Alan Greenspan used the occasion of his
speech to the American Economic Association to
defend his legacy. His 16-year record as Chairman of
the Federal Reserve is certainly mixed, but there is
one mistake he shouldn't be allowed to brush off: the
stock market bubble.
But that's exactly what he tried to do, claiming
that he did the right thing by allowing the bubble to
grow to outlandish proportions, and then trying to
clean up the mess afterwards. His argument was that
he might have caused unnecessary and unpredictable
harm to the economy by raising interest rates in order
to contain the stock market bubble.
But Mr. Greenspan sets up a false choice
between raising interest rates or letting the bubble
grow. There was a much easier solution that did not
involve raising interest rates: he could have simply
explained the basic arithmetic of the bubble to the
financial markets and to the public.
If anyone doubts that this could have
prevented this $8 trillion dollar bubble from
accumulating, they need only to observe the
enormous effect that every Delphic utterance from
Greenspan's lips has on financial markets. Indeed,
when he first noted the possibility of "irrational
exuberance" of the stock market in December of
1996, it sent stock markets falling around the world.
That was enough to scare him from pursuing
the matter further. At the time, the S&P 500-stock
index was at 745 and the Nasdaq was at 1297. The S
& P would more than double over the next three and a
quarter years and the Nasdaq nearly quadrupled. But
Mr. Greenspan -- who already knew that the market
was overvalued before it took off into the stratosphere
-- decided to smile and ride the wave of exuberance.
The arithmetic of the stock market's excess is straightforward (see www.cepr.net) and irrefutable. There was a bubble in the stock market -- not just the Nasdaq or technology stocks -- that was inevitably going to burst. And the bigger it grew, the worse would be the consequences when it broke.
Greenspan's defense is that the recession
brought on by the collapse of the stock market was "exceptionally mild." That's technically true, but also misleading. The recession officially ended in November of 2001, but the economy lost 768,000 more jobs in the first two years of rebound that followed. This is an unusually terrible
recovery: even the "jobless recovery" of 1991-93 generated 1.4 million jobs in its first two years.
Add in the millions of people who lost the
bulk of their retirement savings in the bubble's
collapse, and it is clear that it was irresponsible for
the Chairman of U.S. Federal Reserve to remain silent
in the face of history's largest financial bubble. Sure,
some people would not have liked to hear the truth at
the time -- but the Fed Chairman's job has never been
to win a popularity contest.
Indeed, Mr. Greenspan has been more than
willing to use his enormous power to raise interest
rates, thereby throwing millions of Americans out of
work, in order to keep wages from growing "too fast."
This is based on the theory, for which the economic
evidence is dubious, that low rates of unemployment
lead to "excessive" wage demands -- which
theoretically can cause inflation to spiral out of
control. In 1989 the Fed raised short-term rates
(currently at 1 percent) to 10 percent, unnecessarily
causing the 1990 recession.
Mr. Greenspan's negligence regarding the
stock market bubble is, unfortunately, more than a
question of his legacy. There is currently a $3 trillion
dollar bubble in the housing market, which when it
breaks could have an effect similar to the bursting of
the stock market bubble. Mr. Greenspan has
encouraged the growth of this bubble by publicly
denying its existence.
But this unprecedented run-up in home prices
-- more than 40 percentage points above the overall
rate of inflation over the last 8 and a half years -- has
no plausible explanation other than being the result of
a speculative bubble. Mr. Greenspan should tell the
truth about this bubble -- this time before, rather than
after, it has done its damage.
Mark Weisbrot is Co-Director of the Center for
Economic and Policy Research (www.cepr.net), in
Washington, D.C.
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