No story has appeared in The New York Times under Judith Miller's byline
since June 7, but she still works at the paper, according to Catherine Mathis,
vice president for corporate communications. But, based on other comments by
Mathis, it is obvious that the wagons are still circling the embattled star
reporter.
From postwar Iraq, Miller, the Times' expert on chemical and biological
weapons, wrote a series of exaggerated stories that led readers to believe that
unconventional weapons programs were being uncovered or weapons of mass
destruction were about to be found -- and that this supported the Bush administration's
claims about Saddam Hussein's development of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
Traveling as an "embed" with one of the teams making up the 75th Exploitation
Task Force, Miller crossed the line from that of reporter to that of member
of a team she referred to as "my unit." A professional scandal evolved, with
Miller's authority, and the credibility of the Times, severely undermined. Many
critics have pointed out the far superior (and more credible) work on this
subject by The Washington Post's Barton Gellman.
In the latest major development, Howard Kurtz on June 25 reported in The Washington Post: "Judith Miller played a highly unusual role in an Army unit
assigned to search for dangerous Iraqi weapons," according to U.S. military
officials, "prompting criticism that the unit was turned into a 'rogue operation.'"
Officers told Kurtz that Miller acted as a middleman between the Army unit
with which she was embedded and opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi
National Congress. She already had been quoted by Kurtz (on May 26) as having
privately asserted that Chalabi "provided most of the front page exclusives on
WMD" to the Times; and that her mobile exploration team was "using Chalabi's
[intelligence] network for its own WMD work."
The Times responded to Kurtz through Miller's leading public defender,
Assistant Managing Editor Andrew Rosenthal, who dismissed the notion that she
exercised influence over the unit as "an idiotic proposition. ... Judith Miller is a
reporter. She's not a member of the U.S. armed forces."
Responding to my written questions, Mathis, the Times spokeswoman, insisted
that Miller "did not depend, heavily or otherwise, on Mr. Chalabi as a source
while in Iraq." But there is unchallenged evidence from Miller's own hand that
she heavily depended on Chalabi as a source in the field. Moreover, Chalabi
himself on "The Charlie Rose Show" on June 10 bragged that he was her prime
source for WMD information.
If the Times had it to do over again, would it sanction the policy of
permitting senior reporters to be so thoroughly "embedded" with units in Iraq? Mathis
told me: "The embedding arrangements carried conditions that were consistent
for all news organizations. As far as we know, there was no difference between
arrangements [for the Post's Gellman] and Ms. Miller's arrangements with
regard to security review or other substantive aspects of the accreditation, but
the Post did not disclose Mr. Gellman's arrangements to its readers, so we
cannot be certain of this."
However, Gellman himself has disclosed the negotiated arrangements that
specifically kept him free of the "embed" review snare. He usually quoted military
sources in the field by name, while she relied overwhelmingly on anonymous
sources; and he frequently scooped her.
One of the most curious turns in this affair occurred after Miller returned
home from Iraq. With science reporter William Broad, she wrote a front-page
story on May 21 headlined, "U.S. Analysts Link Iraq Labs to Germ Arms." Quoting
anonymous officials they led with: "United States intelligence agencies have
concluded that two mysterious trailers were mobile units to produce germs for
weapons..."
Their story continued: "The intelligence analysts judgment would support some
of the evidence that Secretary of State Colin Powell presented on Feb. 5 to
the United Nations."
Over two weeks passed before the Times' reporters skeptically revisited the
WMD issue -- and reversed the emphasis and tone of their May 21 report. Did
Times' editors order the pair to re-consider? Executive Editor Howell Raines had
left but Joseph Lelyveld had barely assumed the helm. Whatever the
explanation, the Times and the tandem of Miller and Broad dramatically walked back the
cat.
In a front-page story on June 7 -- "Some Analysts Of Iraq Trailers Reject
Germ Use" -- they executed this awkward journalistic turn: "American and British
intelligence analysts with direct access to the evidence are disputing claims
that the mysterious trailers found in Iraq were for making deadly germs."
Their dissenting sources now said that "the mobile units were more likely intended
for other purposes and charged that the evaluation process had been damaged
by a rush to judgment."
Noting that the Bush administration had claimed that the two trailers found
in Iraq were evidence that Saddam had been hiding a program for biological
warfare, they averred: "Now, intelligence analysts ... are disclosing serious
doubts about the administration's conclusions in what appears to be a bitter
debate within the intelligence community." A senior analyst told them that the
white paper "was a rushed job and looks political."
An editor's note appeared on the inside page at the bottom, noting that
"Miller's agreement with the Pentagon for an 'embedded' assignment, allowed the
military to review her copy to prevent breaches of troop protection and security.
No changes were made in the review."
Important questions about this flip-flop, bearing on credibility, remain
unanswered. Just who was a source for what -- the government for Miller or Miller
for the government or all working together to maneuver backward on a winding
trail of discredited reporting? Were Times' editors trying to belatedly look at
the issue with a more skeptical eye?
Surrounding this whole saga there is the smell of compromised reporting,
using and even colluding with tainted Iraqi sources, while essentially
surrendering detached judgment to the Pentagon. The Times has a serious obligation to
scrutinize Miller's reporting, and editors' editing, on the threat that was
widely advertised as the primary reason for sending American and British soldiers
off to war.
© 2003 VNU eMedia Inc.
###