In the space of six weeks, President Bush has bombed Iraq, angered China, told Moscow to expect reduced aid, worried much of Europe with his insistent approach to national missile defence (NMD) and made clear that he does not intend to share cocktails with Kim Jong Il, North Korea’s leader, any time soon.

The diplomatic temperature at the last Cold War frontier on the Korean peninsula is dropping swiftly, straining relations between the United States and South Korea, hitherto one of the closest military alliances in the world.

President Kim, who flew to Washington yesterday to try to steer the new Administration towards a policy of engagement with North Korea, wants the sort of solid support he got from President Clinton for his efforts to end decades of hostility between the two Koreas. So far, there is little indication that he is going to get it. The Bush team, openly dubious of the prospects for rapid change in the North, is emphasising conventional disarmament to reduce tensions rather than more talks to curb Pyong-yang’s missile programme, while demanding more concrete gestures of reconciliation from the North.

During his confirmation hearings, General Colin Powell, the Secretary of State, flatly referred to the North Korean leader as a “dictator”.

The South Koreans are rattled: “We are really afraid that the change in Administration could undercut the peace process,” an adviser to Mr Kim said last week. The North Koreans are sabre-rattling again, condemning the “hardline” stance taken by the new Administration and threatening to abandon missile and nuclear agreements with the United States.

The new cold front is being propelled, to a great extent, by American ambitions for NMD. The threat of attack from North Korea is one of the central justifications cited by the Bush team for creating a missile shield.

While much of Mr Bush’s foreign policy is still at a formative stage, the President has signalled a tougher stance on a variety of fronts, most notably Iraq. NMD is emerging as the defining factor in Mr Bush’s international vision, despite opposition and anger in Beijing and Moscow and concern across much of Europe.

The American language used to describe NMD appears almost designed to goad Moscow and Beijing. While appearing to entertain the possibility of renegotiating the 1972 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty, it is dismissed as “ancient history”.

Although the Bush Administration is talking a tough game, it is by no means apparent that a clear line of policy has been established. The bombing of Iraq signalled a stiffening of American sinews, but it is unclear whether and how sanctions may be modified, as does the extent of support for Iraqi opposition groups. The United States may simply be playing bad cop to South Korea’s good cop.

Yet the issue of NMD is already pushing Seoul away and increasing tension with Pyongyang. In a remarkable break with Washington, President Kim issued a joint statement with President Putin of Russia last week describing the ABM treaty as “a cornerstone of strategic stability”.

During the last days of the Clinton Administration, Pyongyang showed a willingness to strike a deal ending its production and sales of long-range missiles. That willingness is swiftly evaporating.

The Bush Administration may believe that it is safer building a shield against North Korea’s missiles than getting rid of those missiles, but the more prudent course would surely be to work towards both ends.

China’s demand that Washington should “rein in its wild horse”, in reference to possible US sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan, comes as relations between Beijing and Washington grow more tense. This may be no more than a young administration, containing many Cold War veterans, flexing its muscles, but the lines of potential conflict are being laid down with a dangerous lack of subtlety.

Copyright 2001 Times Newspapers Ltd

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