Last month, Army recruiters fell 42 percent short of their goal, according to the Army Recruiting Command. They had hoped to sign up 6,600 volunteers; but despite bonuses of up to $20,000 for those willing to report by May 30, they fell 2,779 recruits short.

Those numbers are ominous. If they continue in the months to come, as seems likely, they threaten not merely our ability to stick it out in Iraq, but also the Army's long-term ability to perform its duties worldwide. And the reason for that decline is obvious.

In April of 2003, around the first anniversary of the fall of Baghdad, 73 percent of Americans believed the war was worthwhile; only 23 percent did not, according to a CNN/Gallup poll. So recruiters had little trouble filling their quotas.

Today, though, only 41 percent of Americans believe the war was worthwhile, while 57 percent do not. And if Americans do not believe the war worthwhile, they're not likely to sign up to fight in it.

As a result, we now find ourselves in a very grim race. As former Pentagon comptroller Dov Zakheim described the situation in a recent panel discussion in Washington, "Will we become weary before the insurgents become weary?"

Or, as North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh supposedly said:

"You will kill ten of our men, and we will kill one of yours, and in the end it will be you who will tire of it."

This is a bad situation. If we are forced to leave Iraq before a stable government takes hold there, the consequences would be enormous, and our leaders understand that. Even now, despite the polls, it's striking that no major leader of either party has publicly suggested anything but sticking it out.

At some point, though, that's going to change. On an issue like this, the public eventually leads and the leaders will rush to follow. And if the public is growing increasingly disenchanted with this war, top-secret British documents recently leaked to the British press help explain why.

The primary document is an internal summary of a meeting held on July 23, 2002, by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and a handful of his top foreign policy, intelligence and military advisers. At that point, most Americans had no idea that a war with Iraq was even being considered, but apparently, Blair and President Bush had agreed to invade Iraq as far back as an April 2002 meeting in Crawford, Texas.

In the July meeting, Blair and his aides discussed the Americans' plan to create an international crisis around Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction. The idea was to set the stage for war by demanding that Saddam Hussein re-admit U.N. weapons inspectors; when Saddam refused, that would be the excuse to invade.

However, as British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw told Blair in that July meeting, "The case is thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbors, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran."

Blair was also told that the "most likely timing in U.S. minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the U.S. congressional elections."

That description is damning, indicating that the Bush administration cynically manipulated its war plans to create maximum political advantage for Republican congressional candidates.

The document's most devastating paragraph, however, summarizes a report by the head of British intelligence, known as "C." "C" has just returned from meetings in Washington, and he's telling Blair what he learned there:

"Bush wanted to remove Saddam through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD," "C" tells Blair. "But the intelligence and the facts were being fixed around the policy. . . . There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."

The intelligence was being fixed . . . Little discussion of the aftermath. Amazing.

So yes, a nation can be fooled into war by its own leaders. We've learned that much. But unless that war is short and successful, there's a price to be paid.

In this case, what began as an optional war has morphed into a war of great importance. But now, when our leaders tell us that, fewer Americans believe them, and fewer still are willing to die for it.

Jay Bookman is the deputy editorial page editor.

© 2005 Atlanta Journal-Constitution