Phyllis Bennis was not called to testify at the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing on Iraq (July 31-August 1 2002). However, Senator Paul Wellstone
did introduce her written statement as part of the official record of the hearing.
Nelson Mandela was right when he said that attacking Iraq would be "a disaster."
A U.S. invasion of Iraq would risk the lives of U.S. military personnel and inevitably
kill thousands of Iraqi civilians; it is not surprising that many U.S. military
officers, including some within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are publicly opposed
to a new war against Iraq. Such an attack would violate international law and
the UN Charter, and isolate us from our friends and allies around the world. An
invasion would prevent the future return of UN arms inspectors, and will cost
billions of dollars urgently needed at home. And at the end of the day, an invasion
will not insure stability, let alone democracy, in Iraq or the rest of the volatile
Middle East region, and will put American civilians at greater risk of hatred
and perhaps terrorist attacks than they are today.
1) PURPORTED LINKS TO TERRORISM
It is now clear that (despite intensive investigative efforts) there is simply
no evidence of any Iraqi involvement in the terror attacks of September 11. The
most popular theory, of a Prague-based collaboration between one of the 9/11 terrorists
and an Iraqi official, has now collapsed. Just two weeks ago, the Prague Post
quoted the director general of the Czech foreign intelligence service UZSI (Office
of Foreign Relations and Information), Frantisek Bublan, denying the much-touted
meeting between Mohamed Atta, one of the 9/11 hijackers, and an Iraqi agent.
More significantly, the Iraqi regime's brutal treatment of its own population
has generally not extended to international terrorist attacks. The State Department's
own compilation of terrorist activity in its 2001 Patterns of Global Terrorism,
released May 2002, does not document a single serious act of international terrorism
by Iraq. Almost all references are either to political statements made or not
made or hosting virtually defunct militant organizations.
We are told that we must go to war preemptively against Iraq because Baghdad
might, some time in the future, succeed in crafting a dangerous weapon and might,
some time in the future, give that weapon to some unknown terrorist group --maybe
Osama bin Laden-- who might, some time in the future, use that weapon against
the U.S. The problem with this analysis, aside from the fact that preemptive strikes
are simply illegal under international law, is that it ignores the widely known
historic antagonism between Iraq and bin Laden. According to the New York Times,
"shortly after Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait in 1990, Osama bin Laden approached
Prince Sultan bin Abdelaziz al-Saud, the Saudi defense minister, with an unusual
proposition. … Arriving with maps and many diagrams, Mr. Bin Laden told Prince
Sultan that the kingdom could avoid the indignity of allowing an army of American
unbelievers to enter the kingdom to repel Iraq from Kuwait. He could lead the
fight himself, he said, at the head of a group of former mujahideen that he said
could number 100,000 men." Even if bin Laden's claim to be able to provide those
troops was clearly false, bin Laden's hostility towards the ruthlessly secular
Iraq remained evident. There is simply no evidence that that has changed.
Ironically, an attack on Iraq would increase the threat to U.S. citizens throughout
the Middle East and perhaps beyond, as another generation of young Iraqis come
to identify Americans only as the pilots of high-flying jet bombers and as troops
occupying their country. While today American citizens face no problems from ordinary
people in the streets of Baghdad or elsewhere in Iraq, as I documented during
my visit to Iraq with five Congressional staffers in August 1999, that situation
would likely change in the wake of a U.S. attack on Iraq. In other countries throughout
the Middle East, already palpable anger directed at U.S. threats would dramatically
escalate and would provide a new recruiting tool for extremist elements bent on
harm to U.S. interests or U.S. citizens. It would become far more risky for U.S.
citizens to travel abroad.
2) THE HUMAN TOLL
While estimates of casualties among U.S. servicepersonnel are not public, we
can be certain they will be much higher than in the current war in Afghanistan.
We do know, from Pentagon estimates of two years ago, the likely death toll among
Iraqi civilians: about 10,000 Iraqi civilians would be killed. And the destruction
of civilian infrastructure such as water, electrical and communications equipment,
would lead to tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of more civilian deaths, particularly
among children, the aged and others of the most vulnerable sectors. We can anticipate
that such targeted attacks would be justified by claims of "dual use." But if
we look back to the last U.S. war with Iraq, we know that the Pentagon planned
and carried out knowing and documenting the likely impact on civilians. In one
case, Pentagon planners anticipated that striking Iraq's civilian infrastructure
would cause " Increased incidence of diseases [that] will be attributable to degradation
of normal preventive medicine, waste disposal, water purification/ distribution,
electricity, and decreased ability to control disease outbreaks…." The Defense
Intelligence Agency document (from the Pentagon's Gulflink website), "Disease
Information -- Subject: Effects of Bombing on Disease Occurrence in Baghdad" is
dated 22 January 1991, just six days after the war began. It itemized the likely
outbreaks to include: "acute diarrhea" brought on by bacteria such as E. coli,
shigella, and salmonella, or by protozoa such as giardia, which will affect "particularly
children," or by rotavirus, which will also affect "particularly children." And
yet the bombing of the water treatment systems proceeded, and indeed, according
to UNICEF figures, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, "particularly children," died
from the effects of dirty water.
The most recent leaked military plan for invading Iraq, the so-called "inside-out"
plan based on a relatively small contingent of U.S. ground troops with heavy reliance
on air strikes, would focus first and primarily on Baghdad. The Iraqi capital
is described as being ringed with Saddam Hussein's crack troops and studded with
anti-aircraft batteries. What is never mentioned in the report is the inconvenient
fact that Baghdad is also a crowded city of four to five million people; a heavy
air bombardment would cause the equivalent human catastrophe of heavy air bombardment
of Los Angeles.
THE U.S. AND OUR ALLIES
There is no international support, at the governmental or public level, for
a U.S. attack on Iraq. Our closest allies throughout Europe, in Canada, and elsewhere,
have made clear their opposition to a military invasion. While they recognize
the Iraqi regime as a brutal, undemocratic regime, they do not support a unilateral
preemptive military assault as an appropriate response to that regime. Yes, it
is certain that if the U.S. announces it is indeed going to war, that most of
those governments would grudgingly follow along. When President Bush repeats his
mantra that "you are either with us or with the terrorists," there is not a government
around the world prepared to stand defiant. But a foreign policy based on international
coercion and our allies' fear of retaliation for noncompliance, is not a policy
that will protect Americans and our place in the world.
In the Middle East region, only Israel supports the U.S. build-up to war in
Iraq. The Arab states, including our closest allies, have made unequivocal their
opposition to an invasion of Iraq. Even Kuwait, once the target of Iraqi military
occupation and ostensibly the most vulnerable to Iraqi threats, has moved to normalize
its relations with Baghdad. The Arab League-sponsored rapprochement between Iraq
and Kuwait at the March 2002 Arab Summit is now underway, including such long-overdue
moves as the return of Kuwait's national archives. Iraq has now repaired its relations
with every Arab country. Turkey has refused to publicly announce its agreement
to allow use of its air bases, and Jordan and other Arab countries have made clear
their urgent plea for the U.S. to abjure a military attack on Iraq.
Again, it is certain that not a single government in the region would ultimately
stand against a U.S. demand for base rights, use of airspace or overflight rights,
or access to any other facilities. The question we must answer therefore is not
whether our allies will ultimately accede to our wishes, but just how a price
are we prepared to exact from our allies? Virtually every Arab government, especially
those most closely tied to the U.S. (Jordan and Egypt, perhaps even Saudi Arabia)
will face dramatically escalated popular opposition. The existing crisis of legitimacy
faced by these undemocratic, repressive, and non-representative regimes, monarchies
and president-for-life style democracies, will be seriously exacerbated by a U.S.
invasion of Iraq. Region-wide instability will certain result, and some of those
governments might even face the possibility of being overthrown.
THE U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
We claim to be a nation of laws. But too often we are prepared to put aside
the requirements of international law and the United Nations Charter to which
we hold other nations appropriately accountable.
When it comes to policy on Iraq, the U.S. has a history of sidelining the central
role that should be played by the United Nations. This increasingly unilateralist
trajectory is one of the main reasons for the growing international antagonism
towards the U.S. By imposing its will on the Security Council -- insisting on
the continuation of economic sanctions when virtually every other country wants
to lift them, announcing its intention to ignore the UN in deciding whether to
go to war against Iraq -- the U.S. isolates us from our allies, antagonizes our
friends, and sets our nation apart from the international systems of laws that
govern the rest of the world. This does not help, but rather undermines, our long-term
security interests.
International law does not allow for preemptive military strikes, except in
the case of preventing an immediate attack. We simply do not have the right --
no country does -- to launch a war against another country that has not attacked
us. If the Pentagon had been able to scramble a jet to take down the second plane
flying into the World Trade Center last September, that would be a legal use of
preemptive self defense. An attack on Iraq -- which does not have the capacity,
and has not for a decade or more shown any specific intention or plan or effort
to attack the U.S. -- violates international law and the UN Charter.
The Charter, in Article 51, outlines the terms under which a Member State of
the United Nations may use force in self-defense. That Article acknowledges a
nation's "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed
attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." [Emphasis
added.] The Charter does not allow military force to be used absent an armed attack
having occurred.
Some administration spokespeople are fond of a sound-bite that says "the UN
Charter is not a suicide pact." Others like to remind us that Iraq (and other
nations) routinely violate the Charter. Both statements are true. But the United
States has not been attacked by Iraq, and there is simply no evidence that Iraq
is anywhere close to being able to carry out such an attack. The U.S. is the strongest
international power -- in terms of global military reach, economic, cultural,
diplomatic and political power -- that has ever existed throughout history. If
the United States does not recognize the UN Charter and international law as the
foundation of global society, how can we expect others to do so?
5) HOW DO WE GET SERIOUS ABOUT MILITARY SANCTIONS?
Denying Iraq access to weapons is not sufficient, nor can it be maintained
as long as Iraq is surrounded by some of the most over-armed states in the world.
An immediate halt on all weapons shipments to all countries in the region would
be an important step towards containing military threats.
We should expand our application of military sanctions as defined in UN Resolution
687. Military sanctions against Iraq should be tightened -- by expanding them
to a system of regional military sanctions, thus lowering the volatility of this
already arms-glutted region. Article 14 of resolution 687 recognizes that the
disarmament of Iraq should be seen as a step towards "the goal of establishing
in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass destruction and all missiles
for their delivery and the objective of a global ban on chemical weapons."
WHAT ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS?
We are told we must attack Iraq preemptively so that it can never obtain nuclear
weapons. While we know from IAEA inspectors that Iraq's nuclear program was destroyed
by the end of 1998, we do not know what has developed since. We do know, however,
that Iraq does not have access to fissile material, without which any nuclear
program is a hollow shell. And we know where fissile material is. Protection of
all nuclear material, including reinstatement of the funding for protection of
Russian nuclear material, must be a continuing priority.
We should note that U.S. officials are threatening a war against Iraq, a country
known not to possess nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, the administration is continuing
appropriate negotiations with North Korea, which does have something much closer
to nuclear weapons capacity. Backed by IAEA inspections, the model of negotiations
and inspections is exactly what the U.S. should be proposing for Iraq.
INSPECTIONS
There has been no solid information regarding Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
since UNSCOM and IAEA arms inspectors left Iraq in December 1998 in advance of
the U.S. Desert Fox bombing operation. Prior to their leaving, the inspectors'
last report (November 1998) stated that although they had been stymied by Iraqi
non-compliance in carrying out some inspections, "the majority of the inspections
of facilities and sites under the ongoing monitoring system were carried out with
Iraq's cooperation." The IAEA report was unequivocal that Iraq no longer had a
viable nuclear program. The UNSCOM report was less definitive, but months earlier,
in March 1998, UNSCOM chief Richard Butler said that his team was satisfied there
was no longer any nuclear or long-range missile capability in Iraq, and that UNSCOM
was "very close" to completing the chemical and biological phases.
Since that time, there have been no verifiable reports regarding Iraq's WMD
programs. It is important to get inspectors back into Iraq, but U.S. threats have
made that virtually impossible by setting a "negative incentive" in place. If
Baghdad believes that a U.S. military strike as well as the maintaining of crippling
economic sanctions, will take place regardless of their compliance with UN resolutions
regarding inspections, they have no reason to implement their own obligations.
If the United States refuses to abide by the rule of international law, why are
we surprised when an embattled and tyrannical government does so?
Throughout the 1980s Baghdad received from the U.S. high-quality germ seed
stock for anthrax, botulism, E.coli, and a host of other deadly diseases. (The
Commerce Department's decisions to license those shipments, even after revelations
of Iraq's 1988 use of illegal chemical weapons, are documented in the 1994 hearings
of the Banking Sub-Committee.) It is certainly possible that scraps of Iraq's
earlier biological and chemical weapons programs remain in existence, but there
is no evidence Iraq has the ability or missile capacity to use them against the
U.S. or U.S. allies. The notion that the U.S. would go to war against Iraq because
of the existence of tiny amounts of biological material, insufficient for use
in missiles or other strategic weapons and which the U.S. itself provided during
the years of the U.S.-Iraq alliance in the 1980s, is simply unacceptable.
WHAT ABOUT THE OPPOSITION?
General Zinni has described an opposition-led attack on Iraq as turning the
country into a "Bay of Goats." Nothing has changed since that time. Almost none
of the exile-based opposition has a credible base inside the country. There is
no Iraqi equivalent to the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to serve as ground
troops to bolster a U.S. force. Some of the exile leaders closest to the U.S.
have been wanted by Interpol for crimes in Jordan and elsewhere. The claim that
they represent a democratic movement simply cannot be sustained.
WHAT HAPPENS AFTER "REGIME CHANGE"?
There is no democratic opposition ready to take over. Far more likely than
the creation of an indigenous, pop ularly-supported democratic Iraqi government,
would be the replacement of the current regime with one virtually indistinguishable
from it except for the man at the top. In February 2002 Newsweek magazine profiled
the five leaders said to be on Washington's short list of candidates to replace
Saddam Hussein. The Administration has not publicly issued such a list of its
own (though we should note they did not dispute the list), but it certainly typifies
the model the U.S. has in mind. All five of them were high-ranking officials within
the Iraqi military until the mid-1990s. All five have been linked to the use of
chemical weapons by the military; at least one, General al-Shammari, admits it.
Perhaps we should not be surprised by Washington's embrace of military leaders
potentially guilty of war crimes; General al-Shammari told Newsweek he assessed
the effect of his howitzer-fired chemical weapons by relying on "information from
American satellites."
But the legitimacy of going to war against a country to replace a brutal military
leader with another brutal military leader, knowingly promoting as leaders of
a "post-Saddam Iraq" a collection of generals who have apparently committed heinous
war crimes, must be challenged.
And whoever is installed in Baghdad by victorious U.S. troops, it is certain
that a long and likely bloody occupation would follow. The price would be high;
Iraqis know better than we do how their government has systematically denied them
civil and political rights. But they hold us responsible for stripping them of
economic and social rights -- the right to sufficient food, clean water, education,
medical care -- that together form the other side of the human rights equation.
Economic sanctions have devastated Iraqi society -- and among other effects, the
sanctions have made the U.S. responsible for the immiseration of most of the entire
Iraqi population. After twelve years, those in Washington who believe that Iraqis
accept the popular inside-the-Beltway mantra that "sanctions aren't responsible,
Saddam Hussein is responsible" for hunger and deprivation in Iraq, are engaged
in wishful thinking. The notion that everyone in Iraq will welcome as "liberators"
those whom most Iraqis hold responsible for 12 years of crippling sanctions is
simply naive. Basing a military strategy on such wishful speculation becomes very
dangerous -- in particular for U.S. troops themselves.
Phyllis Bennis is a Fellow of the Institute
for Policy Studies in Washington DC.
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