While Americans were counting votes in Florida, Russian President
Vladimir V. Putin dropped a proverbial bombshell, likely to receive
little notice given the postelection chaos. Putin, too, is conducting a
recount--of his nuclear weapons stockpile--and the numbers aren't adding
up. With Russia's military spending down to about $5 billion per year
(compared with U.S. military spending of approximately $300 billion per
year), and his economy in tatters, Putin knows that trying to maintain
nuclear parity with the U.S. is a losing proposition.
Today, 10 years after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia
retain tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, many of which,
astonishingly, remain on hair-trigger alert, ready to be launched on a
moment's notice. So last week, Putin went beyond previous calls for
Russia and the United States to reduce their nuclear arsenals from
current levels to 1,500 warheads per side. Without specifying a number,
he said reductions could go well below that number. The U.S. should seize
the moment.
The wrong conclusion to draw from Putin's offer is that the U.S.
should hang tough and simply wait until Russia drops out of the nuclear
weapon competition, clinging, perhaps, to a mere few hundred warheads.
First, even with a relatively small nuclear arsenal Russia could wreak
incalculable devastation. Indeed, a 1998 New England Journal of Medicine
study by Physicians for Social Responsibility reported that just 16
warheads fired at U.S. targets from a single Russian Delta-4 submarine
could cause as many as 6 million immediate deaths, and just as many, if
not more, injuries from radioactive fallout and other after-effects.
Under what circumstances would the U.S. possibly take such a risk?
Second, Putin's offer, even if made out of weakness, stands on its own
merits, and the U.S. should accept the challenge. Earlier this year, the
U.S., Russia and the more than 180 other nations that have signed the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty reaffirmed their obligation under the
treaty to abolish nuclear weapons, stating that elimination of nuclear
weapons was "an unequivocal undertaking." And, as recently as two weeks
ago at the United Nations, the U.S. voted in favor of a resolution that
calls for complete nuclear disarmament under international agreement.
While the very last steps in such a process are likely to be the most
difficult, the U.S. can quickly move the world in that direction by
reaching agreement with Russia to reduce nuclear arsenals to a few
hundred.
Third, the world's last, best hope of preventing the further spread of
nuclear weapons lies in rapid progress toward a global ban on nuclear
weapons. Ambassador Richard Butler, the Australian diplomat once charged
with overseeing U.N. inspections of Iraq's nuclear weapons program,
recently stated in Boston that all of his experience leads to the
conclusion that as long as any nation has nuclear weapons, others will
seek them. Jonathan Schell, writing recently in Foreign Affairs,
described the status quo this way: "The current American policy is to try
to stop proliferation while simultaneously continuing to hold on to its
own nuclear arsenal indefinitely."
Under an international ban on nuclear weapons there is, of course,
always the risk that a nation might cheat. However, the risks of defying
the international norm would be great for a such a state, far greater
than in a world where the international norm is a world divided between
nuclear "haves" and "have-nots." Indeed, in a world where the current
nuclear powers had agreed to abolish their nuclear arsenals, there would
be great unity of purpose in stopping would-be proliferators, and ample
conventional military power to enforce the international norm.
No treaty is perfect and all entail risks. A treaty banning nuclear
weapons would be no exception. But which is the greater risk: to live
indefinitely in a world where thousands of nuclear weapons are on
hair-trigger alert and more and more nations seek nuclear weapons, or a
world in which an outlaw nation may try to harbor a bomb in the basement?
Putin has put before the U.S. a bold proposal to significantly reduce
the risk of nuclear war. The next U.S. president should say "da." It's
time to ban the bomb.
John O. Pastore is secretary and Peter Zheutlin is associate program director of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, which was recipient of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize.
Copyright 2000 Los Angeles Times
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