Palestinians have not only lost hope in the peace process, they have lost confidence in the United States to serve as an honest broker. At the same time, the continuing loss of Palestinian life resulting from Israel's use of disproportionate force is having an impact in the broader Middle East. There is growing Arab anger at the appearance that the United States has sided with Israel's position and with U.S. silence in the face of more than 250 Palestinian deaths.

The result has been an unraveling of Arab attitudes both toward the prospects for regional peace and the very fabric of the U.S.-Arab relationship. At risk are U.S. ties with several important Arab allies.

The Clinton administration, in its final two months, may not be able to resolve the conflict and establish a comprehensive peace. But it can make a determined effort to restore confidence in U.S. leadership.

To do this, the administration must publicly re-examine some aspects of its Middle East policy, restate some of its fundamental commitments and intensively engage public opinion on all sides of the Middle East equation.

First, the United States can help end current hostilities and stem the possibility of that violence spilling over into a broader regional war. Instead of merely relying on Israelis and Palestinians to act, the United States could address some root causes of the current dilemma.

Palestinians need to have their hope restored. The United States can help provide that with a clear expression of support for the legitimate Palestinian right to a sovereign state, with a capital in Jerusalem, exercising full control over its own borders. A firm U.S. statement of opposition to Israeli settlements would also be helpful. It should be made clear to the Israelis that they can have settlements or peace, but not both.

At the same time, the United States needs to express its sorrow over the loss of Palestinian life. Israeli objections to international protection for Palestinians and Israel's withholding of tax revenues from the Palestinian Authority must be opposed. And the administration should make clear its grave concern with Israel's use of U.S.-supplied weapons in the violence.

Such steps would help restore some confidence in U.S. leadership and act as a restraint against further escalation or expansion of the conflict. They would also provide the Palestinian leadership with the ability to restore some hope and calm among their much-aggrieved people.

But the United States must do more.

For too long it has addressed the Arab world through the narrow confines of an Israeli-focused peace process. In some instances, improvements of bilateral relations were tied to a country's stance toward peace with Israel. This has created some resentment. It is vitally important, therefore, that the administration use this interregnum to restate its commitment to bilateral relations with individual Arab countries and regional blocs of Arab countries. These relationships are important in their own right, and steps should be taken to affirm that reality.

In the short time that remains, the president must make effective use of public diplomacy. His objectives should be to aggressively engage public opinion in the Arab world, to establish confidence in the U.S. commitment to justice and evenhandedness, to restore hope in the future of peace and to rebuild tattered U.S.-Arab relationships.

What is clear is that the future of the peace process and the U.S. role in the broader Arab world have become intertwined. The Clinton administration inherited a complex legacy from its predecessor. During the past eight years, it attempted to manage a deeply flawed peace process in the face of a hostile Congress that often encumbered U.S. diplomacy.

The administration resisted many of these efforts, but never publicly and vigorously challenged them. To his credit, however, the president took dramatic and independent steps to upgrade the U.S.-Palestinian relationship. He also subtly, but firmly, challenged the intransigence of the Likud government of then-Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

It is still too early to draw up a complete eight-year balance sheet. But if left unchecked, the current crisis in the peace process and the U.S.-Arab relationship do not provide for a promising legacy.

While freed from electoral concerns, the president's remaining two months do not allow for dramatic initiatives. But he must act aggressively if he is to pass on to his successor a more promising situation than the one that is unfolding in the Middle East.

James Zogby is the president of the Arab American Institute in Washington.

© 2000 by The Baltimore Sun

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