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In an interview on the PBS NewsHour last Wednesday ,
Joe Biden was unwilling to contradict the official narrative of the
Iraq War that Gen. David Petraeus and the Bush surge had turned Iraq
into a good war after all. That interview serves as a reminder of just
how completely the Democratic Party foreign policy elite has adopted
that narrative.
In an interview on the PBS NewsHour last Wednesday ,
Joe Biden was unwilling to contradict the official narrative of the
Iraq War that Gen. David Petraeus and the Bush surge had turned Iraq
into a good war after all. That interview serves as a reminder of just
how completely the Democratic Party foreign policy elite has adopted
that narrative.
The
Iraq War story line crafted by the Petraeus and the new
counterinsurgency elite in Washington assures the public that U.S.
military power in Iraq brought about the cooperation of the Sunnis in
Anbar Province, ended sectarian violence in Baghdad and defeated
Iranian-backed Shi'a insurgents.
In
reality, of course, that's not what happened at all. It's time to review the relevant history and deconstruct the Petraeus narrative which the Obama administration now appears to have adopted.
The
Sunni decision to cooperate in the suppression of al Qaeda in Iraq had
nothing to do with the surge. The main Sunni armed resistance groups
had actually turned against al Qaeda in 2005, when they began trying to
make a deal with the United States to end the war.
At
an Iraqi reconciliation conference in Cairo, November 19-21, 2005,
leaders of the three major Sunni armed groups (one of which was a
coalition of several resistance organization) told U.S. and Arab officials
they were willing to track down al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
and deliver him to Iraqi authorities as part of a negotiated agreement
with the United States. The Sunni insurgent leaders were motivated not
only by hatred of al Qaeda but by the fear that a Shi'a-dominated
government would consolidate power and exclude the Sunnis permanently
unless the United States acted to rebalance its policy in Iraq.
Two months later, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad actually entered into secret negotiations with the three major Sunni insurgent groups 2006, as later reported by the Sunday Times and confirmed by Khalilzad.
The Sunni leaders even submitted a formal peace proposal to Khalilzad.
They insisted on a "timetable for withdrawal" as part of the deal, but
it was "linked to the timescale necessary to rebuild Iraq's armed forces
and security services", according to Sunday Times.
Khalilzad
cut off the negotiations in February 2006, because such an agreement
would have conflicted with a broader strategy of standing up a Shi'a
army to suppress the Sunni insurgency.
The
major Shi'a factions, determined to eliminate any possible threat to
its power from the Sunnis in Baghdad, unleashed death squads, mostly
from the Mahdi Army, in Sunni neighborhoods across the entire city in
2006 and early 2007.
The
result was the defeat of the Sunni insurgents' political-military bases
in Baghdad, and the transformation of the capital from a mixed
Sunni-Shi'a city into an overwhelmingly Shi'a city, as shown
dramatically in this series of maps, based on U.S. military census data.
As
a result, by late 2006, the Sunni leaders were feeling much more
vulnerable to Shi'a power. Col. Sean McFarland, U.S. Army brigade
commander in Al Anbar province throughout 2006, found
Sunni sheiks expressing "[a] growing concern that the U.S. would leave
Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and
Iranian-supported militias...."
It
was that fear of the Shi'a power that drove local Sunni decisions to
join U.S.-sponsored Sunni neighborhood armed groups in Anbar.
The
sectarian violence in Baghdad began to abate by August 2007, but not
because of additional U.S. troops as the official narrative of the war
suggests. It was because the Shi'a had accomplished their aim of
confining the Sunni population to relatively small enclaves in Baghdad.
That relationship between the achievement of that aim and the reduced
violence was noted by the September 2007 National Intelligence Estimate.
The
main Petraeus conceit about his strategy in Iraq is that it defeated a
Shi'a insurgency that represented an Iranian "proxy war" in Iraq. But
the main premise on which that claim was based -- that Iran was backing "rogue elements"
of Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army -- was simply a psywar ploy by Petraeus
and his staff. The objective of the "rogue elements" line was to divide
the Mahdi Army, as military and intelligence officials admitted to pro-war blogger Bill Roggio.
The
official narrative suggested that Iran exerted political influence in
Iraq by supporting armed groups opposing the government. In fact,
however,Iran's key Iraqi allies had always been the two Shi'a factions
with which the United States was allied against Sadr -- the Supreme
Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki's Dawa Party. They had both gotten Iranian support and
training during the war against Saddam, and the fiercely nationalist
Sadr had criticized SCIRI leaders as Iranian stooges.
The
al-Maliki government had no problem with Iranian training and financial
support of the Mahdi Army in 2006, when the Mahdi Army was eliminating
the Sunni threat from Baghdad. But once it was clear that the Sunnis
had been defeated, the historical conflict between Sadr and the other
Shi'a factions reemerged in spring 2007.
The Iranian interest was to ensure that the Shi'a-dominated government of Iraq consolidated its power. Iran's "supreme leader" Ali Khamenei told al-Maliki
in August 2007 that Iran would support his taking control of Sadr's
strongholds. Later that same month, al-Maliki went to Karbala and gave the local police chief "carte blanche"
to attack the Sadrists there. After two days of violence, Sadr
declared a six-month "freeze" on Mahdi Army military operations August
27, 2007.
By late 2007, contrary to the official Iraq legend, the al-Maliki government and the Bush administration were both publicly crediting Iran with pressuring Sadr to agree to the unilateral ceasefire - to the chagrin of Petraeus.
Al-Maliki
launched the attack on Mahdi Army forces in Basrah in March 2008 in the
knowledge that Iran would back him against Sadr. And when it went
badly, he turned to Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary Guard official in charge of day-to-day Iraq policy, to
force a ceasefire on Sadr. Soleimani told Iraqi President Talibani
that Iran supported al-Maliki's efforts to "dismantle all militias",
and Sadr agreed to a ceasefire within 24 hours of Iran's intervention.
So it was Iran's restraint -- not Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy -- that effectively ended the Shi'a insurgent threat.
It
was Soleimani who had presided over the secret April 2006 meeting of
Shi'a leaders that had chosen al-Maliki as Prime Minister, after having
been smuggled into the Green Zone without telling the Americans. And
that was only one of a several trips Soleimani made to the Green Zone over a two-year period without U.S. knowledge.
But
Biden doesn't want to know this and other historical facts that
contradict the official narrative on Iraq. For the Democratic foreign
policy elite, staying ignorant of the real history of the Iraq War
allows them to believe that deploying U.S. military forces in Muslim
countries can be an effective instrument of U.S. power.
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In an interview on the PBS NewsHour last Wednesday ,
Joe Biden was unwilling to contradict the official narrative of the
Iraq War that Gen. David Petraeus and the Bush surge had turned Iraq
into a good war after all. That interview serves as a reminder of just
how completely the Democratic Party foreign policy elite has adopted
that narrative.
The
Iraq War story line crafted by the Petraeus and the new
counterinsurgency elite in Washington assures the public that U.S.
military power in Iraq brought about the cooperation of the Sunnis in
Anbar Province, ended sectarian violence in Baghdad and defeated
Iranian-backed Shi'a insurgents.
In
reality, of course, that's not what happened at all. It's time to review the relevant history and deconstruct the Petraeus narrative which the Obama administration now appears to have adopted.
The
Sunni decision to cooperate in the suppression of al Qaeda in Iraq had
nothing to do with the surge. The main Sunni armed resistance groups
had actually turned against al Qaeda in 2005, when they began trying to
make a deal with the United States to end the war.
At
an Iraqi reconciliation conference in Cairo, November 19-21, 2005,
leaders of the three major Sunni armed groups (one of which was a
coalition of several resistance organization) told U.S. and Arab officials
they were willing to track down al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
and deliver him to Iraqi authorities as part of a negotiated agreement
with the United States. The Sunni insurgent leaders were motivated not
only by hatred of al Qaeda but by the fear that a Shi'a-dominated
government would consolidate power and exclude the Sunnis permanently
unless the United States acted to rebalance its policy in Iraq.
Two months later, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad actually entered into secret negotiations with the three major Sunni insurgent groups 2006, as later reported by the Sunday Times and confirmed by Khalilzad.
The Sunni leaders even submitted a formal peace proposal to Khalilzad.
They insisted on a "timetable for withdrawal" as part of the deal, but
it was "linked to the timescale necessary to rebuild Iraq's armed forces
and security services", according to Sunday Times.
Khalilzad
cut off the negotiations in February 2006, because such an agreement
would have conflicted with a broader strategy of standing up a Shi'a
army to suppress the Sunni insurgency.
The
major Shi'a factions, determined to eliminate any possible threat to
its power from the Sunnis in Baghdad, unleashed death squads, mostly
from the Mahdi Army, in Sunni neighborhoods across the entire city in
2006 and early 2007.
The
result was the defeat of the Sunni insurgents' political-military bases
in Baghdad, and the transformation of the capital from a mixed
Sunni-Shi'a city into an overwhelmingly Shi'a city, as shown
dramatically in this series of maps, based on U.S. military census data.
As
a result, by late 2006, the Sunni leaders were feeling much more
vulnerable to Shi'a power. Col. Sean McFarland, U.S. Army brigade
commander in Al Anbar province throughout 2006, found
Sunni sheiks expressing "[a] growing concern that the U.S. would leave
Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and
Iranian-supported militias...."
It
was that fear of the Shi'a power that drove local Sunni decisions to
join U.S.-sponsored Sunni neighborhood armed groups in Anbar.
The
sectarian violence in Baghdad began to abate by August 2007, but not
because of additional U.S. troops as the official narrative of the war
suggests. It was because the Shi'a had accomplished their aim of
confining the Sunni population to relatively small enclaves in Baghdad.
That relationship between the achievement of that aim and the reduced
violence was noted by the September 2007 National Intelligence Estimate.
The
main Petraeus conceit about his strategy in Iraq is that it defeated a
Shi'a insurgency that represented an Iranian "proxy war" in Iraq. But
the main premise on which that claim was based -- that Iran was backing "rogue elements"
of Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army -- was simply a psywar ploy by Petraeus
and his staff. The objective of the "rogue elements" line was to divide
the Mahdi Army, as military and intelligence officials admitted to pro-war blogger Bill Roggio.
The
official narrative suggested that Iran exerted political influence in
Iraq by supporting armed groups opposing the government. In fact,
however,Iran's key Iraqi allies had always been the two Shi'a factions
with which the United States was allied against Sadr -- the Supreme
Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki's Dawa Party. They had both gotten Iranian support and
training during the war against Saddam, and the fiercely nationalist
Sadr had criticized SCIRI leaders as Iranian stooges.
The
al-Maliki government had no problem with Iranian training and financial
support of the Mahdi Army in 2006, when the Mahdi Army was eliminating
the Sunni threat from Baghdad. But once it was clear that the Sunnis
had been defeated, the historical conflict between Sadr and the other
Shi'a factions reemerged in spring 2007.
The Iranian interest was to ensure that the Shi'a-dominated government of Iraq consolidated its power. Iran's "supreme leader" Ali Khamenei told al-Maliki
in August 2007 that Iran would support his taking control of Sadr's
strongholds. Later that same month, al-Maliki went to Karbala and gave the local police chief "carte blanche"
to attack the Sadrists there. After two days of violence, Sadr
declared a six-month "freeze" on Mahdi Army military operations August
27, 2007.
By late 2007, contrary to the official Iraq legend, the al-Maliki government and the Bush administration were both publicly crediting Iran with pressuring Sadr to agree to the unilateral ceasefire - to the chagrin of Petraeus.
Al-Maliki
launched the attack on Mahdi Army forces in Basrah in March 2008 in the
knowledge that Iran would back him against Sadr. And when it went
badly, he turned to Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary Guard official in charge of day-to-day Iraq policy, to
force a ceasefire on Sadr. Soleimani told Iraqi President Talibani
that Iran supported al-Maliki's efforts to "dismantle all militias",
and Sadr agreed to a ceasefire within 24 hours of Iran's intervention.
So it was Iran's restraint -- not Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy -- that effectively ended the Shi'a insurgent threat.
It
was Soleimani who had presided over the secret April 2006 meeting of
Shi'a leaders that had chosen al-Maliki as Prime Minister, after having
been smuggled into the Green Zone without telling the Americans. And
that was only one of a several trips Soleimani made to the Green Zone over a two-year period without U.S. knowledge.
But
Biden doesn't want to know this and other historical facts that
contradict the official narrative on Iraq. For the Democratic foreign
policy elite, staying ignorant of the real history of the Iraq War
allows them to believe that deploying U.S. military forces in Muslim
countries can be an effective instrument of U.S. power.
In an interview on the PBS NewsHour last Wednesday ,
Joe Biden was unwilling to contradict the official narrative of the
Iraq War that Gen. David Petraeus and the Bush surge had turned Iraq
into a good war after all. That interview serves as a reminder of just
how completely the Democratic Party foreign policy elite has adopted
that narrative.
The
Iraq War story line crafted by the Petraeus and the new
counterinsurgency elite in Washington assures the public that U.S.
military power in Iraq brought about the cooperation of the Sunnis in
Anbar Province, ended sectarian violence in Baghdad and defeated
Iranian-backed Shi'a insurgents.
In
reality, of course, that's not what happened at all. It's time to review the relevant history and deconstruct the Petraeus narrative which the Obama administration now appears to have adopted.
The
Sunni decision to cooperate in the suppression of al Qaeda in Iraq had
nothing to do with the surge. The main Sunni armed resistance groups
had actually turned against al Qaeda in 2005, when they began trying to
make a deal with the United States to end the war.
At
an Iraqi reconciliation conference in Cairo, November 19-21, 2005,
leaders of the three major Sunni armed groups (one of which was a
coalition of several resistance organization) told U.S. and Arab officials
they were willing to track down al Qaeda leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
and deliver him to Iraqi authorities as part of a negotiated agreement
with the United States. The Sunni insurgent leaders were motivated not
only by hatred of al Qaeda but by the fear that a Shi'a-dominated
government would consolidate power and exclude the Sunnis permanently
unless the United States acted to rebalance its policy in Iraq.
Two months later, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad actually entered into secret negotiations with the three major Sunni insurgent groups 2006, as later reported by the Sunday Times and confirmed by Khalilzad.
The Sunni leaders even submitted a formal peace proposal to Khalilzad.
They insisted on a "timetable for withdrawal" as part of the deal, but
it was "linked to the timescale necessary to rebuild Iraq's armed forces
and security services", according to Sunday Times.
Khalilzad
cut off the negotiations in February 2006, because such an agreement
would have conflicted with a broader strategy of standing up a Shi'a
army to suppress the Sunni insurgency.
The
major Shi'a factions, determined to eliminate any possible threat to
its power from the Sunnis in Baghdad, unleashed death squads, mostly
from the Mahdi Army, in Sunni neighborhoods across the entire city in
2006 and early 2007.
The
result was the defeat of the Sunni insurgents' political-military bases
in Baghdad, and the transformation of the capital from a mixed
Sunni-Shi'a city into an overwhelmingly Shi'a city, as shown
dramatically in this series of maps, based on U.S. military census data.
As
a result, by late 2006, the Sunni leaders were feeling much more
vulnerable to Shi'a power. Col. Sean McFarland, U.S. Army brigade
commander in Al Anbar province throughout 2006, found
Sunni sheiks expressing "[a] growing concern that the U.S. would leave
Iraq and leave the Sunnis defenseless against Al-Qaeda and
Iranian-supported militias...."
It
was that fear of the Shi'a power that drove local Sunni decisions to
join U.S.-sponsored Sunni neighborhood armed groups in Anbar.
The
sectarian violence in Baghdad began to abate by August 2007, but not
because of additional U.S. troops as the official narrative of the war
suggests. It was because the Shi'a had accomplished their aim of
confining the Sunni population to relatively small enclaves in Baghdad.
That relationship between the achievement of that aim and the reduced
violence was noted by the September 2007 National Intelligence Estimate.
The
main Petraeus conceit about his strategy in Iraq is that it defeated a
Shi'a insurgency that represented an Iranian "proxy war" in Iraq. But
the main premise on which that claim was based -- that Iran was backing "rogue elements"
of Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army -- was simply a psywar ploy by Petraeus
and his staff. The objective of the "rogue elements" line was to divide
the Mahdi Army, as military and intelligence officials admitted to pro-war blogger Bill Roggio.
The
official narrative suggested that Iran exerted political influence in
Iraq by supporting armed groups opposing the government. In fact,
however,Iran's key Iraqi allies had always been the two Shi'a factions
with which the United States was allied against Sadr -- the Supreme
Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki's Dawa Party. They had both gotten Iranian support and
training during the war against Saddam, and the fiercely nationalist
Sadr had criticized SCIRI leaders as Iranian stooges.
The
al-Maliki government had no problem with Iranian training and financial
support of the Mahdi Army in 2006, when the Mahdi Army was eliminating
the Sunni threat from Baghdad. But once it was clear that the Sunnis
had been defeated, the historical conflict between Sadr and the other
Shi'a factions reemerged in spring 2007.
The Iranian interest was to ensure that the Shi'a-dominated government of Iraq consolidated its power. Iran's "supreme leader" Ali Khamenei told al-Maliki
in August 2007 that Iran would support his taking control of Sadr's
strongholds. Later that same month, al-Maliki went to Karbala and gave the local police chief "carte blanche"
to attack the Sadrists there. After two days of violence, Sadr
declared a six-month "freeze" on Mahdi Army military operations August
27, 2007.
By late 2007, contrary to the official Iraq legend, the al-Maliki government and the Bush administration were both publicly crediting Iran with pressuring Sadr to agree to the unilateral ceasefire - to the chagrin of Petraeus.
Al-Maliki
launched the attack on Mahdi Army forces in Basrah in March 2008 in the
knowledge that Iran would back him against Sadr. And when it went
badly, he turned to Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian Islamic
Revolutionary Guard official in charge of day-to-day Iraq policy, to
force a ceasefire on Sadr. Soleimani told Iraqi President Talibani
that Iran supported al-Maliki's efforts to "dismantle all militias",
and Sadr agreed to a ceasefire within 24 hours of Iran's intervention.
So it was Iran's restraint -- not Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy -- that effectively ended the Shi'a insurgent threat.
It
was Soleimani who had presided over the secret April 2006 meeting of
Shi'a leaders that had chosen al-Maliki as Prime Minister, after having
been smuggled into the Green Zone without telling the Americans. And
that was only one of a several trips Soleimani made to the Green Zone over a two-year period without U.S. knowledge.
But
Biden doesn't want to know this and other historical facts that
contradict the official narrative on Iraq. For the Democratic foreign
policy elite, staying ignorant of the real history of the Iraq War
allows them to believe that deploying U.S. military forces in Muslim
countries can be an effective instrument of U.S. power.