORS"
According to a chart contained in the report, the total number of
DoD PSCs in Iraq is: 12,942 and 3,321 for the State Department. In
Afghanistan, there are 4,373 DoD PSCs and 689 State Department PSCs.
As we previously reported, in the first quarter of 2009, there has been
a 29% increase in the number of PSCs in Afghanistan and will continue
to grow. The report also raises concerns about the poor or inadequate
training some of the PSCs receive, particularly Third Country Nationals
hired to guard US bases and facilities: "Poorly trained and
ill-equipped contractor employees providing security for our operating
bases put American forces at increased risk of harm."
Regarding accountability, the report notes that the US civilian laws covering contractors are rarely enforced:
WASTE, FRAUD ABUSE
According to the Commission's report, there is a severe
shortage of oversight personnel to monitor these massive contracts and
contractors. The report notes that within the Defense Contract Audit
Agency "overall staffing levels have remained relatively constant at
roughly 4,000 since FY 2000, even though DoD contract transactions have
increased by 328 percent-from 304,500 in FY 2000 to over 1.3 million in FY 2006."
CONTRACTORS "SELF-POLICING"
The Defense Contract Management Agency "told the Commissioners that
contractor 'self policing' had been tried, but 'did not work out.'"
Some contracts are actually being "monitored" by investigators
physically located in the United States. While the Commission asserts
there have been improvements in contractor oversight in Iraq, the
system in Afghanistan "is very different and raises significant
concerns about contracting for certain functions generally performed by
the government." Similar to what happened in Iraq, a contractor was
hired to monitor contractors as part of the Armed Contractor Oversight
Division (ACOD). The company that won the contract is Aegis, the
British-owned firm headed by famed mercenary Tim Spicer. According to
the report, ACOD is "primarily staffed" by the company:
Aegis's work raises heightened inherently governmental concerns because the ACOD receives limited U.S. government supervision. Since its establishment, ACOD in Afghanistan has primarily been run by contractor personnel from Aegis.
Aegis's responsibilities include working with the Afghan Ministry of
Interior in investigations concerning PSC escalation-of-force
incidents. CJTF-101 submitted an expedited request for four field-grade
officers for ACOD; however, as of mid-May the request had yet to be
approved and there were still no senior U.S. military officials
assigned full-time to the directorate. A review of the Aegis
contracting documents showed that without these military officers in
place, Aegis is in a role of significant official responsibility in reviewing activities of other private security contractors.
According to the report, "DoD interviewees informed the Commission
that sufficient military manpower and/or expertise did not exist in
Afghanistan, and that contracting with Aegis allowed the Combined Joint
Task Force (CJTF-101) to obtain expertise quickly. Aegis does not
currently provide armed contractors in Afghanistan, and as the ACOD is
currently structured, an Aegis contractor serves as the Deputy Director
and has day-to-day responsibility for managing the directorate. Should
they be awarded a PSC contract under the current structure, there would
be a conflict of interest."
KBR
The report notes that KBR is still firmly entrenched in the latest LOGCAP contract:
The full report can be downloaded on the website of the Commission on Wartime Contracting.