Two months after the New York Times revealed that the Bush
Administration ordered the National Security Agency
to conduct warrantless surveillance of American citizens, only three
corporations--AT&T, Sprint and MCI--have been identified by the
media as cooperating. If the reports in the Times and other
newspapers are true, these companies have allowed the NSA to intercept
thousands of telephone calls, fax messages and e-mails without
warrants from a special oversight court established by Congress
under the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Some
companies, according to the same reports, have given the NSA a
direct hookup to their huge databases of communications records. The
NSA, using the same supercomputers that analyze foreign
communications, sifts through this data for key words and phrases
that could indicate communication to or from suspected terrorists or
terrorist sympathizers and then tracks those individuals and their
ever-widening circle of associates. "This is the US version of
Echelon," says Albert Gidari, a prominent telecommunications attorney in
Seattle, referring to a massive eavesdropping program run by the NSA and
its English-speaking counterparts that created a huge controversy in
Europe in the late 1990s.
So far, a handful of Democratic lawmakers--Representative
John Conyers, the ranking Democrat on the House Judiciary Committee, and
Senators Edward Kennedy and Russell Feingold--have attempted to obtain
information from companies involved in the domestic
surveillance program. But they've largely been rebuffed.
Further details about the highly classified program are likely to emerge
as the Electronic Frontier Foundation pursues a lawsuit, filed
January 31, against AT&T for violating privacy laws by giving the
NSA direct access to its telephone records database and
Internet transaction logs. On February 16 a federal judge gave the Bush
Administration until March 8 to turn over a list of internal documents
related to two other lawsuits, filed by the American Civil Liberties
Union and the Electronic Privacy Information Center, seeking an
injunction to end the program.
Despite the President's rigorous defense of the program, no company has
dared to admit its cooperation publicly. Their reticence is
understandable: The Justice Department has launched a criminal
investigation of the government officials who leaked
the NSA story to the Times, and many constitutional scholars and a few
lawmakers believe the program is both illegal and
unconstitutional. And the companies may be embarrassed at being
caught--particularly AT&T, which spent millions advertising its
global services during the Winter Olympics. "It's a huge betrayal of the
public trust, and they know it," says Bruce Schneier, the founder and
chief technology officer of Counterpane Internet Security, a
California consulting firm.
Corporations have been cooperating with the NSA for half
a century. What's different now is that they appear to be helping
the NSA deploy its awesome computing and data-mining powers
inside the United States in direct contravention of US
law, which specifically bans the agency from collecting
information from US citizens living inside the
United States. "They wouldn't touch US persons before unless they had a
FISA warrant," says a former national security official who read NSA
intercepts as part of his work for the State Department and the
Pentagon.
This is happening at a time when both the military and its spy agencies
are more dependent on the private sector than ever before, and an
increasing number of companies are involved. In the 1970s, when
Congress acted to stop domestic spying programs like Operation
Shamrock, in which the NSA monitored overseas telegrams and phone calls,
the communications industry was in its infancy. "It was basically
Western Union for cables, and AT&T for the telephone," says James
Bamford, who revealed the existence of the NSA in his famous book The
Puzzle Palace and is a plaintiff in the ACLU lawsuit. "It's much more
complicated now." In fact, today's global telecom market
includes dozens of companies that compete with AT&T,
Sprint and MCI for telephone and mobile services, as well as scores of
Internet service providers like Google, Yahoo! and AOL that offer
e-mail, Internet and voice connections to customers around the world.
They are served by multinational conglomerates like Apollo, Flag
Atlantic and Global Crossing, which own and operate the global system of
undersea fiber-optic cables that link the United States to the rest of
the world. Any one of them could be among the companies contacted by
intelligence officials when President Bush issued his
2002 executive order to obtain surveillance without FISA
approval.
Nobody's talking, though. Asked if AT&T, which was
recently acquired by SBC Communications, is cooperating with
the NSA, AT&T spokesman Walt Sharp said, "We don't comment on
national security matters." He referred me to a recent AT&T letter
to Representative Conyers, which stated that AT&T "abides by all
applicable laws, regulations and statutes in its operations and, in
particular, with respect to requests for assistance from governmental
authorities." MCI, which was acquired in January by Verizon, and Sprint,
which recently merged with Nextel Communications, declined to comment.
Attorney Gidari, who has represented Google, T-Mobile, Nextel and
Cingular Wireless (now part of AT&T), does admit that "some
companies, both telecom and Internet," were asked to participate in the
NSA program. But he claims that only a limited number agreed. "The list
of those who said no is much longer than most people think," he says.
The NSA, some analysts say, may have sought the assistance of US
telecoms because most of the world's cable operators are controlled by
foreign corporations. Apollo, for example, is owned by Britain's Cable
& Wireless, while Flag Atlantic is owned by the Reliance Group of
India. Much of the international "transit traffic" carried by the cable
companies flows through the United States (this is particularly true of
communications emanating from South America and moving between Asia and
Europe). The NSA could get access to this traffic by sending a submarine
team to splice the cables in international waters, as the agency once
did to the Soviet Union's undersea military cables. But that is an
extremely expensive proposition, and politically dicey to boot--which is
where the US telecoms come in. "Cooperation with the telcos doesn't make
NSA surveillance possible, but it does make it cheaper," says Schneier,
the technology consultant.
According to Alan Mauldin, a senior research analyst with TeleGeography
Research in Washington, DC, it would be possible for US intelligence
operatives to gain access to transit traffic from anywhere in the
country with the cooperation of a US company. "You could be inland, at
an important city like New York or Washington, DC, where networks
interconnect, and you could have the ability to tap into the whole
network for not only that city but between that city and the rest of the
world," he says. Foreign-owned cable operators, says Gidari, are also
required by US law to maintain security offices manned by US citizens,
with background checks and security clearances at the landing sites in
Oregon, Florida, New Jersey and other states where fiber-optic cables
come ashore.
The government has gone to great lengths to insure law-enforcement
access to foreign-owned telecom companies. Take the example of Global
Crossing, which owns several undersea cable systems and claims to serve
more than 700 carriers, mobile operators and ISPs. Three years ago, as
Global Crossing was emerging from one of the largest bankruptcies in US
history, it was purchased by ST Telemedia, which is partly owned by the
government of Singapore. As part of the US approval process (which
occurred at a time when Global Crossing was being advised by Richard
Perle, then-chairman of Donald Rumsfeld's Defense Policy Board), the
company signed an unprecedented Network Security Agreement with the FBI
and the Defense Department. Under the agreement, which is on file with
the Federal Communications Commission, Global Crossing pledged that "all
domestic communications" would pass through a facility "physically
located in the United States, from which Electronic Surveillance can be
conducted pursuant to lawful US process." (Global Crossing declined to
comment.) Legal experts say the wording is significant in the context of
the NSA spying flap, but cautioned not to read too much into it. "These
agreements are not uncommon in the industry," says James Andrew Lewis,
director of the Technology and Public Policy Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington. "They provide
assurances that US interests won't suffer damage with foreign
ownership."
History proves a good guide to how the NSA would go about winning
cooperation from a telecom company. When telephone and telegraph
companies began assisting the NSA during the 1940s, only one or two
executives were in on the secret. That kind of arrangement continued
into the 1970s, and is probably how cooperation with the NSA works
today, says Kenneth Bass III, a Justice Department official during the
Carter Administration. "Once the CEO approved, all the contacts [with
the intelligence agencies] would be worked at a lower level," he says.
"The telcos have been participating in surveillance activities for
decades--pre-FISA, post-FISA--so it's nothing new to them." Bass, who
helped craft the FISA law and worked with the NSA to implement it, adds
that he "would not be surprised at all" if cooperating executives
received from the Bush Administration "the same sort of briefing, but
much more detailed and specific than the FISA court got when [the
surveillance] was first approved."
For US intelligence officials looking for allies in the industry,
AT&T, MCI and Sprint have a lot to offer. In 2002, when the spying
program began, AT&T's CEO was C. Michael Armstrong, the former
CEO of Hughes Electronic Corp. At the time, Armstrong was also chairman
of the Business Roundtable's Security Task Force, where he was
instrumental in creating CEO COM LINK, a secure telecommunications
system that allows the chief executives of major US corporations to
speak directly to senior members of Bush's Cabinet during national
emergencies. Randall Stephenson, a former SBC Communications executive
who is now AT&T's chief operating officer, is a member of the
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee, a group of
executives from the communications and defense industries who advise the
President on security issues related to telecom.
Those executives, all of whom hold security clearances, meet at the
White House once a year--Vice President Cheney was the speaker
at their last meeting--and hold quarterly conference calls with
high-ranking officials. (Asked if the NSA surveillance was ever
discussed at these sessions, committee spokesman Stephen Barrett said,
"We do not participate in intelligence gathering.") AT&T also makes
no bones about its national security work. When SBC was preparing to
acquire the company last year, the two companies underscored their ties
with US intelligence in joint comments to the FCC. "AT&T's support
of the intelligence and defense communities includes the performance of
various classified contracts," the companies said, pointing out that
AT&T "maintains special secure facilities for the performance of
classified work and the safeguarding of classified information."
MCI, too, is a major government contractor and was highly valued by
Verizon in part because of its work in defense and intelligence.
Nicholas Katzenbach, the former US Attorney General who was appointed
chairman of MCI's board after the spectacular collapse of its previous
owner, WorldCom, reiterated MCI's intelligence connections in a 2003
statement to the Senate Judiciary Committee. "We are especially proud,"
he wrote, "of our role in supporting our national-security agencies'
infrastructure, and we are gratified by the many positive comments about
our service from officials at the US Department of Defense and
other national-security agencies." MCI's general counsel--who would
presumably have a say in any decision to cooperate with the NSA--is
William Barr. He is a former assistant general counsel at the Central
Intelligence Agency and served as Attorney General during the
Administration of President George H.W. Bush.
Sprint Nextel is top-loaded with executives with long experience in
national security and defense. Chairman and CEO Gary Forsee is a member
of Bush's telecom council (as is Lawrence Babbio, the vice chairman and
president of Verizon). Keith Bane, a company director, recently retired
from a twenty-nine-year career with Motorola, which has worked closely
with US intelligence for decades. William Conway Jr. and former FCC
chairman William Kennard are managing directors of the Carlyle Group,
the Washington private equity fund that invests heavily in the military
and has extensive contacts in the Bush Administration.
There's another group of companies, largely overlooked, that could also
be cooperating with the NSA. These are firms clustered around the
Beltway that contract with the agency to provide intelligence analysts,
data-mining technologies and equipment used in the NSA's global
signals-intelligence operations. The largest of them employ so many
former intelligence officials that it's almost impossible to see where
the government ends and the private sector begins. Booz Allen Hamilton,
the prime contractor for Trailblazer, a huge NSA project updating its
surveillance and eavesdropping infrastructure, employs several NSA
alumni, including Mike McConnell, its vice president, who retired
as NSA director in 1996. (Ralph Shrader, the company's CEO, joined Booz
Allen in 1978 after serving in senior positions with Western Union and
RCA, both of which cooperated with the NSA on Operation Shamrock.) SI International, a software and systems
engineering company with NSA contracts, recently hired Harry
Gatanas, the NSA's former director of acquisitions and outsourcing, to
oversee its $250-million-a-year business with US intelligence and the
Pentagon. Science Applications International Corporation, another big
NSA contractor, is run by executives with long histories in military
intelligence, including COO Duane Andrews, a former Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and
Intelligence.
Are firms that cooperate with the NSA legally culpable? Bamford, who is
not a lawyer but probably knows more about the NSA than any American
outside government, says yes. "The FISA law is very clear," he says. "If
you don't have a warrant, you're in violation, and the penalty is five
years and you can be sued by the aggrieved parties." Kevin Bankston, an
attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, adds that US law "not
only prohibits unauthorized wiretapping; it also prohibits unauthorized
disclosure or use of illegally wiretapped information. As long as you
were doing that, you're potentially liable." Schneier, the technology
consultant, harbors no doubts either. "Arguing that this is legal is
basically saying we're in a police state."
But Gidari, the Seattle telecom attorney, believes that companies
would be insulated from legal challenges if they had assurances from the
government that the program was within the law. He also says Congress
has passed legislation granting immunity to companies operating under
"statutory grants of authority" from the government. "It's not a
slamdunk, but it is a good-faith defense," he says. Former Justice
Department official Bass agrees but says reliance on oral requests from
US officials is another matter: "If they didn't get the type of legal
assurances the FISA provides for"--such as a written statement from the
Attorney General--"there could be some legal exposure." But a full
airing of the legal issues raised by the surveillance program may be a
long time coming. "The likelihood of any enforcement absent a change in
administration is zero," Bass says.
Tim Shorrock (timshorrock@gmail.com), a longtime contributor to The Nation, is writing a book for Simon & Schuster about corporate influence on US foreign policy.
© 2006 The Nation
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