WASHINGTON
- September 25 - The Council for a Livable World Education Fund today said while there are
readiness problems today in the military, the Pentagon is a major part of the problem.
A report released today by the Council Education Fund accused the Pentagon of contributing
to readiness problems by building highly expensive, hard-to-maintain weapons that provide
technologies far beyond what U.S. forces will encounter from the likes of Iraq, Iran or
North Korea.
The study pointed out that the complexity of today's weapons, with the services all too
often insisting on including the latest gee-whiz technology, also means that they are hard
to maintain. The report quoted an army general complaining that the Army's newest
tank is too fancy for soldiers to operate and too costly to fix. This tank costs
$140 per mile to operate versus $47 per mile for its predecessor, the M-60.
The study argued that the Air Force's F-22 fighter, the replacement for the F-15, is going
to be three times as costly to build, making it impossible to build sufficient numbers.
John Isaacs, who wrote the study, argued that: "handing more money to the Pentagon
without insisting on hard choices and reform would be like presenting billions to the
former Indonesian leaders without insisting on an end to corruption and cronyism."
The study pointed out other problems that prevent the Pentagon from getting on top of its
readiness problems, including poor accounting systems and too many high ranking officers.
Isaacs concluded: "Adding billions of dollars to the budget will not provide the
answer to any readniness problems -- especially if those funds are spent on weapons that
are expensive and hard to maintain."# # #
The report follows.
MILITARY READINESS SHORTFALLS:
PENTAGON MAJOR PART OF THE PROBLEM
The Pentagon is lobbying the President to add funds to this year's $271 billion budget and
to increase the fiscal 2000 budget to be presented in 1999. The Joint Chiefs of
Staff met with President Clinton on September 15 to present its case for additional funds,
and will testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 29.
There is increasing evidence of readiness problems -- as opposed to a readiness crisis --
in the military: shortages of spare parts, high-tech weapons that are hard to
maintain, difficulty in retaining pilots and other key personnel, and a declining quality
of life.
However, the Pentagon is part of the problem. It continues to pursue highly
expensive, hard-to-maintain aircraft that provide technologies far beyond what U.S. forces
will encounter from the likes of Iraq, Iran or North Korea. It builds weapons designed
during the Cold War to confront the Soviet threat. It continues to plan for two
major wars almost simultaneously, which the National Defense Panel report of December 1997
contends: "may have become a force-protection mechanism -- a means of justifying the
current force structure."
=====================================
Building weapons hard to maintain
=====================================
The complexity of today's weapons, which the services all too often insist on including
the latest gee-whiz technology, also means that they are hard to maintain.
George C. Wilson, in an August 21, 1998 LEGI-SLATE News Service story, notes the complaint
of the assistant division commander of the 1st Cavalry Division at Fort Hood, Texas:
"The Army's $5 million M1A2 tank often gets too hot to handle in hot weather, Brig.
Gen. Russel L. Honore complained in a recent speech, lamenting that many of today's
weapons are too fancy for ordinary soldiers to operate and too costly to fix . . . The
digitized tank "is more like a an F-16 jet fighter than it's like [the older] M1A1
tank, and this should sort of scare us.'"
Charles Spinney, Pentagon maverick, in an April 15 e-mail message, cited figures that the
Army's newest tank, the M-1A1, costs $140 per mile to operate versus $47 per mile for its
predecessor, the M-60.
=====================================
Building expensive weapons: F-22 tactical fighter
=====================================
The Air Force insists on the extremely expensive F-22 as a replacement for the F-15 plane
to deal with future threats. It is estimated that the 339 F-22's will cost more than
$60 billion to design and build. Yet the General Accounting Office has written that
the F-15E in our inventory will be the premier tactical aircraft in the world until at
least 2010. Each new F-22 will cost over $160 million, including research and
production costs; each F-15 only $50 million in current dollars.
Spinney, in an April 21, 1998 e-mail message, highlights the problem with the F-22:
"New weapons on the drawing board, like the F-22, are so expensive, we can not buy
enough of them to replace the existing weapons in our force structure in a timely
manner."
Moreover, the GAO has discovered a number of technical and testing shortcomings in the
program thus far, including the fact that the Air Force had completed 180 test-flight
hours rather than the planned 600 hours before signing a production contract, and
recommended a delay in production. Instead, the Air Force, which has planned to order to
first two production models, instead labeled them "test vehicles," a fudge that
a Defense News editorial (April 20-26, 1998) labeled "whitewash."
The F-22 is designed to replace the F-15, which replaced the F-4. Spinney, in an
April 11, 1998 e-mail message, pointed out that the that designers of the F-15 boasted
that it would cost much less to operate than the F-4. In fact, according to Spinney,
the F-15 actually cost twice as much to operate than the F-4. While the Air Force
claims that the F-22 will cost 40% less to operate than the F-15, there is ample room for
Spinney's skepticism.
=====================================
Building expensive weapons that don't perform as advertised: The C-17 cargo aircraft:
=====================================
The Air Force's highly-touted C-17 transport plane -- a 120 plane program costing more
than $40 billion -- was sold to a skeptical Congress for its ability to land on unimproved
airfields useful in the small wars of the future. Yet the Defense News of August
24-30, 1998 reveals that the plane fails this key test. The plane can land on dirt
runways, a prime rationale for the high costs when cheaper alternatives were available, if
the dirt runways were thoroughly compacted "as hard as concrete."
=====================================
Building expensive weapons that are not reliable: JSTARS
=====================================
The Pentagon's $11 billion Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), is all
too typical of new Pentagon weapons systems. Internal Pentagon reviews of the
program, reported in the July 27, 1998 Defense Week, suggest the program has reliability
problems, is over budget and late on its deliveries. This radar system built to
find, identify and track moving vehicles such as armored personnel carriers, tanks and
missile launchers, reports only a 65% mission reliability rate.
=====================================
Poor Pentagon accounting systems
=====================================
One reason the Pentagon has difficulty in keeping a lid on costs is its inability to get
its books straight. After many attempts at reform, the Pentagon accounting system
remains as confused as ever. Eleanor Hill, the Pentagon's inspector general, in her
April 16 testimony to Congress, claimed:
"I cannot yet report to you that the Department has successfully corrected the many
shortcomings in its accounting and financial systems. The financial statement data
for most DoD funds remain unreliable and essentially not in condition to audit."
Hill pointed out that the Pentagon still has 122 separate kinds of accounting systems
— although that number is down from 324 in 1991. According to an April 21, 1998 OpEd
by the Washington Post's James Glassman, there were more than $10 billion in "problem
disbursements" — that is, payments that can't be matched with contracts.
In addition, the Pentagon does not know the whereabouts of much of its $636 billion
in property, plant and equipment.
=====================================
Bloated brass
=====================================
Another cause of high military spending is the bloated level of high-ranking officers.
A June 1998 analysis produced by Newhouse News Service's David Wood pointed out
that during World War II, the Army fielded 14 generals for each division; today the Army
has 30 generals, more than twice as many, per division.
During World War II, the Navy had 470 admirals directing 61,000 warships, one admiral for
every 130 ships. Today, the Navy employs 22 admirals overseeing 354 ships.
Similarly, the Air Force had one general for every 244 airplanes in World War II compared
to one general for every 23 planes today.
If that wasn't enough, in 1998, the Pentagon asked for 54 new slots for generals and
admirals.
Conclusion: Adding billions of dollars to the budget will not provide the answer to
any readniness problems -- especially if those funds are spent on the wrong weapons that
are expensive and hard to maintain.
An April 10-16, 1998 Defense News editorial agreed that there is no need to pump more
money into the military budget. It pointed out:
"The Pentagon itself has wasteful spending to cut: for example, three competing
tactical fighter programs and a plethora of rival theater missile defense programs
springing up among the services . . . overturning this year's budget limitations . . .
would not solve the long-term Pentagon budget shortage."
|
