Ralph Nader is running for president, and a fair number of progressive activists are excited by the prospect.

They should be.

If the personality-rich, issue-poor primary campaign featuring Al Gore, Bill Bradley, John McCain and George W. Bush has proven anything, it is that voters who care about economic and social justice have been left with few options this year.

Run right, a Nader candidacy could offer the American electorate a progressive alternative on trade policy, corporate welfare, radical democracy, criminal justice reform, the farm crisis, genetic modification of food and a host of other issues that have been abandoned by the front-running candidates of both major parties. With close to 100 percent name recognition and approval ratings that Gore and Bush would trade their bankrolls to achieve, Nader brings to a national campaign a 40-year record as a reformer that puts the modest claims of John McCain and Bill Bradley to shame.

If Nader wages a serious campaign, he will not be easily dismissed. But will Nader run a serious campaign?

His political track record is not encouraging. In 1992, Nader allowed his name to be floated as a presidential prospect, but the "campaign'' never amounted to much more than a spirited write-in effort in New Hampshire. The '96 effort was modestly more engaged. Nader allowed his name to be placed on 21 state ballots as the Green Party nominee, but he limited his spending to $5,000, failed to campaign in most regions and never built a national organization capable of returning a phone call. Despite the lack of effort, Nader drew close to 700,000 votes, helped the Greens win ballot status in a number of states and in Madison -- where grass-roots activists mounted something resembling a campaign -- beat Bob Dole in some precincts.

All in all, the Nader '96 campaign made for a nice political footnote. But it was too obscure an endeavor to merit consideration as fodder for a question on "Who Wants to Be a Millionaire.''

This year, Nader says things will be different. "I know I have to run a more serious campaign,'' Nader told me in a conversation a few days before his Presidents Day announcement of candidacy in Washington. There will be no $5,000 spending limit; in fact, the candidate and his aides talk of raising and spending $5 million. There will be sincere efforts to get his name and that of Green vice presidential candidate Winona LaDuke on the ballots of all 50 states. Nader says he will devote at least 100 days to "on-the-road'' campaigning, and that he will fight for a place in the fall debates.

Compared with the "strategies'' for the 1992 and 1996 campaigns, that sounds like a veritable political juggernaut.

But there are still no assurances that Nader will crack the big leagues. There remains about the Nader crusade the distinct whiff of the dreaded "educational campaign.'' While he is getting good advice from the likes of Jim Hightower, and while he talks of hiring able organizers of last fall's anti-WTO "Battle in Seattle,'' Nader is starting late in the game. And there is still too much talk about achieving ballot status for future campaigns and too little talk about what it will take to make a real imprint on this year's race.

Nader's instinctive realism and genuine personal modesty make it difficult for him to suggest that his campaign is much more than a political good deed -- an effort to help break up the two-party monopoly by lending his name to the Greens, an attempt to force some dialogue about trade issues in the post-Seattle era, and perhaps a turnout booster that would help Democrats retake the U.S. House.

Frankly, that's not enough of a rationale to get a Nader for President bid the sort of traction it will need to shake up the status quo. Indeed, it may not even be enough to avoid the sort of embarrassment that could do harm to Nader's reputation and to the causes he holds dear. T o have the impact that he would like to achieve, Nader must present himself to the American people as a credible contender for the presidency -- a man who could, if electoral lightning struck, occupy the Oval Office every bit as capably and convincingly as Al Gore or George W. Bush. Progressives who have followed Nader's long career might have no trouble envisioning him in the role, but the visioning process has got to go well beyond the Public Citizen mailing list.

Why does it matter that Nader present himself as a potential president?

Ask John McCain. At the start of his 2000 presidential quest, McCain barely registered in the polls, he had little money and few prospects for ever rivaling Bush's war chest, he refused to pander to key Republican constituency groups, and his decision to skip the Iowa caucuses was portrayed by pundits as a one-way ticket to political oblivion. Those same pundits suggested that McCain was just trying to make a point about campaign finance reform, or angling for a vice presidential nomination. Yet McCain always maintained that he was "in it to win it.'' To do anything less, he explained, would beg the question: "Why bother to work for a candidate who doesn't stand a chance?''

To be taken seriously, not merely by the pundits but by the voters, Nader will need to adopt a similar in-it-to-win-it approach. And he must construct a campaign that supports the claim. No, he doesn't need to be unrealistic; he shouldn't deny the ballot-access barriers that have been erected to block third-party candidacies in key states such as Texas and Illinois, and he should scream at the top of his lungs about the ridiculous limits on participation in the fall presidential debates and about the unfair advantages that attach to major party candidates in a political system that is sick with special interest money.

But Nader must not run a campaign of complaints, excuses and seventh grade civics lessons.

He cannot afford to give his critics -- and they will be many -- an excuse to toss him on the already tall scrap heap of this year's vanity candidacies. If Nader is slotted on the list of also-rans somewhere between Warren Beatty and Donald Trump, it will be next to impossible for him to elbow his way into the debates and even harder for him to run up the November vote totals that will open the way for a new politics.

Nader's opponents are already preparing to undermine his appeal to the very voters who should provide the core support for a reform candidacy.

Operating on the assumption that they will finish Bradley off by early March, the Gore campaign has a strategy for marginalizing any new challenges from the left. If, as the Gore camp hopes, their candidate finds himself in a November race with Bush, they will hit hard on the abortion issue, arguing that liberals who "waste'' a vote on Nader will seal the fate of Roe vs. Wade. Their task has been made easier by a Republican primary campaign that has forced both Bush and McCain to pander to their party's fringe, putting Gore in position to preach about the dangers of placing a Republican president and a Republican Senate in position to create an anti-choice Supreme Court.

Frankly, it is not a bad argument. While Clinton's court appointments have been miserably uninspired, his unspoken abortion litmus test has kept the high court from tipping. And his use of the presidential veto to block a ban on late-term abortions has stymied one of the prime initiatives of the anti-choice crusaders. Simply by pledging to carry on, Gore is well-positioned to win the votes of millions of voters for whom abortion is a decisive issue.

The Gore camp is prepared to make similar distinctions on affirmative action, school choice, environmental protection and other issues. Indeed, if Nader makes progress in the west, watch for the Clinton administration to launch well-timed environmental initiatives in order to soften the Green appeal.

On all of these issues, progressives will be able to point to chinks in the Clinton-Gore armor. What may surprise some Nader backers, however, will be the willingness of Gore supporters to acknowledge their candidate's imperfections. Democratic polls tell the Gore campaign that they do not have to present their candidate as a perfect liberal in order to win the votes of liberals and progressives who are justifiably concerned about living in a nation run by the unholy trinity of George W. Bush, Tom DeLay and Trent Lott.

A realistic Nader campaign has to be prepared to address the legitimate "what if?'' questions that will be asked by women, gays and lesbians, trade unionists, environmentalists and others who fear that the only thing worse than the Gingrich years might be the DeLay years.

A convincing case must be made that only a Nader campaign will bring the fundamental issues of democracy that powered the Seattle insurgency -- trade policy, corporate power, citizen control over decisions on workers' rights, the environment and food quality -- to the fore. From that case must come an argument that these are issues that will fill polling places with voters whose ballots will guarantee against another Republican Congress. That's not an incredible argument. Especially in California, New Mexico and Wisconsin, where Greens such as Mike Feinstein, Steven Schmidt and Ben Manski have proven their organizing and electioneering skills, a serious Nader campaign could well bring new voters to the polls -- indeed, his candidacy is arguably the only vehicle that might be capable of energizing young adults 18 to 24 and others who simply are not going to bother trying to distinguish between a corporate-sponsored Republican and a corporate-sponsored Democrat in the presidential race.

But Nader must make the case, aggressively and convincingly, that votes for him will not be wasted. He will never meet even the most modest goals of his candidacy if he is seen as a spoiler. And glib "What's to spoil?'' lines won't get him very far if women genuinely believe that the only hope for maintaining control over their bodies is a vote for Al Gore. Nor will Nader get far if his focus is so narrow that he is seen as merely competing with Pat Buchanan for the isolationist vote.

In the volatile presidential politics of 2000, a half-hearted Nader campaign may actually be worse than no campaign at all -- since a failed effort could be read as evidence that there is no base for the progressive agenda.

A serious Green Party campaign -- one that can successfully counter the "dangerous spoiler'' criticism -- requires that its candidate present himself as someone who is running for president, who wants to be president and who is conceivable as president. And it requires a campaign that is well enough funded and organized to make a convincing argument that a Nader candidacy will energize and expand the electorate in ways that should guarantee more votes for a progressive Congress.

To achieve anything, however, a Nader campaign must begin by taking itself seriously. That almost certainly requires more aggressive fund raising; the $5 million figure Nader's aides discuss is less than Gore and Bush will spend in individual primary states. Worse yet, it's barely a third of what Buchanan expects to spend on his Republican-turned-Reform campaign. Does this mean that Nader must start shaking down D.C. lobbyists, as "reformer'' McCain has done? Of course not; no lobbyist worth his Gucci loafers would give to the unsafe-at-any-speed candidate. But it does mean that Nader must recognize the power of the Internet as a grass-roots campaign tool (McCain has collected more than $3 million online since his New Hampshire victory) and of old-fashioned Jerry "1-800'' Brown appeals to small givers.

Where should Nader spend his money? He must have a top-to-bottom strategy that combines a media-savvy national campaign capable of deconstructing the "wasted vote'' critique with a rock solid grass-roots effort that can steer newly energized voters -- particularly young people -- to the polls. Nader is aware that only a campaign with tens of thousands of volunteers devoting millions of hours to the effort will be capable of offsetting the daunting television buys of his opponents. Such a campaign requires the sort of organizing that is difficult in any election, and the task will be made harder this year by the fact that the window of opportunity for presenting Nader as a viable alternative will open and shut quickly.

If the mandarins of the Democratic and Republican parties succeed in dispatching the "reform'' candidacies of Bradley and McCain, there will come a moment when, in the words of Arianna Huffington, "America will wake up and say: Is that all there is?''

If the Nader camp is prepared to exploit the nation's distaste for a stiff-as-a-board contest between a pair of political princes whose only real qualifications are their fund-raising skills, it could ignite the sort of political revolution that the McCain campaign has only hinted at. The potential is as limitless as the electorate's imagination; but this is, after all, an electorate that has not since 1856 dislodged a major party presidential candidate from the top tier.

To be anything more than a footnote to the previous footnotes, Nader must present himself as a bold and electable alternative to the major party candidates. He must run hard on the issues that will distinguish him from his opponents -- particularly reform of trade policy, opposition to corporate welfare and Pentagon excesses, support for real environmental and consumer protections, a radical remake of the criminal justice system, and a commitment to restore democracy with honest campaign finance and lobby law reforms. Above all, he must run the sort of campaign that will -- by its skill, energy and courage -- convince tens of millions of Americans that a ballot cast for Ralph Nader is not a protest, or a party-building exercise, but rather an affirmative vote for a man they believe could and should be their president.

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