Let us imagine for a moment that the UN is actually what it is supposed to be: a political union of nations of the world intended to resist abuses of power. These are nations which do not have a seat in the Security Council; nations which are continuously subjected to imperialisms of various kinds – either directly through military might, or through myriad forms of economic maneuvers; nations which are represented by elites who, in some (albeit limited) sense, see the UN as a forum in which to challenge power. While we are at it, let us also imagine that the UN represents us, the people who its brilliantly written Charter continuously invokes.

How would this imaginary UN now negotiate with Blair and Bush? What would its priorities be? As I posed this question to my students, I got two kinds of reactions. The first, a cynical one: why am I wasting their time? The second, an angry, passionate and inflamed one, with the following suggestions. The UN must begin:

• by specifying that it unequivocally condemns the waging of this war based on lies, and demands an apology for the same
  
• by mandating a full independent investigation of U.S actions in Fallujah, rather than another “UN investigation” similar to the one in Jenin
  
• by demanding a complete military withdrawal, but continued provision of the necessary resources for implementing the Brahimi plan
  
• by eliminating any possibility of participation of the occupying powers in the management of natural resources of Iraq, now or in the future
  
• by specifying a firm finalised payment schedule for the U.S.’s outstanding dues to the UN - similar to the repayment schedules for the structural adjustment loans, with associated conditionalities on the supply of oil;
  
• by specifying a firm and pre-negotiated schedule for payments of costs Iraq’s reconstruction by the occupying powers, again, with associated conditionalities on supply of oil;
  
• by establishing Iraqi tax laws which will severely limit repatriation of profits by foreign companies;

A bit on the moderate side I thought - nonetheless a good start. However, it still left three major problems unresolved.

The first concerns the impact this might on the possibility of a regime change in Washington. Isn’t there a real danger that if the UN does intervene, U.S. hostages are released and the troops allowed to return, that this might all be attributed to George Bush? That he may still be seen as the one to rid the world of Saddam? Who knows, he may even win the Nobel Peace Prize (as did Henry Kissinger, after all..)?

Second, if indeed the war was based on lies (and 9/11 was preventable!), how would we bring Bush and Blair to justice?

Third, and most imminent: what can one feasibly expect from the Brahimi plan. From the look of things, its contents are to be left as vague as possible for as long as possible, so that Washington does not withdraw its blessings. As reported on the BBC:

According to initial reports, he is suggesting a caretaker government led by a prime minister - the key figure - with a presidential council of three. He has also supported the idea of convening a national conference to choose a consultative assembly (Majlis ash-Shura) to serve alongside the government until elections can be held. The proposals are almost identical to those outlined last month by senior British officials dealing with Iraq. The difference is that Mr Brahimi is apparently proposing that the UN should actually appoint the caretaker government after consulting the United States and Iraqi leaders, and that the existing Governing Council created by the Americans should be formally dissolved. American and British officials have referred to the danger of prominent Iraqis on the Council competing for the big jobs or even trying to sabotage the exercise. Even if agreement is reached, it is questionable how much real power the new, supposedly sovereign government will have. The American administrator, Paul Bremer, will disappear, but the troops will stay and US commanders will control not only them but the soldiers of the new Iraqi army. Washington will be in charge of the bulk of the aid money, and has put laws in place to ensure that its economic and other interests are protected (BBC online; emphasis mine)”.

Pakistan’s Dawn also spoke along similar lines:

According to the revised plan announced in March, the Interim Governing Council (IGC) will cease to exist on June 30 and a new provisional government will run Iraq. The same day, Mr Paul Bremer, America's proconsul, will cease to be Iraq's supreme ruler. The irony of the power transfer plan is that governance will pass on from one group of America's handpicked men to another group of men doing Washington's bidding. As far as the people of Iraq are concerned, there will be no difference to the situation (Dawn, Editorial April 18, 2004).

After all, the UN’s history in Iraq is not altogether glorious and its relationship with the U.S. is at best, troubled. Can the UN, at this point in time, actually help Iraq overthrow an occupation - rather than mobilize resources from the rest of the world to assist in its legitimation? Perhaps. But only if “we” force it to become what it is supposed to be: a political forum for resisting abuses of power; only if “we” challenge, by whatever means possible, the terrible contradictions it has historically endorsed.

Ananya Mukherjee Reed is Associate Professor, Dept of Political Science at York University in Toronto, Canada. Her address is: ananya@yorku.ca

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