You can't understand today's Iraq debate without understanding Karl Rove's
view of the nation's political crossroads and the longer-term struggle between
Democrats and Republicans to achieve a new governing majority. If you're convinced
that Iraq is purely about national security, read no further. If you want to understand
the full picture, let's go to the heart of darkness.
The defining feature of American politics in recent years has been the remarkable
parity between the two parties. You can't get closer than the presidential tie
in 2000, not to mention the narrow majorities in Congress.
Yet periods of closely divided power are unusual in America. Our system of
government has generally favored the creation of effective majorities. Think of
FDR and the New Deal coalition, which lasted from the 1930s until it gave way
in the late 1960s under the strains of Vietnam and the backlash against civil
rights. Ronald Reagan presided over a period of conservative power from 1980 to
1992.
Most analysts view eras of closely divided power as periods in which one system
of effective majority has broken down and the next system of effective majority
has not yet come into being.
In this view, the 1990s look transitional: Reagan's majority broke down, but
Bill Clinton couldn't get Democrats to the promised land. In their important new
book, "The Emerging Democratic Majority," John Judis and Ruy Teixeira argue that
long-term trends — in particular, the rise of suburban professional women,
Latinos, and a white working class that feels economically insecure — favor
the Democrats.
Many Republicans think these trends favor Democrats, too. That's why George
W. Bush, learning the lesson of Newt Gingrich, has always pretended to have a
"compassionate" agenda. But Republican political consultants privately know the
surest way to stem the Democratic drift is for the war on terror to become the
master narrative of American politics.
In their view, one of two things will happen in the next few years. In the
first scenario, national security (and internal security) become the dominant
issues in our politics, and Democrats, trusted less on these matters, revert to
their minority status of the 1970s and 1980s.
The other scenario is that the public tires of the struggle, or terrorism
remains (thankfully) rare, or there's a decisive "victory" somehow. In this case,
Republican weaknesses on domestic problems come back into focus.
These weaknesses were a problem in the 1990s but not fatal, in GOP eyes, because
of the public's qualms about Bill Clinton's character. But under a less-vulnerable
new leader, in this scenario, Democrats should be able to re-emerge as a "third
way" majority party.
As one conservative thinker said to me, "If the war on terrorism is not a
big deal, it's hard to see the conservatives ever coming back." On the other hand,
if the war on terrorism remains a big deal, the Democrats may split.
One benefit of invading Iraq that conservatives speculate openly about is
that it will tear the Democratic Party down the middle, as did Vietnam. A peace
candidate in New Hampshire in 2004 is the new Republican fantasy.
It turns out affirmative action and immigration were just the warm-up. Now
war is the GOP's ultimate wedge issue.
I'm not saying this is all that motivates the White House. But I have no doubt
it is part of what motivates some powerful people near the president. Serious
Republican thinkers believe the only way for their party to achieve a governing
majority is for the theme of war to be dominant.
This is a fact, and whatever else you may think of it, it's a little scary.
Matt Miller is a senior fellow at Occidental College in Los Angeles. His
column appears regularly on editorial pages of The Times.
Copyright © 2002 The Seattle Times Company
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