There is a simple rule in politics. The more politicians talk of an institution
as being "relevant" and "reborn", the more you know it's on its last legs. Yesterday
the air in Prague was positively tropical with the hot breath of 40 world leaders
attending a summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization all saying how important
this venerable alliance was. What they actually meant when you listened carefully
was that they all had their individual reasons for finding the Organization useful
at this particular moment.
The Americans, having ignored and, indeed, deliberately marginalized the institution
over the year since 11 September, now see it as a way of establishing the grand
alliance to invade Iraq. The Europeans, having bravely talked of being a countervailing
force to US "unilateralism", are now becoming distinctly nervous that America
might go its own way and they want Nato to keep the great power locked in. The
new entrants look upon Nato as a means of consolidating their freedom from Soviet
power.
All these are valid short-term uses. What they do not add up to is a long-term
purpose. And that, as any student of military history knows, is the only thing
that can keep an alliance alive. Nato's great strength has always been that it
has had a common enemy and an effective system of military command. Now it has
neither. The enemy has disappeared. Most of the equipment in heavy tanks, ground
forces and attack aircraft are redundant. And the command structure, as so painfully
shown in Kosovo, has been undermined by differing interests in more localized
situations.
That doesn't matter, argues George Robertson, the Secretary General of the
Organization, because Nato now has a political purpose in reshaping the post-Cold
War map of Europe to include the former Soviet republics. But if you want a political
alliance, why not make a new one, or develop it around the existing institutions
of the European Union? All you do by politicizing the Organization is to confuse
and undermine the tight central command system that has given it its success so
far.
President Bush to the deep relief of Nato staff has instead come
up this week with a new "military" purpose for the alliance, or at any rate a
new enemy. That enemy is "global terrorists who hate freedom, and together we
can work to defeat that enemy in the name of freedom".
It is balderdash, of course. Anyone who seriously believes that the United
States is pursuing a crusade for freedom and democracy need only look to the support
it has given to Uzbekistan and Pakistan since 11 September, never mind its longer-standing
alliances with Saudi Arabia, China and Kuwait. What it is looking for is national
security against any forces, and any countries, it perceives as threatening that
security.
And why not? Alliances are made and held by self-interest not idealism, military
alliances most of all. For half a century, Nato worked as one of the most successful
multi-national organizations in history because the security interests of Europe
and America were felt to be the same the containment of the Soviet Union.
The trouble is that those interests have been revealed as profoundly at odds
over the issue of Iraq. Washington at least under the present Republican
administration sees its primary enemy as coming from states who are not
friendly to America and have the power to launch weapons of mass destruction against
it. That includes not just Iraq but Iran, North Korea and, to a lesser degree
of capability, Syria and Libya. It does not, for the moment, include Pakistan,
India, China, Ukraine or Israel, all of whom have access to weapons of mass destruction
and threaten to destabilize their regions.
It would take a considerable exercise in casuistry to claim that this policy
has anything to do with the war on terrorism as set off by 11 September. For if
it did, the US has obviously much more to fear from Saudi Arabia, where terrorist
cells exist throughout the country, or Yemen.
Europe, on the other hand, sees its threats as coming from precisely the other
way round. On the whole it thinks that the menace from the "rogue states" is less
pressing and best contained through the traditional diplomatic means of inclusion
rather than isolation. The real threat is from the terrorism thrown up by poverty,
instability and religious extremism in the Third World. You only have to consider
the cases of Iran, Libya or North Korea to realize the huge gap that exists between
the two approaches.
The particular casus belli of Iraq can be smoothed over between the
allies as it has been through a resort to the United Nations, although
it still leaves open the question of what happens if the inspectors approve the
Iraqi response and Bush still decides to go to war. But the divide cannot be bridged
overall. The two sides, with the presence in between of Tony Blair, are just too
far apart. And you cannot sustain a military alliance on that basis.
Still less can you regroup that alliance, as Donald Rumsfeld, the US Defense
Secretary, is insisting, around a combination of vastly increased European military
expenditures and the creation of a new super rapid reaction force for what is
referred to as "out-of-theatre operations".
But this only makes the basic dilemma worse. The whole debate set by US politicians
about comparative Defense expenditures between the US and its allies is a facile
one. It is perfectly true that US military spending amounts to double that of
all its Nato allies put together. But that is because the US wishes to be a global
superpower keeping foreign bases in over 40 countries, maintaining permanent fleets
in every ocean and a bomber capacity to reach anywhere in the world. Europe has
not seen its interest in doing that since it gave up its empires.
It is true that Europe badly needs to upgrade its equipment and invest in more
high-tech and carrying capacity. But it needs this quite aside from its membership
of Nato. The problem of that Organization is that any decision on out-of-theatre
action will only exacerbate internal tensions, not ease them.
The chief reason for opposing this desperate attempt to keep Nato on life-support,
however, is that its continuation diverts attention from actually obstructs,
indeed the development of its successors. In the end, the pattern of world
Defense, like the patterns of world politics, is likely to be regional. Europe,
Asia and even perhaps the Arab Middle East will develop mutual support because
they have to. Whether America acts as a nanny to these infants or as a brooding
alternative presence has yet to be seen. But the present unipolar world leaves
too great a vacuum for it not to be filled.
Behind the smiling public faces in Prague, there are few politicians and virtually
no generals who will not tell you in private that they know the patient is dying.
It's just that they don't quite dare to kill him off yet.
© 2002 lndependent Digital (UK) Ltd
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