1. A War Against Iraq Would Be Illegal
2. Regional Allies Widely Oppose a U.S. Attack
3. There Is No Evidence of Iraqi Links to Al Qaeda or Other Anti-American
Terrorists
4. There Is No Proof that Iraq Is Developing Weapons of Mass Destruction
5. Iraq Is No Longer a Significant Military Threat to Its Neighbors
6. There Are Still Nonmilitary Options Available
7. Defeating Iraq Would Be Militarily Difficult
Conclusion
The United States appears to be barging ahead with plans to engage in a large-scale
military operation against Iraq to overthrow the regime of Saddam Hussein. In
the international community, however, serious questions are being raised regarding
its legality, its justification, its political implications, and the costs of
the war itself. Such an invasion would constitute an important precedent, being
the first test of the new doctrine articulated by President George W. Bush of
preemption, which declares that the United States has the right to
invade sovereign countries and overthrow their governments if they are seen as
hostile to U.S. interests. All previous large-scale interventions by American
forces abroad have been rationalizedalbeit not always convincingly to many
observerson the principle of collective self-defense, such as through regional
organizations like the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) or the Organization
of American States (OAS). To invade Iraq would constitute an unprecedented repudiation
of the international legal conventions that such American presidents as Woodrow
Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Dwight Eisenhower helped create
in order to build a safer world.
Although there have been some questions raised recently about the scale and
logistics of such a military operation, there has been surprisingly little dissent
from leading policymakers, including congressional Democrats. This raises serious
concerns, given that an invasion of Iraq constitutes such a dramatic shift in
U.S. foreign policy and involves enormous political and military risks. It appears
that war is inevitable unless there is a groundswell of popular opposition. This
policy report attempts to encourage popular debate by raising a number of concerns
that challenge some of the key rationales and assumptions behind such a military
action.
1. A War Against Iraq Would Be Illegal
There is no legal justification for U.S. military action against Iraq.
Iraq is currently in violation of part of one section of UN Security Council
Resolution 687 (and a series of subsequent resolutions reiterating that segment)
requiring full cooperation with United Nations inspectors ensuring that Iraqs
weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems, and facilities for manufacturing
such weapons are destroyed. The conflict regarding access for UN inspectors and
possible Iraqi procurement of weapons of mass destruction has always been an issue
involving the Iraqi government and the United Nations, not an impasse between
Iraq and the United States. Although UN Security Council Resolution 687 was the
most detailed in the world bodys history, no military enforcement mechanisms
were specified. Nor did the Security Council specify any military enforcement
mechanisms in subsequent resolutions. As is normally the case when it is determined
that governments violate all or part of UN resolutions, any decision about the
enforcement of its resolutions is a matter for the UN Security Council as a wholenot
for any one member of the council.
The most explicit warning to Iraq regarding its noncompliance came in UN Security
Council Resolution 1154. Although this resolution warned Iraq of the severest
consequences if it continued its refusal to comply, the Security Council
declared that it alone had the authority to ensure implementation of this
resolution and peace and security in the area.
According to articles 41 and 42 of the United Nations Charter, no member state
has the right to enforce any resolution militarily unless the UN Security Council
determines that there has been a material breach of its resolution, decides that
all nonmilitary means of enforcement have been exhausted, and then specifically
authorizes the use of military force. This is what the Security Council did in
November 1990 with Resolution 678 in response to Iraqs ongoing occupation
of Kuwait in violation of a series of resolutions passed that August. The UN has
not done so for any subsequent violations involving Iraq or any other government.
If the United States can unilaterally claim the right to invade Iraq due to
that countrys violation of UN Security Council resolutions, other Security
Council members could logically also claim the right to invade other member states
that are in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. For example, Russia
could claim the right to invade Israel, France could claim the right to invade
Turkey, and Great Britain could claim the right to invade Morocco, simply because
those targeted governments are also violating UN Security Council resolutions.
The U.S. insistence on the right to attack unilaterally could seriously undermine
the principle of collective security and the authority of the United Nations and
in doing so would open the door to international anarchy.
International law is quite clear about when military force is allowed. In addition
to the aforementioned case of UN Security Council authorization, the only other
time that any member state is allowed to use armed force is described in Article
51, which states that it is permissible for individual or collective self-defense
against armed attack ... until the Security Council has taken the measures
necessary to maintain international peace and security. If Iraqs neighbors
were attacked or feared an imminent attack from Iraq, any of these countries could
call on the United States to help, pending a Security Council decision authorizing
the use of force. But they have not appealed to the Security Council, because
they have not felt threatened by Iraq.
Based on evidence that the Bush administration has made public, there does
not appear to be anything close to sufficient legal grounds for the United States
to convince the Security Council to approve the use of military force against
Iraq in U.S. self-defense. This may explain why the Bush administration has thus
far refused to go before the United Nations on this matter. Unless the United
States gets such authorization, any such attack on Iraq would be illegal and would
be viewed by most members of the international community as an act of aggression.
In contrast to the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, it is likely that the world community
would view the United Statesnot Iraqas the international outlaw.
There is little debate regarding the nefarious nature of the Iraqi regime,
but this has never been a legal ground for invasion. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia
in 1978 to overthrow the Khmer Rougea radical communist movement even more
brutal than the regime of Saddam Husseinthe United States condemned the
action before the United Nations as an act of aggression and a violation of international
law. The United States successfully led an international effort to impose sanctions
against Vietnam and insisted that the UN recognize the Khmer Rouge as the legitimate
government of Cambodia for more than a decade after their leaders were forced
out of the capital into remote jungle areas. Similarly, the United States challenged
three of its closest alliesGreat Britain, France, and Israelbefore
the United Nations in 1956 when they invaded Egypt in an attempt to overthrow
the radical anti-Western regime of Gamal Abdul-Nasser. The Eisenhower administration
insisted that international law and the UN Charter must be upheld by all nations
regardless of their relations with the United States. It now appears that the
leadership of both political parties is ready to reverse what was once a bipartisan
consensus.
2. Regional Allies Widely Oppose a U.S. Attack
Although there was some serious opposition to the Gulf War in many parts of
the Middle East and elsewhere, it did have the support of major segments of the
international community, including several important Arab states. The Gulf War
was widely viewed as an act of collective security in response to aggression by
Iraq against its small neighbor. This would not be the case, however, in the event
of a new war against Iraq. Instead, Washingtons proposed action would be
seen as an unprovoked invasion. Unlike in 1991, when most of the region supportedand
even contributed tothe U.S.-led war effort (or was at least neutral), Arab
opposition is strong today. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah has warned that the U.S.
should not strike Iraq, because such an attack would only raise animosity
in the region against the United States. When Vice President Dick Cheney
visited the Middle East in March, every Arab leader made clear his opposition.
At the Beirut summit of the Arab League at the end of March, the Arab nations
unanimously endorsed a resolution opposing an attack against Iraq.
Even Kuwait has reconciled with Iraq. This past March, Iraq and Kuwait signed
a document written by Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheik Sabah al Ahmed al Jabbar
al Sabah in which Iraq, for the first time, formally consented to respect the
sovereignty of Kuwait. Sabah declared that his country was 100% satisfied with
the agreement, and Kuwait reiterated its opposition to a U.S. invasion of Iraq.
Saudi Arabias Crown Prince Abdullah called the pact a very positive
achievement and expressed confidence that Iraq would uphold the agreement.
U.S. officials claim that, public statements to the contrary, there may be
some regional allies willing to support a U.S. war effort. Given President Bushs
ultimatum that you are either with us or the terrorists, it is quite
possible that some governments might be successfully pressured to go along. However,
almost any Middle Eastern government willing to provide such support and cooperation
would be doing so over the opposition of the vast majority of its citizens. Given
the real political risks for such a ruler in supporting the U.S. war effort, such
acquiescence would take place only reluctantly as a result of American pressure
or inducements, not from a sincere belief in the validity of the U.S. military
operation.
In the event of a U.S. invasion of Iraq, there would likely be an outbreak
of widespread anti-American protests, perhaps even attacks against American interests.
Some pro-Western regimes could become vulnerable to internal radical forces as
part of such a reaction. Passions are particularly high in light of strong U.S.
support for the policies of Israels rightist government and its ongoing
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The anger over U.S. double standards
regarding Israeli and Iraqi violations of UN Security Council resolutions could
reach a boiling point.
3. There Is No Evidence of Iraqi Links to Al Qaeda or Other
Anti-American Terrorists
In the months following the September 11 terrorist attacks, there were leaks
to the media about alleged evidence of a meeting in Prague between an Iraqi intelligence
officer and one of the hijackers of the doomed airplanes that crashed into the
World Trade Center. Subsequent thorough investigations by the FBI, CIA, and Czech
intelligence have found no evidence that any such meeting took place. None of
the hijackers were Iraqi, no major figure in Al Qaeda is Iraqi, and no funds to
Al Qaeda have been traced to Iraq. It is unlikely that the decidedly secular Baathist
regimewhich has savagely suppressed Islamists within Iraqwould be
able to maintain close links with Osama bin Laden and his followers. In fact,
Saudi Prince Turki bin Faisal, his countrys former intelligence chief, noted
that bin Laden views Saddam Hussein as an apostate, an infidel, or someone
who is not worthy of being a fellow Muslim and that bin Laden had offered
in 1990 to raise an army of thousands of mujaheddin fighters to liberate Kuwait
from Iraqi occupation.
Iraqs past terrorist links have primarily been limited to such secular
groups as Abu Nidal, a now-largely defunct Palestinian faction opposed to Yasir
Arafats Palestine Liberation Organization. At the height of Iraqs
support of Abu Nidal in the early 1980s, Washington dropped Iraq from its list
of countries that sponsored terrorism so the U.S. could bolster Iraqs war
effort against Iran. Baghdad was reinstated to the list only after the Iraqi invasion
of Kuwait in 1990, even though U.S. officials were unable to cite any increased
Iraqi ties to terrorist groups. A recent CIA report indicates that the Iraqis
have actually been consciously avoiding any actions against the United States
or its facilities abroad, presumably to deny Washington any excuse to engage in
further military strikes against their country. The last clear example that American
officials can cite of such Iraqi-backed terrorism was an alleged plot by Iraqi
agents to assassinate former President George Bush when he visited Kuwait in 1993.
In response, President Bill Clinton ordered the bombing of Baghdad, hitting an
Iraqi intelligence headquarters as well as a nearby civilian neighborhood.
Although Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld insists that Iraq is backing
international terrorism, he has been unable to present any evidence that they
currently do so. In fact, the State Departments own annual study Patterns
of Global Terrorism did not list any serious act of international terrorism
by the government of Iraq.
Besides, an American invasion of Iraq would probably weaken the battle against
terrorism. It would not only distract from the more immediate threat posed by
Osama bin Ladens Al Qaeda network, but it would also likely result in an
anti-American backlash that would lessen the level of cooperation from Islamic
countries in tracking down and neutralizing the remaining Al Qaeda cells.
4. There Is No Proof that Iraq Is Developing Weapons of
Mass Destruction
Despite speculationparticularly by those who seek an excuse to invade
Iraqof possible ongoing Iraqi efforts to procure weapons of mass destruction,
no one has been able to put forward evidence that the Iraqis are actually doing
so, though they have certainly done so in the past. The dilemma facing the international
community is that no one knows what, if anything, the Iraqis are currently doing.
In the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent inspections regimen,
virtually all Iraqs stockpile of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems,
and capability of producing such weapons were destroyed. Inspectors with the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) were withdrawn from Iraq in late 1998 before
their job was complete, however, under orders by President Clinton prior to a
heavy four-day U.S. bombing campaign. The Iraqi government has not yet allowed
them to return. Prior to that time, UNSCOM reportedly oversaw the destruction
of 38,000 chemical weapons, 480,000 liters of live chemical weapons agents, 48
missiles, six missile launchers, 30 missile warheads modified to carry chemical
or biological agents, and hundreds of pieces of related equipment with the capability
to produce chemical weapons.
In its most recent report, the International Atomic Energy Agency categorically
declared that Iraq no longer has a nuclear program.
In late 1997, UNSCOM Director Richard Butler reported that UNSCOM had made
significant progress in tracking Iraqs chemical weapons program
and that 817 of the 819 Soviet-supplied long-range missiles had been accounted
for. A couple dozen Iraqi-made ballistic missiles remained unaccounted for, but
these were of questionable caliber. Though Iraqi officials would periodically
interfere with inspections, in its last three years of operation, UNSCOM was unable
to detect any evidence that Iraq had been further concealing prohibited weapons.
The development of biological weapons, by contrast, is much easier to conceal,
due to the small amount of space needed for their manufacture. Early UNSCOM inspections
revealed evidence of the production of large amounts of biological agents, including
anthrax, and charged that Iraq had vastly understated the amount of biological
warfare agents it had manufactured. In response, UNSCOM set up sophisticated monitoring
devices to detect chemical or biological weapons, though these devices were dismantled
in reaction to the U.S. bombing campaign of December 1998.
Frightening scenarios regarding mass fatalities from a small amount of anthrax
assume that the Iraqis have developed the highly sophisticated means of distributing
these bioweapons by missile or aircraft. However, there are serious questions
as to whether the alleged biological agents could be dispersed successfully in
a manner that could harm troops or a civilian population, given the rather complicated
technology required. For example, a vial of biological weapons on the tip of a
missile would almost certainly either be destroyed on impact or dispersed harmlessly.
To become lethal, highly concentrated amounts of anthrax spores must be inhaled
and then left untreated by antibiotics until the infection is too far advanced.
Similarly, the prevailing winds would have to be calculated, no rain could fall,
the spray nozzles could not clog, the population would need to be unvaccinated,
and everyone would need to stay around the area targeted for attack.
Although Iraqs potential for developing weapons of mass destruction should
not be totally discounted, Saddam Husseins refusal to allow UN inspectors
to return and his lack of full cooperation prior to their departure do not necessarily
mean he is hiding something, as President Bush alleges. More likely, the Iraqi
opposition to the inspections program is based on Washingtons abuse of UNSCOM
for intelligence gathering operations and represents a desperate effort by Saddam
Hussein to increase his standing with Arab nationalists by defying Western efforts
to intrude on Iraqi sovereignty. Indeed, the Iraqi defiance of the inspections
regime may be designed to provoke a reaction by the United States in order to
capitalize on widespread Arab resentment over Washingtons double standard
of objecting to an Arab country procuring weapons of mass destruction while tolerating
Israels nuclear arsenal.
A far more likely scenario for an Iraqi distribution of biological agents would
be through Iraqi agents smuggling them clandestinely into targeted countries.
This is what led to some initial speculation, now considered very doubtful, that
the Iraqis were behind the anthrax mail attacks during the fall of 2001. To prevent
such a scenario requires aggressive counterintelligence efforts by the United
States and other potentially targeted nations, but this type of terrorism is not
likely to be prevented by an invasion. Indeed, a U.S. invasion could conceivably
encourage rogue elements of Iraqi intelligence or an allied terrorist group to
engage in an anthrax attack as an act of revenge for the heavy Arab casualties
resulting from U.S. bombing. One of the frightening things about biological weapons
production is the mobility of operations. A regime change engineered
by the U.S. would not necessarily ensure the closure of labs producing such weapons,
since they could easily be relocated elsewhere or even continue to operate clandestinely
in Iraq.
U.S. officials have admitted that there is no evidence that Iraq has resumed
its nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons programs. Scott Ritter, a former
U.S. Marine officer who served as chief weapons inspector for UNSCOM, responded
to a query on a television talk show in 2001 about Iraqs potential threat
to the U.S. by saying:
In terms of military threat, absolutely nothing. His military was devastated
in 1991 in Operation Desert Storm and hasnt had the ability to reconstitute
itself
In terms of weapons of mass destruction,
we just dont
know. We know that we achieved a 90 to 95% level of disarmament. Theres
stuff thats unresolved, and until we get weapons inspectors back into Iraq,
that will remain a problematic issue
. We should be trying to get weapons
inspectors back into Iraq, so that we can ascertain exactly whats transpiring
in Iraq today instead of guessing about it.
Finally, Saddam Hussein has demonstrated that he cares first and foremost about
his own survival. He presumably recognizes that any effort to use weapons of mass
destruction would inevitably lead to his own destruction. This is why he did not
use them during the Gulf War. In the event of a U.S. invasion, seeing his overthrow
as imminent, and with nothing to lose, this logic of self-preservation would no
longer be operative. Instead, such an invasion would dramatically increase the
likelihood of his ordering the use of any weapons of mass destruction he may have
retained.
Saddam Husseins leadership style has always been that of direct control;
his distrust of subordinates (bordering on paranoia) is one of the things that
has helped him survive. It is extremely unlikely that he would go to the risk
and expense of developing weapons of mass destruction only to pass them on to
some group of terrorists. If he does have such weapons at his disposal, they would
be for him and nobody else. In the chaos of a U.S. invasion and its aftermath,
however, the chances of such weapons being smuggled out of the country into the
hands of terrorists would increase. Currently these weapons, if they do exist,
are under the control of a highly centralized government unlikely to provoke an
attack by passing on the weapons to terrorist groups.
5. Iraq Is No Longer a Significant Military Threat to Its
Neighbors
It is also hard to imagine that an Iraqi aircraft carrying biological weapons,
presumably some kind of drone, could somehow penetrate the air space of neighboring
countries, much less far-off Israel, without being shot down. Most of Iraqs
neighbors have sophisticated antiaircraft capability, and Israel has the best
regional missile defense system in the world. Similarly, as mentioned above, there
is no evidence that Iraqs Scud missiles and launchers even survived the
Gulf War in operable condition. Indeed, UNSCOM reported in 1992 that Iraq had
neither launchers for their missiles nor engines to power them.
Israeli military analyst Meir Stieglitz, writing in the Israeli newspaper Yediot
Ahronot, noted that there is no such thing as a long-range Iraqi missile
with an effective biological warhead. No one has found an Iraqi biological warhead.
The chances of Iraq having succeeded in developing operative warheads without
tests are zero.
The recent American obsession with Iraqs potential military threat is
discredited by the fact that Iraqs military, including its real and potential
weapons of mass destruction, was significantly stronger in the late 1980s than
it is today. Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein was once a real threat to Iraqs
neighbors when he had his full complement of medium-range missiles, a functioning
air force, and a massive stockpile of chemical and biological weaponry and material.
Yet, from the Carter administration through the Reagan administration and continuing
through the first half of the senior Bush administration, the U.S. dismissed any
potential strategic Iraqi threat to the point of coddling Saddams regime
with overt economic subsidies and covert military support. This support continued
even as Iraq invaded Iran and used chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and
Kurdish civilians.
Iraqs current armed forces are barely one-third their pre-war strength.
Even though Iraq has not been required to reduce its conventional forces, the
destruction of its weapons and the countrys economic difficulties have led
to a substantial reduction in men under arms. Iraqs Navy is virtually nonexistent
and its Air Force is just a fraction of what it was before the war. Military spending
by Iraq has been estimated at barely one-tenth of its levels in the 1980s. The
Bush administration has been unable to explain why today, when Saddam has only
a tiny percentage of his once-formidable military capability, Iraq is considered
such a threat that it is necessary to invade the country and replace its leaderthe
same leader Washington quietly supported during the peak of Iraqs military
capability.
6. There Are Still Nonmilitary Options Available
The best way to stop the potential of Iraq developing weapons of mass destruction
would be through resuming United Nations inspections, whichdespite episodes
of Iraqi noncooperation and harassmentwere largely successful. It was Washingtons
ill-considered decision to misuse the inspection teams for unrelated spying operations
and the decision to engage in an intense four-day bombing campaign against Iraq
that led Saddam Hussein to cease his cooperation completely in December 1998.
Since then, the United States has not offered any incentives for Iraq to allow
inspections to resume. From the outset, Washington made it clear that even total
cooperation with UNSCOM would not lead to an end to the devastating international
sanctions against Iraq. As a result, Saddam Hussein may be refusing to allow UN
inspectors to return not because he has something to hide but because he has nothing
to gain by cooperating. Offering an end to or a substantial liberalization of
nonmilitary sanctions in return for unfettered access by UN inspection teams would
probably be the best way to regain access for the inspectors.
Unfortunately, Bush administration officials are apparently no longer even
interested in renewing UN inspections, dismissing out of hand Iraqs recently
announced willingness to consider their return. This raises questions as to whether
the potential Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction is really a genuine
concern of American officials or merely an excuse to go to war.
A number of observers, including Scott Ritterwho had criticized the Clinton
administration for not pushing the Iraqi regime harder on its initial refusals
to allow inspections into some of the governments inner sanctumsbelieve
that the Bush administration is sabotaging United Nations efforts to reopen inspections.
For example, Ritter told the Los Angeles Times that the recent decision
to engage in covert operations to assassinate Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi leaders
effectively kills any chance of inspectors returning to Iraq because
the Iraqis will never trust an inspection regime that has already shown
itself susceptible to infiltration and manipulation by intelligence services hostile
to Iraq.
There is also no reason why the current emphasis on deterrence will not continue
to work. Iraq was able to build up its initial raw components, equipment, and
technologies for the development of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons
through imports, much of which came from the United States. The vast majority
of these items and infrastructure has since been destroyed. Although the economic
sanctions have been quite controversial as a result of their devastating effects
on Iraqi civilians (and are therefore frequently violated), international support
for and enforcement of the military sanctions have remained quite solid.
Furthermore, even without a resumption of inspections, relying on existing
satellite surveillancewhich ensures that Iraq cannot build any large weapons
plants without detection and presumably destruction, immediately afterwardsseems
far less risky than an all-out war.
Finally, given that UN Security Council Resolution 687 also calls for disarmament
initiatives throughout the region, the United States could help curb Iraqs
appetite for weapons procurement by reversing its opposition to arms control initiatives
for the entire Persian Gulf region.
7. Defeating Iraq Would Be Militarily Difficult
Most likely, the United States would eventually be victorious in a war against
Iraq, but it would come at an enormous cost. It would be a mistake, for example,
to think that defeating Iraq would result in as few Americans casualties as occurred
in driving the Taliban militia from Kabul. Though Iraqs offensive capabilities
have been severely weakened by the bombings, sanctions, and UNSCOM-sponsored decommissioning,
its defensive military capabilities are still strong.
Nor would a military victory today be as easy as during the Gulf War. Prior
to the launching of Operation Desert Storm, when the Iraqis figured out the extent
of the forces being deployed against them, they decided not to put up a fight
for Kuwait and relied mostly on young conscripts from minority communities. Only
two of the eight divisions of the elite Republican Guard were ever in Kuwait,
and they pulled back before the war began in mid-January. The vast majority of
Iraqs strongest forces were withdrawn to areas around Baghdad to fight for
the survival of the regime itself, and they remain there to this day. In the event
of war, defections from these units are not likely.
There are close to one million members of the Iraqi elite who have a vested
interest in the regimes survival. These include the Baath Party leadership
and its supporters, security and intelligence personnel, and core elements of
the armed forces and their extended families. Furthermore, Iraqa largely
urban societyhas a far more sophisticated infrastructure than does the largely
rural and tribal Afghanistan that could be mobilized in the event of a foreign
invasion.
Nor is there an equivalent to Afghanistans Northern Alliance, which did
the bulk of the ground fighting against the Taliban. The Kurds, after being abandoned
twice in recent history by the United States, are unlikely to fight beyond securing
autonomy for Kurdish areas. The armed Shiite opposition has largely been eliminated,
and it too would be unlikely to fight beyond liberating the majority Shiite sections
of southern Iraq. The U.S. would be reluctant to support either, given that their
successes could potentially fragment the country and would encourage both rebellious
Kurds in southeastern Turkey and restive Shiites in northeastern Saudi Arabia.
U.S. forces would have to march on Baghdad, a city of over five million people,
virtually alone. Unlike the Gulf War, which involved conventional and open combat
where U.S. forces could excel and take full advantage of their firepower and technological
superiority, U.S. soldiers would have to fight their way through heavily populated
agricultural and urban lands. Invading forces would be faced with bitter, house-to-house
fighting in a country larger than South Vietnam. Iraqis, who may have had little
stomach to fight to maintain their countrys conquest of Kuwait, would be
far more willing to sacrifice themselves to resist a foreign, Western invader.
To minimize American casualties in the face of such stiff resistance, which would
largely come from within crowded urban areas, the United States would likely engage
in heavy bombing of Iraqi residential neighborhoods, resulting in very high civilian
casualties.
The lack of support from regional allies could result in an absence of a land
base from which to launch U.S. aerial attacks, initially requiring the United
States to rely on Navy jets launched from aircraft carriers. Without permission
to launch aerial refueling craft, even long-range bombers from U.S. air bases
might not be able to be deployed. It is hard to imagine being able to provide
the necessary reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft under such circumstances,
and the deployment of tens of thousands of troops from distant staging areas could
be problematic as well. U.S. forces could conceivably capture an air base inside
Iraq in the course of the fighting, but without the pre-positioning of supplies,
its usefulness as a major center of operations would be marginal.
Finally, there is the question of what happens if the United States is successful
in overthrowing Saddam Husseins regime. As is becoming apparent in Afghanistan,
throwing a government out is easier than putting a new one together. Although
most Iraqis presumably fear and despise Saddam Husseins rule and would likely
be relieved in the event of his ouster, this does not mean that a regime installed
by an invading Western army would be welcomed. For example, most of the leading
candidates that U.S. officials are apparently considering installing to govern
Iraq are former Iraqi military officers who have been linked to war crimes.
In addition to possible ongoing guerrilla action by Saddam Husseins supporters,
U.S. occupation forces would likely be faced with competing armed factions among
the Sunni Arab population, not to mention Kurd and Shiite rebel groups seeking
to break away from any ruler in Baghdad. This could lead the United States into
a bloody counterinsurgency war. Without the support of other countries or the
United Nations, a U.S. invasion could leave American forces effectively alone
enforcing a peace amidst the chaos of a post-Saddam Iraq.
Conclusion
The serious moral, legal, political, and strategic problems with a possible
U.S. invasion of Iraq require that the American public become engaged in the debate
over the wisdom of such a dramatic course of action. What is at stake is not just
the lives of thousands of Iraqi and American soldiers and thousands more Iraqi
civilians but also the international legal framework established in the aftermath
of World War II. Despite its failings, this multilateral framework of collective
security has resulted in far greater international stability and far less intergovernmental
conflict than would otherwise have been the case.
During the 2000 election campaign, George W. Bush scored well among voters
by calling for greater humility in U.S. foreign policy, decrying the
overextension of U.S. military force, and criticizing the idea that the U.S. armed
forces should be engaged in such practices as nation-building in unstable
areas. As president, Bush has made a remarkable reversal of this popular position
and appears eager to embark on perhaps the most reckless foreign military campaign
in U.S. history. Taking advantage of the fear, anger, and sense of nationalism
felt by so many Americans in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the
Bush administration and its allies in Congress and the media are now seeking to
justify an unrelated military campaign that would have otherwise been unimaginable.
The most effective antidote to such arrogance of power is democracy. Unfortunately,
in times of international crisis, many Americans are wary of exercising their
democratic rights and are reluctant to oppose a presidents foreign policy.
Yet, seldom in U.S. history has it been so important for Americans to raise their
concerns publicly and challenge their elected representatives to honor their legal
and moral obligations.
Stephen Zunes <stephen@coho.org>
is Middle East editor of Foreign Policy in Focus
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