The current fight against terrorism poses an unprecedented challenge. To
succeed, the US must overcome the desire for massive military retaliation in
response to the horrific attacks on September 11. It should adopt a
strategy based on a more accurate understanding of the perpetrators of these
attacks and the roots of anti-American sentiments in the Middle East.
For starters, that means moving far beyond Osama bin Laden. The likely
perpetrators of these murderous attacks are the product of a fringe network
of militants originally recruited by the CIA and Pakistan from around the
Arab and Muslim world in the 1980s during the Soviet war with Afghanistan.
After pulling its support once the Soviet Union left, the US further angered
these militants during the Gulf War when it stationed troops and bases in
the Arabian Peninsula near the holy sites of Mecca and Medina. Consequently,
anti-US bombings began increasing from the 1995 and 1996 car-bombings at US
military installations in Saudi Arabia, to the 1998 bombings of the US
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the recent attack on the USS Cole in
Yemen.
Osama bin Laden is not the sole mastermind of these attacks as is often
claimed in the media. He just facilitates these groups with logistics and
finances. His network has no geographical location or fixed center. It
appears to be a kaleidoscopic overlay of cells and links that span the globe
from camps on the Afghan-Pakistan borderlands to immigrant ghettoes in
Europe and the U.S.
What's more, this network is largely disconnected from most Islamic
opposition groups in the Middle East who are fighting national struggles to
create Islamic states. What drives their hatred of the US is not Islam but
more political factors. They believe that Muslims have received the brunt
of international violence over the last decade. They point to the genocide
against Bosnian Muslims, the Russian war in Chechnya, the conflict between
India and Pakistan over Kashmir, the Israeli occupation of Palestinian
lands, and the UN sanctions against Iraq. In all of these cases, they view
US policies either tacitly condoning the violence or actively supporting it.
Therefore, a military strike on militant camps in Afghanistan may kill or
capture bin Laden and a number of his associates but it will not likely
incapacitate the far-flung networks of militants that may have produced the
recent attacks. They will remain in place, with new reasons to carry out
more terror. Moreover, a massive display of American military might brought
to bear on a Muslim nation, especially one that kills innocent civilians in
the process, is precisely the type of action that these militants hope will
create the conditions for unifying greater numbers of Muslims against the
United States. It would confirm their view that the US is an arrogant
superpower that cares little about Muslim lives.
A more effective alternative to a military response must combine a massive
international law enforcement effort with a political strategy designed to
isolate and undermine these militant networks. The deliberate and murderous
attacks on innocent American civilians should be characterized and
prosecuted as a crime not a war. The United States must use all its
resources to compel international cooperation to ensure that the
perpetrators have no place to hide. Identifying bin Laden and his network as
criminals who have
violated international law will make it extremely difficult for countries,
especially those who fear being allied with an American-led war, to refuse
more discrete and effective assistance to the US. Also, given the disperse
nature of the networks, only international cooperation will work to root
them out. American declarations of war inhibit rather than promote this
cooperation.
This approach must be bolstered by a political strategy that deepens the
isolation of these fringe networks from the vast majority of Arabs and
Muslims, many of whom hold deep and legitimate grievances with US policies
but who do not support violence. In words and deeds, the US must clearly
make a distinction between Islam as a religion and violent extremism. But
the US must also critically reexamine its policies in the Middle East.
The US should condemn the serious human rights abuses committed by its
allies with the same force as it condemns other regimes in the region and
condition its aid on progress in opening up closed political systems. It
should curtail the massive arms transfers to the region and reduce its
military presence, which have done little to promote democracy or stability.
The US must also recognize the failure of the devastating sanctions regime
on Iraq and support legitimate Palestinian aspirations for an independent
state alongside a secure Israel.
Such an approach is not a concession to terrorism but a more realistic and
effective response that is closer to the values that the United States
claims to uphold.
Steve Niva teaches International Politics and Middle East Studies
at the Evergreen State College. He writes regularly for Middle East Report
(www.merip.org) and is an Associate at the Middle East Research and
Information Project (MERIP) in Washington DC.
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