According to this myth, the Bush administration's foreign policy underwent a radical transformation after the terrorist attacks. Beforehand, or so the myth holds, the U.S. tried to deal with the world as a sole superpower, avoiding international agreements. Since Sept. 11, it reversed course and has chosen a new, multilateral approach.

The reality is otherwise. If you focus on actual policy positions rather than mere style and tone, the Bush administration has changed far less than have the perceptions of it. The earlier accusations of unilateralism stemmed from the administration's actions on several treaties and international agreements. The administration withdrew from the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. It refused to support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or the creation of an international criminal court. It demanded changes in an accord on illegal sales of small arms. And it served notice it might pull out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty if Russia did not agree to changes that would permit testing of a missile defense system.

Now, let's look at the aftermath of Sept. 11. In the weeks since then, the Bush administration has moved with great fanfare to form a coalition of nations against terrorism. So has the administration cast aside what was earlier deemed unilateralism? It has not.

It hasn't altered its position on the Kyoto treaty or the test ban treaty or any of the other issues that were the basis of the earlier judgments. It hasn't changed its views on missile defense. Sure, the Bush administration is asking for help from other countries now. But look carefully and you'll find that it also is careful to avoid tying itself down or turning decisions over to international or multilateral organizations. Before the Gulf War, the first Bush administration placed great importance on showing that it had authorization from the U.N. Security Council. This time, the U.S. gave only a glancing nod to the U.N. Neither do U.S. military forces act under a NATO command, as they did in Kosovo two years ago.

In fact, in some ways, the war against terrorism will make the U.S. more unilateral than before. Take the proposal for an international criminal court. For years, the Pentagon has opposed such a court on grounds that its creation could open the way for U.S. soldiers to be unfairly prosecuted for war crimes.

Now U.S. troops are going into combat again. U.S. leaders are promising that we will conduct new covert operations and that our forces and intelligence agencies won't be bound by earlier restrictions.

In this new, no-holds-barred climate, the Pentagon, the administration and Congress will inevitably be less inclined to support an international criminal court than they were before Sept. 11.

Curiously, the idea that the Bush administration has done an about-face unfairly trivializes the views of both liberals and conservatives.

The misperception is unfair to the administration and its conservative supporters because it seems to suggest their pre-Sept. 11 views were not thought out and were due merely to inexperience in government. In fact, they represented long-held Republican positions. Former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft opposed the test ban treaty. Former Secretary of State George Shultz had gone on record against the international criminal court.

In a different way, the erroneous notion that the Bush team has "seen the light" and renounced unilateralism is harmful to liberal causes. If everything's fine with the administration now, even though it hasn't altered its earlier positions, then the implication is that issues such as the Kyoto treaty and the test ban treaty aren't really very important.

The Myth of Abandoned Unilateralism reflects, above all, the desire of everyone, Americans and allies, to close ranks with the Bush administration. That's understandable. In the process, however, the Bush team's erstwhile critics seem to be changing their views more than is the administration itself. For its part, the administration isn't any more or less unilateral than it ever was.

Copyright 2001 Los Angeles Times

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